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PREFACE.
THE present work contains an exposition of Psychology
from a genetic point of view. A glance at the table of
contents will show that the order followed is that of the
successive stages of mental development. The earlier
stages have been copiously illustrated by reference to the
mental life of animals. The phases through which the
ideal construction of Self and the world has passed are
illustrated by reference to the mental condition of the
lower races of mankind.
The shortcoming which I have been most anxious to
avoid is sketchiness. I am convinced that the study of
Psychology is of no use to the student unless he is able to
live himself into psychological problems, so as to acquire
a real power of thinking for himself on psychological
topics. For this purpose cut and dried statements skim-
ming important questions are of no avail. An effective
introduction to Psychology must be clothed in living flesh
and blood, both for the student's own sake, and for the
sake of his success in examinations. Nothing is more
dreary and exasperating to the examiner than to read
papers by a candidate who has evidently crammed books
on Psychology, but who has never done a genuine bit of
psychological thinking. The most essential gift to be
imparted to the beginner is a real interest in the subject,
r.nd a real power of dealing with it even when familiar
formulas fail him. He ought to be able to do riders in
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Psychology as lie does riders in Euclid. It is true that
there are students who cannot advance so far from lack of
natural endowment. But even for them a treatment full
enough to be interesting and so rememberable is better
than arid and dogmatic statements which have to be read
over feverishly the day before an examination in order
that they may not slip out of the mind. Certainly the
teacher who needs Psychology for educational purposes
would do much better to leave the subject alone altogether
than to learn it in a merely external way.
My greatest debt here as elsewhere is to my teacher,
Professor James Ward. In treating the special sensa-
tions I have found the fourth volume of Professor Poster's
Text-Book of Physiology very useful. The special chapters
on Light-Sensation and Sound-Sensation are abbreviated
and adapted with modifications from Professor Ebbing-
haus' Grundziige der Psychologie. In general I have found
much help in the writings of James, Baldwin, Ladd,
Royee, and Lloyd Morgan. My proofs have been read by
Mr. J. Welton, Lecturer in Education in the Yorkshire
College, Victoria University, by Professor J. S. Mackenzie,
of the University College of South Wales, and by Mr.
M. C. W. Irvine, Mental and Moral Science Tutor in the
University Correspondence College. I have found their
services invaluable, and in particular I feel that the book
owes much to the suggestions of Mr. Welton. My brother,
Mr. J. F. Stout, has rendered me great assistance in pre-
paring for the press, and has compiled the Index.
GK F. STOUT.
May, 1899.
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2 PSYCHOLOGY. [CH. i.
of his own consciousness, and not of the cigar ; inasmuch
as he is thinking of the cigar, he does not think about
sensations.
On the other hand, the bystander who describes what the
man is doing, naturally uses psychological terms. He is
thinking, not only of the cigar, but the man in relation to
it. What he has to describe is just this relation in its
varying phases ; he is not concerned with either the
man or the cigar independently of each other. He thinks
of the cigar merely as an object to which the man's activity
is directed
;
and in consequence he thinks of the man as a
subject which becomes aware of the qualities of this object,
and adjusts his actions accordingly. But the man himself
takes no note of the fact that the cigar is an object, and
that he is a subject ; he could not take note of the one fact
without taking note of the other. But he is so wholly
absorbed in the object, that he does not stop to consider its
relation to himself as subject ; in other words, though it is
an object to him, he does not think of it as such. His
point of view is essentially the same with that of the
physical sciences. The point of view of the spectator
is essentially that of psychology. Psychology is con-
cerned with the relation of what is perceived, or in any way
thought of, to the percipient or thinker.
It thus appears that psychology must take into account
not only the subject but also the object. This is necessary
because subjective states and processes cannot be adequately
described without reference to their objects. It is im-
possible to name a thought without naming it as the
thought of something or other. But psychology is only
concerned with objects, if and so far as they are necessarily
implied in the existence of corresponding states and pro-
cesses in the subject. . The object with which it has. to
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deal is always an object as perceived or thought about by
some individual at some time. Of course, a:i object is
always actually much more than this; the sensible qualities
of the cigar belong to it both before and after the man has
seen, smelt, touched, and tasted it. Not only is this true as
a physical fact ; but it is also recognised by the subject
himself in perceiving or thinking about the object. The
man only perceives the odour of the cigar in actually smell-
ing it ; but he regards it as a permanent quality, existing
and persisting independently of his momentary perception.
The question never occurs to him unless he begins
to philosophise or psychologise. But if anybody should
tell him that the odour, flavour, texture, dampness, or
dryness of the cigar, only exist in the moment in which he
thinks of them or perceives them, he would at once
recognise, though perhaps dimly, that he had perceived
them or thought of them as being something different
from what they are now said to be. He had per-
ceived them or thought of them as having a permanence
and independence which is entirely irreconcilable with the
supposition that they exist only if and so far as he is
actually perceiving or thinking of them. But psychology
is mainly concerned with the perceiving or thinking itself,
and it therefore only takes account of the object so far as
it is actually perceived or thought of. It is concerned, in
the first instance, not with what is known, but with the
process of knowing, not with what is willed, but with the
process of willing, not with what is agreeable or disagree-
able, but with the process of being pleased or displeased.
Hence it takes no account of the object, except in so far
as somebody is supposed to be actually knowing it or
willing it, or being satisfied or dissatisfied with it. For the
physical sciences the object is something that is to become
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known; for psychology it is something which, is actually
in process of being known. Psychology is the science of the
processes whereby an individual becomes aware of a world of
objects and adjusts his actions accordingly.
2. Distinction from oilier Sciences. We have already
marked off psychology from all physical sciences. The
world of material facts and processes is the object of
physical science; its whole aim is to know this object
more completely and precisely. Psychology, on the con-
trary, does not directly and primarily aim at increasing
our knowledge of the material world or any part of it.
The cognitive process itself is an object of psychology.
But psychology cannot itself take the place or fulfil the
function of the cognitive process which it investigates. In
turning its attention upon the function of knowing, it
necessarily withdraws its attention from the special nature
of the objects known. It must indeed constantly recognise
the existence of these objects ; but this is only because
their existence is involved in the very conception of cogni-
tive process.
This line of demarcation separates not only psychology,
but also other departments of philosophy, from the
physical sciences. We have now to distinguish the
psychological point of view from that which characterises
logic, theory of knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics. These
are all concerned with knowledge, feeling, and will,
rather than with their objects. But their attitude is
different from that of psychology. Logic is a normative
science
;
it is pre-occupiod with the distinction between
truth and error. It has to show how thought must pro-
ceed in order to represent its object correctly. Psychology,
on the contrary, deals only with the laws that govern the
cognitive process as it actually takes place. It is no
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business of psychology to inquire liow it ought to take
place. The principles which it lays down account equally
for correct thinking and for incorrect thinking. It deals
with objects as they are actually presented to consciousness.
It has no concern with the nature of the object as it may
be apart from its actual presentation. It cannot, therefore,
inquire whether or not the actual presentation corresponds
to the true nature of the object as it exists in the real
world.
Theory of knowledge pushes the question of truth and
falsehood further back than logic. It inquires how truth
and falsehood are possible at all ; in other words, it
investigates how the private thought of an individual can
apprehend a reality independent of his own individual
existence, either truly or falsely ; how, for instance, can a
finite consciousness, composed of a series of fleeting states,
beginning to exist at a certain date and ending at a certain
date, connected with and dependent on a body which forms
only a small fragment of the infinite extension of the
material world, how can such a finite and particular
being contain in itself the thought of the universe as a
whole ? How can it becomo a spectator of all time and
all existence? Obviously, such questions are very far
removed from the province of psychology. The possibility
of thought is assumed by the psychologist. The relation
of subject and object is pre-supposed by him as a datum.
He simply investigates the actual laws which regulate the
processes through which the subject passes in knowing,
willing, feeling, in relation to the object.
Ontology may be regarded as an offshoot from theory of
knowledge. Theory of knowlege inquires how the finite
individual can be aware of the universe to which he belongs.
It appears to some philosophers that this question cannot bo
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answered unless we give an account of the nature of the
universe as well as of the individual. But an attempt to give
an account of the nature of the universe, as such, is ontology.
Evidently this is very far removed from psychology, which
has only to do with the natural history of subjective
processes as they occur in time.
What has been said of logic, theory of knowledge, and
ontology applies also to ethics. Ethics inquires how we
ought to will, not how we actually do will. It may push
its investigation further, and inquire how the distinction
between right willing and wrong willing is possible at all ;
and finally, it may attempt to answer this question by
giving an account of the nature of the universe as a whole.
Psychology, on the other hand, deals only with the
process of volition as it actually occurs, without reference
to its Tightness or wrongness, or to the ultimate conditions
which make rightness and wrongness possible.
Aesthetics is precisely analogous to ethics, except that
the distinction between beauty and ugliness is substituted
for that between right and wrong. Psychology has
nothing to do with this distinction, as such. It only
inquires how things actually come to appear beautiful or
ugly ; it has no concern with such questions as whether
what appears beautiful really is beautiful, or how the
distinction between beauty and ugliness is constituted.
Perhaps what appears beautiful therefore is beautiful ;
if this be so, then psychology solves the problems of
aesthetics
;
but it does so only by accident. It cannot
itself show that it has solved these problems. In order to
do so, it would have to prove that in aesthetics appearance
and reality coincide ; but whether this be true or false, it
is certainly beyond the province of psychology to discuss
the question.
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3. Consciousness. If we analyse suck processes as
those of looking, listening, smelling, or tasting, we find
that they involve two distinct and disparate groups of
facts. On the one hand, they are modes of conscious-
ness, specific kinds of experience ; on the other, they imply
occurrences taking place in the bodily organs of sense
which do not, as such, enter into the conscious experience
of the subject. For instance, a man in looking at an
object moves his eyeballs; this involves the existence and
operation of a muscular apparatus; but the operation of
this muscular apparatus is not, as such, a constituent of his
conscious state. It exists for the consciousness of the
psychologist or physiologist, who is analysing the visual
process ; but it does not form part of the act of looking at
an object so far as this is an experience of the subject who
sees the object. The subjective experience is conditioned
by, but it does not contain the muscular process. We
may express this by saying that though the muscular pro-
cess is a psychological fact, in the sense that it is a fact
that psychology must take account of, yet it is not a
psychical fact, viz., a fact of consciousness. The term
psychological is wider than psychical : all psychical facts are
psychological facts, but not all psychological facts are
psychical facts. A psychical fact must be in some way or
other an experience of the subject whose processes the
psychologist is investigating.
A psychical fact is a fact of consciousness ; but what is
consciousness ? Properly speaking, definition is impossible.
Everybody knows what consciousness is because everybody
is conscious. It is not, however, enough simply to say
this. Confusion would be sure to arise if we passed the
question by in this manner. The difficulty is that con-
sciousness has manifold modes and degrees ; and there is
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always a danger of restricting the term so as to make it
apply to certain modes and degrees and not to others,
Historically, the word has been used by certain writers for
the awareness which we have of ourselves and of our own
experiences, as states of the self. Indeed, consciousness
lias been called an inner sense, and has been regarded as
a special function by which we perceive the mind and its
processes ; just as sight and hearing are outer senses for
the perception of material facts. In opposition to all such
views, we must state definitely that consciousness includes
not only awareness of our own states, but these states
themselves, whether we have cognisance of them or not.
If a man is angry, that is a state of consciousness, even
though he does not know that he is angry. If he does
know that he is angry, that is another modification of con-
sciousness, and not the same.
Wherever there is not total unconsciousness in the sense
in which we attribute unconsciousness to a table or a log
of wood, consciousness in some mode or degree is present.
As Professor Baldwin says, it is "the common and
necessary form of all mental states ; ... it is the point of
division between mind and not-mind."* To quote Pro-
fessor Ladd : ' ' What we are when we are awake, as
contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound
and perfectly dreamless sleep, . . . that it is to be con-
scious. What we are less and less, as we sink gradually
down into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away :
and what we are more and more, as the noise of the crowd
outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap, or as
we come out of the midnight darkness of the typhoid-fever
crisis
"f that is consciousness. The becoming conscious
* Elements of Psychology, p 57
f Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 30.
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and the becoming unconscious are in all their phases and
gradations states of consciousness. They are not states of
unconsciousness, nor are they transition states between
consciousness and unconsciousness. There are no such
transition states. The very dimmest and vaguest feeling
accompanying the last stage of sinking into dreamless
sleep, or the first stage of gradual awakening, is already
consciousness. It mav become fuller consciousness, but it
cannot become consciousness, for it is that to begin with.
If, as some suppose, the dreamless sleep itself is
accompanied by some dim feeling, this dim feeling is dim
consciousness.
It should be noted that though there are psychological
facts which are not psychical, their psychological character
is derivative and subsidiary. The psychologist takes
account of them only if, and so far as, they are necessary
in the formulation and explanation of processes which are
in the proper sense psychical, which in some way enter
into consciousness.
CHAPTEE II.
THE DATA AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
1. Presented Objects as Data. Psychology has to discuss
mental processes, such as sensation, perception, attention,
volition, and the like. But except in the case of pure
sensation,* none of these processes can either exist or be
conceived apart from a presented object. We cannot attend,
perceive, or "will, without perceiving
1
, willing, or attending
to something. Now, the object which is presented to any
individual subject at any moment exists for it at that
moment only in virtue of subjective processes which are
then occurring, or which have occurred previously. The
development of an individual mind is at the same time the
development of the objective world as presented to that
individual mind. The limits of its possible development
are also the limits of the real world as a possible presenta-
tion to its consciousness. It follows from this that presented
objects are most essential and important data for psychology.
Being the effects of psychological causes, they form an
indispensable starting-point in investigating the nature of
these causes. In this respect psychologypresents an analogy
to other sciences of development, such as geology and
biology. Geology finds an actual formation of the earth's
crust: it finds a certain arrangement of strata, and it
inquires by what processes this arrangement has arisen.
* This exception will be explained in Book ii., Ch. 1.
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Similarly, psychology finds a certain world of objects pre-
sented, let us say, to an educated Englishman of the
nineteenth century, and it inquires how this world has
come to be presented. The geologist finds different strata
arranged according to the successive periods of their forma-
tion. Similarly, the psychologist finds different psycholo-
gical strata. The world of the young child, or the world
of the Australian aborigine, are comparatively primitive
formations
;
and the psychological problem is to discover
how the transition has been made from these earlier stages
to the later stages with which civilised adults are now
familiar. Sometimes the arrangement of geological strata
is disturbed by volcanic conditions ; similar upheavals also
take place in the case of mind, in the various forms of
insanity.
Let us take a single example of a presented object as a
psychological datum. A man looks into a stereoscope, and
he is asked what he sees. He replies that he sees a
cathedral, looking solid in the same manner as an actual
cathedral would look solid. He may go on to describe
the object in detail, and he need not at any point in
his description use psychological terms. He will speak,
not of perceptions, feelings, and sensations, but of the spire,
the roof, the windows, etc. Now spire, roof, and windows,
whether of an actual church, or of one seen through a
stereoscope, are not subjective processes ; nevertheless,
solid figure as seen through a stereoscope is a most im-
portant datum for the psychological theory of the processes
by which we perceive the third dimension of space. The
appearance of solidity is produced, not by a solid thing, but
by two flat surfaces on which are drawn representations of
the cathedral or other object as seen from different
points of view ; we know, therefore that the perception
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of a solid object depends on processes which do not
involve as their necessary condition the operation on
the organ of vision of that solid object itself. We
find by a process of exclusion that the only essential
conditions which can be operative in producing the distinc-
tive stereoscopic effect are certain peculiar experiences
connected with the use of the two eyes. These experiences
are not of course part of the object; they only become
known through the psychological inquiry which attempts
to account for the presentation of the object. The special
importance of this case arises from the presentation of the
object taking place under experimental conditions which
can be precisely analysed.
But the general method is by no means confined to
experimental cases. "Since the whole world, as it
exists for an individual consciousness, whether from a
practical, theoretical, or aesthetic point of view, has come
so to exist through piior mental process, it may be said
that there is no objective fact which is not capable of being
utilised by the psychologist. From this point of view we
may say, with Dr. Ward, that * the whole choir of heaven




jBritannwa, 9th ed., vol. xx., p. 38). So too, are all works
of imagination, e.g., the Iliad or Hamlet or Grimm's Fairy
Tales, and all rules of conduct, e.g., Roman law, the Brah-
man ritual, the four books of Confucius and Mencius. We
must, however, carefully note that mere examination of
mental products is valueless for psychology, except in so
far as it helps us to trace mental process. This purpose
is best served when we can arrange the products as parts
of a historical series, in which each may be treated as the
goal of preceding, and the starting-point of succeeding,
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development. Thus we may profitably compare the
views of the world as it presented itself to Homer,
to Socrates, and to Darwin respectively. Hence the
great importance of philology and anthropology to the
science of mind. The products of thought are em-
bodied in language, so that the comparison of the
vocabulary and of the syntactic structure of different
languages is a means of comparing different stages of
mental evolution. The comparative study of the religious
and other beliefs of primitive races has the same kind of
psychological value, and the same holds good as regards
their technical and artistic productions. Again, apart from
any reference to historical order, we may compare the same
object as it is presented to different minds, or to the same
mind under different conditions. This course yields im-
portant results, when we can assign definite circumstances
on which the variation depends. Thus, by comparing
space as it exists for persons possessed both of sight and
touch, with space as it exists for the blind, we may obtain
valuable data for determining the part played by visual
experience in the development of this perception. A flood
of light is thrown on the conditions of mental development
in general by examination of the cases of such abnormal
individuals as Laura Bridgman or Helen Keller.* Under
the same head come the data supplied by mental pathology,
including cases of aphasia, psychic blindness, and so forth."f
It should be borne in mind that a presented object as a
datum of psychology need have no actual existence in the
* Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller were deprived almost from birth
of the senses of sight and hearing ; and yet both reached a high degree of
.mental development. For Laura Bridgman see Stanley Hall's article in
Mind, O.S. iv., p. 149. For Helen Keller see Mind, O.S. xiii., p. 314,
adv., p. 305, and N.S. i., p. 574, ii., p. 280.
f Analytic Psychology, vol. i., pp. 9-11.
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real world. The solid figure seen in the stereoscope is not
actually present ; but it is none the less perceived, and that
is all with which psychology has any concern. Its real
presence or absence is a matter of physical fact, not of
psychical fact. Its absence is important for psychology
only because it involves the absence of certain conditions
which might otherwise be supposed to be essential to the
presentation of solidity.
2. Introspection. To introspect is to attend to the
workings of one's own mind. When instead of asking
what we perceive or will, we inquire how we perceive or
will, or how we come to perceive or will, the answer, so far
as it can be obtained by direct observation, depends on
introspection. Thus, to take once more the case of the
stereoscope. Because the solid object is not physically
present, someone may say that its presence is merely
inferred. From a purely logical point of view, this may
be true. If a man, deceived by the stereoscopic appearance,
were called upon to define his reasons for believing the
solid object to be physically present, he would no doubt
say that it looks solid, just as if it were really so. He
would then be assigning a peculiar visible appearance as
a reason for assuming a physical fact. But if it is
meant that the actual visible presentation of solidity is
itself an inference, appeal must be made to introspection.
Inferring is a mental process with which we are familiar.
In it we proceed to a conclusion, which is mentally
distinguished or distinguishable from its premises. But
in the stereoscopic illusion there is no distinguishing
between premises and conclusion, or transition between
them. On the evidence of introspection, therefore, we say
that inference as a psychological process is not present.
Take another example. A man shows us a pretty chess
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problem and its solution. Neither his mental attitude nor
ours is introspective while he is telling us about the
problem. But suppose that he goes on to describe how he
came to invent the problem, or how he came to discover its
solution
;
he will then be describing the workings of his
own mind. He will speak of his disappointment and
perplexity, his renewed hopes, his despair when all possible
ways appeared futile. He will perhaps tell us how the
understanding of the whole problem flashed upon him
suddenly with the key-move, every element in it then
assuming its right place, so that his subsequent mental
activity became smooth and easy. All this is introspection.
Consider next an example from the sphere of practice.
A general gives an important order, or a responsible
statesman puts before the world a scheme of policy.
Neither the general's order nor the statesman's
scheme directly expresses psychical facts ; but if the
general begins to tell us how he was led to give the
order, he will, in all probability, describe the process of his
own consciousness. He may tell us that his mind for a
time oscillated between alternative lines of conduct ; now
one appearing better, and now the other. He may tell
us that the state of indecision, where there was need for
prompt action, became unbearable ; and that he suddenly
put an end to it by fixing on one definite decision, without
any real conviction that it was the best. Or again, he may
describe how the decision emerged gradually out of his
previous hesitation, so that he awoke one morning with a
clear conviction that a certain course was the right one.
Much has been written about the difficulty and untrust-
worthiness of introspection. It is often urged that
ps}
T
chology, in so far as it rests on an introspective basis,
must always be in an unsatisfactory condition. But it
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must be remembered that quite apart from any aid which
he may receive from physiology, the psychologist lias at
his command a vast mass of data which are not due to
introspection. This we have brought out in the preceding
section on presented objects as data for psychology. It is
conceivable that this class of data alone would serve as the
basis of hypotheses explanatory of the development of
mind. Thus we might have a kind of psychology without
introspection, and yet quite distinct from physiology.
What introspection does is to supply us with a direct
instead of a hypothetical knowledge of mental process.
It thus forms a source of psychological material which is
invaluable and unattainable by any other means. But the
ultimate test of psychological theories is their power to
explain how the world comes to exist for the individual
mind. The ultimate data of the science are therefore
objects as presented to the individual mind, in successive
phases, and under varying conditions of its development.
Turning now to the alleged obscurities, fallacies, and
difficulties of introspection, we may note at the outset that
these do not exist when the questions which it has to
answer are made sufficiently broad and simple. There is
no fallacy, obscurity, or ambiguity in the statement that
when I have toothache I dislike it very much, or that I
was afraid when I saw a white figure in a churchyard.
There is no fallacy or ambiguity in the statement that
feeling pleased is different from feeling displeased, or that
when we are fully convinced that an action is totally
impossible, we cannot voluntarily determine to perform it.
Facts of this kind can be observed with ease and certainty
by everyone. Now if introspection could only supply us
witli such simple and obvious data, it would none the less
be of essential value. It would supply us with the general
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terms in which to describe mental process. The more
precise determination of such process in detail might be
hypothetical, and dependent on other data as the ultimate
test of its correctness. To a large extent this is the case.
In this respect psychology is on a footing with other
sciences. If we ask for the actual observations of the
process of natural selection on which the Darwinian theory
is based, we find what appear very slender foundations
of fact for a very large superstructure. There are the
experiences of the breeder, and very little more. The real
data which support the weight of the theory consist in the
nature of the actual products which the process is assumed
to explain, the actual constitution of animal and vegetable
species in their higher and lower forms.
The deliverances of introspection are not, however, limited
to such simple and obvious issues as we have mentioned.
Like all other modes of observation, it is capable of being
immensely improved by systematic training and practice.
The plain man, as Dr. Sidgwick calls him, has, as a rule,
no permanent and absorbing interest in the workings of
his own mind. His attention is mainly engrossed by other
objects. Thus, the introspective attitude is unfamiliar to
him. This unfamiliarity is the chief reason why he seems so
helpless when called on to observe the finer details of his
own mental operations. Like a person passing from full
illumination into a dimly-lighted room, he can at first
discern little
;
but in time his power of discrimination
may increase. By repeating his observations again and
again, and comparing them with each other, he makes
gradual progress. The result of previous observation
becomes the basis of a new advance. This is of course in
no way peculiar to introspection. A man who is only
beginning to observe in a systematic way fine distinctions
Psych. 2
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between tastes, smells, and colours, shows at first tlie same
helplessness. Advance is made as the cumulative result
of a series of successive efforts of attention, each paving
the way for the next. It is indeed a commonplace that the
practised observer notices at once what the untrained fail
to see even when it is pointed out. But besides individual
practice there is yet another element in the training
1 of the
introspective psychologist. He derives immense help from
the work of his predecessors. They teacli him what to
look for, and how and where to look for it. Thus \vhat the
introspection of one generation has achieved becomes the
starting-point for fresli progress in the introspection of the
next. The advance that has actually been made in this
way is immense, as at once appears on comparing from
this point of view the work, let us say, of Aristotle,
with that of William James.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there are certain
drawbacks attaching to the introspective process which
cannot wholly be overcome even by sustained practice and
systematic training. The most important drawback is that
the mind in watching its own workings must necessarily
have its attention divided between two objects, on the one
hand, the mental operation itself which is to be observed,
and on the other, the object to which this mental operation
is directed. If I observe the process of seeing, I must
attend at once to what is seen, and to the seeing of it. If
I observe what takes place in attending, I must first
attend to something, and then to the process of attention.
Thus if the introspective effort is sustained and strenuous,
it is apt to destroy the very object which it is examining.
For by concentrating attention on the mental process, we
withdraw it from the object of that process, and so arrest
the process itself. Thus, introspection, when it is directly
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concerned with a mental operation that is in itself more
or less absorbing, can only proceed by taking a series
of transient side-glimpses. This difficulty is, however,
not so serious as it appears ; for, in the first place, retro-
spection is to a large extent free from it. By calling up a
process in memory immediately after it is over we are often
able to notice much that escaped us when it was actually
going on. In like manner the astronomer can call up in
memory the image of a star which has just passed
before his vision
;
and can then notice details which had
'escaped him at the moment of its actual appearance.
In the next place, we must bear in mind that it is not the
isolated observation which is of importance in introspective
psychology, but rather the accumulation of a vast number
of observations, each helping the others. Thus, what is
important is to acquire a general habit of alertness, a
perpetual readiness to attend to the workings of our own
minds whenever opportunity presents itself ; and it must
be noted that opportunities are constantly presenting
themselves
;
the subject-matter which we have to observe
is perpetually with us. This may be set down as a grand
advantage of introspection, compensating in a high degree
for its drawbacks. Finally, introspection, to be effective
for the advancement of science, must, like other modes
of observation, be carried on by a number of experts
in co-operation. Each must communicate to the rest his
own results, for confirmation or rejection. Thus, it is
an essential part of his business to state his results
in such a form that they can be tested by others.
He must be able to point out to others exactly where and
how to look for what he himself has observed. This is
most easy when the method of experiment, as distinguished
from mere observation, is followed, and constitutes one of
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the main advantages of that method. Of course, what is
true of one individual, A, may not hold good of another,
B
;
but B's inability to confirm A by his own experience
should deter A from setting down as true for all men, or
most men, what holds good only for some persons, possibly
only for himself.
3. Manifestations of Mental Process in Others. No one
can directly observe what is passing in the mind of another.
He can only interpret external signs on the analogy of his
own experience. These external signs always consist in
some kind of bodily action or attitude. Thus when a man
clenches his fist, stamps, etc., we infer that he is angry.
When a dog wags its tail, we infer that it is pleased. The
knowledge acquired in this way must be carefully distin-
guished from that which is obtained through inter-
communication by means of language. When a man tells
us that he is or was angry, he is not directly expressing
his anger, but his knowledge of his anger. He is conveying
to us the result of his own introspection. This source of
information is in no way peculiar to psychology. It does
not differ from any other communication of observed facts
by means of words. The peculiarly psychological inference
rests on signs which may or may not be noticed or understood
by the subject who displays them. On the other hand, com-
munication by means of language necessarily pre-supposes
that the person communicating the information is himself
aware of the meaning of the words which he uses. He
must first understand himself in order to make others
understand him. It may happen that the inference from
the direct expression of the mental state may contradict
the subject's own assertion about it. He may show most
unambiguous symptoms of anger, and at the same time
declare vehemently that he is not angry.
$3.] DATA AXD METHODS. 21
In the case of the lower animals and young children, it
is impossible, and in the case of savages it is difficult, to
obtain verbal descriptions of their own mental states and
processes. This is partly because they either do not use
language, or use a language inadequate for the purpose,
and partly because they are not introspective. Under such
conditions our only course is to rely on the interpretation
of the appropriate external manifestations of the processes
themselves. Interpretation becomes more difficult in
proportion to the difference between the mind of the
psychologist and the mind which he is investigating. The
interpretation must rest on some analogy between the two.
But if the analogy is only partial and accompanied by
great diversity, a constructive process is necessary. It is in
his own mind alone that the psychologist has the constituent
elements from which an interpretation can be framed.
"All depends on accurate resolution of his own complex
consciousness into its constituents, and on re
-compounding
these in such a way and in such proportions as to explain
the nature and order of the signs which indicate to him the
mental processes of others."
* For instancej he finds among
savages a wide-spread belief in the power of all kinds of
odds and ends to influence the fortunes of the person
possessing them. This is a prevailing tendency of savage
thought ; if the psychologist looks for analogies in his own
mental life, he will find them few and far between. But they
are not likely to be wholly absent. There are moments in
which he either has been influenced or has felt strongly
inclined to be influenced, by considerations in themselves
as meaningless as those on which the savage relies. The
fall of a picture, or the spilling of salt, or the presence
of thirteen at table, may make him uneasy in spite of
*
Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 15.
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reason. If lie has ever been carried away by the gambling
impulse, he must have been almost irresistibly prompted
to regard quite irrelevant details as having an essential
bearing on his winning or losing. In order to construct
the mental state of a savage, he must carefully observe
and analyse these transient and occasional mental attitudes
in which he approximates to savagery. He must then
attempt to represent a mind in which tendencies, that, in him,
are so overborne by other conditions as to be transient and
occasional, are unchecked by opposing forces, and for that
reason prominent and permanent. It sometimes happens
that a man is so destitute of a certain kind of mental
tendency himself, that he is unable to understand its
presence in others. Thus, Charles Lamb tells us that his
friend, George Dyer, could never be brought to say anything
in condemnation of the most atrocious crimes, except that
the criminal must have been very eccentric.
The besetting snare of the psychologist is the tendency
to assume that an act or attitude which in himself would
be the natural manifestation of a certain mental process
must, therefore, have the same meaning in the case of
another. The fallacy lies in taking this or that isolated
action apart from the totality of the conditions under
which it appears. It is particularly seductive when the
animal mind is the object of inquiry. The economy of a
beehive displays such adaptation of means to ends, as to
suggest strongly far-reaching prevision and political faculty
of a human kind in the bees. But it would be very rash
to trust this first impression. We must first consider all
the other actions of bees and similar insects ; we must also
examine in detail how the individuals concerned severally
perform the separate acts which in their combination'
constitute the orderly scheme of organization of bee society.
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We shall then find that the most essential modes of
behaviour, especially on the part of the queen-bee, are due
to congenital tendencies, which operate independently of
previous experience. We must further take into account
the physical organisation of the bees. Their nervous
system differs so widely and in such a manner from the
human, as to make us hesitate before ascribing to them so
very large a share of processes especially characteristic of
human beings. Finally, we find that the division of labour
which makes the bee community possible, is directly
determined by congenital differences of physical organi-
sation. The queen-bee, the worker, and the drone,
differ not only in their actual behaviour, but in their
bodily constitution. The bodily constitution is so pre-
arranged by nature as to be adapted for certain special
functions. Here all analogy with the political organisation
of human beings breaks down. This is a typical instance.
The lesson to be learnt from it is that in investigating
the mental conditions of persons or animals widely
removed in their general circumstances and conditions
from our own, we must assume an attitude of critical
suspense until we have taken into account everything
which can have a bearing on the problem.
This warning is the more important because human
language is especially constructed to describe the mental
states of human beings, and this means that it is especially
constructed so as to mislead us when we attempt to describe
the workings of minds that differ in any great degree from
the human. The very implications of the words we
are almost compelled to use in describing what we suppose
to go on in the mind of a dog or a cat surreptitiously
introduce interpretations wiiich may be quite false, and
often are so. It is, therefore, above all things necessary
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in these cases to criticise our language, avoiding popular
phraseology, and substituting technical terms with fixed
meanings carefully defined. A horse, having had a feed
at a certain place on one day, stops of his own accord at
that place on the second journey. People say that it
remembers being fed there before, and infers that it will
be fed there again. In all probability these words with
their human implications are quite misleading. Suppose
that the driver of the horse is a bibulous person, who takes
a drink as a matter of course whenever he comes to a
public-house on the road. In order to do this he need not go
through the process of remembering that he has had a
drink at a public-house before, or of inferring that he can
have a drink at a public-house again. He simply has a
bias to stop at a public-house whenever he comes to one.
Probably the horse's act implies just as little of remember-
ing or inferring.
4. Experiment and Observation. To experiment is to
observe under conditions which we have ourselves pre-
arranged. The pre-arrangement is intended to simplify
the issue that is to be decided, by excluding irrelevant
conditions. In this wide sense psychology has always been
to some extent experimental. What is especially modern
is the introduction of apparatus and of exact measurement,
such as are employed by the physical sciences. Ex-
periment may be used in connexion with any of the modes
of observation which we have described. It generally
involves more than one of them, and often all three. The
primary question may be, what kind of object will be pre-
sented under certain assignable conditions. A simple
illustration is afforded by the old Aristotelian experiment
of holding an object between the second finger and the
forefinger of the hand, not in their usual position, but with
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the second finger crossing backwards over the forefinger.
Under these circumstances, there arises a perception of
doubleness, so that we appear to be touching two distinct
objects instead of one. Here the question is, what object
do we perceive under the given conditions ? Is it single or
double ? We may also put a question to introspection
proper, and ask how far our mental attitude resembles
that which exists in ordinary cases in which two objects
are perceived by touch, e.g., when two opposite sides of the
same finger are touched. In my own case, for instance,
I find that when two opposite sides of the same finger are
touched, the appearance of doubleness is more definite and
unmistakable. With the crossed fingers there is a certain
sense of strangeness and hesitancy which is absent in the
ordinary perception of doubleness. Another case in which
the primary question relates to the presented object is that
of our stock example the stereoscope. Here the conditions
of perception are pre-arranged by means of a special
apparatus, and the question is, what, under these con-
ditions, is the nature of the object apprehended ? Here,
too, the introspective inquiry may be also raised, if we ask
whether our apprehension of the object is direct or due to
a process of inference. It is also possible to make experi-
ments in which the primary issue is introspective. Thus,
we may attempt to will something which we know to bo
impossible, in order to find out whether we can do so or not.
Or again, we may deliberately attempt to attend simul-
taneously to two disconnected objects, with the view of
discovering whether attention can be so divided.
Finally, we may experiment on the connexion between a
mental state and its external manifestation. In this way,
it is possible to discover many subtle signs and symptoms
of mental process which evade ordinary observation.
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For instance, variations in the circulation of the blood,
and in respiration, and in muscular power, accompanying
various phases of emotion, may be accurately measured
by physical apparatus. In principle, this kind of ex-
periment often occurs in ordinary life. Whenever we
say a thing or do a thing to a person, in order to see
how he will take it, we are performing a psychological
experiment.
It is clear that the experimental method does not disclose
any essentially new source of psychological data. It is
only observation under test conditions, deliberately pre-
arranged for the purpose of settling a definite question.
It is not quite accurate to define it merely as observation
under test conditions. For test conditions may arise in the
ordinary course of things, without any deliberate pre-
arrangement on our part. All pathological cases come
under this head. In such cases as those of Laura Bridgman
or Helen Keller we have an opportunity of observing,
under test conditions, what the sense of touch alone can
effect, in the absence of sight, hearing, smell, and taste.
But the test conditions are such as could not be pre-arranged
by the psychologist. He is not permitted to make people
blind and deaf from their birth in order to watch the
consequences.
The experimental method has often great advantages;
but it has also certain drawbacks. The very conditions
which we wish to investigate are often such as occur only
in the normal course of mental life, and are interfered with
by artificial arrangements. For instance, experiments on
the association of ideas labour under this defect. The
question which interests us is how the succession of ideas
is determined in ordinary thinking. But experiment
subjects the mind to conditions which are quite remote
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from those of the normal flow of thought. In experi-
ment, isolated words or other objects are successively
presented to a person, and he is called on to name the first
idea which each of them suggests to him. Thus, continuity
of interest, which is all-important in ordinary thinking, is
excluded. Another question in which the experimental
method is seriously defective is that relating to the mental
imagery accompanying the use of words. When we
deliberately select a word, and ask ourselves what imagery
it calls up in our minds, we are by the very process of our
inquiry interfering with the result. We are looking for
mental imagery, and we have no right to affirm that the
imagery which we find would be present if we had not
been looking for it. The only safe course in such a case
as this is to cultivate the habit of watchfulness, so that we
may frequently catch ourselves in the act of using words in
a natural manner in the ordinary course of thought. This
perpetual readiness to notice what is taking place in our
own minds, without deliberately resolving to do so, on this
or that special occasion, is at once a most difficult and a
most necessary equipment of the introspective psychologist.
The special function of the experimental method has
been well stated by one of its most enthusiastic advocates,
Professor Titchener. " An experiment is a trial, test, or
observation, carefully made under certain special con-
ditions : the object of the conditions being (1) to render
it possible for any one who will to repeat the test, in the
exact manner in which it was first performed, and (2) to
help the observer to rule out disturbing influences during
his observation, and so to get at the desired result in a pure
form. If we say precisely how we have worked, other
investigators can go through the same processes, and
judge whether our conclusions are right or wrong j and if
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we do the work in a lilting place, with, fitting instruments,
without hurry or interruption, guarding against any
influence which is foreign to the matter in hand, and





results, results which follow
directly from the conditions laid down by us, and are not
due to the operation of any unforeseen or unregulated
causes. Experiment thus secures accuracy of observation,
and the connection of every result with its own conditions ;
while it enables observers in all parts of the world to work
together upon one and the same psychological problem."*
5. Quantitative Methods. A science becomes more
exact in proportion as it deals with exactly measured
quantities. Of late years, a strenuous effort has been made
to measure the duration and intensity of psychical process.
What are called reaction-time experiments are intended to
measure the duration of simple mental operations. "It is





' that on the occurrence of a certain sensory
stimulusf (given by the experimenter) a certain movement
shall be made (by the reactor)."J The time elapsing
between the occurrence of the sensory stimulus and the
execution of the movement in response to it is accurately
measured. The responsive movement may follow at once
upon the becoming aware of the effect of the stimulus,
or "be restrained until certain connections have been
formed in consciousness. In the former case, we
speak of a simple, in the latter, of a compound, reaction."
The simple reaction has two forms, the muscular and
the sensory.
' ' In the muscular, the reactor is
* An Outline of Psychology, p 35
f Such as the sound of a falling body. A sensory stimulus is a stimulus
acting on an organ of sense such as the eye or the ear.
I Op. cit., p. 319. Ibid, p. 320.
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directed to hold his attention from the outset upon the
movement which is to be made in response to the
stimulus."* In the sensory,
" the reactor is directed to hold
his attention from the outset upon the sensory stimulus,
and to withhold the reaction movement until he has sensed
that stimulus."! One result of these experiments is that
the muscular reaction occurs in a distinctly shorter
time than the sensory. When the attention of the
reactor is fixed in preparation for a coming sensation, he
waits until he is distinctly aware of the presence of the
sensation before reacting. On the other hand, in the
muscular reaction, the reactor, being pre-occupied with
making ready for his own reaction, need not wait till he is
fully aware of the presence of the sensation. Hence he
becomes with practice able to react before he has any
distinct consciousness of it. The stimulus, as soon as it
begins to operate, produces simultaneously sensation and
reaction. The time taken by the simple reaction varies
according to the nature of the stimulus. The sensorial
reaction to light lasts about 270-thousandths of a second.
A thousandth of a second is symbolised by the Greek letter
a. The muscular reaction to light lasts 180<r. The
sensorial reaction to sound lasts 225 a, and the muscular
1200-. The sensorial reaction to pressure lasts 210<r and
the muscular llOo-.
Accuracy of measurement is secured by special apparatus.
An electric clock or chronoscope, as it is called, marks
thousandths of a second. The production of the stimulus
sets this clock going. The finger of the reactor all the
time rests lightly on the button. The movement he makes
by way of reaction consists in a slight pressure on this
button, which immediately stops the clock.
*
Op. cit., p. 325, f Ibid., p. 323,
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In the compound reaction, various complications are
introduced. The reactor may be called on to discrimi-
nate between two sensations, reacting only to one of
them. Thus he may be told "that he will be shown either
black or white, and that he is to react when he has cognised
the black as black or the white as white
;
but he does not
know which of the two brightness qualities to expect in
each particular experiment."* In this case, he knows that
either white or black is to be looked for. The conditions
may be further varied, so that he has no definite knowledge
of the alternatives which are to be submitted to him,
although he is expected to react on one of them, and one
only. "Thus he may be told that he will be shown a light
stimulus, and that he is to react when he has cognised this
stimulus as a particular brightness or a particular colour ;
but nothing more explicit is said."f
The measurement of the intensity of psychical states is
attended by peculiar difficulties, due to the intrinsic nature
of the quantity to be measured. The degree of loudness
of a sound cannot be broken up into fractional parts which
can be marked off from each other. We cannot say by
direct comparison of two sounds that one is half, or a
quarter, or a third, or twice as loud as the other. The two
sounds cannot be superposed so as to make the fainter
coincide with part of the louder, leaving a remainder
which can be regarded as the quantitative difference
between them. In this respect intensive differs from
extensive quantity. The difference between two exten-
sive quantities is itself an extensive quantity. The
difference between two lines, one a foot long and the other
ten inches long, is itself a line two inches long. But the
difference between the loudness of two sounds is not itself
*
Op, cit., p. 328. f Ibid., p. 329.
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a sound having a certain assignable loudness. "The
difference between two intensive quantities, in fact, differs
from each, as much as the difference between two horses
differs from a horse."*
Nevertheless, the attempt to measure intensive magnitude
is not so desperate as it appears. Clearly we cannot take
one intensive quantity as the unit of measurement of others ;
but we may take as unit of measurement the difference or
interval between two intensities. Suppose that we are
considering, instead of two sounds, two pairs of sounds.
Symbolise the one pair by A and 11, the other by a and /3.
We find that we are able to judge whether the difference
in loudness between A and B is or is not equal to the
difference in loudness between a and /3. Thus, if we have
a scale of increasing gradations of intensity, we may take
as our point of departure any given intensity in the scale.
We can then arrange other intensities in relation to this,
proceeding by intervals which we j udge to be equal. By
counting these equal intervals we can assign a numerical
value to any intensity in the scale. The unit which is of
most use is the least perceptible difference, viz. that differ-
ence between two intensities which makes it just possible
for us to be aware that there is a difference at all. All
least perceptible differences in the same class of intensities
are regarded as equal to each other, because they appear
equal when compared.
Instead of measuring psychical process, we may measure
its external manifestations or conditions, and we may also
measure the objects which are presented by means of it.
As an example of the first kind of procedure, we may refer
to the measurement of variations in the circulation of the
*B. Russell : "On the Relations of Number and Quantity," Mind, N. S.
Ti., p. 334.
32 PSYCHOLOGY. [CH. n.
blood, and in the action of the lungs, under varying phases
of emotion and pleasant or painful feeling. The measure-
ment of the presented object is of value when it can be
brought into definite relation with varying conditions of
presentation. The best example is supplied by recent
attempts to measure certain geometrical illusions of visual
perception. The following is a good illustration. Two
lines in reality parallel are each intersected by slanting
cross-lines, the cross-lines of the one being opposed
in direction to the cross-lines of the other. The parallel
lines are then not perceived as parallel, but as diverging
in the direction in which the cross-lines would meet
if produced, and converging in the opposite direction.
XXXX X X X X XXXX X \X X X X X \ \ X X X X X X X
XX XXX XX X XX X XXXXXX X X X XX XX X XXX
rig. i.
Now, to measure the amount of illusion, we have only
to substitute for parallel lines lines really convergent
in such a manner and degree that they appear parallel
under the same conditions. The degree of convergence
required for this purpose measures the amount of
the illusion. By this means it is possible to trace the
variations which take place in the amount of the illusion
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with variations in the conditions. It is found to vary
according to the number and obliquity of the cross-lines.
It exists in a fainter degree when the cross-lines merely
meet the parallels without intersecting, or when they
approach them without meeting. By establishing definite
quantitative values for these varying cases valuable data
are supplied for discovering the process on which the illu-
sion depends. Actual experiments of this kind of course
require a specially contrived apparatus. The lines may be
represented by moveable threads, which can be readily
adjusted at will so as to be parallel or to deviate from
parallelism in varying degrees, the deviation being accu-
rately measured by a scale. In this particular case, the
solution of the problem has not been definitely reached,
but there is no doubt that the quantitative method has far




1. Physiological Antecedents and Consequents of Mental
Process. It is an old saying that the body is the organ of
the mind, the instrument through which it woiks. This
account of the matter is evidently true so far as regards
the peripheral organs of sensation and motion. We cannot
see without eyes, or hear without ears ; we cannot move
without muscles. But without sensation and motion the
process of consciousness would be impossible. We can
give no satisfactory account of the mental life without
reference to the construction of the organs of sense and the
impressions they receive from external agencies, or without
reference to the mechanism of movement by which we act
on the external world and change our spatial relations to
surrounding objects. There is practically no difficulty in
determining the nature of the relation between body and
mind when we have in view on the bodily side only the
peripheral instruments of sensation and motion. For all
psychological purposes this must be regarded as a relation
of interaction. Impressions on eye or ear produce modifi-
cations of consciousness, and conscious volitions produce
muscular contractions. Serious difficulties arise only when
* This is not an easy subject. The student is recommended to do his
best to understand this chapter on the first reading, but should certainly
make a point of returning to it after having re.ad. the book through.
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\we push our inquiry further back, and examine the relation
of nervous process to conscious process. Muscular con-
.traction follows change in consciousness only when the
muscle is excited by an impulse which has its origin in a
disturbance of the grey matter of the nervous system.
.Similarly, impressions on the organs of sense produce
; sensations only when they set up an impulse which is
transmitted to the brain. In this process some parts of
the nervous system, may be regarded as intermediate links.
Consciousness is not immediately connected with the
occurrences which take place in them. These occurrences
are either antecedent conditions of the nervous changes
which are directly connected with consciousness, or con-
sequences ensuing from nervous change that is directly
connected with consciousness. They thus constitute inter-
mediate stages between change in consciousness and change
in the peripheral organs, and inversely. The nervous
mechanisms which fulfil this mediating function may be
Tegarded, like the muscles or the senses, as organs in the
.service of mental process. The relation is one of inter-
action. Conscious volition produces change in the nervous
:mechanism, and change in the nervous mechanism, set up
in the first instance by impressions on the organs of sense,
produces changes experienced in consciousness as sensa-
tions. But the case is essentially different for those
nervous processes which are connected with consciousness
immediately, without the intervention of any other material
occurrences. This unmediated connexion of neural and
conscious occurrences is found mainly, if not exclusively, in
the cerebral cortex, which is the highest part of the brain.
" Viewed broadly, the brain is a mass of white matter, with
nuclei of grey matter deeply imbedded in it, and with a
sheet of grey matter, .about one-fifth of a square
meter in
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area and between two and three mm. thick, covering the
folds, fissures, and convolutions of its surface."* This
overlying sheet of grey matter is the rind or cortex of the
brain, and is in immediate connexion with conscious pro-
cess. For our present purposes, we may without serious
inaccuracy regard all processes taking place in other parts
of the nervous system as connected with consciousness only
so far as they are causes or effects of processes in the
cortex. Before coming to the vital question of the relation
between cortical process and conscious process, it will be
convenient to give some account of those parts of the
nervous structure which lie beneath the cortex.f
2. Function of the Sub- Cortical Nervous Mechanism.
The portion of the nervous system which lies below the
cortex is partly contained within the cranium. This por-
tion consists of nuclei of grey matter imbedded in white
matter. The nuclei of grey matter constitute what are
called the sub-cortical centres. The white matter consists
of nerve-fibres, serving to conduct impulses between the
cortex and the sub-cortical centres, and between the sub-
cortical centres themselves. Running through the trunk
of the body, behind the viscera, there is another important
portion of the nervous system the spinal cord. At its
upper end it enters the cranium, and this portion of it
receives a separate name, and is called the medulla oblongata,
or simply, the bulb. Nerve-fibres connect the muscles
and the surface of the body with the spinal cord, and
strands of nerve-fibre pass upwards along the cord itself to
the sub-cortical centres.
* Dr. Waller, Human Physiology, p. 518.
f The student should make a point of reading the chapters on the
nervous system in some good Physiology. Lessons I. and XI. in Huxley's
Elementary Physiology (Macmillan & Co., price 4s. 6d.) , and Ch. IX. in
Davis's Elementary Physiology (Blackie's Science Text-Books, price 2s.),
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These sub-cortical portions of the nervous system
serve to convey and modify impulses passing between
peripheral organs and the cortex ; but they also discharge
functions which are independent of their connexion with
the cortex. They are organs of what is called reflex action.
Reflex actions are such as take place in a fixed and
uniform manner in response to an appropriate external
stimulus. Without the actual presence of the external
stimulus they do not occur, and whenever the external
stimulus operates they occur inevitably and invariably,
unless they are interfered with by the simultaneous opera-
tions of another external stimulus, or by processes going
on in the cortex. Their typical characteristics are best
seen when interference on the part of the cerebral cortex is
excluded, which may be effected by simply removing the
cerebral hemispheres from the brain of an animal. "We
may perhaps broadly describe the behaviour of a frog, from
which the cerebral hemispheres only have been removed,
by saying that such an animal, though exhibiting no
spontaneous movements, can, by the application of appro-
priate stimuli, be induced to perform all or nearly all the
movements which an entire frog is capable of executing.
It can be made to swim, to leap, and to crawl. Left to
itself, it assumes what may be called the natural posture of
a frog, with the fore limbs erect, and the hind limbs flexed,
so that the line of the body makes an angle with the
surface on which it is resting. When placed on its back,
it immediately regains this natural posture. When placed
will put him in possession of the most essential facts. If he wishes to go
more deeply into the matter, Dr. "Waller's Human Physiology (Longmans,
Green, & Co.), may be safely recommended. For the advanced student,
Parts III. and IY. of Dr. M. Foster's Text-Book of Physiology (Macmillan
& Co.) are necessary. What I have said in the text is the roughest
possible sketch, and can only serve, at most, as a reminder.
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on a board, it does not fall from the board when the latter
is tilted up so as to displace the animal's centre of gravity ;
it crawls up the board until it gains a new position in which
its centre of gravity is restored to its proper place. Its
movements are exactly those of an entire frog, except that
they need an external stimulus to call them forth. They
differ, moreover, fundamentally from those of an entire
frog in the following important feature : they inevitably
follow when the stimulus is applied ; they come to an end
when the stimulus ceases to act. By continually varying
the inclination of a board on which it is placed, the frog
may be made to continue crawling almost indefinitely ; but
directly the board is made to assume such a position that
the body of the frog is in equilibrium, the crawling ceases ;
and if the position be not disturbed the animal will remain
impassive and quiet for an almost indefinite time. When
thrown into water, the creature begins at once to swim
about in the most regular manner, and will continue to
swim until it is exhausted, if there be nothing present on
which it can come to rest. If a small piece of wood be
placed on the water the frog will, when it comes in contact
with the wood, crawl upon it, and so come to rest. If
disturbed from its natural posture, as by being placed on
its back, it immediately struggles to regain that posture ;
only by the application of continued force can it be kept
lying on its back. Such a frog, if its flanks be gently
stroked, will croak ; and the croaks follow so regularly and
surely upon the strokes that the animal may almost be
played upon like a musical, or at least an acoustic instru-
ment. Moreover, provided that the optic nerves and their
arrangements have not been injured by the operation, the
movements of the animal appear to be influenced by light ;
if it be urged to move in any particular direction, it seems
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in its progress to avoid obstacles, at least such, as cast a
strong shadow ; it turns its course to the right or left or
sometimes leaps over the obstacle. In fact, even to a
careful observer, the differences between such a frog and
an entire frog, which was simply very stupid or very inert,
would appear slight and unimportant except in this, that
the animal without its cerebral hemispheres is obedient to
every stimulus, and that each stimulus evokes an appro-
priate movement, whereas with the entire animal, it is im-
possible to predict whether any result at all, and if so what
result, will follow the application of this or that stimulus."*
The characteristic of reflex action which Professor Foster
here emphasises is its lack of spontaneity its thorough-
going dependence on the actual present operation of a
stimulus external to the nervous system. Experiments
of the kind he describes have been performed on birds and
rabbits as well as on frogs. The results are, broadly,
similar, except that in the case of birds there is some
appearance of spontaneity when the animal has had sufficient
time to recover from the shock of the operation. But this
spontaneity is too small in degree and too ambiguous in its
nature, to invalidate the general conclusion that the
function of the sub-cortical centres when working by them-
selves is almost wholly reflex. Closely connected with lack
of spontaneity there is another and equally important
characteristic of reflex action. It takes place invariably in
the same way without being modified in accordance with
the results of past actions. Whether it is accompanied by
any sort of experience or not, we may at least affirm that it
is characterised by the absence of the process of learning by
experience.
* Text-Boole of Physiology. By Dr. M. Foster. Sixth Edition. Part
in., "The Central Nervous System," pp. 1000, 1001.
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Lack of spontaneity, and lack of the power of learning
by experience, do not necessarily imply the absence of all
consciousness in the widest sense of the word. It would be
very rash, therefore, to affirm dogmatically that the frog
without its hemispheres is entirely devoid of any kind of
feeling. Whether it is so or not is a question which has
been much disputed, and we shall not here attempt to
decide it. But there is one point which emerges clearly
from the experiment : this is that the working of the
sub-cortical mechanism, together with whatever conscious-
ness may accompany it, is capable of taking place separately
from, and independently of, processes in the cortex. If this
happens when the hemispheres are removed, it may also
happen when they are present. In so far as the sub -cortical
centres operate independently of the cortex, any conscious-
ness which may accompany their action will be disconnected
from the consciousness which accompanies the action of
the cortex. But the consciousness which accompanies
intelligent action is associated with cortical process.
Now intelligent consciousness, capable of learning by
experience, constitutes, in all but the lowest grades of
animal life, the main stream of consciousness. Thus,
though the independent action of the sub-cortical centres
may not be wholly unconscious, whatever consciousness it
involves does not form part of the main current of mental
life in man and the higher animals. Only when process in
sub-cortical centres ceases to be separate and independent,
and brings into play in a marked manner the action of the
cortex, is it accompanied by conscious modifications which
form part of the conscious life of the individual as a whole.
This is borne out by human experience. In cases of
injury to the spinal cord, the functional connection between
lower and higher parts of the cord may be destroyed.
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If under these conditions the soles of the patient's feet
are tickled, they will be jerked away; but the man
himself is in no way aware of what takes place, except as
he might be aware of the movement of a foreign body. Quite
apart from pathological conditions of this sort, reflex actions
are constantly going on, which do not involve in any appreci-
able way the consciousness of the individual as a whole.
The pupil of the eye is constantly contracted and expanded
in accordance with varying degrees of illumination. In
eating, morsels of food are swallowed by reflex action. We
are constantly breathing in the same reflex way. These
and similar processes can and do go on while the con-
sciousness of the individual is pre-occupied with other
matters. On the other hand, there are certain reflex
actions, such as sneezing, coughing, and withdrawal of the
hand, when suddenly burned or scalded, which usually
involve consciousness. A sneeze, for instance, produced
by Cayenne pepper, can hardly take place unconsciously.
But whenever such actions are unmistakably accompanied
by consciousness, it is evident that the stimulus which
produces them excites in a conspicuous way the cortex
as wrell as the sub-cortical centres. Intelligent attention
is either brought to bear on the situation, or it is
disturbed and deranged by the violence of the shock.
When a pin is suddenly plunged into a man's leg, he
jumps, by reflex action. But at the same time, there
is a marked disturbance of his intelligent consciousness.
The train of thought, with which he may have been
pre-occupied at the moment, is broken off and his
whole mental attitude changed. The sensation which
introduces a sneeze has not the same violent disturbing
effect
;
but so far as it is conspicuously accompanied
by consciousness, it tends to attract attention and to
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produce intelligent adaptation to circumstances. The
man pulls out his handkerchief, or the like. When
the main stream of consciousness is very intently pre-
occupied, external stimulants which would otherwise
excite cortical process, fail to do so and merely produce
reflex action of which the individual is unconscious.
Thus, when we are much pre-occupied with some
absorbing object, we may cough or yawn without being
aware of it. From the facts we have stated, we may con-
clude that the cortex is pre-eminently, if not exclusively,
the seat of those processes which are immediately correlated
with individual consciousness.
Besides being a mechanism of reflex action, the sub-
cortical centres constitute an apparatus by means of
which the cortex produces movements of the organism.
The mechanism for the relatively simple constituents
of complex activities is contained in the sub-cortical
centres. The complex activities are produced by the
cortex playing upon the lower centres, so as to evoke the
simple constituent movements in a certain order, simul-
taneous and successive. It is, above all, the successive
co-ordination of movements which is due to the cortex.
Simultaneous co-ordination of a complex kind is involved
in many purely reflex actions.
From a biological point of view, the function of the
cortex is adaptation to irregularly varying conditions.
Reflex action will suffice to maintain the life of an animal
which has merely to perform simple actions in a uniform
way on the recurrence of uniform external conditions. But
where fluctuating adaptation to fluctuating conditions is
required, reflex action becomes inadequate, and often
actually harmful. Action must be varied in correspondence
with the results of previous action, so that it may not be
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repeated in circumstances nnder which it has proved in-
jurious. For this, intelligence, and the nervous organization
correlated with intelligence are required. The burnt child
Bhuns the fire, and so saves itself from future burns ; but
the moth will dash again and .again into the candle-name,
though it is singed every time. The moth's action is reflex,
that of the child is intelligent.
3. Immediate Correlation of Conscious and Nervous
Process. In the cortex at least we have a direct relation
between nervous process and conscious process, and are so
brought face to face with the question of the ultimate
nature of their connexion. To some extent this is a question
of fact, and can be settled by special evidence. But there
is also a wide field for speculation, in which we cannot be
at all certain of our conclusions.
The facts show that there is not only a general correla-
tion between conscious process as a whole and cortical
process as a whole, but also that special parts of the
cortex are connected with special constituents of the mental
life. A generation ago the prevailing doctrine among
physiologists was opposed to this "localisation of function,"
as it is called. It was held that the cortex discharged each
of its separate functions as a whole, so that injury done to
it, or removal of part of its substance, did not involve the
loss or impairment of any special mental process rather
than any other. The only result was a general impair-
ment of mental power. Just as a man still breathes as
before when he has only one lung, except that he does so
less efficiently, so it was supposed that a part of the brain
might in the same manner be substituted for the whole.
On the other side, the phrenologists maintained a very
definite theory of localisation. But their doctrine was a
mass of psychological and physiological crudities. They
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mapped out the brain into organs corresponding- to
complex faculties, such as acquisitiveness, combative-
ness, ideality, orderliness, constructiveness, and the like.
Such a scheme is a psychological absurdity. Each of
these faculties involves the cooperation of a vast number
of fundamental processes, and the same processes enter in
varying combination into the constitution of the different
faculties. Thus the procedure of phrenology is like that
of a man who should assume a different board and a
different set of pieces for every game of chess, or a separate
alphabet for every word. Besides this there is a very
obvious anatomical objection against the supposed
evidence adduced by the phrenologist. This consisted in
the reading of character by the feeling of bumps ; but as
a matter of fact, the external conformation of the skull is
far from accurately corresponding to the development of
the brain.
But the most crushing refutation of phrenology is
supplied by what has been ascertained in recent years
about the modes in which cerebral functions actually are
localised. So far as the cortex has been mapped out on
good evidence, it is found that the division of function
among different parts corresponds, not to complex faculties,
but to the bodily organs of sensation and movement. One
portion of the cortex, anatomically connected with the eye,
is specially correlated with visual consciousness, in the way
of sensation or mental imagery. Another, anatomically
connected with the ear, has a similar relation to auditory
experience. Another is specially connected with touch-
sensations, and with movements of the limbs. The
evidence on which these conclusions are based is partly
gathered from experiments on animals, and partly from
pathological data. The pathological evidence is most
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important and unambiguous. Diseases affecting com-
munication of ideas by means of language have been
especially useful. Under the general name aphasia are
embraced many defects of varying kinds. The patient may
be simply unable to articulate words, although he can
understand them when he hears them. This is motor
aphasia, and it has been definitely connected with lesion of
a special part of the brain called the third frontal con-
volution.* Again, a man maybe able to articulate, and yet
lack the power to distinguish words as such when he hears
them. He hears them indeed as a confused stream of
sound, but they are not for him words. This is sensory,
or, more accurately, perceptual aphasia, and it is connected
with lesion of a special portion of the auditory area of the
cortex. Similarly, inability to recognise written words
for what they are is connected with lesion of a special
portion of the visual area. These indications may serve
to show what is meant by localisation! of cerebral
functions, and the methods by which it is determined.
But it must be remembered that our ignorance is still
incomparably greater than our knowledge. The student
must also be warned against supposing that localisation is
definite and precise in its nature. "The various activities
making up the business of the brain do not take place all
over its surface, as in a country without towns and villages,
where all kinds of industry go on in every hut or tent ;
nor are the different activities absolutely restricted to
certain spots, as if in walled towns. The brain cortex is
* Of the left hemisphere in right-handed persons, and of the right
hemisphere in left-handed persons.
t In localisation what is locally marked off is a certain portion of the
brain and the material processes which take place in it. The correspond-
ing conscious process is not, strictly speaking, localised. The nature of
its connexion with the localised brain-process remains to be discussed.
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not comparable with either of these extreme cases; its
territory must be recognised as possessing towns Avith
special industries, but towns with straggling and over-
lapping suburbs, and industries that are, indeed,
predominant each in a given centre, but not exclusive
of all other industries in that centre, nor excluded from
other centres in which other industries predominate."*
Data of the kind described afford us no efficient help
when we come to consider precisely how cortical process is
related to the corresponding conscious process. There are,
in the main, three alternative possibilities, interaction,
one-sided action, and simple concomitance. On the inter-
action hypothesis, a cerebral process may produce a state of
consciousness, just as a nervous process may produce a
muscular contraction, or as change in one part of the cortex
may produce change in another part; and, inversely, a
conscious process, such as a volition, may act on the cortex,
just as the cortex acts on sub-cortical centres, and these on
the muscles.
The main objection to this view is that the kind of
interaction pre-supposed is utterly incongruous with the
conception of causation on which the whole system of our
knowledge both of physical and psychical process is based.
It is the function of science to explain how events take
place, or, in other words, to make their occurrence
intelligible ; but this is only possible in so far as we can
discover such a connexion between cause and effect as will
enable us to understand how the effect follows from the
cause; or, in other words, we must exhibit cause and effect
as parts of one and the same continuous process. To
explain is to exhibit a fact as the resultant of its factors.
This is the ideal of science, and it is never completely
* Waller's Physiology, pp. 534-535.
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attained. But in so far as it is unattained, our knowledge
is felt to be incomplete.
Now when we come to the direct connexion between a
nervous process and a correlated conscious process, we find
a complete solution of continuity. The two processes have
no common factor. Their connexion lies entirely outside
of our total knowledge of physical nature on the one hand,
and of conscious process on the other. The laws which
govern the change of position of bodies and of their com-
ponent atoms and molecules in space, evidently have
nothing to do with the relation between a material
occurrence and a conscious occurrence. No reason in the
world can be assigned why the change produced in the
grey pulpy substance of the cortex by light of a certain
wave-length should be accompanied by the sensation red,
and why that produced by light of a different wave-length
should be accompanied by the sensation green. It is
equally unintelligible that a state of volition should be
followed by a change in the substance of the cortex and so
mediately by the contraction of a muscle.
The same difficulty is felt from a practical as well as from
a theoretical point of view. The physiologist, in his
endeavour to make organic processes intelligible, by con-
necting them with the general order of physical nature,
cannot but regard the presence of a factor which does not
enter into this order as a most serious stumbling-block,
which may upset all his calculations. A favourite way of
putting the objection from this point of view, is to say that
the intervention of conscious process in physiological pro-
cess would contradict the law of conservation of energy.
This is not strictly true, because the conservation of energy
is a law framed expressly for a material system ; when a
factor is introduced which is not material, though the law
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may not be applicable, it is not violated. Apart from
interfering conditions stones will fall to the earth ; this law
is not violated when I lift a stone in my hand. Similarly
no change in the material world, as such, produces loss or
gain 'of power to do work; the power being merely trans-
ferred from one portion of matter to another. Nevertheless,
it is quite conceivable that loss or gain of energy might
ensue from the operation of a factor w^hich does not belong
to the material world at all. But, though no contradiction
is involved in such a supposition, it is clear that the fresh
creation of material energy by conscious process would
introduce an incalculable and disturbing factor, seriously
interfering with the work of scientific discovery and
explanation. Nor is this objection limited to the law of
conservation of energy ; it applies to all the ultimate
principles on which our knowledge of the physical world is
based. So far as the conservation of energy is concerned,
it might be supposed that there is a transfer of energy
from material process to conscious process. Physical
energy might be transformed into intensity and complexity
of consciousness, and vice versa. But there is no sufficient
evidence of this, and all that we know points in the con-
trary direction. Intensive quantity is not measurable and
calculable in such a way as to make it comparable with
other forms of energy. The hypothesis of interaction, it
is clear, labours under very serious difficulties, and though
it cannot be pronounced impossible, yet it will be well to
avoid it, if we can find some alternative which is on the
whole more tolerable.
To the second alternative, one-sided action, either of
matter on mind, or of mind on matter, the theoretical
objections which have been brought against interaction
apply with equal force. It also involves the additional
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difficulty that all other action with which we are acquainted,
is interaction. One-sided action would therefore be con-
trary to our general experience of the order of nature.
Yet the hypothesis that matter causally determines con-
sciousness, without being itself determined by consciousness,
is one which has so much currency that it requires special
criticism. This doctrine of materialism, as it is called,
seems incapable of any precise statement; whatever
plausibility it possesses, arises from the use, or rather from
the misuse, of the word function. Digestion is a function
of the alimentary canal ; breathing is a function of the
lungs ; why cannot we simply affirm that consciousness is
a function of the brain? The objection is, that we do not
make two things the same by applying the same word to
them, when in their own nature they are radically and
essentially different. When we say that digestion is a
function of the stomach, we mean that digestion is the
stomach engaged in digesting. When we say that
breathing is a function of the lungs, we mean that
breathing is the lungs at work. In describing the process
of digestion, we, ipso facto, describe the stomach itself as
engaged in the process. In describing the process of
breathing, we, ipso facto, describe the lungs as filling
themselves with air by a certain movement, and expelling
it by an alternate movement. But if we describe the
brain at work, there is no need to mention consciousness at
all
;
and in naming and describing conscious processes,
there is no need to mention the brain. The function of
the brain as a physiological organ is to move the body ;
the contraction of muscles is the result of neural impulses ;
and in describing it we have to mention the nervous
system, including the cortex, as engaged in it. But the
process of consciousness cannot be analysed or resolved
Psych,
4
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into such, processes as chemical and physical changes in
nerve-cells. If consciousness is supposed to be produced by
the nervous process, the production is simply creation out of
nothing. An objection of an equally serious kind is that
the materialistic theory destroys all possibility of agency on
the part of conscious beings. According to it, the appear-
ance of causal connexion within the process of consciousness
itself is an illusion
;
no judgment was ever due to a train
of reasoning ; no volition was ever due to motives. The
sole cause in every case was a certain modification of the
nervous system. Similarly conscious process can, on this
view, never determine external action. No man ever
lifted a finger because he willed to do so. No tears were
ever the consequence of emotion. This question is some-
times confused by the supposition that materialism would
only interfere with what is called free-will; in truth, it
makes impossible any real operation of consciousness of
any kind whatever. The logical consequence is not only
that man as a conscious being never does anything freely,
but that no man ever does anything at all.
We now come to the third hypothesis. This differs both
from the theory of interaction and from materialism, inas-
much as it separates the statement of facts from theoretical
explanation. Its first problem is to state the facts without
implying direct interaction between nervous and conscious
change, and without implying that the one creates the
other. The formula which it uses for this purpose is that
of psycho-physical parallelism, which simply states that
modifications of consciousness emerge contemporaneously
with corresponding modifications of nervous process.
The nervous changes are supposed to be parts of
the total continuous process of the physical universe, so
that science will require none but material conditions to
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explain tliem. On the other hand, there is causal con-
nexion within the process of consciousness itself, as such.
This psychical causation runs parallel with the material,
but is not itself material. When a bodily action, such as
moving a finger, follows upon volition, it is the cortical
process concomitant with the volition which sets the
muscles in contraction and so produces the movement.
When an external impression is followed by a sensation,
what the external impression produces is a cortical process,
which is concomitant with but does not cause the sensation.
The external impressionmaybe regarded as if it were a cause
of the sensation, inasmuch as it. is a cause of the cortical
process correlated with the sensation. Similarly, the
volition may be regarded as if it were a cause of the move-
ment, inasmuch as it is correlated with the cortical process
which sets the appropriate muscles in contraction. This
account of the matter covers the facts as they are known
to us
;
but it is merely a way of formulating these facts ;
it is not an explanatory theory. On the contrary, if it is a
true formulation of the facts it is evident that these facts
do not contain their own explanation. If the concomitance
of cortical and conscious process is regarded as an ultimate
principle, it is simply a miracle. That the cortical process
which sets in motion the muscles moving the finger should
happen to be accompanied by the conscious volition to
move the finger without causal connexion between them,
is in itself utterly unintelligible. If we are to find an
explanation, we must frame some hypothesis to account
for psycho-physical parallelism, and in so doing we are
compelled to plunge into ontology.
4. Metaphysical Explanation of Psycho-Physical Parallel-
ism. If the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is true,
the reason of the connexion between conscious process and
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the correlated nervous process is not to be found in the
nervous and conscious processes themselves. Both must
be regarded as belonging to a more comprehensive system
of conditions
;
and it is within this system as a whole that
the reason of their connexion is to be sought. In parti-
cular, the individual consciousness, as we know it, must be
regarded as a fragment of a wider w
T
holo, by which its
origin and its changes are determined. As the brain
forms only a fragmentary portion of the total system of
material phenomena, so we must assume the stream of
individual consciousness to be in like manner part of an
immaterial system. We must further assume that this
immaterial system in its totality is related to the material
world in its totality as the individual consciousness is
related to nervous processes taking place in the cortex of
the brain. Within the immaterial system the individual
consciousness is a determining factor : within this system
it acts and is acted on. But this interaction is virtually
interaction between conscious process and the material
world : for the total immaterial system to which the
individual consciousness belongs is correlated with material
phenomena in general, as the individual consciousness is
correlated with nervous occurrences in the cortex. When
a volition sets the finger moving, the volition acts within
its own sphere of influence, and the corresponding cortical
process acts within its own sphere of influence.
We have yet to consider the relation of the immaterial
system as a whole to the material system as a whole. If
this relation be regarded as one of mere parallelism or
concomitance, the fundamental difficulty, so far from being
removed, is aggravated. To obtain light on this ultimate
question, we must take an entirely new point of departure.
We must consider the problem of the ultimate nature of
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matter. To do so here at length, is of course impossible ;
butwo may saythat the explanation of psycho-physical paral-
lelism is ultimately based on an idealistic view of material
phenomena. The sensible qualities of matter exist only
for minds which, have certain experiences in the way of
sensation. The extension, configuration, and other qualities
of material bodies all pre-suppose the existence of certain
modes of conscious experience. In like manner, the ulti-
mate constituents of matter as they are recognised by
scientific theories are abstract constructions of the human
mind. In general, all that makes matter material pre-
supposes some consciousness which takes cognisance of it.
Matter, as perceived and conceived by common sense and
science, is essentially a phenomenon ; and phenomenon
simply means appearance or presentation. There can be
no appearance or presentation apart from a subject to
which an object appears or is presented. Hence the nature
of matter as known is constituted by its being known, or at
least knowable. On the other hand, it is equally certain
that the existence of what is known to us as matter does not
depend on our knowledge of it. ^Ve do not make matter.
Only its appearance as material phenomenon is dependent
on us. Hence it follows that, so far as it exists independ-
ently of its presentation to a cognitive subject, it cannot
have material properties, such as extension, hardness,
colour, weight, and the like. It is an agency which
is an essential condition of material phenomena, but is not
itself a material phenomenon. Thus we are led by a quite
different line of investigation to the same conclusion which
was suggested by the relation of conscious process to
nervous process. The world of material phenomena pre-
supposes a system of immaterial agency. In this imma-
terial system the individual consciousness originates. To
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it, in some way, the sensational experiences are due which
form the basis of our knowledge of the material world. It
is on it the individual consciousness acts when it produces
changes in the material world. All this is possible because
the system of immaterial agency is identical with what we
know as matter, in so far as matter exists independently
of its possible presentation to a perceiving subject.
This theory has been purposely stated in a vague form.
There are varying views as to the nature of the system
of immaterial agency. Some say that it is will, others that
it is absolute thought, others that it is unknowable ; in any
case, the student should guard against the assumption that
the immaterial system is a sort of repetition of the
material system, involving the same sort of interactions,
and similar distinctions and relations of its parts. One
thing seems clear, that we are nearer the truth in
speaking of it as consciousness, than in speaking of it as
matter.
5. Conclusion. We have discussed three theories of
the immediate connexion between conscious and nervous
process. Of these, what we have described as materialism
must be rejected. The other two, interaction and
parallelism, have each advocates among the best psy-
chologists and metaphysicians of the present day. The
student is recommended to avoid hastily deciding between
them. The hypothesis of parallelism is that to which we
are ourselves inclined. It certainly covers the known
facts, and forms the most convenient working hypothesis.
It escapes the difficulties which attach to the theory of
interaction. But it must be admitted that it does so only
by somewhat bold speculation.
For psychological purposes the doctrine of psycho-
physical parallelism is, as we have said, a sufficiently good
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working hypothesis, if we take it merely as a mode of
formulating" facts. We shall accordingly assume its
validity in this work. In indicating the theoretical ex-
planation of psycho-physical parallelism we have passed
beyond the limits of psychology proper, and entered upon
ontological speculation. It has been thought advisable to
adopt this course for two reasons : first, because the
intelligent student always feels a keen interest in the
relation between body and mind, and cannot, as a rule, rest
satisfied with the statement of the simple concomitance of
nervous and mental processes. In the second place,
theories on the subject are in the air and are put
forward in a more or less dogmatic fashion by popular
writers. Hence a mere attempt to give a formula for
the facts is apt to be interpreted as a decision in favour of
one or other of these theories. To avoid being misunder-
stood it is necessary to be explicit. But the reader should
take note that we do not pretend to have given more than





ULTIMATE MODES OF BEING CONSCIOUS.
1. Introductory. Human consciousness is normally con-
cerned with some object or other. In waking life, we are
usually, and perhaps always, perceiving something or
thinking about something. Now there are three ways in
which our consciousness is related to its object. (1) We
have some kind of cognisance of the object ; (2) we feel
pleased or displeased with it, or otherwise emotionally
affected towards it
; (3) we experience a tendency in
some way to alter or transform it, either by bringing it
more fully into consciousness, or the reverse. Thus, we
may say that there are three ultimate modes of being
conscious of an object: knowing, feeling, and striving;
the cognitive attitude, the feeling attitude, and the conative
attitude. These three are normally and in all probability
always united in the same total state of consciousness.
They are not distinct states which succeed each other in
time
; they are partial constituents of one concrete whole.
2. Cognition. The word cognition is here used in a
very wide sense. It covers all modes and degrees of being
aware of or cognisant of an object. The word object must
56
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not be taken to mean merely material object, but whatever
we can in any way be aware of or cognisant of. The book
I see before me on the table is an object to me, inasmuch
as I perceive it. The immortality of the soul is also an
object to me whenever I think of it. Nothing is an object
to me, whenever I use the word nothing and attach a
meaning to it ; so is a Centaur when I imagine one. To
perceive or think at all is to perceive or think of something,
and this something, just because it is perceived or thought
of, is an object presented to consciousness.
The use of the words presented and presentation requires
to be explained. Whenever we perceive or think of an
object, the object must have its specific nature by which it
is distinguishable from other objects. Now the specific
nature of the object as perceived or thought of pre-
supposes a correspondingly specific modification of the
individual consciousness which perceives or thinks of it.
As the stream of consciousness successively takes cog-
nisance of various objects, it must itself pass through
correspondingly varying states. The distinctive nature of
the object is apprehended only in so far as the object is
qualified by the specific modifications of consciousness
which exist in the moment of cognition. This leads up to
the definition of the word presentation. Whatever con-
stituents of our total experience at any moment directly
determine the nature of the object as it is perceived or
thought of at that moment, belong to the cognitive side of
our nature, and are called presentations.
Suppose that what I perceive at a given moment is a
sensible quality, such as the colour red. Without having
the sensation red I could not perceive the sensible quality
red. The sensation of red is therefore a presentation of
the sensible quality. Here a difficulty will no doubt occur
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to the student. "Why do we distinguish between the
sensation and the sensible quality ? "Why do we not say
that the sensation is itself the object? There is one
obvious consideration which makes plain the need for this
distinction. I can perceive the sensible quality again and
again on different occasions, and identify it as the same.
But on each separate occasion I have a separate sensation.
The sensations are so many distinct events or occurrences
in the history of my individual experience. The sensible
quality is not an event in the history of my experience at
aH. It is an object which may be perceived and identified
as the same in many different phases of my life-history
widely separated in time. The same distinction becomes
still more obvious if we take other instances. If I perceive
a triangle, my perception is not triangular, it is not
made up of lines and angles. On the other hand, the
triangle as it appears to me when I see it is not an occur-
rence in the history of my individual consciousness ; it is a
geometrical figure, which is a very different thing. Again,
in a moment of time I may think of eternity : it is obvious
that the specific modifications of consciousness which exist
wThile I am thinking of eternity, and disappear after I have
ceased to think of it, are not themselves eternity or eternal.
Similarly, I may think of non-existence ; this is an actually
existing thought ; and the specific modes of consciousness
which give it its specific nature must actually exist. They
cannot therefore be identified writh the object of the thought,
which is non-existence.* The object itself can never be
identified with the present modifications of the individual
* It may nevertheless be true that in distinguishing between presenta-
tion and presented object we are in a sense counting the same thing over
twice. Doubtless they form an inseparable unity ; but for psychological
purposes the distinction must be made. If we are counting the same
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consciousness by which it is cognised. This holds true
even when we are thinking about modifications of our own
consciousness. The conscious experience in which we
think of another conscious experience is always at least
partially distinct from the conscious experience of which
we think. "Whenever we try to think of an immediate
experience of our own, as such, we can do so only by
investing it with attributes and relations which are not
themselves immediately experienced at the moment. For
example, I may think of a momentary appearance in con-
sciousness as an occurrence in my mental history, an
incident in my experience. But neither my experience, as
a whole, nor the positions and relations of any part within
that whole can be given as a transient phase of individual
consciousness. The momentary consciousness is only one
link in the series which constitutes my experience."*
Though cognitive consciousness and its object are not to
be identified, they are none the less intimately correlated.
Differences in the nature of the object as presented pre-
suppose correspondingly differentiated modifications of
consciousness. These special modes of subjective experience
which define and determine the direction of thought or per-
ception to this or that specialobject are presentations.
" We
may say, if we choose, that the object itself is presented,
but we must not say that it is a presentation ; and when
we say that it is presented, it is better to say that it is
presented to consciousness, than that it is presented in
consciousness. In the perception of a tree the reference
thing over twice, we are at least regarding it from two essentially different
points of view. In the one case we are regarding it as qualifying the
object of which the individual consciousness is cognisant ; in the other,
we are regarding it as qualifying the stream of individual consciousness
itself.
*
Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 44.
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to an object is circumscribed and directed by a plexus of
visual and other presentations. The object thought of is
thereby made determinate. It is a material thing and not
a mental occurrence, a tree and not a stone, an oak and not
an elm."*4
3. The Feeling-Attitude. Besides having cognisance of
an object, we are usually, if not always, pleased or dis-
pleased, satisfied or dissatisfied with it, and sometimes
partially the one and partially the other. This feeling-
attitude pre-supposes the existence of cognition. We can-
not feel pleased or displeased with a thing when we have no
cognisance of it. Even when we have no cognisance of it,
it may produce an agreeable or disagreeable feeling in us ;
but this causal relation is quite different from that between
subject and object. We may feel displeased with a glaring
light. Doubtless our displeasure is caused by vibrations
in the luminiferous ether; but if we know nothing of
these vibrations, we cannot say that they are the object of
our displeasuref, in the psychological meaning of the word
object. Therefore, from a psychological point of view, we
cannot say that we feel displeased with them.
Can our total consciousness at any moment be entirely
devoid of pleasure and displeasure ? This is a question
which we may be at first sight tempted to answer
decidedly in the affirmative. I may, it would seem,
perceive a stone, or a clod of earth, or a geometrical
diagram, without feeling either agreeably or disagreeably
affected towards these objects. But the apparent
plausibility of this answer disappears when we look
more closely into the case. Why do we notice these
*
Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p 47.
+ The term displeasure is ordinarily used to signify resentment. In this
work we make it signify simply the opposite of being pleased. The term
pain, as we shall see later, is ambiguous.
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objects at all ? Perhaps \ve do so merely with the view of
settling by experiment the question we are now discussing.
But if that be so, the issue of the experiment itself is more
or less satisfactory or unsatisfactory. We are in some
degree pleased that our own pre-conceived view is con-
firmed, or displeased because it is apparently upset. If
we have no pre-conceived view, we are pleased or dis-
pleased because we do or do riot succeed in obtaining
an answer to the question proposed. Thus, the affirma-
tive answer turns out under these special conditions
to be due to an oversight. We have not taken into
account our total consciousness in relation to the object,
but only a small and unimportant part of it. Now, suppose
that, instead of having a pre-existing motive for noticing
the object, we simply take cognisance of it because it
happens to pass before our eyes. Here it may be said
that we are purely neutral in regard to it. But there are
many tilings presented to our bodily vision of which we take
no cognisance. The more pre-occupied we are, the more
entirely they escape notice. If this or that object so
obtrudes itself when our minds are pre-engaged on some
other topic as to divert the current of our thoughts, it must
have some interest of a pleasant or unpleasant character.
If it does not divert the current of our thoughts, the
cognisance we take of it will be slight and transient, and
will form only a small and insignificant portion of our total
consciousness. Thus our total consciousness may involve
pleasant or painful interest, although this small portion of
it does not contribute in any appreciable degree to its
pleasantness or unpleasantness. Again, our minds may be
comparatively disengaged, so that they are free to attend
to surrounding things ; but it is the characteristic of these
idle moods that we are more or less amused or bored by
C2 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. I., en. I.
the trivial objects which obtrude themselves on our senses.
On the whole, the presumption appears to be that .our total
consciousness is never entirely neutral. The student must
here be warned against a common fallacy : we are apt to
suppose that we are only pleased or displeased, when we
expressly notice, at the time, that we are, or remember
afterwards that we have been, pleased or displeased. But in
fact we only notice or remember when the pleasantness or
or unpleasantness is specially conspicuous. There is a
customary level of agreeable or disagreeable feeling which
we are apt to treat as a neutral state. In like manner, we do
not notice that we are hot or cold, unless we feel more hot or
cold than usual. Similarly, what we call silence is not
absolute silence, but only a comparative absence of sound.
This is shown when we pass from what we call silence to a
still more complete absence of sound. The previous state
then ceases to appear to us as one of silence. As a matter of
fact, sound of some sort is never wholly absent from our
experience. The same is in all probability the case with
pleasure or displeasure. One or the other or both, are
always in some degree present, although we by no means
always notice their presence.
When we wish to say that pleasure or displeasure
belongs to this or that mental process, we say that
the process is pleasantly or unpleasantly toned. Feeling-
tone is a generic word for pleasure and pain. It is
less ambiguous than feeling alone, which not only
has many other applications in ordinary language, but
even in psychology is to some extent required for other
purposes. Hence, as a technical expression, we shall
henceforward speak of feeling-tone when the reference is
to pleasure-pain.
Are there other kinds of feeling-attitude besides
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pleasure and displeasure ? It would seem that there
are. It is difficult to bring emotions, such as anger and
fear, and sentiments, such as love and hate, completely
under any other head. Certainly, an emotion, like anger,
involves some kind of cognition ; but it cannot be said that
the specific experience of being angry directly qualifies the
nature of the presented obj ect ; in other words, this experience
is not a presentation. So, too, anger has feeling-tone, mostly
of an unpleasant kind. But its specific quality cannot be
resolved into pleasure or displeasure. Again, it involves
certain characteristic active tendencies
;
but there is in it a
peculiar and unanalysable mode of being conscious, which
cannot be resolved into these. We must, therefore, con-
clude that in the complex emotion of anger there is included
a specific feeling-attitude distinct from being pleased or
the reverse. The same may be said of the other emotions.
4. The Conative Attitude. The states designated by
such words as craving, longing, yearning, endeavour, effort,
desire, wish, and will, have one characteristic in common.
In all of them there is an inherent tendency to pass beyond
themselves and become something different. This tendency
is not only a fact but an experience ; and the peculiar mode
of being conscious, which constitutes the experience, is
called conation. The process of consciousness is a process
of incessant change ; the changes are partly due to the play
of external impressions, and to other conditions extraneous
to consciousness itself. But this is rarely, if ever, entirely
so. The process is in part self-determining. The successive
phases have, by their very nature, a tendency to pass into
other phases. The stream of consciousness has a current ;
and its course is determined not merely by external con-
ditions, but by its own drift at any moment. Considered
in relation to the presented object, conation is a tendency
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to alter it, or make some difference in it, to expel it from
consciousness, or to bring it more vividly and completely
before consciousness.
Mental activity also produces or tends to produce changes
in the body and in the external world. But we must care-
fully separate these changes from conation. They are
merely means by which it may work. The end to which it
is directed is always some change in consciousness itself.
If I will to blow a candle out, the mental activity does not
lie in the contraction of my muscles, nor yet in the effect
produced on the candle as a physical occurrence. It is the
resulting darkness, in so far as I am aware of it, which is
the end attained by my volition. In other words, it is a
change in the object, as presented, which I strive to attain in
willing to blow out the candle. It is not necessary that I
should have actual experience of the physical result. I
may make a will, leaving property to a certain person.
Here, what I am aiming at or endeavouring after is that
this person shall enjoy my property after I am dead. By
the nature of the case, I can have no direct experience of
the result. What satisfies me and so terminates the
volitional process is the "belief that my property wrill
actually come into the hands of the legatee. Before I
made the will, this was only a floating possibility. In
making the will, I transform it into a practical certainty.
It may happen that the end to which conation is directed
is, from the nature of the case, unattainable. Thus, I may
wish to recall or undo the past. This is a tendency which
cannot realise itself. But none the less it is a tendency as
much as if it could realise itself. Considered as a mode of
consciousness, it is just as much a conation as the desire
to blow out a candle standing before my eyes.
Conation may attain its end by merely mental process,
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without overt bodily action. In part or whole, it may bo
satisfied by fuller knowledge of its object; and this may
be brought about merely by a train of thought or observa-
tion, without altering the nature of the object as it actually
exists apart from its being presented to consciousness.
From this point of view we can bring under conation all
that is covered by the word attention. Attention is simply
conation in so far as it finds satisfaction in tho fuller
presentation of its object, without actual clianjo i:i tho
object. This may bo possible only in part. Thus, wo may
have a practical end in view, and we may, for tlio sake of
this end, attend to the conditions and means of its attain-
ment. I may wish to climb a rock, and I first observe it
carefully to determine the best mode of ascent. So far,
all I have gained is more complete knowlodgo. This is a
partial satisfaction of my original desire. It carries
me a stage nearer to my end ; but it does so only because
it makes further steps possible. On tho other hand, my
interest may be purely theoretical. I may simply desire
to know the geological structure of the rock. In this case,
mere observation will be sufficient. If it is necessary to
climb the rock, the climbing will be merely a means of
making observation possible, just as in the previous case
observation is merely a means of making climbing possible.
Sometimes it would appear as if attention were not directed
to the fuller presentation of an object, but merely to the
keeping of it unchanged before consciousness. "Perhaps
the closest approximation to this mental attitude is found
in the case of attention to a simple object of sense or
imagination, on account of the immediate pleasure it
yields."* Now we allow here that the end of attention
is not cognitive ; none the less, its end is in a SCTLJQ
* Analytic Psychology, vol. i., pp. 126-7.
Psych, f
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the fuller presentation of the object. So long as the
pleasure-giving capacity of the object is not exhausted, it
makes a difference to consciousness whether it continues to
be presented or not. It is only fully presented when
consciousness is satiated.
We have repeatedly used the word end. Conation is the
intrinsic tendency of a state of consciousness to pass beyond
itself into a different state. Just in so far as the tendency is
realised, it ceases to exist, or in other words, finds its end.
When it is completely realised its end is completely
attained, and it completely disappears. Hunger disappears
after a full meal
;
intellectual curiosity disappears when a
problem is solved, and so on. Thus the word end, used in
reference to conative tendencies, whatever else it may imply,
implies also its ordinary literal meaning. The end after
which consciousness strives, is, when attained, the termina-
tion of the striving. This is a point to which we shall have
to refer later. It is obscured by two circumstances. The
first is, that there are some ends, such as the moral ideal,
which can never be completely attained. The second is,
that while we are actually striving after the end, we think
about its own positive nature, and not about the psycho-
logical result which would follow its complete achievement.
We do not consciously strive after the cessation of our own
activity, except when we try to go to sleep or when in
any other way we endeavour after repose. None the
less, it remains a fact that the complete achievement of any
end means the complete cessation of the special activity
directed towards that special end.
As feeling-tone has two phases, pleasure and displeasure,
the first positive and the second negative, so conation has a
positive phase, appetition, and a negative phase, aversion.
It is either directed to maintain and further develop a
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presented object, or the reverse. To use a phrase of
Hobbes, it is either an endeavour towards or an endeavour
frontwards. Appetition by no means coincides with pleasure,
or aversion with displeasure. We may feel a very keen
desire for an object, and yet feel nothing but displeasure
if we are delayed or obstructed in its attainment. I may
desire food, and this is a positive conation. But if no
food is to be had, the feeling-tone of consciousness
will be disagreeable. So we may have an aversion
to the presence of a person ; and this is very unpleasant
if wo cannot get rid of him ; but it may bo very
pleasant, if we can throw him out of the window, or kick
him downstairs. It is worth while to note this point,
because it disposes of certain attempts which have been
made to identify conation with feeling-tone.
Wo have finally to deal with the question whether
conation in some form or degree is invariably a constituent
of consciousness. The problem is beset with the same
difficulties as in the case of feeling-tone, and similar
remarks apply here also. We are apt to assume that
consciousness is absolutely inactive, when it is only com-
paratively so. Wo only notice that we are endeavouring
after an end, when our endeavour rises above a certain
pitch of intensity. Thus wo do not generally say that our
consciousness is active when we happen to catch sight of an
object and attend to it in a slight and transient way.
Xone the less, conation may be, and probably is, present in
this case, as well as in the most intense mental effort.
The best mode of approaching the question introspectively
is by comparing different degrees of conative tendency ; a
state of consciousness which, taken by itself, would appear
to be purely passive and inert, ceases to appear so when it
is compared with one which is still more passive and inert.
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"Take, for example, tlie following series: (1) In a state of
delicious languor I enjoy the organic sensations produced
by a warm bath. (2) In an indolent mood, I let my eye
wander from object to object, and amuse myself with what
I see, without any definite plan or purpose. (3) Without
plan or purpose, I give the rein to my own ideas, following
the train of more or less casual associations. (4) I repeat
the multiplication table, or work out some simple arith-
metical question of a familiar kind. (5) I work out an
arithmetical question which is more of a task because it is
more complex, though it is of a familiar type, and presents
nothing in the nature of a puzzle. (6) I attempt an
arithmetical question which for a time baffles me, because
it contains a difficulty which requires to be overcome by
repeated trials. (7) In a critical point of my career I
endeavour to decide between two courses of action, the
whole course of my future life being dependent on the
decision. Of these, (7) is a mental state characterized by a
far more intense feeling of activity than (1) ; and (2), (3),
(4), (5), (6) constitute an ascending scale of transitions
mediating between them."*
We must distinguish between activity and the feeling of
activity. The only question which introspection can con-
sider is whether we always have some immediate experience
of striving, or tendency towards an end. Even if this
question is answered in the negative, it may still remain
true that conscious process, as a matter of fact, always
involves tendency towards an end, though the tendency is
not always a mode of being conscious.
5. Sentience or Sub- Consciousness. "We have so far
considered consciousness only in its relation to presented
objects. But if we analyse our total experience at any
*
Analytic Psychology, vol. i., pp. 160-1.
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moment, we shall find in it much material which is not at
the moment contributing to the cognitive function of
consciousness, and is to that extent without objective
reference. It is the special function of presentation to
present objects; but those modifications of consciousness
which are capable of fulfilling this function may exist even
when they are not the means of cognising objects.
"
They
may exist as possible material for discriminative thinking
without being actually utilised to the full extent in which
they are capable of being utilised. At this moment I am
thinking about psychological topics. I receive at the same
time a multitude of diversified impressions from sur-
rounding things which certainly enter into my total
experience. But if I refer them to an object at all, I do
so in a very indeterminate way. My thought-discrimina-
tion is very far from keeping pace with the differentiation
of the sensory data as immediately experienced. To quote
Abraham Tucker : ' "We may see leaves falling from the
trees, birds flying in the air, or cattle grazing upon the
ground, without affirming, or denying, or thinking, any-
thing concerning them ; and yet, perhaps, .... upon being
asked a minute afterwards wTe could remember what we
had seen. A man may have beheld a field from his
window a hundred times without ever observing whether
it were square or pentangular, and yet the figure was
exhibited to his view every time he looked upon it
'
... .A
single sweep of the eye takes in an indefinite multitude
of details. But to make each of these severally
significant for thought would require a long series of
successive acts of attention. Of course, the total impression
which they collectively constitute may be significant, as in
our first glance at a landscape before we begin to observe
its component parts. The essential point is the antithesis
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between the detailed dcterminateness of presentation and
the comparative indeterniinateness of discriminative
thinking. The relative independence of presentation is
perhaps even more strikingly illustrated by the sensations
arising from our general bodily state. These appear to
be constantly present in every moment of waking life
perhaps even in sleep. But as a rule they enter our
trains of thought only in the vaguest way, if at all.
Occasionally we say 'I feel well,' or 'I feel ill,' or 'I
feel tired,' or 'I feel bright,' or 'I feel dull.' But for
the most part we do not take any definite note of our
condition. When we do so, we are always aware, if we
reflect on the point, that the sensations which determino
our judgment are not created by it, but are prior to it."*
* Analytic Psychology, vol. i., pp. 48-49,
CHAPTER H.
PRIMARY LAWS OF HEXTAL PROCESS.
1. Relativity. "By the principle of relativity. . . .it is
denied that any psychic factor, or complex psychosis,* can
exist without having its own definite quality, quantity, tone
of feeling, value in combination, and influence upon simul-
taneous or successive factors and psychoses, determined by
the relation in which it stands to other factors and psychoses
in the entire mental life. Or stated positively every
individual element, or state, or form of mental life is what it is
only as relative to other elements, states, and forms of the same
mental life" f More briefly we may say : Mental development
depends on modes of consciousness being determined ly their psy-
chological relations and subject to modification accordingly . This
statement, though sufficiently comprehensive, is proportion-
ately vague. The vagueness lies mainly in the phrase
"psychological relations." What is the nature of the
psychological relationsthroughwhich modes of consciousness
are enabled to interact ? To understand this we must con-
sider the unity and continuity of consciousness. This topic
falls under two heads, (1) general unity and continuity,
and (2) the special unity and continuity constituted by
conation.
*
Psychosis= total state of consciousness as existing at any one moment.
f Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 6G1-2.
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2. General Unity and Continuity. The partial consti-
tuents of our conscious life are, as Dr. Ward puts it, not
disjoined from one another by something which is disparate
in nature from consciousness. They are not separated "as
one island is separated from another by the intervening sea,
or one note in a melody from the next by an interval of
silence."*1 The unity and continuity of consciousness con-
ceived in this most abstract and general form, enables us to
recognise what we may call relations of immediate contiguity.
Whatever components of any given moment enter into the
composition of a single state of consciousness are imme-
diately contiguous. Similarly, successive states are in
immediate contiguity if and so far as the termination of
one coincides with the commencement of another. "At
any given moment," says Dr. Ward, we have "a 'field of
consciousness,
'
psychologically one and continuous ; at the
next, we have not an entirely new field but a partial change
within this field.
"f Inasmuch as the emergence of the new
is a modification of the old, they are continuous and so far
psychologically contiguous. We have not merely A and
then B, but also the passage of A into B ; and this passage
as such is a modification of consciousness. The transition
is itself an experience. It is the more obviously so the
more abrupt it is. The interruption, being a felt interrup-
tion, itself constitutes a relation between the two states,
however unlike they may be. Take for instance an illus-
tration given by Dr. Ward in another context the "passing
from the scent of a rose to the sound of a gong or a sting
from a bee."J Professor Ladd well remarks, that in
"the case of so abrupt a transition in the content and
* Article
"Psychology," in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th edition,
part xx., p. 45.
f Ibid. \ Op. cit., p. 50.
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feeling-tone of two successive mental states, the law of
relativity would not be violated, but the more amply
illustrated. The amount of our absorption in the scent of
the rose would influence the redistribution of attention to
the sound of the gong, and even to the sting of the bee ;
the degree of pain which the succeeding sensations of
sounds or smarting gave would be enhanced by the
preceding pleasure; the control of the motor results of
[movements prompted by] the new sensation would bo
determined by the perceptions, etc., into which the sensa-
tion abruptly broke ; and so on, and so on."*
Thus there are relations arising out of the unity of a single
state of consciousness as it exists at any moment, and there
are also relations arising out of the transition from one
state to another. These relations involve immediate
contiguity in time ; either in the way of simultaneous
existence or of continuous succession. But there is another
kind of psychical connexion independent of direct proximity
in time, and arising out of a more special and intimate
continuity than that which is characteristic of the flow of
consciousness in general.
3. Conative Unity and Continuity. Suppose that, while
playing chess or whist, I am suddenly called away at a
critical stage of the game to meet a visitor on a matter of
business. The interruption, as such, constitutes a relation
between the state of consciousness which is interrupted
and that which interrupts it. But this relation exists
between otherwise disparate and disconnected processes,
and depends on that immediate contiguity in time which
has been discussed. If, on the contrary, we consider
the successive phases of the process of making up the
mind about the move at chess, or of settling the matter
*
Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 663.
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of business, we find a different and more intimate kind of
continuity, which may be called conative or appetitive
continuity, or continuity of interest. From this point of
view, my state of mind when I have finished my business
with the visitor and returned to my game is continuous
with my state of mind when I was interrupted, rather than
with the intervening flow of consciousness. The very word
interruption implies this. It is clear, then, that continuity of
interest is more or less independent of direct proximity in
time. This kind of continuity is essentially connected with
mental activity in the strict sense, with the striving,
conative, appetitive side of our nature. Its general condition
is that the successive phases of a conscious process shall
constitute a movement towards an end. By an end is
meant a state of consciousness in which the process finds its
natural termination the termination prescribed to it by its
own nature, and not by extraneous conditions. Each phase
of the process before the end is reached is incomplete, and
tends by its own inherent constitution to pass beyond itself.
If the activity is displaced by a disparate and disconnected
process before it has attained its goal, it tends spontaneously
to recur after the interruption and work itself out, starting
from the stage at which it was cut short. If, while it
continues to occupy consciousness, its progress is in any way
checked or arrested, an experience of dissatisfaction or un-
pleasantness arises. So long and so far as its progress is
unchecked, but notyet completed, consciousness is unsatisfied,
but not dissatisfied, and ceteris paribus the experience is
pleasant.
Conative unity depends upon conative continuity. If we
take any momentary phase in the flow of conative process,
we find a total state of consciousness in which some con-
stituents are irrelevant to the main direction of thought,
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and others are essentially concerned in its progress.
Thus in playing a game of chess the modifications of
consciousness due to impressions from surrounding objects
are irrelevant to the main current of consciousness. Only
the experiences connected with the position of the pieces on
the board are relevant, and only these experiences are
embraced in the conative unity of consciousness. This
distinction corresponds broadly to that between thought
and mere sentience.*
The total process of consciousness is, in general, composed
of a succession of processes, each of which has a certain
appetitive continuity. Some of these may be very transient
and involve only a slight and evanescent interest. But in
so far as they involve interest or attention at all they are
essentially conative. Even when the mind rambles from
object to object in a desultory way, its slight and transient
occupation with each in turn involves some degree of
attention and interest. Thus the transitions which are
without conative continuity are transitions from one
conative process to another. But even these are in a sense
conative, if one process occurs as a marked interruption of
another. In the moment of interruption, the interruption
itself constitutes a sort of conative continuity between the
old process and the new. Just in so far as the new process
is experienced as an interruption of the old, it is a
constituent part of it, an incident in its progress.
In the development of the mental life, conative unity and
continuity is of altogether predominant importance. Such
psychical relations as depend on mere proximity in time
are subsidiary, and may, in a broad view of mental
evolution, be neglected. Thus, in what follows, we shall
almost entirely confine our attention to those mental
* Discussed in 5 of last chapter.
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connexions which arise from the combination of mental
elements as constituent parts of the same conative process.
4. Retentiveness. Hetentiveness in some form is an
indispensable condition of development or progress of any
kind. Advance would be impossible unless the results of
prior process persisted as the basis and starting-point of
subsequent process. In marching, each step has its point
of departure from the new position secured by the previous
step. In marking time there is continual reversion to the
same position and no advance. No house could be built if
each brick vanished as it was laid and had to be replaced
anew. A rope cannot be formed of dry sand, which
crumbles away as it is put together. Similarly, mental
development would be impossible unless previous experience
left behind it persistent after-effects to determine the
nature and course of subsequent experience. These after-
effects are called, in psychology, traces or dispositions,
and the psychological law of retentiveness may bo stated
as follows : when and so far as mental development takes
place through mental conditions, it does so because specific
modes of consciousness leave behind them specific traces or
dispositions, ivhich determine the nature and course of sub-
sequent process, so that ivhen they are modified it is modified.
The persistence of dispositions is not absolute ; they tend
to decay, and may perhaps disappear altogether if they
are not maintained by renewal of the corresponding
mental processes, or of mental processes connected with
these. In this respect there is a great difference between
different individuals. Some are more retentive than
others. But even in the most retentive minds, traces tend
to fade away : "so that if they be not sometimes renewed
by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those
kinds of objects which at first occasioned them, the print
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wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen."
Thus the experiences, "as well as children, of our youth,
often die before us
;
and our minds represent to us those
tombs to which we are fast approaching, where, though
the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are
effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away."* The
differences in the retentive power of individuals are, in
part at least, differences in original endowment, and
cannot be explained on psychological grounds. As Locke
remarks, some minds retain the characters drawn on them
"like marble," others "like freestone," and others "little
better than sand." The ultimate explanation of this
difference in original endowment must take a physiological
form.
5. Conative Continuity and Rctentiveness. The kind of
continuity which we have called conative involves in a
characteristic way the principle of retentiveness. All
progress towards an end depends on the persistence of the
results of previous process as the basis of succeeding
change. So in this case, continuity of interest is only
possible if and so far as each succeeding stage of the
movement of consciousness towards an end is determined
and qualified by the cumulative disposition left behind by
preceding stages. At the same time this cumulative dis-
position is itself subject to modification by each new mode
of consciousness as it emerges. Dr. Ward has given an
example which partially illustrates this point.
"Suppose that in the course of a few minutes we take
half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower. We
have not as many complex presentations which we might
symbolise as F^ J?^ F3 . But rather, at first, only the
general outline is noted, next the disposition of petals,
*
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ii. x., 5.
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stamen, etc., tlien the attachment of tho anthers, form of
the ovary, and so on It is because the earlier appre-
hensions persist that the later are an advance upon them
and an addition to them."*
This example excellently illustrates the working of
retentiveness where there is continuity of interest. But it
does so only partially and for a special case. The case
adduced is one in which "earlier apprehensions" recur as
part of the same simultaneous whole with the later. The
process by which the "earlier apprehensions" were
originally formed is not itself repeated, inasmuch as the
preparatory dispositions left behind by previous experience
render it unnecessary. Hence, there is room for further
advance, for growing distinction and definition within the
total presentation. But with the new distinctions the old
also are combined in the same complex whole. This is
one of the ways in which preformed dispositions may
operate. But it is by no means the only way. The per-
sistent traces of past experience may modify present
experience and be modified by it, without reappearance of
the content of the past experience in the actual moment of
present consciousness.
The effect of rhythmic repetition of the same stimulus is
peculiarly instructive, because the external occasion of each
successive impression is throughout the same, so that modi-
fications of consciousness arising in the course of the
process must be due to the working of retentiveness,
to the cumulative disposition left behind by previous
impressions. The sequence of physical stimuli is a, a, a, . . . .
the sequence of mental states is a^ a.^ a3 , The mere
fact that the second a comes before consciousness as a
repetition, as another of the same kind, constitutes an
* Article " Psychology," p. 47.
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important difference between it and the first a. But, besides
this, there may be a gradual modification of consciousness
as the series advances, until a point is reached in which
each new impression produces an effect relatively so small,
in comparison with the accumulated result of previous
impressions, as to be inappreciable. This is well brought
out in certain experiments on what is called the "span of
consciousness." The purpose of these experiments is to
ascertain how many objects of a certain kind can be appre-
hended at once. It is found that, after hearing as many as
fifteen or sixteen successive sounds at regular intervals of
from 0-2 to 0- 3 seconds, the subject can identify or distinguish
this series as a whole from another equal or unequal
to it. Counting is not admitted, and the successive sounds
are of course not all simultaneously discriminated at
the close of the series. A " sensation-mass " alone
is distinctly perceived. This is evidently a cumulative
effect. Apart from special experiments in the laboratory,
anyone can easily verify the statement that successive
series of a rhythmic character can at their close be
apprehended as a whole without mentally reproducing
and discriminating in the moment of apprehension
the several sequent parts which compose them. Thus,
in walking, we may mentally divide our successive
steps into distinct groups, and be aware without counting
when one series ends and another begins. We need not
even know the number of steps which are mentally con-
nected within a single series. We may simply begin by
walking a certain number of paces without counting them,
and then as we proceed mark the points at which the
initial series has repeated itself.
We have so far considered only the regular sequence of
physically identical impressions. But the most important
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cases of rhythm are those in which recurrent similarity in
certain respects is combined with diversity in other respects.
The rhythm of verse, which depends on a more or less
uniform recurrence of long and short or of accented and
unaccented syllables, may serve as an illustration. In
hearing a line from Milton or Vergil we need not at any
moment have more than one word actually present to con-
sciousness. Yet this single word appears as part of the
whole and is qualified in a quite specific way by its place
in the whole. The sound of the word
"unpremeditated"
has a quite different value for consciousness in the present
sentence or in a dictionary from that which it acquires in
Shelley's lines :
" That from heaven, or near it,
Pourest thy full heart
In profuse strains of unpremeditated art."
Substitute "unstudied" for
"unpremeditated," and the
result is not merely one word in place of another. On the
contrary, the occurrence of the wrong word is for conscious-
ness the ruin of the whole rhythmic structure. What is
true of verse is still more obviously true in the case of
music. The last note of a melody may be and often is the
only note of which we are aware at the moment it strikes
the ear. Yet in it the entire melody is in a sense present.
It comes before consciousness as part of a quite specific
whole and derives a specific character from its place in
that whole. The cumulative disposition generated by the
ordered sequence of previous notes cooperates with the
new stimulus to the organ of hearing, and the ensuing state
of consciousness is the joint product of both factors mutually
modifying each other. If a wrong note be struck, the whole
melody is at once marred. The same happens if a note is
unduly prolonged. Throughout the process the part is
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determined by the whole, and the whole by the part. In
reading a sentence or a paragraph, when we come to the
final word, the meaning of the sentence or paragraph as a
whole is present to our consciousness. But it is only as a
cumulative effect of previous process. What is directly given
as a special datum is the last word itself and its meaning.
In a similar way, the cumulative effect of one paragraph or
chapter of a book qualifies and determines the meaning of
another. We may set by the side of this highly complex
case a very simple one. Pronounce successively the words
fructify, mystify, identify, simplify ; all these words terminate
in the same sound. When we are just finishing or have
just finished the utterance of each word, the special item of
sensation before consciousness is the final sound they have
in common. The preceding sounds in which they differ
have vanished from consciousness; nevertheless, in each
case we are aware that we have said one word and not
another, that we have said fructify and not mystify, and so
on. This can only be because in each instance our con-
sciousness, when the final sound is being pronounced,
is modified by the cumulative effect of the preceding
sounds.
This cumulative effect of the preceding phases of a
conative process on the succeeding, may be called primary
retentiveness, in order to distinguish it from the retentive-
ness which is involved in reproduction and association,
processes to be discussed later on.
6. Primary meaning. Primary retentiveness is corre-
lated with what we may call primary meaning. We may
sum up the result of the last section as follows : (1) In
all processes having appetitive or conative continuity, and
consisting of a series of distinct steps, a cumulative
disposition is gradually formed which is the product of
Psych. 6
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antecedent mental change, and a cooperative factor in
succeeding mental change. (2) The after-effect of pre-
ceding mental process is not reproduced, but simply
persists or is retained. (3) Its persistence in no way
involves the persistence or the resuscitation of the
specific items of sensation or mental imagery which have
contributed to form it. These do not persist, but only
their effects. If we denote the sequences of specific items
of sense-experience, or, it may be, of ideal imagery, by
#, 5, 0, d, then a, J, c, d, by no means adequately symbolises
the process as a whole. For when b occurs, the resulting
state of consciousness is the joint product of b and the
persistent disposition or after-effect left behind by a. Simi-
larly, when d occurs, the resulting state of consciousness is
due to d in cooperation with the persistent disposition left
behind by a, 5, and c. We may denote the after-effect of
a by niij the after-effect of a and b by w2 , and so on. The
whole series may then be represented by a, bmlt cm.,,
dm-A .
Now what does m stand for ? What change or
modification of consciousness does it represent ? Clearly,
it represents the relation of the specific items 5, c, d, to the
whole of which they are part, a peculiar character which
belongs to them in virtue of their being part of this whole.
Now the only general word which is at all appropriate for
expressing this kind of consciousness is the word meaning
or significance m, then, stands for meaning or significance.
The meaning which is essentially involved in all conative
continuity may be designated primary meaning, to dis-
tinguish it from that which depends on association and
reproduction.
7. Association and Reproduction. On seeing a flower, I
am told that it has a certain name, Afterwards, I hear
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this name again : it may then call up to my mind a mental
picture of the flower, though no flower is actually present.
It is clear that if I had never seen the flower, the
mental picture of the flower would not have arisen. Now
suppose the original perception of the flower had left no
trace behind it after itself ceasing to exist, that it had
flitted over the surface of my mind like a shadow over the
surface of a stream, without producing any permanent
result. The case would then have been just the same as
if I had never seen the flower. The mere hearing of the
name would be inoperative unless there were something
for it to act on, an appropriate trace of past experience
constituting a preparatory disposition for future experience.
13ut primary retentiveness is not in this case sufficient.
More is implied than the mere cumulative effect of the
previous phases of a continuous process determining
succeeding phases. Retentiveness in this instance works
by way of reproduction and association. The specific
nature of the original experience which we call the per-
ception of the flower, is partially reinstated in the mental
image of the flower. The name, as we say, reproduces the
mental image. It does this through association. The
actual perception of the flower occurred as part of the same
continuous conscious process as the hearing of the name.
Hence, when the name occurs again, it may re-excite the
mental disposition left behind by the perception, and
re-excite it in such a way that the mental image of the
flower rises before the mind although no actual flower is
present to the senses. In so far as the mere fact that a
certain modification of consciousness has already occurred
constitutes the general possibility of its recurrence,
retentiveness takes the form of reproduction. The general
possibility of recurrence is for the most part actualised in
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each, special case by association. The disposition left
behind by the previous experience must be re-excited if
the experience itself is to be reproduced. The re-excite-
ment is mostly, though not always, effected by a presenta-
tion similar to some presentation which has formed part
of the same total process with the experience which
is to be reproduced. This is expressed by saying that the
re-instatement takes place by the previous association of
the reproduced and reproducing presentation. In the
example given, the association is between the perception of
the flower and its name. The repetition of the name
revives the mental image of the absent flower.
8. Acquirement of Meaning. Reproduction has a great
many modes and degrees, according as the original
experience is more or less fully and independently re-
instated. The least that can happen, in order to make the
word reproduction applicable at all, is found in a process
of fundamental importance which we may call the acquire-
ment of meaning. We must distinguish between meaning
which is primary and meaning which is acquired. Primary
meaning accompanies the first occurrence of any series
having continuity of interest. Secondary meaning accom-
panies its recurrence, and depends on the fact that it
has occurred before. In the series a, lmlt cm*, dm3 ,
on its first occurrence d has a meaning due to the
cumulative disposition left behind by a, b, c. Now,
suppose that on a future occasion the process as a
whole is repeated. Its point of departure is in #, but a
now excites the cumulative disposition produced by the
previous occurrence of the whole series a, bm^ cmZl dm-6 .
The starting-point of the series is therefore no longer a,
but am3 . In other words, a has acquired meaning through
previous experience* <. Let us consider the example of a
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tune. On first hearing it, the successive notes have each a
significance, a value for consciousness derived from their
connexion with the whole. Now suppose that the tune
has been repeated often enough to become recognisable.
In order to recognise it, it is not necessary to go through
the whole again. You know what the tune is as soon as
you have heard a certain portion of it. This stands for or
means the rest
;
and if you are only interested in recognising
the tune, it is quite unnecessary to go further, or even
mentally to reproduce what follows. So, if I begin to
say,
" Twice one is two, twice two" there is no need
for me to go further. A hearer who knows the multi-
plication table knows what follows as a whole without
detailed repetition. The beginning of the series is
equivalent to the whole, and it is just because it means
the whole that it is unnecessary to repeat the whole in
detail.
Let us now take a case which belongs to quite a low
level of conscious life. A chick on emerging from
the shell, and without previous experience, tends to
peck at, seize, and swallow all small objects*. This is
a conative process, which has for its end the cessation
of the appetite for food. Now the chicken does not,
at first, distinguish between what is edible and what
is not. This it has to learn by experience. It will
at the outset peck at and seize all worms and cater-
pillars indiscriminately. There is a particular kind of
caterpillar called the cinnabar caterpillar. When this is
first presented to the chicken it is pecked at and seized
like other similar objects. But as soon as it is fairly
seized it is dropped in disgust. When next the chicken
sees the caterpillar, it looks at it suspiciously and refrains
* This example is taken from Lloyd Morgan's Habit and Instinct, p. 41.
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from pecking. Now, what has happened in this case?
The sight of the cinnabar caterpillar re-excites the total
disposition left behind by the previous experience of
pecking at it, seizing it, and ejecting it in disgust. Thus
the effect of these experiences is revived. The sight
of the cinnabar caterpillar has acquired a meaning. It
means the experiences which in the first instance followed
it; and just because it means them it may more or less
dispense with the necessity of actually repeating them.
It may so determine the course of action that repetition or
re-instatement of the specific items of the previous experi-
ence is needless. To this extent, it is practically equivalent
to them : it functions instead of them.
When one thing means another, it can, for certain pur-
poses, or in reference to a certain end, be substituted for
another. If a means b, this does not imply that a carries b
along with it or about with it. We might as well
suppose that a five-pound note must always have five
sovereigns literally wrapped up in it. The note will pass
current instead of five sovereigns, and in like manner the
peculiar visual appearance of the cinnabar caterpillar will,
in some degree, pass current instead 'of the peculiar sensation
of disgust which has previously followed it. It re-excites
the whole disposition left behind by the previous process,
and it re-excites this disposition as it has been modified in the
course of previous process. Consequently, this process will
not take place again as it took place before. But to under-
stand the special kind of transformation which it undergoes,
we must take into account the essential nature of appetitive
process. This lies in its being directed to an end, in the
case of the chicken, the satisfaction of the appetite for food.
This tendency towards an end is manifested in one general
character of all appetitive process. Lines of action, if and
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so far as they are unsuccessful, tend to be discontinued or
varied
;
and those which prove successful, to be maintained.
In this way, for instance, accuracy in the act of pecking is
attained by the chicken. When it misses, it tries again
and again with slight variations until it succeeds, and it is
the successful adjustments which tend to persist, and the
unsuccessful which are eliminated. The endeavour towards
an end, whether the end be consciously foreseen or not, is
ipso facto an endeavour to avoid failure and obstruction.
Everything in the way of check or impediment or want of
success, causes dissatisfaction and altered behaviour. This
holds good of appetitive activity in its primary occurrence ;
it is always characterised by persistence with varied effort.
The same must also hold good for its repetition. Here, too,
the lines of action which proved unsuccessful on its primary
occurrence will be suppressed whenever the conditions under
which they previously led to failure are recognisable.
Thus, the sight of the peculiar markings of the cinnabar
caterpillar will, at the outset, by its acquired meaning,
repress the tendency to peck and swallow. In other words,
so far as the end of action is concerned, the sight of the
caterpillar is superior to the actual taste of it, just as
cheques and paper money generally are for certain purposes
superior to coin.
The process which we have called the acquirement of
meaning is the minimum in the way of reproduction
required to explain intelligent learning by experience. All
more specific modes of reproduction pre-suppose it, and
owe their guiding efficacy to it. All revival of specific
items of sensation and the like, in so far as it makes
possible intelligent adaptation to the result of previous
experience, must make more definite and explicit the
peculiar consciousness which arises from the re-excitement
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of tlie total disposition left behind by previous process
The case we have analysed is sometimes explained in a
different way. It is said that when the chick sees again
the caterpillar, which it has previously ejected in disgust,
the previous sensation of disgust is reproduced by the sight
of the peculiar markings of the caterpillar. The primary
experience of disgust prompted the ejection of the caterpillar;
hence, it is argued, the revived sensation will lead the
chicken to refuse the unsavoury morsel. Now, it is probable
enough that something which may be called a revival of
the disgusting sensation, actually takes place ; but this is
not sufficient, and possibly not necessary, to account for
the result. According to the proposed explanation, the
chick has (1) a primary sense experience, the sight of the
caterpillar, and (2) a faintly revived sensation of disgust.
What must follow ? Each of the two sensations, the one
primary, and the other secondary, independently prompt to
a certain kind of action, and the result can only be a sort
of mechanical interference, not intelligent guidance. The
visual experience prompts to picking and seizing. The
revived distaste prompts to the act of ejecting or dropping
from the beak. The tendency to ejection ought to interfere
with the act of pecking only in so far as the two move-
ments are mechanically incompatible. One would expect
a nondescript blend of the two movements, or an alternation
between them. Intelligent behaviour cannot be a product
of such conditions. Two motor impulses of a quasi-reflex
character are brought together in a mechanical way, and
nothing can ensue except a sort of mechanical resultant.
It is true that if it be granted that the sight of the cinnabar
caterpillar has, from the first, a specific meaning, this
meaning may be rendered more explicit by re-instatement
of the sensation of disgust. But the mere re-instatement
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of the sensation of disgust taken by itself does not
account for the result, whereas the acquirement of mean-
ing might account for the result apart from the revival
of the specific sensation. In the case we are discussing,
there probably is a certain revival of sensation, though
it takes place in a peculiar way, and not by direct associa-
tion.*
Acquirement of meaning is that mode of reproduction
which approaches most nearly in its nature to primary
retentiveness. It might indeed be deduced a priori from
the existence of primary retentiveness. If the successive
phases of a process concur to form a total disposition as
their cumulative effect, the renewal of a part of the
process must tend to re-excite this disposition. Just as in
primary retentiveness it is not the specific items of previous
experience which persist in succeeding experience, but
only a modification of consciousness due to the cumulative
disposition, so the re-excitement of the cumulative dis-
position does not necessarily involve revival of the specific
items of previous experience, and it must involve some-
thing different from this. It must involve what primary
retentiveness involves, that peculiar modification of con-
sciousness which we can only call apprehension of meaning
or significance of the peculiar character which the part
derives from its relation to the whole.
We have now to consider modes of reproduction more
specific in their nature than the general re-excitement of a
total disposition. These more specific modes of reproduction
assume manifold forms and gradations, which are to be
regarded as stages in the evolution of meaning towards
definiteness and explicitness. Meaning unfolds into them
as the seed unfolds into the plant.
*
Cf. end of 9.
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9. Tlie various modes of Specific Reproduction. (#) Com-
plication. Being reproduced is something different from
being produced again. Repeated production involves a
renewal of the producing conditions. But reproduction
exists only in so far as the original conditions of production
are inoperative (see 7). Apart from the renewal of these,
the previous occurrence of the reproduced experience of itself
constitutes the possibility of recurrence. This necessarily
implies that the previous occurrence has left behind a
persistent trace or disposition. But previous occurrence
constitutes only the general possibility of recurrence.
The exciting cause, in so far as the revival depends on
association,* is found in the occurrence of another presenta-
tion, ^4, which has previously existed in some kind of
psychological relation to B, the presentation which is repro-
duced. In the main, the relations which operate as conditions
of association consist in the union of the two modes of
consciousness, as parts or phases of the same continuous
conative process. The readiness with which associations
are formed, and their strength, depend largely on the
importance of the presentations in relation to the
whole activity of which they form a part. The strength
of the association is also, to a very great extent, dependent
on the number of times the connexion between the
associated presentations has been repeated.
Specific reproduction may assume a great variety of
forms and degrees. Let us call the reproducing presenta-
tion, A, and that with which it has been associated, B : the
reproduced presentation may be denoted by I. Now, the
various forms of reproductive process depend (1) on the
varying relation of I to A, (2) on the varying degrees of
completeness in which I corresponds to B. These points
* This is by no means always the case.
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of view are intimately connected. I may be either an
integral part of A, or it may have a distinct individuality,
so as to be capable of persisting when A has vanished. In
the second case, the process is one of free reproduction :
when b is an integral part of A and incapable of inde-
pendent existence, the process is called complication, because
the result is merely a change in the constitution of A, and
for the most part an increase in its complexity. The facility
and clearness with which I can be distinguished and sepa-
rately attended to in the w
Thole complex A admits of many
gradations. It may be as intimately interfused with the
whole as the red and blue which interpenetrate each other
in purple. On the other hand it may t>e as easily disen-
gaged as colour is from form. In general, the more
intimate is the union of b with the other constituent
characters of A, the more partial and the more profoundly
modified is the reproduction of B, so that in some cases it
is hard to decide whether or not there is any reproduction.
We may take as a typical example of complication the
peculiar differences of quality which attach to sounds
according to the various modes in which they are produced.
We distinguish clapping, crashing, clashing, hissing,
bursting, splitting, rending, grinding, rushing, and whist-
ling noises. Now these sounds doubtless have distinctive
qualities, considered merely as auditory sensations. But it
seems clear that they also have acquired modalities due to
association. In producing them we have in each case certain
distinctive experiences of movement and resistance, and in
seeing them produced similar experiences are excited in a
partial and inchoate way. When the sounds are merely
heard their quality is partly constituted by a partial and
modified reproduction of these sensations. The repro-
duced element is not usually distinguished without an
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express act of analytic attention. But it is none the less
present as a peculiar modality of the auditory experience.
Perhaps this will be most clearly brought out by consider-
ing the imitative words by which the nature of such sounds
is commonly expressed. The word "clap" resembles the
sound of clapping, the word "hiss" the sound of hissing,
and the word " tear " the sound of tearing. But on exami-
nation it soon appears that the resemblance by no means
lies wTholly in the sounds considered merely as ear-sensa-
tions. It depends also on the movements of articulation.
In saying
"
clap," the lips are clapped together ; in saying
"
hiss," the breath is driven through a narrowed aperture ;
in saying "tear," the tongue is pulled away from the
palate. In these and similar instances we do not
ordinarily distinguish between the motor and the purely
auditory imitation. So in the original experiences which
are imitated the two factors are combined without
distinction, constituting a complex sensory quality which
escapes analysis until the reflective scrutiny of the psycho-
logist is brought to bear upon it. In this complex quality
the sound as such is the dominant constituent, and the
associated motor element appears as a modification of the
sound.
For further illustration we may refer (1) to the qualifi-
cation of sight by touch and resistance, and (2) to the
qualification of touch and resistance by sight.
"The sight of a suit of polished armour," says Dr. "Ward,
11
instantly reinstates and steadily maintains all that we
retain of former sensations of its hardness and smoothness
and coldness*." The armour looks hard, smooth, and cold.
But this peculiar appearance to the eye does not necessarily
* Article "Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th edition, part xs.,
p 57.
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involve any distinct representation or idea or separate
sensation of hardness, smoothness, or coldness. The
corresponding tactile and other experiences are not repro-
duced as separate and distinct modes of consciousness.
They are not discriminated from the visual experience
itself. The reproduction manifests itself rather as a
modification of the visual experience an addition to its
unanalysed complexity. Similarly, ice looks cold because
we have felt it to be cold. If it had been always warm to
the touch, it would have looked warm. Yet its cold look
is not a suggested idea ; nor is it a distinct temperature-
sensation. It is something which is presented as if
included in the visual appearance as an integral part of it.
Any attempt to separate it destroys both its own specific
character and that of the visual experience.
If (2) we now turn to the converse case, the qualification
of actual touch experience by revived visual experience, we
find the union of the constituents of the complex much looser.
This does not mean that they are more easily separable ;
for the association in normal human experience is almost,
if not quite, indissoluble. But when the tactual experience
is primary, the reinstated visual experience is much more
prominent, more readily distinguishable and separately
appreciable, than is the reproduced tactual element when
the visual experience is primary. We have here a case of
complication which approaches most closely to free repro-
duction. When we close our eyes and touch an object, we
need not indeed have a distinct picture of the surface
touched. But the slightest reflective scrutiny is enough to
show that the total impression is complex, containing a
visual as well as a tactual constituent, and also, in most
cases, that the visual constituent is as prominent as the
tactual or even more so.
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(Z) Free Reproduction. In free reproduction, the repro-
duced mode of consciousness, b, is capable of existing
apart from, the A which reinstates it. b has an in-
dividuality of its own distinct from A, and it can there-
fore follow A in time, continuing to exist when A
has disappeared. Trains of ideas supply by far the
most familiar and important illustration. In complica-
tion, on the other hand, the existence of I is bound
up with the existence of A. "To realise this difference,''
says Dr. Ward, "we need only to observe first how the
sight of a suit of polished armour, for example, instantly
reinstates and steadily maintains all that we retain of
former sensations of its hardness and smoothness and
coldness, and then to observe how this same sight gradually
calls up ideas, now of tournaments, now of crusades, and
so through all the changing imagery of romance."*
4 The
characteristics of ideas and the nature of their distinction
from actual perceptions are topics which wrill be fully
discussed at a later stage. It is sufficient to notice here
(1) that any reproduction which can be called an idea,
must have sufficient independence to be capable of forming
a distinct link in a train of thought ; (2) that it must be
the thought of an object, such as a thing, quality, relation,
or event, and not a mere crude sensation, however faint;
(3) that just because an idea differs from an actual
perception, ideal reproduction! is always of a partial
and modified character. The mental image of the flower,
as called up by the name, is a typical illustration (</., 7).
Is free revival in every case ideal revival, or does it also
take other forms ? In particular, are sensations, as such,
ever re-instated ? Can they be recalled in their original
sensational character without recurrence of the appropriate
* Ibid. f Reproduction which takes the form of an idea.
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external stimulus ? This is an important question.
Broadly speaking, we may affirm that the direct repro-
duction of sensations, as such,* is an exceptional aii.l
abnormal event. But there is an indirect process by which
sensations of a certain class may be re-excited, although
some of the conditions determining their first occurrence
are by no means operative. Some sensations belong to
the class called organic. It is characteristic of these that
they are immediately excited, not by impressions upon the
external organs of sense, but by the changing states of
the internal organs, such as muscles, glands, and the like.
Now, change in the state of these internal organs is, in a
very important measure, determined from within the body
by changing conditions of the nervous system. Any strong
nervous disturbance tends to discharge itself over the
whole organism, affecting respiration, heartbeat, tension of
the muscles, circulation of the blood, secretion, etc. Such
a nervous disturbance may, in the first instance, bo set up
by an external impression such as a wound or a blow.
But it may be afterwards more or less reproduced by
association without the external impression, and it may then
internally generate organic sensations bearing a marked
similarity to those which accompanied its original occur-
rence. These sensations may without impropriety bo said
to be reproduced, though in a circuitous manner. The
physiological stimulus is indirectly re-instated, and it
directly produces the sensation. Tickling is not merely
a skin-sensation. The skin-sensation sets up changes
in the central nervous system which determine diffused
organic disturbance, including spasmodic movements,
and the resulting organic sensation constitutes what
* By sensation, as such, is meant sensation with the peculiar intensify
and liveliness which it possesses when produced by an external stimulus
acting on a sense-organ.
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is most specific in the experience of being tickled. But a
similar effect may be induced without actual contact. By
merely making believe to tickle a sensitive person it is
possible to produce the nervous disturbance with the
resulting organic sensations and convulsive movements.
In like manner, the mere sight of nauseous food may pro-
duce nausea and even vomiting. The intense organic
discomfort which may be occasioned by merely looking on
at a surgical operation, or even by seeing surgical instru-
ments, has the same origin.
10. Facilitation and Arrest. In actual reproduction,
one mental process reinstates another. But instead of
actual re-instatement, we may have mere facilitation. The
one mental process may favour the entrance of the other
into consciousness, without actually introducing it into
consciousness.
Facilitation may assume many forms and take place
under many diverse conditions. It is an essential
characteristic of attention. The nurse whose attention is
concentrated on the sick child is pre-disposed to notice
whatever sign or movement it makes, and to take action
accordingly. Her mind is set in a general attitude of
response to whatever impressions come to her from this
source. This general attitude of response to a certain
kind of stimulus may persist even when conscious attention
has itself ceased. The nurse who goes to sleep with her
attention concentrated on the child is likely to be
awakened by the slightest cry from it, though more
intense sounds fail to disturb her repose.
Under the head of facilitation due to attention we may




' '* * ' Individuals often remember
*Mwd, Q,S. ii., 449.
10.] MENTAL PROCESS. 97
clearly and well up to the time when they have to use
their knowledge, and then, when it is no longer required,
there follows a rapid and extensive decay of the traces.
Many schoolboys forget their lessons after they have said
them
; many barristers forget details got up for a particular
case. Thus, a boy learns thirty lines of Homer, says them
perfectly, and then forgets them so that he could not say
five consecutive lines the next morning, and a barrister
may be one week learned in the mysteries of making cog-
wheels, but in the next he may be well acquainted with
the anatomy of the ribs instead." In other words, the
general direction of interest facilitates the recall of certain
experiences. It makes the corresponding dispositions
more readily excitable. This seems only partially to
depend on direct attention to the special subject-matter to
be remembered. The barrister who keeps in mind for a
week "the mysteries of making cog-wheels" does so
through general interest in the case which he has in hand,
and not by constantly thinking of cog-wheels. In other
words, the corresponding mental dispositions are main-
tained in an excitable condition, not so much by attending
directly to the subject matter, as by attending to some-
thing connected with it. So long as the need for
remembering remains, there is a sense of having some-
thing on the mind. When the need no longer exists,
a feeling of relief is experienced, and the power of
remembering disappears.
If we learn something by heart, e.g., a page of verse,
we may afterwards so far forget it as to be unable to recall
the words in their proper order. We may then set about
learning it anew. But on the second occasion it may take
very much less time to do so than on the first.
The original learning by heart has facilitated the second.
Psych. 7
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The nature of facilitation is well illustrated in a series
of experiments carried out by Professor Pillsbury.*
Printed words variously mis-spelt were successively
exposed on a screen for a period of about one-fifth of a
second. The subject of the experiment was called on to
read off these words. He did so for the most part incor-
rectly, and most often without noticing the wrong spelling.
We have here nothing to do with the nature and frequency
of the mistakes. What does interest us is the effect pro-
duced by calling out a word having some association with
the word to be shown immediately before the exposure
was made. The result of this was always a great increase
in the number of mis-spellings overlooked. "In only a
very few cases did the word called out suggest the word to
be shown before the latter was seen, and then the mis-
prints were observed quite as frequently as at other times.
In most cases, the relation between the two words was
noted after the printed word was seen. In such cases, the
association helped the entrance of the word. It seemed to
confirm the results of the visual impression, and to give a
feeling of confidence that the word seen was the word
intended." The words called, though they did not of
themselves actually reproduce other words, yet facilitated
the perception of one word rather than of another.
Arrest may be regarded as the negative side of facili-
tation. Whatever facilitates the occurrence of certain
mental processes is a bar to the occurrence of others. The
nurse, with attention concentrated on the child, is apt to
overlook impressions which are not connected with the
main direction of her interest. In general, any mental
process tends to hinder the occurrence of others, if and so
fir as it does not facilitate their occurrence.
* " A Study in Apperception," American Journal of Psychology, viii. 3.
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11. Habit and ^Automatism. Actions at first requiring
attention come to be performed without attention when
they are frequently repeated under sufficiently similar
conditions. In such instances, the action is said to be
automatic, to go on of itself. "The clearest examples of
habitual action taking place apart from attention are those
in which attention is otherwise occupied, as when a person
knits, or plays on a musical instrument, and at the samo
time engages in conversation, or threads his way through
a crowded street while absorbed in thought. It should be
noted that in such instances the diversion of attention is
probably never absolutely complete. The musician, for
instance, is more or less aware that he is playing a piece
of music, and the absent-minded walker is not utterly
oblivious of the fact that he is in a crowded street and in
motion. What can be asserted confidently is that in such
cases there is no persistent and discriminating attention to
the details of the action. This distinction helps us to
understand another group of habitual actions which do
not appear to fall into the state of secondary automatism,
however much they may be practised. Fencing supplies
a good instance in point. The most expert fencer cannot
afford to allow himself to be absorbed in an irrelevant
train of thought while he is engaged in a duel. On the
contrary, the keenest watchfulness is required. The
reason is that only certain component parts of the action
have become thoroughly habitual ; these do not of them-
selves require to be attended to. The practised fencer has
not to think about the proper modes of thrusting and
parrying ; what requires attention is the tactics of his
opponent. As soon as he discerns by sight or feeling the
direction in which his antagonist's rapier is moving, the
proper reply is made automatically. Thus, attention is
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demanded for the proper combination of a series of
movements which, are severally automatic, a combination
which has to be adjusted to constantly fluctuating con-
ditions. The union of attentive adaptation to relatively
novel circumstances with automatic adaptation to circum-
stances more uniformly repeated is found in all ordinary
voluntary action. Thus, the decision to blow out a candle
may require attention, but the process of walking towards
it and blowing is automatic."*
Habit is not confined to bodily actions. There are also
habits of thought and of will. Of course, thought and
volition are in their very nature processes that involve
attention. When we speak of a "habit of thought" or a
" habit of will," we do not mean that the special acts of
volition or the special trains of thought can go on without
attention. We have seen that in such bodily activities as
fencing, "automatic processes may enter as component
parts into a total process which as a whole is very far from
being automatic. The inverse of this is seen in habits of
thinking and willing. Here a comprehensive habitual
tendency realises itself on special occasions by means of
special processes which are not habitual."! We may take
as an example the habit of answering letters on the day
on which they are received. Here, what is habitual and
automatic is not the actual process of writing the reply
this, of course, requires attention but the writing of the
reply on the same day on which the letter is received is a
habitual and automatic procedure. It takes place as a
matter of course. The alternative of postponing it to
another day is not entertained without exceptional motives.
A good instance of a habit of thought is that of the
making of puns. There are some persons who continually
*
Analytic Psychology, vol. i., pp. 260-261. f Ibid, p. 262.
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make puns simply because they have fallen into the habit
of doing
1
so. Of course each single pun requires attention ;
but the general trend of attention in this direction rather
than in other directions is a matter of habit.
The formation of habit involves the operation of two
distinct conditions. The first is retentiveness
;
the second
lies in the essential nature of conation, according to which
conative processes cease, if and so far as their end is
attained. Let us take as an example the child learning to
walk. This at the outset involves full attention. " At the
outset, performance falls far short of intention : only a
certain series of contractions of certain muscles, in proper
proportions and in a proper order, is capable of realising
the end aimed at, with the maximum of rapidity and
certainty, and the minimum of obstruction and failure,
and corresponding effort. At the outset of the process of
acquisition, muscles are contracted which are superfluous,
and which therefore operate as disturbing conditions.
Others are not contracted at the right moment, and in the
right measure, so that action is deranged. Now the effort
to attain the end is, eo ipso, an effort to avoid failure and
obstruction
;
hence there will be a constant tendency to
alter muscular adjustments in so far as they are unsuccess-
ful. Hence arise gradual approximations to success, and
it is these which are permanently retained, while all that
belongs to the process of trial, as such, disappears. In
this way a fixed and uniform series of movements is
organised, which can go on of itself without conscious
effort, without trial and failure.*
It will be seen that the formation of habit is an example
of facilitation. The dispositions left behind by previous
conation facilitate subsequent conation in the attainment
*
Op. cit., pp. 267-268.
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of its end. "When this process of facilitation reaches a
point at which conscious endeavour is no longer necessary,
the action becomes automatic.
12. Physiological Dispositions. In using such words as
dispositions and traces, we have hitherto maintained a
strictly psychological point of view. But as conscious
process in general is correlated with nervous process, so
psychological traces and dispositions may be regarded
from another point of view as physiological facts. They
are persistent modifications of nervous structure. Their
existence, inter-connexion, and mode of operation are in
the first instance revealed to us by purely psychological
evidence. But there are many advantages in also con-
sidering them from a physiological point of view. When
we are considering a disposition merely as a trace of
previous consciousness, and a pre-condition of further
conscious process, we may call it a psychical disposition.
" When, on the other hand, we desire to consider
exclusively the physiological side, the term physiological
disposition is in place. WTien both are simultaneously to





THE "FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY" AND ASSOCIATIONISM.
1. Introductory. There are two general theories of







and the other Associationism is at least
obsolescent. But the ways of speaking and thinking which
these theories pre-suppose have obtained such a hold on the
popular mind, and, so far as they are false, they represent
fallacies so natural, that it is worth while to give a critical
account of them.
2. The
"Faculty Psychology" "An individual fact is
said to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, by
stating the law or laws of causation of which its produc-
tion is an instance. Thus a conflagration is explained, when
it is proved to have arisen from a spark falling into the
midst of a heap of combustibles. And in a similar manner,
a law or uniformity in nature is said to be explained
when another law or laws are pointed out, of which that
law itself is but a case, and from which it could be
deduced."* Now a law of causation states a relation between
two terms, cause and effect, antecedent process and result-
ing product. Each of these must have a character of its
own, by which it can be definitely conceived and described.
Where this condition is not fulfilled there is no causal
*
Mill, Logic, 9th edition, vol. i., p. 540.
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law, and explanation is impossible. An effect can-
not be its own cause, and cannot, therefore, afford its own
explanation. But it is a fallacy of not infrequent
occurrence to assign as a cause what turns out on examina-
tion to be only the effect itself, expressed in different
language. This is a special case of the fallacy called
"
argument in a circle," and it usually consists in adducing
as the cause of a special fact the general conception under
which it is comprehended. The classical instance of this
confusion is the reply of Moliere's physician to the question,
11 Why does opium produce sleep ? " " Opium," lie answers,
"produces sleep because it has a soporific tendency." It
is to be noted that the fallacy does not lie in reducing the
particular to the general, for this is the form assumed by
all explanation. The generalised effect (soporific virtue)
is adduced as the cause of the special effect (the produc-
tion of sleep by opium). But in order to explain, we
require a generalised relation between the fact to be
explained and some other fact which determines it
Thus, we may explain why a person goes to sleep by his
having taken opium, but not by his possession of a power
of somnolescence.
In psychology, the fallacy we have described needs to be
guarded against with special care. The form which it is
apt to assume is that of referring a mental state to a
corresponding "faculty." To say that an individual mind
possesses a certain faculty is merely to say that it is capable
of certain states or processes. To assign the faculty as a
cause, or as a real condition of the states or processes, is
evidently to explain in a circle, or in other words it is
a mere failure to explain at all. Thus, it is futile to
say that a particular voluntary decision is due to Will
as a faculty. It is equally futile to say that extraordinary
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persistence in a voluntary decision is due to an extraordinary
strength of Will, or of Will-power, or of the Faculty of
Will. AVe explain nothing
1 by asserting that certain
mental processes in man have their source in the Faculty
of Reason, or that certain other processes in lower animals
have their source in the Faculty of Instinct. It may be
true that conscience is a Compound Faculty including on
the one hand the power of judgment, and on the other
a certain susceptibility of feeling or sentiment. But such
statements in no way account for the actual generation of
a scruple or a twinge of conscience.*




may take either a positive or a merely negative form. A
faculty may be explicitly regarded as an agency or real
condition, producing its own special manifestation, and
interacting with other faculties similarly conceived as
agencies or real conditions. But such a position has
rarely been maintained without disguise or equivocation.
What we find is rather a tendency to rest satisfied with a
reference of this or that state or process to a corresponding
faculty without pushing the inquiry further so as to raise
the question of causal explanation. Reference to a
faculty, though it is futile from the point of view of causal
explanation, may none the less have a good and useful
meaning from another point of view, that of classification.
Now some kind of classification is a primary necessity for
*
Locke, in criticising the phrase, "freedom of the will," has brought
out very clearly the nature of this fallacy. "We may as properly say,
that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as
that the will chooses, or that the understanding conceives ; or, as is usual
that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys, or
obeys not the will ; it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say
that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of
singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking." Essay on Human
Understanding, bk. ii., ch. 21, 17.
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the psychologist. To divide and arrange the various and
fluctuating modes of consciousness in a distinct and orderly
manner, so that each may receive an appropriate name,
this is in itself no small achievement. Many of the
earlier psychologists were so absorbed in inquiries of this
nature that they ignored the need for discussing questions
of origin and development. They tacitly assumed that
the whole problem was one of classification. .If they had
held and expressed this view with full distinctness, there
would have been no ground for charging them with a
fallacy of confusion, and the Faculty Psychology could
not be justly used as a term of reproach. But they were by
no means completely clear as to their own position. They
did not fully realize that they were only classifying and
not explaining. They would probably have repudiated the
charge that they treated faculties as real agencies if the
charge had been distinctly formulated. But none the less,
they frequently used language which implied causal
relation both between faculty and special process and
between different faculties.
Indulgence in such modes of expression had a disastrous
effect. It created an appearance of explanation without
the reality, and in this way seriously retarded the progress
of knowledge. For this reason the word "faculty" has
almost passed out of use in modern psychology. But the
fallacy does not necessarily disappear with the word in
which it has so often found expression. We are by no
means secure against it even in the present day. It is,
therefore, necessary to warn the student against this
peculiar mode of explanation in a circle, and to insist on
the necessity of real explanation by definite conditions,
giving rise to definite results, according to a fixed order.
3. Associationism. Faculty Psychology is valuable,
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if at all, only as a scheme of classification. But the
ultimate aim of science is to explain and not merely to
classify. Hence, when once explanatory principles came
to be clearly conceived and expounded the Faculty
Psychology tended to disappear. Its greatest enemy in
modern times has been the theory of reproduction as
determined by Association. This theory, when pushed to
an extreme, so as to exclude all other modes of explanati :>n,
becomes what is called "Associationism." Such writers as
James Mill in England, and in a very different way
TIerbart in Germany, may be taken as types of it. The
assumption which lies at the basis of Associationism is that
mental conditions can only give rise to a mental product,
if and so far as they reappear in the product as its com-
ponents. From this point of view, to explain the origin of
a state of consciousness is to enumerate its constituent
parts and show how they came to cohere with each other
by association. As all words are put together out of
the letters of the alphabet, so all derivative mental states
and processes are put together out of primary and simple
modes of consciousness, arising from the stimulation
of sensitive surfaces either outside or inside the body.
In ordinary human consciousness these elementary sen-
sations rarely if ever occur in their purity. They
have all acquired associations, so that they now appear
embedded in a cluster of revived residua of previous
experiences. Thus, when an orange is perceived, what is
immediately given in the way of sensation may be only
yellow colour. According to the theory we are considering,
the perception of the orange wholly consists in the more or
less complete re-instatement of past sensations by the
present sensation. The present sensation forms the
nucleus of a cluster of revivals. The immediate ocular
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experience reproduces tlie visual appearance of the orange
from other points of view. It reproduces the smell, and
the taste, and the character of the pulpy contents as
presented to sight and touch.
It is admitted that for the most part the simple components
of such a psychical complex can only be ascertained by
laborious investigation ; that the ordinary states of conscious-
ness which common sense regards as ultimate are really not
ultimate, but have an origin and development due to
psychological conditions. The essential point is that these
conditions are held to operate only in one special manner ;
they combine, and their combination is the effect which they
produce. On this theory, causation and composition coincide.
4. d.ssociationism criticised. "Mental Chemistry" In all
psychical development some kind of association and repro-
duction is involved. So much may be conceded to associa-
tionism. Its defect lies in making the whole process merely
reproductive, to the exclusion of other modes of psychical
interaction, giving rise to new and not merely reproduced
results. In the general course of nature causation and com-
position by no means always coincide. Conditions by no
means always persist in their product as its component parts.
Neither the sculptor's chisel nor its movements form part of
the completed statue. The fire does not remain as an in-
tegral part of a burnt house, or a knife as an integral part of a
wound. The theory which would reduce all mental pro-
duction to reproduction, is, therefore, by no means a self-
evident truth. Its claims to acceptance rest entirely on the
verification which it may receive from experience. What
kind of verification is necessary and attainable ? It would
seem at first sight that this question is easy to answer.
If the producing conditions exist in the product itself we
ought to be able to find them by analytic scrutiny of the
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product. In material compounds this may not be possible,
because the components may bo so intermingled that they
cease to be discernible by our senses. But it is the dis-
tinctive peculiarity of the combinations which are brought
about by mental association and reproduction, that both
the components and their union exist in consciousness. It
would seem, therefore, that it ought to be as easy to detect
the components of such a compound as to spell a word on
phonetic principles.
But this conclusion is too hasty. To exist in con-
sciousness is one thing. To be a discriminated and
identified object of consciousness is quite another thing.
Spoken language is composed of a limited number
of elementary sounds. But language was spoken long
before these elementary sounds were discovered and
represented by an alphabet. So in articulating the sound
of each letter combined movements of the throat, lips,
tongue, and palate are involved. The corresponding
sensations are experienced by everyone who utters the
sounds. But they are only discernible by an express
effort of analytic attention. Most of us never notice them
at all. Again, the timbre of a musical note is due to its
complexity. Overtones are united with a fundamental
tone. These overtones are not as a rule separately dis-
cernible by an unpractised observer. But he may learn to
discriminate them by adopting an appropriate method. If
a simple tone is produced by itself and then compared with
the complex note of which it is an overtone, and if this
process is repeated with sufficient frequency, it becomes
possible to distinguish the overtone as a separate component
of the complex to which it belongs.
It is illegitimate to demand that the constituents of a
complex mode of consciousness shall be immediately obvious
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to simple inspection. But it is both legitimate and necessary
to demand that they shall be ascertainable by a systematic
process of reflective scrutiny conducted under favourable
conditions. To affirm their presence where no scrutiny
can detect them is simply to refuse to appear before
the bar of experience, and judgment must go by
default against those who assume such a position. If
a certain mode of consciousness is alleged to consist of
certain constituents, #, b, c, the only criterion of primary
importance by which we can test their presence is systematic
comparison. "We must compare a, b, and c, severally,
and, if possible, collectively, with what is alleged to be a
product constituted by their combination.
It is necessary to bring the general plan of explanation
which governs the procedure of the Association School to
this test. Brought to this test it certainly collapses. One
of the ablest members of the school, J. S. Mill, has virtually
confessed its bankruptcy in his doctrine of "Mental
Chemistry." "When many impressions or ideas are
operating in the mind together, there sometimes takes
place a process of a similar kind to chemical combination.
When impressions have been so often experienced in
conjunction, that each of them calls up readily and
instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, those ideas
sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and appear
not several ideas, but one ; in the same manner as, when
the seven prismatic colours are presented to the eye in
rapid succession, the sensation produced is that of white.
But as in this last case it is correct to say that the seven
colours, when they rapidly follow one another, generate
white, but not that they actually are white ; so it appears
to me that the Complex Idea, formed by the blending
together of several simpler ones, should, when it really
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appears simple (that is, when the separate elements are not
consciously distinguishable in it), be said to resultfrom, or be
generated by, the simple ideas, not to consist of them. Our
idea of an orange really consists of the simple ideas of a
certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste and smell,
etc., because we can, by interrogating our consciousness,
perceive all these elements in the idea. But we cannot
perceive, in so apparently simple a feeling as our perception
of the shape of an object by the eye, all that multitude of
ideas derived from other senses, without which it is well
ascertained that no such visual perception could ever have
had existence; nor, in our idea of Extension, can we
discover those elementary ideas of resistance, derived from
our muscular frame, in which it has been conclusively
shown that the idea originates. These, therefore, are cases
of mental chemistry; in which it is proper to say that the
simple ideas generate, rather than that they compose, the
complex ones."*
It is well worth while to examine this statement with
some care. We must note that it contains a reluctant confes-
sion of the inadequacy of the Association theory, wrung by
the stress of facts from one of its most devoted adherents.
Mill shows his reluctance by the grudging nature of his
admissions. He maintains the Association theory if and so far
as he can find any plausible pretext for doing so. Thus he
holds that our "idea of an orange really consists of the simple
ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste and
smell, etc., because we can by interrogating our conscious-
ness perceive all these elements in the idea." This is very
plausible. For it is certainly true that when we ask our-
selves what an orange is, we can only answer by enumerat-
ing such characteristics as those assigned. But the real
*
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question at issue is quite different. The real question is
whether in every moment in which we catch sight of an
orange and know it for an orange, all these distinctive
characteristics must be actually presented to consciousness.
It will be seen at once that the necessity of such a collective
resurrection of our previous experiences of oranges, when-
ever one happens to catch our eye, is by no means obvious.
No doubt the visual appearance means all this to us in the
moment in which we become aware of the object. But to
say that a means bed is one thing ; to say that it drags
bed along with it is something altogether different. To
suppose the contrary is, as we said before, like supposing
that a five-pound note must always have five sovereigns
literally wrapped up in it. The note will pass current
instead of five sovereigns, and in like manner the
visual appearance of the orange will in a manner pass
current instead of the special experiences with which
it has been conjoined. It will in certain ways and
to a certain extent determine action, thought, and feeling,
as these experiences will determine action, thought, and
feeling, if they are actually present or actually repro-
duced in the form of ideas.
Though Mill clings to reproduction and association with
all his might, he is in spite of himself compelled to confess
their impotence to solve some of the most vital questions
of genetic psychology. He is constrained to introduce a
new principle of fundamental importance, which is, in a
way, the contrary of that of association. In the products of
associations, the producing factors persist in the result as
its components. In the process of "generation" which Mill
assumes the generating factors effect their own disappear-
ance in giving birth to their product. Its life is their
death. Yet Mill is by no means clearly aware that he is
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deserting the association doctrine. He is rather of opinion
that he is modifying
1 and improving it. This is shown by
his use of the term " Mental Chemistry." A chemical
compound really is a compound. It really " consists
"
of
its components and is not merely "generated" by them.
Its weight is equal to their weight. By appropriate means
the chemical combination can be dissolved so that the
components again exist in a separate form. It is true that
the compound has properties which do not belong to the
components taken separately. But the components do not
cease to exist in order to make way for the new properties
as the generating factors in mental chemistry cease to exist
in producing a new product. It may be said that though they
do not cease to exist, they disappear just as the psycho-
logical factors disappear. But this is equivocation. The
disappearance of the psychological factors is equivalent to
their non-existence : the disappearance of chemical factors
merely means that there are certain ways in which they
cease to manifest their presence to us. The analogy
between the chemical process and the mental, as the mental
is conceived by Mill, appears more plausible from another
point of view. In order that oxygen and hydrogen may
combine to form water they must first be brought together.
Similarly, according to Mill, the generating factors of a new
mental product must first be brought together in a firmly
associated group or cluster before they annul each other
and give place to something radically new. For this
reason, he appears to have imagined that he was still
following the lines of the association theory. But in so
thinking he evidently fell into a "fallacy of confusion."
What he affirms is that a preliminary process of association
and reproductionprecedes the generation of a new and simple
mode of consciousness. What he tacitly assumes is that
Psych. 8
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the process of generation itself is somehow reducible to
association and reproduction. But this is mere confusion
of thought.
" Generation " remains an altogether distinct
process from that which prepares the way for it. The
fallacy had already been pointed out before Mill wrote in
Thomas Brown's criticism of Condillac. "The great error
of Condillac, as it appears to me, consists in supposing that
when he has shown the circumstance from which any
effect results he has shown this result to be essentially the
same with the circumstance which produced it. Certain
sensations have ceased to exist, certain other feelings have
immediately arisen ; these new feelings are, therefore, the
others under another shape. Such is the secret, but very
false logic, which seems to prevade his whole doctrine."*
This applies mutatis mutandis to Mill. He held that
because a certain grouping of mental elements precedes
the emergence of a product distinct from each and all of
them, this product must be the veiy elements themselves
which have "melted and coalesced into one another."
The metaphor of " melting and coalescence," if it is taken
as more than a literary flourish, is quite unmeaning.
Things which "melt and coalesce into one another"
remain in existence after their union. The hydrogen and
oxygen which unite to form water, persist, according to the
principle of the indestructibility of matter, in the compound.
It is only because of their persistence that they can
properly be said to be compounded or to have coalesced.
But there is no principle corresponding to the inde-
structibility of matter applying to modes of consciousness.
They do not persist in their product, and therefore they do
not " melt and coalesce " in it.
We have provisionally assumed Mill's theory that the
*
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of a new mode of consciousness by psycho-
logical conditions must be preceded by an associative
grouping of the generating factors. But, in reality, this
assumption is neither self-evident nor justified by
experience. Mill, at this point, merely shows the strength
of the bias which led him to affirm the Association theory,
even in the act of denying it. From another point of view
also, his account of "mental chemistry" is, in the main,
fictitious. He holds that the co-operative condition entirely
disappears in giving rise to something new. This may
happen in certain cases : but it is certainly not the pre-
vailing rule, and above all it does not apply to the special
class of cases which he refers to. Spatial perception,
tactual and visual, in its various forms and modifications,
is undoubtedly due to a vast complexity of co-operative
conditions which do not appear in the result. But it is
untrue that none of the contributory factors are discernible.
Magnitude, as perceived by the eye, is colour extended or
spread out. Shape, as perceived by the eye, is constituted
by the boundaries of colour. In such perception there is
always present at least visual sensation, and generally
experiences accompanying eye-movements. The spatial
character which belongs to these visual and motor
experiences is indeed derivative and not a datum of
primary sensation. It belongs to them, at least in the
case of human beings, only in virtue of their previous
combination in specific ways with other specific experiences,
tactile, motor, and visual. None the less, the ocular
perception of extended form and magnitude does not float
loose in detachment from all the factors which contributed
to its origin. For among these factors an essential part
is played by the visual and motor sensations, which
become endowed with a spatial character as the result
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of the process. What happens is not that a, I, c, d, e,
the antecedent conditions, all disappear beyond recognition
and leave behind them an x quite disparate from all or any
of them. What happens is rather that one of these
conditions has, through interaction with the others, acquired
a peculiar modification, so that whenever it recurs, it recurs
in a profoundly modified form.
What is true in the doctrine of mental chemistry is the
denial, express or implied, that reproduction by association
is the only principle of fundamental importance controlling





1. Sensation and Stimulus. One characteristic mark
of what we agree in calling sensation is its mode of
production. It is caused by what we call a stimulus. A
stimulus is always some condition, external to the nervous
system itself and operating upon it. This stimulus may
consist in physiological change originating in the organism
itself, as in the case of organic sensations, or in physical
conditions external to the organism, which act on the
peripheral organs of sense, and by means of afferent
nerves affect the central nervous system. The change in
the internal state of the body which gives rise to organic
sensation may be initiated, in the first instance, by an
external stimulus acting on peripheral organs as in the
case of tickling. We have also to count among the various
modes of stimulation the irritant effect of certain variations
in the nature, and the distribution of the blood-supply
within the brain, leading to hallucinations. Causal
dependence on some kind of external condition is essential
to the conception of sensation.
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It is above all things important to distinguish the cause
of sensation from the object of sense-perception. A man
examining a material thing present to his senses may
successively or simultaneously see it, feel it, weigh it in
his hand, hear the sound it makes, smell it, and taste it.
In so doing he perceives its sensible qualities, such as
colour, hardness, weight, odour, and flavour. He does so
by means of the sensations which are produced in him by
the varying relations of his sensitive organism to the
object. But the sensible qualities perceived are by no
means identical with the cause of sensation. The colour-
sensation, for instance, is due to a vibratory motion of the
particles of the luminiferous ether, giving rise to certain
chemical or physical changes in the organ of vision, and
so to a certain modification of connected parts of the
nervous system. But these conditions are not what a man
sees when he perceives the colour red or blue. Similarly,
the weight of the object as perceived is by no means to be
identified with the changes produced by it in the skin,
muscles, tendons, etc., which occasion the sensations
necessary to the perception of the weight.
Sensations are essential to the perception of things
and their qualities ; but in the conception of what con-
stitutes a sensation we abstract from the cognitive function
which belongs to it as an element in the perception of an
object. The vital point on which we fix attention is that
a sensation is a mode of consciousness produced by a
specific mode of stimulation, and having its own specific
nature ultimately determined by the conditions which pro-
duce it. We have noted that the producing conditions may,
in the first instance, be external to the organism. But they
can only affect the nervous system by first operating on those
parts of the organism, which we call the organs of sense.
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Thus the changes in the organ of sense, and the subsequent
processes by which these changes affect the nervous
system, constitute the essential antecedents of the sensation.
2. Sensory Elements. If I look at grass, I have the
sensation of green. If I look at snow, I have the sensa-
tion of white. I can assign no psychological reason why
in the one case the sensation is that of white and in the
other that of green. The difference can only be accounted
for by the different way in which my eye is affected by
different kinds of light. So in all cases the qualities of
sensation must be ultimately accounted for by reference to
the nature of the stimulus.
If I do not actually see grass or snow, but summon up
mental pictures of them in my mind's eye, the qualities of
greenness and whiteness are present in my mental image
as they are present in actual perception. Now these
qualities would not be present in the mental image unless
they had been previously produced by the operation of an
external stimulus. For this reason, some waiters would
apply the term sensation to these qualities even when they
appear in the mental image. Both in actual perception
and in the mental image they defy psychological analysis,
and can be ultimately accounted for only by reference to
external stimulation. There is, however, an objection to
applying the word sensation to both cases indifferently.
Though greenness appears both in the perception and in
the mental image of grass, it appears in a different manner
in each instance. The present operation of the external
stimulus gives it peculiar intensity, steadiness, and other
distinctive characters, which do not belong to it in the
mental image. It is better to restrict the term sensation to
the special form of consciousness which accompanies the
actual operation of the stimulus. The qualities of sensation
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as they appear in mental imagery may be called sensory
elements, but not sensations. The term elements indicates
that their peculiar nature cannot be psychologically
accounted for, that ultimately it can only be explained by
reference to an external stimulus. The word sensory in-
dicates that their existence pre-supposes the previous
existence of corresponding sensations.
3. Mere Sensation. In denning sensation we have
disregarded the cognitive function which it may discharge
as a constituent element in the perception of an object.
It does not follow from this that sensation can actually
exist without cognitive function. This is a question to be
separately considered on its own merits. We may
formulate it as follows : Is there such a thing as mere
sensation ? We owe to Professor Stumpf an argument
which seems to settle this question in the affirmative. It
is based on the fact that within limits we can vary a
stimulus without producing any perceptible difference in
the object cognised. If this variation in the stimulus is
accompanied by variation in the sense-experience, then we
have a variation in the sense-experience which makes no
difference to cognition. There is a difference in mere
sensation, but not in perception. That, as a matter of fact,
this is so may be demonstrated as follows. We may vary
the physical conditions on which the pitch of a musical
note depends, so as to produce a graduated scale of notes
increasing or decreasing in pitch. Symbolise the series by
P!, P2, P3 , P4 , P5, Pn- Now, if the variation of the
physical conditions is sufficiently gradual, Pl may be quite
indistinguishable from P2, and similarly P2 may be quite
indistinguishable from Ps , and P3 from P4 . None the less,
P4 will be perceived as distinctly different from P,. But
this would be impossible unless the change in the physical
3.] SENSATION DEFINED. 121
conditions were accompanied by a change in the sensation,
even when the change is imperceptible. If the pitch-sen-
sation Pl is regarded as identical with the pitch-sensation
P2 , merely because the one note is indistinguishable from
the other, and if in like manner P2 is regarded as identical
with P3, and P3 with P4 , and so on, thenPl must be identical
with Pn
,
and it would be impossible tha.t any perceptible
difference should ever arise. The same argument may be
applied to a gradual increase in heat or weight or
pressure or brightness. The burden on a man's back may
be increased by sufficiently gradual additions from an
ounce to a stone without his noticing the successive
increments. If these successive increments made no
difference to his sensation, the sensation produced by a
stone weight would be all the same to him as the sensation
produced by an ounce.
The merit of Stumpf's argument lies in the exact and
cogent form into which it is thrown. But the same point
may be brought out by an appeal to common experience.
It is easy to show that there is by no means a complete
coincidence between the existence of sensations and their
cognitive function. They may exist as possible material
for perceptual consciousness, without being actually
utilized. "At this moment I am thinking about psycho-
logical topics. I receive at the same time a multitude of
diversified impressions from surrounding things which
certainly enter into my total experience. But if I refer
them to an object at all, I do so in a very indeterminate
way. My perceptual discrimination is very far from keep-
ing pace with the differentiation of the sensory data as
immediately experienced."* The room is well-lighted,
and the sun is shining in at the window. But, with, my
*
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thoughts otherwise occupied, I do not notice this. My
thoughts might be similarly occupied in the twilight
without my noticing that it was twilight. But my total
experience would be different in the two cases. The kind
and degree of illumination modifies my consciousness, even
though I do not take cognisance of it. In like manner, I
often, in becoming aware of a sound, am at the same time
aware that I have been hearing it for some time past
without being aware of it. The corresponding sensation
was present in my consciousness though I did not notice
the sound.*
4. Sensation as Cognitive State distinguished from Sen-
sation as Cognised Object. We must distinguish the know-
ledge, of which sensations are the vehicle, from the
knowledge which has for its object sensations themselves.
It is true that without the sensations we can have no
knowledge of them : but it is not true that whatever we
know by means of sensations is knowledge of these sen-
sations. We must distinguish between what a sense-
experience means and what it is in its own intrinsic nature.
The image thrown by an object on the retina of the eye
decreases in magnitude as the distance of the object
increases. This involves a corresponding difference in the
visual sensation. When we deliberately fix our attention
on the sensation and its phases, we may, with practice and
by using appropriate means, notice this difference. We
may become aware that a man entering a room and
approaching us apparently increases in stature. But for
the most part we ignore these variations in our experience.
None the less, they fulfil a cognitive function. They help
to determine our perception of the distance of the object
seen. It is the business of the artist to attend to these
*
Cf. Bk. i.,ch. i., 5.
I 4.] SENSATION DEFINED. 123
and other differences in visual sensation, and reproduce
them in his pictures. Only in this way is he enabled to
effect an artistic illusion. He must reproduce differences
of colour and of shading, etc., and differences due to the
varying way in which objects in varying positions affect
the eye. But for all this he needs a special training.
He has to learn to notice what nobody notices in ordinary
life. In ordinary life, people attend only to what the
sense-experience practically means. The artist must
acquire the power of attending to the intrinsic nature of
the sense-experience itself.
Similarly, in psychology, we have to attend to sensations,
as such : we have to examine their attributes as psychical
states, and not merely their meaning as vehicles of
knowledge. The two points of view only partially coincide.
If we compare the colour red as a quality of a material
object with the colour red as a quality of the corresponding
sensation, we find that redness as immediately perceived is
an attribute common to both. The difference lies in the
different relations into which it enters in the two cases.
As a quality of the thing, it is considered in relation to
other qualities of the thing, its shape, texture, flavour,
odour, etc. As a psychical state, it is considered as a
peculiar modification of the consciousness of the percipient,
in relation to the general flow of his mental life. But this
is not the only difference. When we are attending to
redness as a sensation, we take cognisance of many
characteristics which are usually ignored when we are only
interested in it as a quality of material objects. The
manifold variations which the colour of an object under-
goes under varying phases of illumination are, to a large
extent, ignored in ordinary perception, because they make
no practical difference in the nature of the object as a
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physical thing. The colour is regarded as the same, and
the illumination alone as varying. But for the psycho-
logist, whose interest is in the sensation, and not in the
physical object, these variations are of primary importance,
and he, like the artist, must fix attention upon them.
Sensations, as such, therefore, are psychical states.
These psychical states, as such, become objects only when
we attend to them in an introspective way. Otherwise
they are not themselves objects, but only constituents of
the process by which objects are cognised.
CHAPTEE II.
THE SEXSATIOX-llEFLEX.
1. As distinguished from Physiological Reflex. "We
may define a reflex act" says Dr. Waller, "as the immediate
motor response to centripetal excitation."* The emphasis
here is on the immediacy of the response. The reaction
depends directly on the stimulus, so that it always
occurs in an invariable and inevitable manner whenever
the stimulus is repeated, and is discontinued when the
stimulus ceases to operate. If we irritate with acetic acid
the thigh of a frog whose cerebral hemispheres have
been removed, the leg is jerked away. By using
a suitable apparatus it may be arranged that whenever
the leg is thus jerked away it comes in contact with
a hot plate ; when this happens, it is jerked back
again. On being again irritated, it is once more jerked
away and once more conies in contact with the hot plate,
when it is again withdrawn; and so the process may go on
until the limits of fatigue are reached.
A reflex act may be performed without being accompanied
by change in consciousness, or at least by any conspicuous
change. Coughing and sneezing are reflex acts, due to
irritation of the mucous membrane. But a person may
sneeze or cough either unconsciously or consciously.
*IInman Physiology, p. 294.
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Perhaps the unconsciousness is in any case not complete ;
but it is often very nearly so. The consciousness on the
other hand is sometimes very keen, as when the irritation
of the mucous membrane is violent. Now those reflex
actions which, roughly speaking, take place unconsciously,
may be described as physiological ; those which take place
with consciousness may be described as sensational.
There is no reason for believing that the physiological
reflex is effected through nerve-fibres other than those which
convey and effect the sensation-reflex.
The sensation-reflex is the most primitive form of mental
life which is distinctly recognisable. If, then, we fix the
conditions under which the physiological passes into the
sensational reflex, we thereby fix the conditions under
which mental life first appears in a definite form. These
conditions appear to be two-fold. In the first place, the
merely physiological reflex is found where the action takes
place regularly and uniformly in response to stimulation
which is uniformly and regularly recurrent. The sensation-
reflex, on the other hand, takes place on a com-
paratively special emergency, which is only of occasional
occurrence. In the second place, much depends on the
degree in which the mind is pre-occupied by higher pro-
cesses. A man may cough unconsciously when he is
absorbed in some interesting topic, although in a less
pre-occupied condition of mind the cough would have been
a sensation-reflex. The more pre-occupied he is, the more
intense must the irritation be in order to produce an
appreciable sensation. Taking up the first point, it is plain
that those reflex movements which belong to the ordinary
and normal routine of the vegetative life of the organism
are almost wholly physiological. The heart's beat and




, swallowing, the secretion of saliva,
and the like, are not normally accompanied by distinctly
appreciable sensations. I say distinctly appreciable sensations,
because, in all probability, they do in their totality con-
tribute to determine the state of consciousness as a whole,
giving it a certain tone or modality. But the effects of the
various organic processes blend into avague total experience.
Their several effects are not separately appreciable. The
most we can say is that, as Dr. Michael Foster puts it, "if the
whole of our abdominal viscera were removed, we should
be aware of the loss as a change in our commoYi or general
sensibility."* On the other hand, when a stimulus is of
comparatively occasional occurrence, and prompts a special
combination of movements to meet a special emergency,
the concomitant experience may disengage itself from
the vague mass of general sentience and become salient in
consciousness. The more special the occasion, and the
more intense the stimulation, the more definitely does the
sensation-reflex stand out in its own proper character as
distinguished from the physiological reflex. Coughing is
an act required only now and then, when irritating matter
happens to be lodged in the throat. Hence in waking life
it is usually a sensation-reflex, when the mind is not other-
wise too much pre-occupied, or when the irritation is
intense enough to counteract even a strong pre-occupation.
The act of swallowing belongs to the fixed routine of
vegetative life, and is not in the ordinary course of things
accompanied by a separately appreciable experience. But
if we touch the back of the tongue with a finger, or tickle
it with a feather, this is an interruption of routine requiring
a special adjustment adapted to the special emergency,
which cannot be made without a well-marked modification
* Text-Book of Physiology, book iii., ch. vi., p. 1421.
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of consciousness. So, breathing is normally unconscious ;*
but if any difficulty or obstruction occurs in the respiratory
process, it at once becomes accompanied and prompted by
painful sensations.
On the second point we need not say much. Where
the mind is much pre-occupied, we may have a physio-
logical reflex where otherwise we should have had a sen-
sational reflex. As an extreme example of the effect of
mental pre-occupation we may refer to the soldier who in
the heat of the battle is unaware of being wounded. What
most concerns us is the fact that at the lower levels of
organic life, where action is largely or mainly reflex, so
that higher processes play a comparatively small part,
there can be very little mental pre-occupation. Thus, the
lower we descend in the scale, the stronger is the presumption
that a reflex act adapted to meet an occasional emergency is
of a sensational and not merely of a phsysiological character.
2. Distinguished from Perceptual Reaction and Ideational
Reaction. In sensation-reflexes specially coordinated move-
ments follow the mere existence of a sensation as an isolated
and transient experience ; the movements are not prompted
and guided by any meaning which the sensation may convey.
Where movement is determined by what the recognised
quality of the sensation points to, by what it gives warning
of, the reaction is to that extent perceptual or ideational, not
merely sensational. The distinction may be illustrated by
the difference between sneezing and repressing a sneeze.
The sneeze follows the irritation of the mucous membrane.
This is a sensation -reflex. It arises from the mere
existence of the feeling of irritation. On the other hand, the
* This means that the breathing-sensations are normally merged in the
mass of general sentience ; they are not normally prominent in
consciousness, as they are when breathing is obstructed.
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repression of an inconvenient sneeze, or the turning of the
head aside, or similar measures of precaution, are at least
perceptual acts and may involve distinct ideas. The agent
performs them because he recognises the irritation as of a
certain kind pointing to certain consequences which are
inconvenient at the moment. "What determines his conduct
is the cognitive function of the sensation, not its mere
existence as a feeling, a transient and isolated experience.
The presence of ideal representations in the way of mental
imagery is not necessary. We may not be able to spare
time to call up a mental picture or a verbal description
of the consequences of sneezing in a person's face. A
recognised sensory quality comes before the mind as
having a certain special significance : it presents itself
as a fragment of a whole ; it points beyond its own
existence
;
in virtue of this cognitive value which it
possesses, it prompts to a certain line of action, such as
the repression of the sneeze.
In this case, a sensational impulse comes into conflict with
a perceptual, and it is a matter of doubt which will prevail.
Many sensational impulses, when they reach a certain in-
tensity, become quite uncontrollable even in human beings ;
this may help us to understand the almost mechanical way
in which they repeat themselves without modification by
experience in some of the lower animals, whose perceptual
consciousness is comparatively little developed. For the
power of learning by experience first arises with perception,
with meaning and the acquisition of meaning. The purely
sensory reaction, unguided by higher modes of conscious-
ness, follows inevitably its appropriate stimulus. Thus a
moth or a " daddy-long-legs
"
flies again and again into
the flame in spite of the obviously painful result. Here
we have apparently a sensory reaction uncontrolled by
Psych. 9
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perceptual consciousness. The brightness of the flame
produces an immediate sense-impulse to move in its direc-
tion. But the light-sensation is not correlated with other
experiences ; it does not acquire a warning significance.
From the biological point of view, the action required in
response to a stimulus is one which serves to maintain the
life and well-being of the organism. The appropriate
response may be determined by the special nature of the
agency acting on the organism ; and it may be more or less
delicately differentiated according to the varying nature
of this agency. In so far as this is the case, the reaction is
perceptual rather than sensational. On the other hand,
many agents differing in their own nature may impress
the organism in a similar manner, and so give rise to a
similar response. In so far as this is the case, the reaction
approximates to the purely sensational type. Thus, when
a part of the body is cut or bruised or otherwise
suffers direct injury, it matters not at the moment
whether a stone, a piece of wood, or a piece of iron,
does the mischief. In each case, the rapid withdrawal
of the part of the body affected, or of the body as a
whole, is the appropriate reaction, and follows directly on
the unpleasant sensation. It depends on the mere existence
of the sensation as a painful experience ; it does not depend
on the specific nature of the sensation being recognised or
known for what it is; this is only necessary when the
specific nature of the sensation points to something beyond
itself to some special kind of material agent ; and when
the organism has to adjust itself in reference not to the
immediate operation of this agent, but to its other qualities
and modes of behaviour, as when an animal perceives its
prey in the distance. Such adjustment requires a
prospective attitude of mind, a state of expectant attention
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and of preparation for future aetion. It is the beginning
of a systematic coordination of successive actions, deter-
mined by the whole nature of the object which thus reveals
its presence. Where the appropriate reaction takes place,
so to speak, on the spur of the moment, and is not the
commencement of a systematic combination of successive
acts, so directed as to secure some remoter good or avert
some remoter evil, it need be determined by nothing but
the sense-experience as an immediate feeling, independently
of its cognitive function.
3. Conative and Iledonic Aspect of the Sensation-Reflex.
The movements arising from sense-impulses display in a
simple and distinct manner an antithesis which pervades
all manifestations of mind. They are directed either, on
the one hand, to the removal, avoidance, or abatement of
the stimulation which excites them, or, on the other, to its
detention, maintenance, or increase. The first kind of
reaction may be called positive, and the second negative.
The psychical states which find expression in these antithetic
types of movement, show a corresponding contrast of a two-
fold character. The reaction of avoidance or repulsion is the
outward manifestation of disagreeable consciousness, and
also of aversion, or, as Hobbes would say, of " endeavour
fromward;" the positive reaction is the manifestation of
r.greeable consciousness and also of appetition, or "en-
deavour toward." Appetition and aversion are the
fundamentally antithetic directions of psychical activity;
their contrast is a contrast which belongs to the conative
or striving aspect of consciousness. Pleasure and dis-
pleasure are the fundamental antithetic modes of feeling-
tone. Their contrast is a contrast which belongs to the
hedonic aspect of consciousness. In the purely sensory
impulse, appetition always actually coincides with pleasure,
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and aversion always actually coincides with pain. At
higher levels of psychical life, the coincidence between
positive conation and positive tone of feeling, and between
negative conation and negative tone of feeling is by no
means complete. After a fashion, the sensation-reflex may
be described as an activity inasmuch as it has a conative
aspect in the way of appetition or aversion. But the
activity involved is of a rudimentary and primitive kind,
just as the process itself is of a rudimentary and primitive
kind. The sensation-reflex consists in a single simul-
taneous act
;
in this respect it is contrasted with perceptual
process, which may, and usually does, combine a series of
distinct and successive acts in the unity of a single action
directed towards a single end. Thus, in the case of percep-
tual activity, we may speak of progress towards an end,
which may or may not be interrupted or obstructed in its
course. In the case of the sensation-reflex, on the contrary,
the word " progress" has little or no meaning. It is for
this reason that in it appetitive conation and agreeable
feeling completely coincide. This is not the case in per-
ceptual process, because disagreeable feeling may arise
through obstruction of appetitive activity, which none the
less remains appetitive although it has become disagreeably
toned. We are endeavouring to hit the nail on the head
even when we miss it.
We may briefly describe the physiological process involved
in a sensation-reflex as follows. A stimulus disturbs the
equilibrium of the nervous system. The subsequent pro-
cess consists in the recovery of nervous equilibrium. When
this is accomplished the end of the whole activity is attained,
and it ceases. To put it simply, the excitement is allayed.
The tendency to equilibrium is the physiological correlate
of what on the psychical side we call conation, the striving
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aspect of consciousness. But the nervous system may
regain its balance in two opposite ways. It may be that
it can only do so by removal of the stimulation which starts
the whole process. On the other hand, it may happen that
the continuance of the stimulation for a longer or shorter
time is a positive condition of the reattainment of equi-
librium. In the first case, we have pain and aversion ; in
the second, pleasure and appetition. As a rule, the more
important is the perceptual function of a sensation, the less
emphatic is its feeling-tone, and the more it approximates
to a mere sensation concerned in merely sensory reaction,
the more emphatic is its feeling-tone.
4. Relative Purity of Sensation-Reflex. The same
sensation may, by its mere existence as a momentary
experience, issue or tend to issue in a certain movement,
and at the same time it may also determine action by its
significance. Thus the perceptual may mingle with the
sensational impulse, so that in practice it may sometimes
be difficult to draw the line between them. The two modes
of consciousness blend in intricate ways and in varying
degrees.* In general, they bear an inverse ratio to each
other. The lower we descend in the scale of animal life,
the more important is sensation ; the higher we ascend, the
more important is perception. It should, however, be clearly
understood that in theory the distinction between them is
sharp and clear. This is peculiarly evident when the per-
ceptual impulse depending on the meaning of a sensation
is contrary to the sensational impulse itself, as when we
repress a coming sneeze.
* This applies almost, if not quite, universally to the developed human
consciousness. The nearest approach to the pure sensation-reflex in
adult human beings is the reaction which accompanies intense bodily
pain, especially if it occurs suddenly without the subject being prepared,
for it beforehand.
CHAPTEE HI.
DIFFERENTIATION OF SENSE-EXPERIENCE, AND ITS
PSYCHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.
1. Differentiation and Integration. The lower we descend
in the scale of animal life, the more important is sensation ;
the higher we mount, the more important is perception,
in other words, the intrinsic intensity and feeling-tone of
sensation counts for less; its meaning counts for more.
The reaction which it sets up is directed not so much to
the maintenance or removal of the present stimulation as
to the attainment of remoter ends.
This graduated difference in the relative prominence of
sensation and perception is accompanied and manifested
by a corresponding variation in the nature of sense-experi-
ence itself. The more developed is perceptual consciousness
the more delicately differentiated is sense-experience. In
other words, there is a finer correspondence between differ-
ences in the nature of the external stimulus, and differences
in the sensation produced. With this finer differentiation
is connected more definite restriction. The more delicately
discriminated sensations are, the more capable they are of
co-existing simultaneously in the same consciousness with-
out mutual interference or amalgamation. "Colours,"
says Dr. Ward, "are with us so distinct from sounds
that except as regards the drain upon attention there is
134
2.] SENSE-DIFFERENTIATION. 135
nothing in the intensest colour to affect the simultaneous
presentation of a sound. But, at the beginning, whatever
we regard as the earliest differentiation of sound might
have been incopresentable with the earliest differentiation
of colour, if sufficiently diffused, just as now a field of sight
all blue is incopresentable with one all red. Or, if the
stimuli appropriate to both were active together, the
resulting sensation might have been what we should
describe as a blending of the two, as purple is a blending
of red and violet;"* Thus " increased differentiation seems
to be intimately connected with increased 'restriction.' "f
With differentiation and restriction there is loss of the in-
tensity and of the intrinsic pleasantness or painfulness of
the sensation itself. The intensity and feeling-tone of
sensation need to be strongly emphasised, where the
reaction depends directly on the mere existence of the
sensation, as such. In so far as the reaction depends on
the meaning of the sensation, and not on its mere existence,
the important point is that its special quality should corre-
spond accurately to the special quality of the stimulus.
Any direct effect produced by its own intrinsic intensity
and feeling-tone would interfere with its value as a vehicle
of meaning as an indication of something beyond its own
existence. Thus, as perceptual consciousness becomes
relatively more prominent and important, sensation is
more delicately differentiated, more definitely restricted,
less intense, and less strongly toned in the way of pleasure
or pain.
2. Differentiation of Sense- Organs. Degree of discrimi-
native sensibility corresponds broadly to the complexity
and differentiation of the organs of sense. If the nerve-
* Article " Psychology," Encyclop. Brit., ninth ed., part xx., p. 46.
t Ibid.
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fibres running to the skin in human beings are laid bare
and directly stimulated,
"
then, however they be stimulated,
be the stimulus weak or strong, if consciousness be affected
at all, the affection takes on the form of pain; psycho-
logical examination of the subjective result discloses nothing
that can be called a sensation of touch."* Touch- or
pressure-sensations, delicately differentiated as they are,
and almost neutral in tone, and capable of combining in
one moment of consciousness a great variety of qualitative
differences, can only be developed by the help of special
terminal organs. But cutaneous pain-sensations, and all
organic sensations which are vague, diffusive, and strongly-
toned, arise without the help of specially differentiated
end-organs. Now, in the ascending scale of animal life,
we find a growing complexity and differentiation of the
terminal organs of sense and of their nervous con-
nexions, marking a correspondingly graduated displacement
of sensational by perceptual consciousness.
In following the ascending scale of animal life, we find a
gradual evolution of specialised structures for the reception
of special kinds of external stimulation ; beginning with
those which are scarcely distinguishable from the general
surface of the body, and ending with such elaborate organs
as the human eye or ear. The best illustration is drawn
from sight, because most is known about it. It must be
understood that the word
"sight" is here used to mean
merely
"
sensitiveness to light." It must not be assumed
that the sensations produced by luminous vibrations are
the same in the higher organisms as in the lower.
In some lowly organisms which have no eyes the general
surface of the body appears to be sensitive to light. This
is the case with earth-worms and newts. "It is easy to
*
Foster, Text-Book of Physiology, p. 1427.
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imagine," says Lubbock, "that in unpigmented animals
whose skins are more or less semi-transparent, the light
might act directly on the nervous system even though it
could not produce anything which could be called vision."*
Certainly it would be misleading to call the experience
of the earth-worm a visual sensation. "We must rather
suppose it to be a kind of general organic discomfort.
The most rudimentary beginning of a special structure
for the reception of light-stimulation consists simply in
groups of pigmented cells with a nervous connexion.
The pigmented material occurring in a semi-transparent
organism arrests and absorbs the light. The limpet
has eye-spots of this simple kind "on the outer side
of the tentacles where the eyes are situated in more
highly organised species,"f The skin is thrown into a
pit within which the epithelial cells are elongated and
pigmented.
The next step is the development of a lens for condensing
the light in the manner of a burning-glass. Some species
of worms have only pigmented cells, others have a concen-
trating apparatus. These simple eye-spots, consisting of
pigmented cells and a vitreous body or condensing lens,
may exist in great numbers over the general surface of
the organism. Thus in a species of worm called "Poly-
ophthalmians
" there is a series of eye-spots "along the
sides of the body, in pairs from the seventh to the
eighteenth segments."J Such rudimentary organs can only
serve to render the creature sensitive to degree of illumi-
nation, to the transition from light to darkness ; they thus
make possible a protective reaction when the shadow of an
approaching object falls on the animal.
* The Senses of Animals, p. 207. f Lubbockj P- cit -> ? 139<
J Op. cit., p. 134.
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The next important step is the development of a rudi-
mentary retina, essentially consisting in a layer of rod-like
nerve-endings. The eye of the snail is situated on its hinder
horn or tentacle. It consists of a cornea or transparent
horny integument, a lens, and a retina composed of three
layers, (1) the rods, which are the proper organ of vision,
(2) a cellular layer, (3) a fibrous layer. "In all proba-
bility the eye does little more than enable the snail to
distinguish between light and dark." "It does not seem
to be aware of an object unless it is brought within a
quarter-of-an-inch of its tentacle."* The rods of the retina
in which the optic nerve terminates in all probability
merely render the animal differentially sensitive to different
directions of the light. In many animals which possess
these retinal rods the formation of an image in any way
comparable to that thrown on the retina of the human eye
is impossible from the position and convexity of the lens.
These eyes with rudimentary retinas, more or less sensitive
to direction, may be spread in great numbers over the
surface of the body. There are certain species of a genus
of sea-shore slugs called Oncliidium which have these
scattered eye-spots in varying numbers, some a hundred,
others as few as twelve. The number differs in different
individuals of the same species, and the eyes "are con-
tinually growing and being reabsorbed."f The back of
the Onchidium contains a number of glands, each opening
by a minute pore ; and it has been suggested that when
warned by the shadow of certain flying-fish which come
out of the sea to prey upon them, the little slugs emit a
shower of spray and so drive off their enemy.
The next stage in the development of the eye is the
* Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 293.
t Lubbock, The Senses of Animals, p. 143.
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formation of a retinal image by means of a lens ; it is
necessary for this that each diverging pencil of rays from
a point in the object shall be brought again to a focus in
one point, and in only one point, of the retina. The
delicacy and perfection with which this is effected depends
on the complexity of structure of the retina, on the nature
of the lens, and on the power of adjusting it for different
distances. Cuttle-fish and their allies have well-developed
apparatus for the formation of images. So have vertebrate
animals, but of course in varying degrees. Many fishes
do not distinguish their food (worms) at a greater distance
than three or four feet. On the other hand, some of them
have very accurate vision for short distances.
" I have
often seen," says Mr. Bateson,
" a large Wrasse search the
sand for shrimps, turning sideways, and looking with
either eye independently, like a chameleon. Its view is so
good that it can see a shrimp with certainty when the
whole body is buried in grey sand, excepting the antennae
and antennae plates."* Some reptiles and amphibians have
similar accuracy of vision at short distances.
Besides this main line of development of the visual
organ which leads up to the eye of vertebrates, with its
apparatus for forming a distinct image by means of a lens
and delicately sensitive retina, there is a branch line which
leads to the compound or facetted eye of insects and of
Crustacea such as crabs and lobsters. The surface of these
compound eyes is divided up into a great number of
hexagonal areas, each of which is called a facet, and in
some insects forms a little lens. A kind of dragon-fly is
stated to have twenty thousand of these hexagonal facets.
Beneath each facet is a crystalline cone, with its base
towards the facet and its apex turned inwards, where it
* Quoted by Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 287.
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ends in great elongated cells ; in the midst of these there
is a nerve-rod. Dark pigment is developed round each of
the cones. " Starting from a simple form of eye consisting
of a lens and a nerve-fibre, we should arrive at the com-
pound eye by bringing together a number of such
eye-spots, and increasing the number of lenses, while the
separate cells beneath each lens coalesced to form a single
crystalline cone and rod." As regards the way in which
these eyes perform their function, there has been much
dispute. But it is now pretty clearly made out that the
facetted organs taken collectively fulfil in a different way
the same office as the lens in the eye of vertebrates. Only
those rays of light which go straight through a crystalline
cone affect the nerve-rod. All the rest which strike the
cones obliquely are absorbed by pigment. Thus, each of
the cones conveys to its own nerve-rod a single minute
spot of light coming from a single point in the field of
view, and from that point only. The result is what Lloyd
Morgan calls a
"
stippled image."* The range of vision
with such eyes is much smaller, and the image which they
form must be far less accurate and distinct than in the
higher vertebrates.
*
Op. cit., p. 290,
CHAPTEE IV.
LIGHT-SEXSATIOM".
1. Introductory. Having given a general account of
the nature of sensation, and of the sense-reaction, we now
pass to the special senses, beginning with those we know
most about, sight and hearing. Sight is a vehicle of spatial
perception, and it is so in part because of the peculiar
nature of visual sensation. But we shall postpone treat-
ment of this part of the subject, until we come to deal
with perceptual as distinct from sensational consciousness.
At present we are only concerned with the peculiar modi-
fications of consciousness specifically corresponding to
differences in the nature of the physical stimulus which we
call light. In other words, we have to deal with colour-
sensations, including the neutral tints, white, black, and
intermediate greys.
2. Nature of the Stimulus. Physically considered, light
is an undulating movement of the particles of a generally
diffused medium called the luminiferous ether. For our
purposes, we may represent this undulating movement by
the waves which pass along a rope, when it is fixed at one
end, and jerked up and down by the hand at the other.
As the wave traverses the rope, what travels along it is not
of course the material particles of the rope themselves, but
only a form of movement which is transmitted from one
141
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set of particles to another. The hand may move more or
less quickly ; the more quickly it moves, the shorter are the
waves. In the undulating
1 movement the particles of the
rope first rise above and then fall beneath their position
of equilibrium when the rope is -at rest. They rise to a
crest, and sink into a hollow. The length of the wave is
measured by the distance between the point at which this
movement begins and the point at which it terminates.
Longer waves traverse the rope in the same time as
shorter ones; hence the shorter wave must be more fre-
quently repeated in the same time. Thus the shorter the
wave the shorter time it takes to complete itself. The
amplitude of the wave must be carefully distinguished from
its length. The hand, while continuing to repeat its move-
ments in the same time, and consequently producing waves
of the same length, may take a more or less extended
swing. The more extended the swing, the greater is the
amplitude of the waves that traverse the rope. The
particles of the rope rise higher and sink lower; their
crests are higher and their hollows deeper. Suppose now
that the hand, in making its excursion to and fro, also
trembles. Two different kinds of impulse are then com-
municated to the rope, each of which separately would give
rise to waves of different length. The result is waves of a
more complex form which can be mathematically explained
as due to a combination of the waves which the separate
impulses would severally produce.
Thus we can distinguish three characteristics of an undu-
lating movement: (1) wave-length, (2) amplitude, (3)
simplicity or complexity. In the case of light, each of
these characters of the physical undulation is specially
connected with a corresponding characteristic of visual sen-
sation. Differences of wave-length are specially connected
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with differences of colour-quality other than those which
are constituted by degrees of paleness or darkness, viz.
by more or less resemblance to white or black. Colour-
quality in this restricted sense is called colour-tone. For
example, the difference between yellow and green, or
between yellow-green and a still yellower green, is a
difference of colour-tone. The difference between yellow
and yellowish-brown is difference in saturation due to a
darkening of the yellow. The amplitude of the
wave is specially connected with the intensity of the
sensation. Any specific colour-tone, such as green or
red, produced by light of a certain wave-length, may
be made brighter or less bright by increasing or
diminishing the intensity of the light, viz. the amplitude
of the vibration. It may become brighter without alter-
ation of its colour-tone. If we have a series of greys
including what we call white, arranged in a graduated
scale of brightness, it is possible to fix the brightness of a
given colour, such as green, by comparing it with the
greys. It is judged to be equally bright with one of them,
and more or less bright than the rest. The complexity of a
wave determines what is called the degree of saturation or
purity of the corresponding colour. AVe can, as we have
seen, compare a green with a grey or w
Thite in respect of
intensity or brightness : but we can also compare it in
another respect : we can ask how far the green resembles
the grey in quality. It may be a greenish grey or a
greyish green, or apparently a pure green. The more it
approximates to grey, the less saturated it is, and the more
free it is from any apparent admixture of grey, the more
saturated it is.
It must not be supposed that colour-tone is determined
solely by wave-length, intensity solely by amplitude,
U4 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. n., CH. iv.
and degree of saturation solely by complexity. It is
only within certain limits that the physical intensity
of light can be varied without affecting colour-tone.
Variation in the intensity of the light also affects
saturation; increase makes the colour whiter, and
decrease makes it darker. Wave-length not only deter-
mines colour-tone, but also helps to determine bright-
ness. Some colour-tones are brighter than others, even
though the physical stimulus is less intense. Com-
plexity of vibration is a very important factor indeed in
determining colour-tone. The same colours which are
produced by simple waves can be produced by complex
waves also, though in a less pure or saturated form.
White or grey results from a combination of lights
of all wave-lengths, and also from various other com-
binations. In ordinary daylight, all wave-lengths are
combined.
3. Structure of the Eye, For anatomical detail we must
refer to the text-books of physiology. The eye as a whole
is analogous to a photographic apparatus. "In it a
camera or dark chamber of notable size exists similar to
that which a photographer uses, having a lens in the fore
part, and a sensitive curtain at the back When the
photographer looks in at the back of his camera, he sees on
the ground glass plate the image depicted which he wishes
to photograph, placed upside down, but faithfully deline-
ated in all its colours
;
and such an inverted landscape is
formed in like manner in the back part of each of our
eyeballs. And as the photographer adjusts the focus of
his instrument by altering the position of the lens,
screwing it nearer or further from the screen, so we adjust
the focus of our eye instinctively according to the distance
of the object looked at, not indeed by changing the position
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of the lens but by altering its form so as to make it stronger
or weaker as required."*
1
The sensitive curtain is called the retina; in its centre
there is a circular depression called the fovea centralis.
This pit and its immediate margin is also called the yellow
spot, from its colour. In ordinary light this is in all
respects by far the most discriminative part of the
retina, and it alone gives distinct vision of an object.
Near it, on the nasal side, the optic nerve enters the
eye, and this point, not being sensitive to light, is called
the blind spot.
The retina is an expansion of the optic nerve. Its
essential constituents are certain minute cells of two
kinds, called respectively rods and cones. The yellow
spot consists mainly of cones closely packed together. In
other parts the rods predominate. The number of cones
decreases from the yellow spot to the margin of the retina.
4. Descriptive ^Analysis of Light- Sensations. We must
distinguish between neutral tints and colours proper.
Neutral tints consist of black and white and intermediate
greys. Starting with pure black, we can arrange the greys
in a series, so as to pass by gradual transitions to pure
white. Each grey may be interposed between two others
which it resembles so closely as to be barely distinguish-
able from them. It differs from the one which precedes it
in being a little lighter, and from the one which follows it
in being a little darker. Thus, though the greys differ,
the general form of transition between them is throughout
identical.
The eye is capable of distinguishing about 700 shades
of grey, from the deepest black to the most brilliant
white. It should be noted that though black is not due
*
Cleland, Evolution, Expression, and Sensation, pp. 77,78.
Psych. 10
146 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. n., CH. iv.
to a positive physical stimulus, as other visual sensations
are, it is yet a positive experience. The eye which sees
darkness is not at all comparable with the back of the
hand, which sees nothing. There is reason for believing
that the grey field which is present to consciousness in the
absence of light is due directly to a brain-process, and
does not involve excitation of retinal elements at all.
Differences of colour-tone, apart from differences of
saturation and intensity, are best studied in the order in
which they occur in the spectrum. The spectrum is formed
by passing ordinary white light through a prism, and so
breaking it up into its component simple lights, and project-
ing these on a screen. The simple components of the white
light are then arranged in a series in the order of their wave-
lengths. At one end are the longest wave-lengths, giving
the sensation of red, at the other the shortest, giving the
sensation of violet, viz. a blue tinged with red. Be-
tween the red end and the violet end are interposed all the
various colour-tones,* with the exception of the purples.
The purples can be formed by intermixing red and violet
lights in varying proportions. In what follows we shall
suppose the spectrum completed by the addition of these
purple tints, so as to form a closed figure.
We have said that colours are best studied in the order in
which they occur in the spectrum. But unfortunately the
spectrum is unsuitable in other respects for the analytic
comparison of colour-tones. In comparing a series of colours
merely with reference to their colour-tones, their brightness
and saturation ought to be kept as uniform as possible. But
the colours of the spectrum differ greatly in brightness,
Hence in what follows we shall suppose a series of colours
arranged in the order of the spectrum, but uniform in
* Not of course all degrees of saturation and intensity.
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brightness and saturation. Such, a series may be made
by taking bits of transparent coloured paper, and adjusting
their degree of brightness and saturation by placing bits
of grey or white paper underneath them.
The whole series of colour-tones, beginning with red and
returning to red, is continuously graduated, like the grey
series of which we have just spoken. But there is an
important difference. In the region of greatest wave-
lengths, the transitions are from red to yellow; each
member of the series is interposed between two others
which it resembles so closely that the difference is barely
perceptible, but it differs from the one in being redder,
and from the other in being yellower. Thus the form
of transition ia the series is uniform throughout, and
Gren
Fig. 2. Circle illustrating serial order of colour-tones.
is quite analogous to that between black and white. But
after passing yellow, there occurs what may be best
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described as a change of direction. The transition is still
continuous
;
but it now takes place between yellow and
green. We begin with, greenish yellows, and pass by the
smallest perceptible transitions to yellowish greens, and so
to pure green. After passing green there is another change
of direction
;
we now have a green-blue series. There is
still another turning-point after passing blue ; the series
which follows is blue-red, passing from blue through violet
and purple to red. The change of colour in the spectrum
is throughout so continuous that it is not possible to fix
the exact point at which these changes of direction
begin. All that can be said is that they begin some-
where in the region of red, yellow, green, and blue,
respectively. Since the change of direction occurs, it
must occur somewhere. At the precise point of its
occurrence, there must be a simple colour-tone, such
as pure red, pure yellow, pure green, or pure blue. For
instance, pure yellow is the point of transition between
the red-yellows and the green-yellows, and pure red is
the point of transition between the purples and the red-
yellows.
It may be well to note here a question of some psycho-
logical interest which has been much discussed. Is it right
to say that a blue-green is a combination of blue and green,
or a red-yellow a combination of red and yellow ? It has
become the fashion of late to say that such a colour as a
blue-green merely resembles blue and green, but does not
contain them as constituent elements. The colour itself,
it is maintained, is perfectly simple. Now it is natural for
common sense to distinguish one blue-green from another,
by saying that there is more or less of blue in it, or more
or less of green in it. It does not appear to the present
writer that any cogent arguments have been brought
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forward to show that this point of view is untenable. A
blue-green may approach so very near to pure green as to
bo barely distinguishable from it, so that the casual
observer would regard it as a pure green. It seems strange
to say that such a blue-green contains no green at all.
What is probably in the mind of those who deny the
combination is that a blue-green cannot be simply
denned as blue
-f green. The components by entering
into so intimate a combination are modified in a peculiar
way. This modification is a new element which may
be regarded as simple. The experience of the com-
bination of blue and green is a simple experience,
and seems to be identical in kind with the experience of
the combination of yellow and red, and other such pairs.
But the components abstractly regarded are not the less*
discernible as partaking of the nature of blue and green.
Because there is something new and simple in the
experience, we have no right to infer that there is no
complexity in it. It must, however, be admitted that
the question is not an easy one ; and the balance of
authority seems to be against the view which I am
inclined to favour. But in any case it is most con-
venient to speak of such a colour as blue-green as a
combination of blue and green. If the student is not
inclined to believe that the colour actually is complex he
may interpret the statement that blue-green is a com-
bination of blue and green as merely meaning that on the
one hand it resembles blue, and on the other resembles
green.
* Of course they are not separable, but they are under appropriate con-
ditions distinguishable. The respect in which blue and blue-green are seen
to resemble each other when compared is different from the respect in which
green and blue-green resemble each other when compared. This appears
to me a sufficient reason for inferring complexity in the blue-green,
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So far we have only considered difference in colour-
tone, apart from difference in intensity and saturation ;
but all the colours of the spectrum may vary in either of
these respects so as to form a continuous series. Each
of them may be made more or less pale by an admixture
of white light. If the general intensity of the illumina-
tion be increased or diminished while the spectrum is
being examined, and if the increase or diminution is
not too great, the result is that all the colours in the
spectrum vary in brightness while remaining the same
in colour-tone. But the change in brightness is in general
accompanied by a change in saturation. Increased
brightness makes a colour paler, and decreased brightness
makes it darker causes it to be mixed with black. When
the increase or decrease is made sufficiently great, the
colour-tones tend to disappear in mere whiteness or black-
ness, respectively. They may be mixed with white light, and
also lowered or increased in intensity, so that both changes
are combined. All the colour-differences recognised in
ordinary life may be accounted for in these various ways.
They are constituted by differences in primary colour tone,
in intensity, and in saturation. Pink and rose-colour are
whitish reds
;
maroon is a dark red, i.e., a red so
diminished in intensity as to be strongly infuse^ with
black. Olive is a dark green. We usually call a pale
green or blue a light green or blue. The series of colour-
modifications obtained by making a colour-tone, such as
blue, paler or darker is psychologically quite analogous to
to such a series as that of the blue-greens. Here, too, the
question of simplicity or complexity arises. Those who
maintain that no two distinguishable parts of the blue-
green series have, qua sensations, any common element, but
that they are all simple and independent colour-qualities,
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must maintain the same for the blue-black series. They
must maintain that a black in which only the artist's eye
detects a tinge of blue has no element in common with
pure black, or with black that has a barely appreciable
tinge of green.
Intensity is by no means independent of colour. In the
spectrum, the physical light is most intense in the region
of red. But for our experience the yellow is distinctly the
brightest colour. The blue is less bright than the red, but
the difference is by no means in proportion to the difference
in the intensity of the illumination.
It should be noted that the red of the spectrum is
not pure red, but, as Hering pointed out, is tinged with
yellow.
5. The Retina's own Light. In the total and continued
absence of external light, there still exists a field of view
which does not consist of mere darkness. Upon a back-
ground of medium grey, there are seen specks and clouds
of colour. This is due to the fact that retinal elements
are continually being stimulated by such internal pro-
cesses as the circulation of the blood and the re-distribution
of heat. This internal stimulation is called the retina's own
light (Eigenlicht der Retina}. The sensation of black is
not obtained in its purest form in the complete absence of
external stimulation. It arises when the eye passes from
objects which stimulate it, to some object which fails to
stimulate it except in a slight degree.
6. Total Colour-Blindness. The extreme margin of the
retina is totally colour-blind. Let the eye be fixed upon an
object immediately in front of it, and let someone gradually
introduce an unknown coloured object into the field of
view from one side. On its first entrance into the field of
view, the object will appear white, grey, or black. Its
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colour will only become recognisable as it approaches the
centre of the field.
Again, when the illumination is sufficiently faint, the
whole of the retina, with the exception of the yellow spot,
is totally colour-blind. All the colours of the spectrum
pass into grey when the light is made dim enough.
When we pass from ordinary daylight into a dark room,
we are not at first able to discern objects : but after a time
the eye adapts itself to the faint illumination. It then
becomes able to discern objects but not their colour-tones.
It sees everything in black and white. It has been
experimentally ascertained that this twilight vision depends
on the portions of the retina which surround the yellow
spot. The yellow spot itself does not become adapted to
the faint illumination. If a small patch of colour is seen
only by means of the yellow spot, decreasing illumination
causes the colour to disappear altogether, but does not
transform it into a patch of grey. Cases have been
carefully examined and recorded of persons who showed
an entire want of sensibility to colour-tones, not only
under faint illumination, but under all conditions.
They saw everything in black and white. In most
of these pathological cases, though not in all, there
is an alteration in the distribution of the intensity of light-
sensation in the spectrum. For the normal eye the region
of greatest brightness is that of yellow light; for the
totally colour-blind, it lies in the green rather than in the
yellow portion of the spectrum. It is a notable fact that the
spectrum, as seen under sufficiently faint illumination,
shows the same change in the distribution of the bright-
ness of its parts. The totally colour-blind cannot for the
most part bear illumination of ordinary strength. They
can see well in a dim light, but are painfully dazzled
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by full light. This indicates that their ordinary con-
dition is analogous to that of a normal person whose
eyes have been adapted to twilight vision. Colour-
blindness is common to both cases. Probably a special
visual apparatus is brought into play in twilight vision, and
this is the only apparatus which in most cases exists in the
eyes of the totally colour-blind. Recent research seems to
show that this special apparatus is constituted by the rods
of the retina as distinguished from the cones.
7. Partial Colour-Blindness. Between the outer margin
of the retina and the yellow spot, there is a region which
is partially colour-blind. It is sensitive to blue and yellow,
but not to red and green. This may be tested by an
experiment similar to that described in the previous section.
When the colours of the spectrum are seen sideways, so
that they fall on the partially colour-blind zone of the
retina, the blue-green region appears grey. This grey
divides the whole spectrum into two parts. The part con-
taining light of greater wave-length appears yellow, that
containing light of smaller wave-length, appears blue.
Bed and green are not discernible.
It is well known that there are many persons whose
whole retina is affected by a partial colour-blindness, con-
sisting in an inability to distinguish between red and
green. Now, abstractly considered, this inability to dis-
tinguish between red and green may arise in either of two
ways. A person who was insensitive to both red and
green could not of course distinguish them from each
other. But the same might hold true of a person sensitive
to red and not to green, or to green and not to red. If
we suppose yellow to be due to a combination of the
retinal processes which are produced by red light and
green light respectively, persons insensitive to red would
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see all yellows as green, and those insensitive to green
would see all yellows as red. Both modes of explain-
ing partial colour-blindness have been, and still are,
advocated. On the whole, it seems most probable that
in the partially colour-blind the retina is equally incap-
able of giving rise to sensations either of red or green.
But the question is full of difficulty. The evidence
shows clearly that there are two distinct types of
partial colour-blindness, and it has been maintained that
in the one type the sensation red is absent and in the other
type the sensation green. But instances have occurred in
which only one eye has been colour-blind, the other eye
being normal. These instances have belonged to the type
which would be classed as red-blindness by those who dis-
tinguish between red-blindness and green-blindness. Now
in such cases the colour-blind themselves testify that the
colours they see with the abnormal eye are yellow and blue,
and those they fail to see, red and green. They see the
spectrum as composed of yellow and blue, with a grey
region in which normal persons see blue-green.
If we suppose that partial colour-blindness consists in
the absence of the sensations both of red and green, we
must find some explanation of the difference between the
two types which are on the opposite view distinguished as
red-blindness and green-blindness. In both types it is
possible, by mixing in varying proportions light from the
short-waved end of the spectrum with light from the long-
waved end, to produce all the colour-tones which they are
capable of seeing when their retina is affected by inter-
mediate simple lights. In type i. (the so-called red-blind),
the rays at the extreme end of the spectrum, which give
distinct sensations of red to the normal eye, produce no
appreciable effect of any kind, and other reddish rays
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produce only faint sensations. In type ii., the retina is
sensitive in some way to rays at the red end of the
spectrum; and in general, reddish rays produce more
intense sensation of some kind than in type i. In comparing
a certain reddish yellow with a yellow almost free from red,
the intensity of the reddish yellow light must be made
about four times as great for type i. as for type ii., in
order that the resulting sensations may be indistinguish-
able in intensity and colour-tone. Clearly there is a great
difference in sensitiveness to red light in the two types.
But it by no means follows that the red light produces the
sensation red in type ii. and not in type i. The most
probable explanation is that the red light has a greater
power of producing the sensation yellow in type ii. than in
type i.*
A corresponding difference is found in normal persons
in regard to sensations of yellow. "If by means of a
special arrangement we bring a certain amount of the red
part of the spectrum and a certain amount of the green
part of the spectrum on to the eye at the same time, the
result is a sensation of yellow. . . . By the same arrange-
ment we can bring on to the eye at the same time a certain
amount of the actual yellow of the spectrum. In this way
we can make a match between a mixture of spectral red
and green, on the one hand, and spectral yellow on the
other, comparing the mixedf sensation derived from two
parts of the spectrum with the sensation derived from a
single (yellow) part. We have to adjust the quantities of
red light and green light until the mixture seems of the
* Professor Gr. E. Miiller has given an elaborate explanation of how
this takes place. See Zeitschrift f. Psychologic und Physiologie der Sin-
nesorgane, Band XIV. Heft 3 und 4, p. 182.
f The sensation as distinguished from the stimulua is not mixed.
Physiologists are apt to confuse the two things.
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same hue and tlie same brightness as the yellow, not
showing either a reddish or a greenish tone. When this
is done it is found that different people differ very
materially as to the proportion of red and green, the pro-
portion of the intensities of the two lights, necessary to
make the match with yellow."*
4
8. Effects of the Mixture of Lights of Different Wave-
Lengths. When lights of all wave-lengths are intermingled
in due proportion, the result is grey or white. If in the
mixture there is a relative predominance of some one
light, such as green or blue, the result is a whitish green
or a whitish blue.
If we select any colour of the spectrum, it is possible to
find some other colour which, mingled with it in due pro-
portion, will yield a neutral tint. If one of the components
of the mixture is present in greater quantity than is
required to produce a grey, the predominant light gives its
own colour to the mixture. The other light diminishes the
degreeof saturation. Thus, if goldenyellow andbluebemixed
in proper proportions, they yield the sensation of white.
As the proportion of blue is increased, the white becomes
more and more a bluish white
;
as the proportion of yellow
is increased, the white becomes more and more a yellowish
white. Colours which, intermixed with each other, yield
white, are called complementary. Yellow is complementary
to blue. The red of the spectrum is not complementary to
green, but to a bluish green. It should be remembered,
however, that the red of the spectrum is not pure red, but
yellowish. As every discernible colour of the spectrum
possesses its complement, either within the spectrum
or in the purple series, the pairs of complementary
colours are indefinitely numerous. If the simple lights
*
Foster, Text-Boole of Physiology, part iv., pp. 1240-1241.
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corresponding to colours which, are not too far removed
from each other in the spectrum are mingled, the
result is a colour corresponding to an intermediate
light. The wider the interval separating the mingled
colours the whiter is the resulting colour. When the
interval becomes sufficiently wide, mixture in proper
proportion yields pure white. For instance, by mingling
the simple lights which severally produce blue and green,
we can obtain all the blue-greens. A larger proportion
of the blue light yields a bluer green : a larger proportion
of the green light yields a greener blue. If we mix
blue with yellowish-green, we obtain a green mingled
with the white due to the combination of blue and
yellow. This green may be relatively pure or it may be
bluish or yellowish according to the proportion of blue
or yellow light in the mixture. The combination of
of pure blue w7ith pure yellow yields white. If, proceeding
further, we mix blue with, red, we obtain a new colour not
contained in the spectrum, purple. By mixing the red light
of the spectrum with the green in certain proportions we
produce yellow : by increasing the quantity of red light,
the yellow is made redder ; by increasing the quantity of
green light, the yellow is made greener. The laws of
combination which hold good of simple lights apply also to
those mixtures which produce the same colours as the
simple lights.
If we select three colours so related that by combining
any two of them we can obtain a colour which is comple-
mentary to the third, it is possible, by varying combinations
of the three, to produce all the colours of the spectrum.
But there is only one triplet of colours by which the
rest can be produced in a high degree of saturation.
This triplet is red, green, and a bluish violet. For this
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reason red, green, and violet, have been called primary
colours.
The best method of mixing lights of different wave-
lengths, so as to ascertain the resulting sensation, is to
allow two different parts of the spectrum to fall on the
same part of the retina at the same time. Another
way is by using the colour-wheel or colour-top. Sectors of
the colours to be investigated are placed on a disk.
The pigments used in colouring must be as pure as
possible ; in other words, they must as nearly as possible
reflect simple and not compound lights.* The disk is set
rapidly spinning so that one kind of light is brought to
bear on the retina before the effect of the other has ceased.
Thus the different modes of stimulation are superposed.
If one sector of the disk is blue, and another yellow, and
if the colours are present in due proportion, the rapidly
rotating disk will appear grey.
9. The Effects of Contrast. A man passing a street-
lamp in moonlight casts two shadows. That which is cut
off from the light of the lamp and only illuminated by the
moon, appears blue. Now, moonlight is white or nearly
so. The blue appearance of the shadow is due to contrast
with the yellow illumination thrown by the lamp on the
surrounding field of view. The excitement of the retina by
the yellow light indirectly affects that portion of the retina
or of the central nervous matter which is not directly excited
by it. The influence thus exerted by the yellow light pro-
duces an effect similar to that which would be produced by
a blue light acting directly. Now blue is complementary
to yellow. The general law of contrast is that a colour in
any part of the field of view tends to tinge adjoining parts
* The mixture of the pigments themselves, in the way that artists mix
them, is by no means equivalent to a mixture of the lights which they reflect.
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with its complementary colour. The effect is greatest when
a large field of uniform colour acts on a small one. A
small spot of grey on a relatively extensive field of blue,
appears distinctly yellowish. If a small spot of red be sub-
stituted for the grey, it will combine its own colour with
the contrast colour. It will appear yellowish red or red-
dish yellow. The effect of contrast is most marked at the
meeting-point of the two colours. It is interfered with by
lines of demarcation separating them, such as a pencil-
mark drawn round the red spot on the blue field. It is
also interfered with by differences in the texture of the
coloured surfaces. For these reasons, it comes out most
clearly when contours are obliterated, and differences of
texture reduced to a minimum. The most favourable
conditions are obtained in the case of coloured shadows, or
by projecting the light from coloured glasses on a wall, or
by means of coloured disks in rapid rotation with the
colours in concentric zones. A simple method is to
place a small piece of paper on a larger sheet, and
to cover both with a sheet of tissue paper. The tissue
paper obliterates contours and conceals difference of tex-
ture. The contrast effect is of course in general stronger
in proportion as the direct excitation of the part of the
retina affected by it is weaker; thus grey is better to
experiment with than white. The influence of contrast is
also operative between black and white. The same grey will
appear darker on a white background, and lighter on a black
background. If contrasted colours are complementary to
each other, the contrast renders them more saturated.
10. The Negative After-Image, etc. "If, after looking
steadfastly at a white patch on a black ground, the eye
be turned to a white ground, a grey patch is seen for some
little time. A black patch on a white ground similarly
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gives rise when the eye is subsequently turned towards
a grey ground," to the image of a white patch. These
after-images, which follow the removal of the primary
stimulation, are called negative images. "When a red
patch is looked at, and the eye subsequently turned to a
white or to a grey ground, the negative image is a greenish
blue; that is to say, the colour of the negative image is
complementary to that of the object. Thus also orange
produces a blue, green a pink, yellow an indigo-blue,
negative image, and so on."* The conditions for the
production of the negative image are the more favourable,
the more intense and persistent is the primary stimulation.
When the primary stimulation is very transient, it may
give rise in the first instance to a positive image, as we
shall see later. Negative images arise also when the eye
is simply closed after the primary stimulation as well as
when it is turned to a different background.
It is not absolutely necessary for the occurrence of
negative images that the primary stimulus should be
removed. The same result may be brought about by
diminishing its intensity. If we steadfastly gaze at a red
spot on a yellow ground, and then diminish the intensity
of the illumination by turning down the light or other-
wise, a green spot upon a blue ground will appear
instead of the red spot on a yellow ground.
The same process is manifested in a different way while
the eye is actually subject to the primary stimulation in
undiminished intensity. If we gaze long and steadfastly at
any colour, it gradually becomes less saturated ; the effect
of steadfastly gazing at yellow is the same as that produced
by gradually mingling the yellow light with more and
more of its complementary blue. It becomes paler. We
*
Foster, Text-Boole of Physiology, part iv., book iii., chap, iii., p. 12GG.
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may gather these facts under one formula. The continu-
ance of the same mode of stimulation tends to produce a con-
trast effect, not only on adj oining portions of the retina, but
also on that portion which the stimulus directly excites.
This contrast effect takes the form of a negative image
when the primary stimulation is withdrawn or sufficiently
weakened. When the stimulus is continued so as to
maintain its positive effect, the contrast effect mingles
with this, so as to produce loss of saturation. In this way,
the yellow illumination of a gas-light or candle practically
becomes equivalent to white light when it is long continued.
It is noteworthy that negative images modify each other's
colour-tone by contrast, and this even in cases in which it
is difficult to obtain a contrast effect under ordinary con-
ditions. The negative image of a red patch on a white
ground is blue-green ; the negative image of the white
ground which surrounds it is reddened by contrast. This
is important, because it shows that contrast phenomena
are not due to errors of judgment, as has been maintained
by Helmholtz.
11. The Positive After-image, etc. Light acting on the
retina takes a certain time to produce its full effect, and
the retinal excitement takes a certain time to disappear
after the stimulus has been removed. If we take a black
disk with a white sector, and set it in very rapid rota-
tion, the whole disk appears to the eye as a uniform
grey. As the white sector is whirled round, it affects
successive portions of the retina, but by no means so
intensely as if it continued to act on the same part.
Owing to the rapidity of the rotation, it returns again to
the same point before the effect of the previous stimulation
has become appreciably diminished. The result is a uniform
grey identical with, that which would be produced 12 tlio
Psych. 11
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white light from the sector were equally distributed over
the whole surface of the rotating disk at rest. The per-
sistence of the visual sensation after the stimulus has ceased
gives rise, under certain conditions, to what is known as the
positive after-image. To obtain this, the eye must briefly
glance at an object, instead of steadfastly gazing at it. The
conditions are most favourable when an eye which has for
some time been withdrawn from the influence of light is
momentarily exposed to a somewhat strong stimulus.
' ' Thus
if immediately on waking from sleep in the morning the
eye be directed to a window for an instant and then closed,
an image of the window with its bright panes and darker
sashes, the various parts being of the same colour as the
object, will remain for an appreciable time."*
12. Physiological Theories of Light- Sensation. Very
little indeed is known by direct observation and experi-
ment about the physiological processes either in the retina
or in nervous matter corresponding to light-sensation. The
theories on the subject are hypothetical constructions based
on physical and psychological data. The two which are
best known are those connected with the names of
Helmholtz and of Hering respectively. Neither of these is
satisfactory ; but that of Hering is based on a more com-
plete survey of facts ; and if it is not right, it may safely
be said to be on right lines. It has recently been greatly
modified and improved by Prof. Or. E. Miiller, but his views
are at once too complex and too recent for us to deal with
them here. "We shall therefore refer to Bering's theory
mainly in its original form.
The theory of Helmholtz is primarily based on the facts
of colour combination regarded from a physical point of
view. The aim is to account in the simplest way for the
*
Foster, op. cit., p. 1265.
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production of the same colour by many different combina-
tions of physical light. Helmholtz believed that this could
be done by assuming three, and only three, ultimate
physiological processes. Each of these processes takes
place in the first instance in the retina and is conveyed by
its own special nerves to the brain, where it produces a
corresponding specific nervous excitation. The pro-
cesses severally correspond to the sensations of red, green,
and blue. Their combination in equal proportions yields
the sensation of white or grey. Every kind and combina-
tion of light excites all three processes. Hence no colour
under ordinary conditions of stimulation is ever quite
saturated. It always contains a certain intermixture of
white. By combining in various proportions the red and
the green processes, the green and the blue, the red and
the blue, all the colours of the spectrum, together with the
purple, may be obtained.
This theory seems a highly satisfactory account of the
results of combining lights of different wave-lengths, so
long as we do not test it by psychological analysis of the
resulting sensations. But when we do this, a difficulty
occurs in the case of white and yellow. By mixing green
light with blue light, we obtain a blue-green. This, says
Ilelmholtz, is due to a compounding of the physiological
processes corresponding to blue and green respectively.
His account of the matter is borne out by a scrutiny of the
sensation itself. A blue-green partakes of the nature both
of blue and green : it resembles both of them at once. It
resembles each in varying degrees according as blue or green
preponderates. But by mixing red and green lights we
produce, not reddish green but yellow. The yellow does
not partake of the nature both of red and green, as blue-
green partakes of the nature both of green and blue, No
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analytic scrutiny of sensation can discover such a colour as
a reddish green. The same is true of white. White,
according to Helmholtz, is a compound of all three ultimate
physiological processes. But, as a matter of fact, the sensa-
tion of white does not partake at once of the three colour-
tones, red, green, and blue.
Objections of this kind will probably have different
weight with different persons. But it so happens that
they are confirmed by some very important facts connected
with colour-blindness. If white arises through a combina-
tion of the three elementary processes, all the colour
sensations ought to be possible when the sensation of white
is possible. But, as we have seen, there are well-established
cases of total colour-blindness. Here all three elementary
processes are absent, and yet the sensation of white
remains unimpaired. On the theory of Helmholtz we
must say that the three elementary processes are really
present, but that they are on all occasions excited in equal
proportions by all kinds of light. This is a rather improb-
able assumption, but the improbability becomes increased
to the verge of impossibility, when we consider that the
same hypothesis must be applied to a number of other
cases in which colour-sensibility is absent, and sensibility
to white and black is preserved. All lights of whatever
wave-length, produce only neutral sensations, when they
act on the retina for a very short time. All the colours of
the spectrum pass into grey when the illumination is
sufficiently diminished. They pass almost completely into
white when the illumination is sufficiently intensified.
The extreme outer margin of the retina is sensitive to
white, but totally colour-blind. Under all these varying
conditions we must, according to Helmholtz, suppose that
the three elementary colour-processes are present, and that
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the only reason why the corresponding colours are not per-
ceived is that the processes are always excited in equal
proportions.
ATI equally serious objection arises from cases of partial
colour-blindness. It is evident that, if Helmholtz is right,
the absence of one or more of the elementary colour-
processes must involve the absence of the sensation of
white, which is due to their combination in equal propor-
tions. "A person who is green-blind ought, upon this
supposition, to see in white only its red and blue consti-
tuents, and hence white ought to look to him as purple
looks to us. As long as his defect made him incapable of
explaining to us what he felt, this might perfectly well, for
aught we knew, have been the case. But we know now
that a person who is green-blind in one eye only sees
white with his defective eye exactly the same as he sees
it with his normal eye."* A similar argument applies
also to yellow. The partially colour-blind usually retain
the sensations of yellow and blue, although they are with-
out the sensations of red or green or both. There is a
marginal zone of the retina at which the sensibility to red
and green ceases, and that to yellow and blue is retained.
So, with great increase in the intensity of illumination, red
and green are still discernible in the spectrum, though
yellow and blue disappear. Such facts as these are in-
compatible with the supposition that yellow is due to a
combination of the red process and the green process.
If the theory of Helmholtz is unsatisfactory in its account
of colour-combination, its failure to explain other facts of
light-sensation is still more conspicuous. It accounts for
contrast effects between adjoining colours as errors of
* C. L. Franklin, "On Theories of Light-Sensation," Mind, N.S.,
vol. ii. (1893), p. 479.
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judgment. A fuller investigation of these phenomena has
shown that such an hypothesis is quite untenable. The
colour-produced by contrast appears and behaves in all
respects like the colour produced by direct stimulation.
Negative images are explained by Helmholtz as due to
fatigue. By long continuance, one or more of the ultimate
colour-processes become exhausted, so that the others are
predominantly aroused either by stimulation from without,
or from the retina's own light. One objection to this view
is that, on the principles of Helmholtz, fatigue of all three
processes must be constantly taking place, as all three are
excited by every kind of light. Now the fatigue which is
to explain negative images must take place in the course
of a few seconds. Hence we should expect a very con-
spicuous effect of fatigue from the ordinary use of the eyes
in daylight. Hardly any capacity for light-sensations of
any sort ought to be left at the end of an hour, especially
after exposure to predominantly white light, which must
exhaust all three processes equally.
In Hering's theory, a strenuous attempt is made to
escape the difficulties which beset that of Helmholtz.
Following the clue given by psychological analysis of light-
sensations, he assumes six ultimate processes, correspond-
ing to the sensations of white, black, red, green, yellow,
and blue. These he arranges in antithetic pairs; white
and black go together, and similarly red and green, blue
and yellow. To each pair there corresponds a separate
retinal substance, and a distinct modification of central
nervous matter. The red-green substance is susceptible of
two antagonistic processes, chemical in their nature. Bed
light excites the one, and green the other. "When red and
green light are combined in equal portions, neither process
is produced because of their mutual incompatibility. Hence
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there is no such, colour as a reddish green. But both the
red and green act on the black-white substance, so as to
produce the sensation of white. When red or green sensa-
tions occur, their intensity is mainly due to this
excitement of the black-white substance. Hence, when
red and green light act simultaneously in equal proportions,
though the two stimulations neutralise each other as far as
their colour effect is concerned, they continue to act on the
black-white substance, and produce the sensation of white.
The relations of the blue and yellow processes are analo-
gous. The black and white processes are supposed by
Hering to be antagonistic in much the same way ; but as a
matter of fact there must be an essential difference here,
as black and white combine to form intermediate greys, so
that the two processes are not incompatible any more than
the blue and green, or the yellow and red processes are.*
Hering is no doubt right in assuming that the processes
corresponding to black, white, red, green, blue, and yellow,
are separate and distinct in their nature, so that none of
them can be resolved into combinations of the others.
But he probably pushes this point too far in assuming that
his pairs of antithetic processes always take place in
separate substances. There is no doubt that there is a
special apparatus connected exclusively with the white-
black process. Total colour-blindness and allied facts
seem to clench this conclusion. But it does not follow
* "
Really, black and white do cancel each other in the retina : there is
no grey process there. But the cortical cells with which the optic nerve
is connected are always in a state of commotion (owing to changes of
temperature, etc.), whether there is a stimulus before the eye or not ; and
this commotion gives us the 'intrinsic' or 'subjective' sight-sensation,
the sensation of grey." Professor Titchener, Primer of Psychology,
p. 42. (This proposed explanation is due to Gr. E. Miiller, who works it
out with great care.)
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that the white-black processes cannot also take place in
those retinal elements which subserve the colour processes.
When blue and yellow lights act simultaneously so as to
give rise to the sensation of white, Hering has good reason
for denying that the blue process and the yellow process
take place together. As such, they neutralize each other ;
but when he refers the conjoint effects of the two lights
merely to their action on the white-black substance, his
position is not without difficulty. Since the yellow and blue
processes neutralise each other, the combined intensity of
these processes must be deducted from the resulting
sensation of white. This involves the assumption that the
intensity of the yellow and blue processes, as such, is very
small indeed, and that when they actually occur, the
brightness of the corresponding sensations is mainly due
to the intermixture of white. This is hard to believe.
''Hopeless confusion is introduced into all our conceptions
of colour when we are asked to believe that the entire
brightness of every sensation of light is nothing but the
brightness due to the white sensation which is mixed with
it. ... Can they be thinking beings who have allowed
themselves to follow Hering into the intellectual vagary of
supposing that a perfectly saturated red, for instance that
is a red wholly free from white admixture no matter what
the amount of chemical activity which called it forth, would
have no brightness whatever, that there would be nothing
in sensation corresponding to differences in amount of this
photo-chemical process ?"* Hering' s view cannot be set
aside in this sweeping way. But we can scarcely accept
it without fuller evidence than has yet been adduced
in its favour. If Hering is right in holding that bright-
ness is almost entirely due to the effect which it produces
*
Franklin, op. cit., p. 480.
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on his white-black substance, colours, which, are indis-
tinguishable in intensity and tone when the lights which
produce them fall on the yellow spot, ought also to
be indistinguishable when the lights which produce
them fall on the totally colour-blind margin of the
retina, and are seen as greys. As a matter of fact, this
appears to be approximately true. On the other hand,
two colours apparently identical in brightness and tone,
one produced by a mixture of spectral lights, and the
other by homogeneous light, may differ very greatly when
they are seen as greys in twilight vision. But this can
hardly form a cogent argument against Hering, because
the conditions of twilight vision differ essentially from
those of ordinary daylight vision. (See 6, adJin.)
The red and green of the spectrum in combination pro-
duce yellow. Hering accounts for this by the composite
nature of the spectral red. It contains an admixture of
yellow : and when the red and green lights neutralise each
other, the yellow alone is left. He may be right, but this is
one of the points on which it is difficult to see that his theory
is quite satisfactory. It would in some respects be preferable
to suppose that the yellow process* can be produced by
positive co-operation of red and green lights.
Hering' s theory may easily be made to account for
the phenomena of contrast and negative images. They
are due to a disturbance of the chemical equilibrium
of the retinal substances. For instance, we may suppose
that the white process has for its product the accumu-
lation of material for the black process, and vice versd.
Hence the white process will positively tend to give
rise to the black process, both in the portion of the
*
Viz., a distinct retinal process corresponding to yellow, not a combination
of the processes separately produced by red and green lights respectively.
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retina affected and in the adjoining part. Whatever
may be the special details of the process, it seems clear
that both contrast effects and after-images are due to a
positive tendency on the part of each of the ultimate
retinal processes to produce its complementary process.
In conclusion, we may say that the theory of light-
sensation, although beset with difficulties, is in a hopeful
condition. New facts are being constantly discovered, and
more exact quantitative measurements being made. New
theories are being propounded, and old theories modified
in accordance with these fresh discoveries, and, on the
whole, satisfactory progress is being made. It is, above
all, interesting to note that those attempts are most suc-
cessful which follow most accurately psychological data
and psychological analysis. In this respect, the comparison
of the predominantly psychological method of Hering with
the predominantly physical method of Helmholtz is
instructive.*
* The general plan of exposition and much of the detail in this chapter
is taken from Ebbinghaus. Grundzilge der Psychologie, Erster Halbband,
Leipzig, 1897, p. 320 ff. The student who can read German should consult
this work. In English the treatment of Light-Sensation in Foster's Text-
Book of Physiology, fifth edition, book iii., chap, iii., pp. 1222-1247, is
excellent. See also Mrs. C. L. Franklin's article "On Theories of
Light-Sensation," Mind, N.S. vol. ii. (1893), pp. 473-489. The latest
developments are mainly to be found in German and especially in the
pages of the Zeitsclirift fur Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane,




1. Nature of the Stimulus. The physical stimulus which,
occasions sensations of sound consists of vibrations of the
particles of the air. As in the case of light, we can dis-
tinguish wave-length or rapidity of vibration, amplitude,
and complexity. Wave-length determines pitch ; amplitude
loudness, and complexity timbre.
2. Organ of Hearing. For anatomical details we must
again refer to physiological text-books. The drum of the
ear is thrown into vibration by impact of sound-waves.
This produces movements in certain small bones, and these
movements in their turn give an impulse to a fluid, which
by its impact throws into vibration a membrane called the
basilar membrane. The vibrations of this membrane are
the immediate stimulus exciting certain hair-cells, in which
the fibres of the auditory nerve terminate.
3. Noises and Musical Sounds. Noises as immediate
experiences are characterised by confusion and indefinite
complexity, and for the most part by irregularity. A
musical sound is marked by unity and uniformity of
character. "The vibrations which constitute a musical
sound are repeated at regular intervals, and thus possess a
marked periodicity or rhythm."* Musical sounds are also
*
Foster, Text-Boole of Physiology, book iii., chap, iv., p. 1361.
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produced when the periodicity, instead of being regular,
varies continuously. Regular vibrations which would
otherwise produce musical sounds, give rise to noises,
when a large number of them, differing but little in wave-
length, occur together, as when a number of adjoining
keys of a piano are simultaneously touched. But in general,
the stimulus which gives rise to noises is produced by a
series of vibrations differing from one another in period.
"There is, however, no abrupt line between" noises and
musical sounds. " Between a pure and simple musical
sound produced by a series of vibrations, each of which
has exactly the same period, and a harsh noise in which no
consecutive vibrations are alike, there are numerous inter-
mediate stages. Much irregularity may present itself in a
series of sounds called music, and in some of the roughest
noises the regular repetition of one or more vibrations may
be easily recognised."*
4. Pitch. "The greater the number of consecutive
vibrations which fall upon the ear in a second, the shorter
the time of each vibration, the higher is the pitch. Hence
the pitch of a sound is determined by the length of the wave,
a low note having long, a high note short wave-length.
We are able to distinguish a whole series of musical sounds
of different pitch, from the lowest to the highest audible
note."f In this series each note has its fixed position
between two others which are barely distinguishable from
it; the one being somewhat higher, and the other some-
what lower. The arrangement is therefore linear, and
comparable to the series of greys intervening between
white and black. It has been maintained that, as in the
greys we can distinguish varying degrees of affinity to
white and black respectively, so in the scale of notes of
* Ibid. + Op. cit., p. 1362.
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different pitch, two ultimate modes of sensation are involved,
corresponding to black and white.* But this view has not
been generally accepted.
" Vibrations having a recurrence below about thirty a
second are unable to produce a sensation of sound,"f
There is a similar limit for high notes. For most
persons this is fixed at about 16,000 vibrations a second,
though some persons can distinguish tones of 40,000.
In music, only a comparatively small portion of these
tones are used, beginning with about thirty and ending-
with about 3,600 vibrations a second.
The power of distinguishing difference of pitch is very
highly developed within a certain range. In tones rising
from 100 to 1000 vibrations in a second, practised observers
under favourable conditions can discriminate differences of
pitch corresponding to differences of one quarter or one
fifth of a wave-length. Tones above 4000 or below forty
are distinguished from each other with great difficulty.
Towards the higher end of the scale, differences of hundreds
or even of thousands of vibrations a second may not be
recognisable.
5. Harmonic Intervals. When, of two notes simultane-
ously produced, the vibration period of one is exactly twice
as rapid as that of the other, the two sensations show a
strong tendency to blend into one. It is hard to distinguish
them as two. The result of their union is a richer and fuller
sensation, peculiarly agreeable to the ear. There is also a
tendency to confuse the two sensations even when they do
not occur simultaneously. When even a practised musician
is called upon to imitate on the piano a tone whistled by the
mouth, he frequently produces the tone which corresponds to
See Mach, Analysis of the Sensations (English trans.), pp. 127, 128.
f Foster, op. cit., p. 1363.
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half or double the number of vibrations per second, or in
other words, the upper or lower octave of the note which
he has to imitate. What is peculiarly interesting is that the
tendency to confuse a note with its octave in memory, and
to hear them as a single musical sound when they are
simultaneously produced, does not depend on similarity in
pitch. Notes much nearer in pitch are easily and clearly
distinguished. What has been said of the octave holds
also of other musical intervals, the double octave, the fifth,
and the twelfth.
6. Combination of Musical Sounds from different sources.
When musical sounds occur together, it usually requires
attention to discriminate them. It is, as we have seen,
peculiarly difficult to do so when the one is the octave, the
fifth, or the twelfth of the other. The greater the relative
intensity of one of the notes as compared with the others,
the more easy it is to discern it as a separate tone. It is
harder to distinguish in proportion to its relative faintness.
The combination of tones yields a specific experience, which
cannot be regarded as merely the sum of the separate
experiences of the separate notes. Even when the con-
stituent tones are discriminated, they are still apprehended
as integral parts of a whole. This whole has its own
characteristic pitch and its own characteristic intensity.
Its pitch is approximately that of the lowest of its con-
stituent tones, even when this is not the most intense.
The intensity of the total experience is not equal to
the sum of the intensities of its constituents. It is
approximately equal to the intensity of the loudest among
them.
7. Seats and Dissonance. "If two tuning-forks"
sounded together
"
are not of the same pitch, but so related
that the period of vibration of the one is not an exact
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multiple of that of the other, the sensation which we
experience has certain marked features. We hear a sound
which is the effect on our ear of the compound wave
formed out of the two waves
;
but the sound is not uniform
in intensity. As we listen the sound is heard now to grow
louder and then to grow fainter or even to die away, but
soon to revive again, and once more to fall away, thus rising
and falling at regular intervals, the rhythmic change being
either from sound to actual silence or from a louder sound
to a fainter one. Such variations of intensity are due to
the fact that, owing to the difference of pitch, the vibratory
impulses of the two sounds do not exactly correspond in
time. Since the vibration period, the time during which a
particle is making an excursion, moving a certain distance
in one direction and then returning, is shorter in one sound
than in the other, it is obvious that the vibrations belonging
to one sound will, so to speak, get ahead of those belonging
to the other : hence a time will come when, while the
impulse of one sound is tending to drive a particle in one
direction, say forwards, the impulse of the other sound is
tending to drive the same particle in the other direction, i.e.
backwards. The result is that the particle will not move,
or will not move so much as if it were subject to one
impulse only, still less to both impulses acting in the same
direction
;
the vibrations of the particle will be stopped or
lessened, and the sensation of sound to which its vibrations
are giving rise will be wanting or diminished : the one
sound has more or less completely neutralised or 'interfered'
with the other, the crest of the wave of one sound has more
or less coincided with the trough of the wave of the other
sound. Conversely, at another time, the two impulses will
be acting in the same direction on the same particle, the
movements of the particle will be intensified, and the sound
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will be augmented. And the one condition will pass
gradually into the other. The repetitions of increased
intensity thus brought about are spoken of as beats."*
Beats are separately discernible when the difference between
the vibration frequency of the concurrent tones is very
small. As the difference becomes greater, the beats occur
more rapidly, and are not so clearly discernible. They
then give rise to a rattling or whirring effect. This
ceases somewhere between thirty and sixty beats in the
second. But even then the beats still manifest their
presence by imparting to the notes which produce them a
certain roughness. This experience may persist even when
there are hundreds of beats in the second. When the
beats occur with sufficient rapidity, the roughness or harsh-
ness ceases. Before this point is reached, the notes, because
of their harsh effect, are said to be dissonant. The number
of beats produced by two notes which approach each other
in vibration frequency, is equal to the mathematical differ-
ence between the number of vibrations per second of each.
"Thus two...tuning-forks vibrating respectively at sixty-four
or seventy-two a second, will give eight beats a second, "f
because the shorter wave overtakes the longer eight times,
so as to give to the vibrating particles opposite impulses,
which neutralise each other. We have seen that as the
interval between the combined tones becomes increased,
the beats become so rapid that they are no longer
appreciable; but they recur again when the interval is
sufficiently increased. They recur when the interval is
somewhat greater or less than the octave, and again, when
it is somewhat greater or less than the twelfth, the double
octave, etc. Two tones of 200 and 396 vibrations in a
second give four beats; four beats are also produced by
*
Op. cit., pp. 1367, 1368. t Ibid.
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tones of 200 and 404 vibrations in a second. The number
of beats is equal to the difference between the vibration
number of the higher tone and that multiple of the vibra-
tion number of the lower tone which comes nearest to the
vibration number of the higher tone. Thus if the notes
are 200 and 596 the number of beats is 3 x 200 - 596 = 4.
This explains why a small deviation from the octave or
other musical interval produces a dissonant effect.
8. Difference- Tones. When two tones are sounded
together, certain other tones are heard, occasionally with
great distinctness, for which there is no assignable physical
stimulus. Within the compass of the same octave, there
are mainly two of these. One corresponds to the difference
between the vibration numbers of the primary tones, and
is called the first difference-tone. The other corresponds
to the difference between the vibration number of the
higher tone and twice the vibration number of the lower
tone, and is called the second difference-tone. The mode in
which these tones are produced has not yet been satis-
factorily determined. But it seems that they are due
to the structure and function of the organ of hearing,
and not to physical conditions. Their explanation forms
an important test for any general physiological theory of
sound-sensations.
9. Timbre. The same note sounded on a piano, a
violin, a trumpet, etc., has a very varying character, though
its pitch is identified as the same. Differences of this kind
are called differences of timbre. Timbre is due to the com-
plexity of the sensation. Ordinary musical sounds, even
when they arise from a single source, are not simple.
Attentive analysis can discern a number of distinct partial
tones. The power of discrimination varies with musical
aptitude and practice in analysis. The pitch of the whole
Psych. 12
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complex is approximately the pitch, of the lowest tone.
This is called the fundamental tone and is of course identi-
fied at the outset. The overtones, as they are called, are
separated from the fundamental tone by harmonic intervals.
The most intense of them are usually those which have
most affinity with the fundamental tones, such as the
octave. Thus, though their relative intensity makes it
easier to discriminate them, their harmonic relation makes
it more difficult. With sufficient practice, a person of
natural musical aptitude acquires great power of discrimi-
nating overtones. The less skilled may use artificial helps.
Thus the partial tone may be first sounded separately on
the key of a piano, and then kept in mind in attending to
the note which is to be analysed. Several tones in succes-
sion may be tried in this way; some of them may be
discernible as constituent overtones and others not.
Sometimes slight differences in pitch are noted between
the overtone and the corresponding note as sounded on the
piano. This is one of the reasons why the analysis must
be regarded as real, and not illusory.
A moderate number of relatively low partial tones
makes the whole richer and fuller and somewhat higher
in pitch. A large number of high overtones of consider-
able intensity gives to the whole a sharp and penetrating
and sometimes a somewhat harsh character. The
harshness arises from beats between the high overtones.
The combination of partial tones in a complex note
produced from a single source is analogous to the com-
bination of notes from different sources, except as regards
the great difference in intensity between the fundamental
tones and the overtones. The whole experience due to the
combination is specific in its character, and is not a mere
summation of the experiences severally due to the partial
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tones. This is true even when the partial tones aro
discriminated. They are still apprehended as constituents
of a whole having an unique character. Analytic attention
in discovering overtones does not appear to create them in
the moment of discovery, but to find what is already
pre-existing. Thus the composition of an ordinary musical
note affords an excellent example of sensations which are
merely felt without discrimination of their distinctive
qualities. So long and so far as the experience is
unanalysed, the constituent sensations are present, qua
sensations, though their presence is not cognised. There
is a sense-differentiation without perceptual distinction.
10. General Theory of Sound- Sensation. Anatomical
research seems to show that the immediate stimulus
to the terminations of the auditory nerve is constituted
by the vibrations of the basilar membrane. The main
clue to the way in which this membrane acts is found
in physical and psychological data. On the physical
side, w
re have the broad fact that impulses which would
separately give rise to distinct waves of sound, blend
their effects before they reach the ear into a single
resultant effect. They produce a single wave, the form
of which is mathematically accounted for by their com-
bination. This is true whether the several impulses come
from, separate material objects or from the same object.
Thus the vibrations which produce ordinary sounds are
complex in their mode of origin. The forms which they
consequently assume can be mathematically resolved into
a combination of the forms of certain constituent simple
waves. These simple waves are called pendular, because
their form is like that described by the sweep of a
pendulum. Though one, not many waves, is produced by
the impulses which simultaneously set the air in vibration,
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yet each of these impulses acts separately on the organ
of hearing. This is known to be so because the several
sensations corresponding to each are distinguishable in
consciousness. We can analyse a single note into its
partial tones, and we can distinguish a number of notes
sounded simultaneously from different sources. This is
the starting-point for the theory of sound- sensations.
The organ of hearing must be so constructed as to respond
separately to the several impulses which produce the
complex wave.
The most simple and obvious, if not the only, way of
accounting for this analytic power of the ear is that
propounded by Helmholtz, and now commonly, though
not universally, accepted. It proceeds on the analogy of
certain physical phenomena. If a tuning-fork, which
produces a simple tone without overtones, be laid on the
top of a piano, and if the corresponding note is sounded
by touching one of the keys, the tuning-fork vibrates in
sympathy with it. If the lower octave of the note be sounded,
the tuning-fork again vibrates in sympathy; for its
own note, being an octave of the note sounded on the
piano, is contained in this as one of its overtones. It can
be similarly made to vibrate in sympathy with any of the
notes which contain its own note as an overtone. It is
unaffected by other notes. Conversely, if the tuning-fork
is struck in the neighbourhood of the wires of a piano,
those wires will vibrate in response to it, which are
specially adjusted to the same tone, or to any of the notes
which contain this as an overtone. In the second case
they do not vibrate along their whole length, but in
segments. The wire which corresponds to the lower
octave of the tone sounded on the tuning-fork responds by
ii vibration of which the wave-length is half the length of
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the wire. Now, the theory of Helmholtz is that the
basilar membrane consists of a series of strands, each of
which, like the wires of a piano or like a tuning-fork, is
adapted to its own peculiar tone, and vibrates in response
to this. Thus, however complex the physical sound-wave
may be, it produces in the basilar membrane not a single
complex vibration, but a number of distinct vibrations,
and each of these constitutes a separate stimulus affecting
the terminations of the auditory nerve.
Though the theory of Helmholtz is very simple and
plausible, it is not without difficulty. In particular, it does
not in its present form satisfactorily explain difference-
tones (see 8). Attempts have been made to find a substi-
tute for it : but in all probability it only needs modification
and development. Recently facts have come to light
analogous to colour-blindness which appear strongly to
support it. There are cases in which the mechanism for
conducting sound-impulses is intact, and yet the sensibility
for greater or smaller portions of the scale of tones is
absent or much impaired. In some instances the tone-
deafness extends to the greater part of the scale, leaving
sensibility only to a fragmentary portion of it. One tone
of moderate intensity may be clearly distinguished, while
another neighbouring tone is indistinguishable, even when
it is very loud. It is difficult to explain these phenomena
unless we suppose in the ear a system of separate elements,
each adjusted to its own peculiar tone, some of which may
be absent or incapable of discharging their function while
the rest behave in a normal manner.
In this chapter I have followed Ebbinghaus very closely. For further
reading in English the student is referred to Foster's Text-Book of
Physiology, part iv., book iii., pp. 1361-1378, and to The Power of Sound,
by E. Gurney. In German there is the great work of Karl Stumpf
in two vols., entitled Tonpsychologie.
CHAPTEE VI.
OTHER SENSATIONS.
1. Taste and Smell* The greater number of the sen-
sations which are usually ascribed to taste are in reality
odours. "If the nose be held and the eyes shut, it is very
difficult to distinguish, in eating, between an apple, an onion,
and a potato ; the three may be recognised by their texture,
but not by their taste." Cinnamon applied to the tongue
under the same conditions appears like flour ; the taste
may appreciate a slight sweetness, but that is all. There
are four undoubted taste-sensations sweet, salt, acid, and
bitter. There are two others the alkaline and the metallic
which are disputed. The alkaline is possibly a mixture of
salt and sweet, together with peculiar touch-sensations.
All taste-sensations appear to be intermingled with and
qualified by tactile sensations. An acid, too slight to be
distinguished as such, produces a peculiar touch-sensation
by its astringent character ; and as the acidity is increased
the touch-sensation becomes stinging, and finally passes
into a pain-sensation which completely dominates the
special experience of acidity. Salt is also accompanied by
a stinging sensation : but this does not reach the same
pitch of intensity as in the case of acids. The sensation of
*In regard to taste, I have mainly followed Kiesow, "Beitrage zur
Physiologischen Psychologic des Geschmacksinnes," Philosophische Studien^
X. (1894), pp. 329-368, 532-561.
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softness and smoothness is associated with sweetness;
tliis is appreciable when the sweet substance is present in
quantities so small that it cannot be discerned as such.
As the sensation of sweetness becomes intensified, the
touch-sensation is dominated and obscured by it. But it
emerges again as the sweetness is further increased. Very
intense sensations of sweetness are sometimes accompanied
by a biting sensation.
The tip of the tongue is especially sensitive to sweetness,
the edges to acidity, and the base to bitterness. The tip
and edges are equally sensitive to salts, the base less so.
When the mouth has been washed out, and some neutral
substance, such as distilled water, is applied to the tongue,
the result differs according to the point of application, and
varies in different persons. The base of the tongue appears
in all cases to respond by a sensation of bitter. In some
persons the same sensation is aroused to whatever part of
the tongue the distilled water is applied. Others feel no
sensation except at the base. Others feel a sensation of
sweetness at the tips and of acidity at the edges. There
appear to exist among taste-sensations relations somewhat
analogous to the contrast of colours. Salt, by a sort of
contrast, makes distilled water taste sweet. It has the
same effect on solutions of sweet substances which in them-
selves would be too weak to be appreciable. It also has an
intensifying effect on solutions which are strong enough to
be appreciable. It operates in this way both when the same
part of the tongue is successively stimulated, first by a salt,
then by a neutral or sweet fluid, and also when the salt
and the sweet are simultaneously applied to homologous
parts of the tongue, e.g., to corresponding points on the
right and left edges of the tongue. Sweet has a much
weaker contrast effect on salt, than salt on sweet. In both
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forms of the experiment, sweet instead of making distilled
water taste salt by contrast, makes it taste sweet. On the
other hand, contrast with sweet makes distinctly appre-
ciable a salt solution in itself too weak to be perceived.
Similar relations have been observed between salt and acid,
and between sweet and acid
;
but in the case of sweet and
acid they are manifested only when the two stimuli arc
applied successively to the same part of the tongue, not
when they are applied simultaneously to homologous parts.
Bitter appears neither to produce contrast effects nor to be
affected by them.
The sense of taste can be stimulated only by fluids.
Solid substances must be dissolved in the mouth before
they can affect it.
The appropriate stimulus for the sense of smell, on the
other hand, consists of odoriferous particles conveyed to
the membrane in a gaseous medium. The sensations of
smell have not been adequately classified or analysed into
their primary constituents : there appears to be a very
great variety of them. They are often modified by
mixture with touch and taste-sensations. The pungency
of an odour is not strictly a sensation of smell at all,
but a peculiar kind of tactual experience. Odours proper
do not appear to produce sneezing : this is due to
irritation affecting the sense of touch. Odorous sensations
take " some time to develop after the contact of the
stimulus with the olfactory membrane, and may last very
long. When the stimulus is repeated the sensation very
soon dies out : the sensory terminal organs speedily
become exhausted. The larger, apparently, the surface of
olfactory membrane employed, the more intense the
sensation
;
animals with acute scent have a proportionately
large area of olfactory membrane. The greater the
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quantity of odoriferous material brought to the membrane,
the more intense the sensation up to a certain limit ; and
an olfactometer for measuring olfactory sensations has
been constructed, the measurements being given by the
size of the superficial area, impregnated with an odoriferous
substance, over which the air must pass in order to give
rise to a distinct sensation. The limit of increase of
sensation, however, is soon reached, a minute quantity
producing the maximum of sensation, and further increase
giving rise to exhaustion. The minimum, quantity of
material required to produce an olfactory sensation may be
in some cases, as in that of musk, almost immeasurably
small."*
The sense of smell plays an immensely important part
in the life of animals. It is to them what sight and
hearing are to us. The animal detects its prey and follows
it by means of scent. On the other hand the scent of the
pursuer warns the prey and guides its efforts to escape.
Probably every individual and every species has its own
characteristic and distinctive odour. There are some men
who can distinguish human beings by smell; dogs and
other animals possess this power in a very high degree.
The ants of one nest attack those of another nest or of
another species who may intrude among them ; whereas
they never under normal conditions attack ants belonging
to their own nests. It has been clearly shown by experi-
ment that this is due to the peculiar and distinctive
odours belonging to different nests and their inhabitants.
The unfamiliar odour of an ant coming from a strange
nest has an exasperating effect. The intruder is attacked
and usually killed. If before being introduced into a
nest it is first bathed in juice produced by crushing the
*
Foster, op. cit., pp. 1389-1390.
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tenants of the nest, no notice is taken of it however
widely it may differ in appearance from these. It is
incorrect to say that ants recognise other ants as belonging
or not belonging to their own family : all depends on the
irritating effect of the unfamiliar odour of strangers.*
The comparatively small part played by smell in the mental
life of human beings may be accounted for by the fact
that trains of ideas constitute so large a part of human
experience. Smells are not adapted to ideal revival in
serial succession as sounds and sights are.
2. Cutaneous Sensations. These are principally of three
kinds pressure, temperature, and certain others allied in
their nature to organic sensations, among which the most
prominent are those which from their peculiarly disagree-
able character are called pains. This last class will be best
considered in connexion with organic sensations in general.
"The sensation caused by pressure is at its maximum
soon after its beginning, and thenceforward diminishes.
The more suddenly the pressure is increased, the greater
the sensation
;
and if the increase be sufficiently gradual,
even very great pressure may be applied without giving
rise to any sensation. A sensation in any spot is increased
when the surrounding areas of skin are not subject to
pressure at the same time. Thus if the finger be dipped
into mercury the pressure of the mercury will be felt more
at the surface of the fluid adjoining the skin which is
not in contact with the mercury, than in the parts of the
skin wholly covered with the mercury; and if the finger
be drawn up and down, the sensation caused will be that
* See Albrecht Bethe's Diirfen wir den Ameisen und Bienen psychische
Qualitdten zuschreiben (Archiv fur die gesammte Physiologie. Bd. 70).
Bethe also shows that ants find their way to and from their nests by
means of smell. In moving they leave an odorous track behind them.
$ 2.] OTHER SENSATIONS. 187
of a ring moving along the finger."* It should be noted
that this applies only to sensations of pressure sufficiently
marked to attract attention. As a matter of fact, pressure-
sensations are present over the general surface of the
body in every moment of our lives, and their presence can
be detected as soon as we turn attention to them. Such
conditions as the circulation of the blood, etc., furnish a
constantly present stimulus within the body itself, and
such uniform contact as that with the clothes we wear
produces sensations which ordinarily escape notice, but
are quite discernible when we attend to them.
The different areas of the skin are sensitive to pressure
in varying degrees. The tips of the fingers, the lips, and
the surface of the forehead, discriminate the smallest
differences. The sole of the foot, the arm, and the back,
have comparatively little power of discrimination.
Bodies of the same shape, weight, size, and temperature,
produce different pressure-sensations according to their
various textures. Thus contact with a smooth surface and
contact with a rough surface yield specifically different
experiences. Similarly, we distinguish sharpness and
bluntness, hardness and softness, wetness and dryness.
All these peculiar qualities of sensation are due to varying
combinations of pressure, to variations in the relative
intensity of the constituent pressures, in the mode of their
spatial distribution, and in their successive changes. A
smooth surface produces a uniform pressure at every point ;
a rough surface produces a pressure which is discontinuous
and irregular. The difference between hard and soft is con-
nectedwith successive changes in the intensity of the pressure
sensations. Sharpness and bluntness are differences in
the extent of surface touched. These various qualities are
*
Foster, op. cit., p. 1413.
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presented to consciousness, not merely as varying combina-
tions of pressure, but as having a specific character of
their own, which does not appear to be capable of further
analysis. We are here confronted with the same fact
which has met us in other departments of sensation. Just
as the partial tones combined in a musical note produce by
their union a specific experience distinct from the quality
of any of them taken separately, or of all of them taken
together, so the combination of pressures which we experi-
ence when velvet comes in contact with the skin, produces
those peculiar modifications of consciousness which we call
softness and smoothness.
Temperature-sensations are of two classes the cold and
the hot. The sensation of cold is as specifically distinct
from that of warmth, as the sensation of black from
that of white. A sensation of heat sufficiently marked
to attract attention seems only to take place when the
temperature of a region of the skin, which has pre-
viously been fairly constant, is raised ; and it is also a
necessary condition that the rise in temperature should
not be too gradual.
" Our skin has a certain temperature
which varies from time to time, according to circumstances,
and is not the same in all regions of the skin at the same
time. A given spot of skin at a given time will have a
certain temperature ; that temperature does not give rise
to a distinct sensation though its effects may enter into
what we may call general sensibility ; we may not be
directly conscious, for instance, that the forehead has one
temperature and the hand another, though the two
temperatures may differ widely."* As the stimulus for
sensations of heat is a more or less sudden rise in the
temperature of the skin ; so the stimulus for sensations of
*
Op. dt., p. 1416.
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cold is a more or loss sudden fall in the temperature of tlie
skin. This applies only to sensations conspicuous enough
to attract attention. A general experience of heat or
cold is always present, and discernible whenever we are
interested in taking note of it.
The sensations of heat and of cold and of pressure
respectively are produced at different points of the skin.
"If a blunt pointed but otherwise fine needle be used
to exert pressure, a little exploration will ascertain that
at some points the amount of pressure can readily be
recognised the sense of touch is acute while at other
points, and these may be quite near the others, the
amount of pressure cannot be recognised, and indeed no
/sensation is experienced until the pressure is excessive
and then the sensation felt is not one of touch proper
but of pain. Similarly, if heat or cold be applied by
means of a metal tube or rod narrowed to a point, it
will be found that some points of the skin are very
sensitive to changes of temperature, while other points
are insensitive to temperature, the application of heat
or cold giving rise to pain only and not to specific
sensations of heat or cold. Further, the points of the
skin which are sensitive to pressure are those which are
not sensitive to heat or cold, and vice versa"* It appears
also that the points sensitive to heat are not identical
with those sensitive to cold. The separation in this case
does not seem to be so complete as that between tem-
perature-spots and pressure-spots. Some points peculiarly
sensitive to cold seem also in a less degree to be sensitive
to heat, though this result of experiment may be illusory.
It is possibly due to spreading of the stimulation over
neighbouring parts of the skin. Further investigation is
*
Op. cit., p. 1428, 1429.
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needed, but the general result, so far, is: the skin is the
seat of three distinct senses, the sense of heat, the
sense of cold, and the sense of pressure.
3. Motor Sensations. If we close our eyes so that wo
cannot see our own body, we are none the less distinctly
and accurately aware of the position of our limbs. If wo
move a limb, for example the arm or the finger, we aro
distinctly and accurately aware of the amount and direction
of the change and of the new position which it produces.
Similarly, if instead of merely moving a limb we push
against a wall, or lift a weight, we are aware of the kind
and degree of tension produced by the resistance opposed
to our efforts. If, instead of actively initiating movements
ourselves, we allow the position of our limbs to be shifted
in various ways by another person while we remain passive,
we are still almost equally capable of appreciating position
and change of position. If our muscles are contracted by
the application of an electric current, the experiences
which mark position and change of position as well as
amount and kind of resistance, continue to be present.
How do these experiences originate ? In any movement
a great many changes take place in a great many tissues.
In moving the arm, the skin is in various ways crumpled
and pressed at every stage of the process. There are
varying degrees and kinds of tension in the tendons : the
joints slide over one another; the muscles pass through
various stages of contraction. All these tissues appear to
be supplied with sensory nerves ; it is therefore possible
that each and all of them contribute to determine the
experiences which mark position and change of position.
As a matter of fact, it is probable that all of them con-
tribute in some degree. The skin appears to be the least
important. Our discrimination of position, movement, etc.,
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is not " notably diminished by temporary anaesthesia of
the skin
; if, for instance, the skin of the arm be rendered
for a while anaesthetic, we do not find any marked change
in our power of judging1 weights or resistance, or in
appreciating, with the eyes shut, the position of the
limb."* Joints, on the other hand, constitute a very
important factor, so far at least as concerns appreciation
of position and change of position. This is shown in a
series of experiments carried out by Groldscheider. "This
patient observer caused his fingers, arms, and legs to be
passively rotated upon their various joints in a mechanical
apparatus which registered both the velocity of movement
impressed and the amount of angular rotation. No active
muscular contraction took place. The minimal felt amounts
of rotation were in all cases surprisingly small, being much
less than a single angular degree in all the joints except
those of the fingers."f Anaesthesia of the skin made no
difference in the result. Anaesthesia of the joints them-
selves greatly decreased the power of discrimination. In
the perception of resistance, the tendons are probably the
most important factor. They are organs especially adapted
for the appreciation of strain or tension.
" Let your arm
hang down loosely by your side. Attach a fairly heavy
weight by a string to the forefinger. The weight pulls the
surfaces of the elbow and other joints apart ; so that there
is no pressure or friction of one surface against another.
But you soon get the sensation of strain throughout the
arm.
"| Sensations due to the states of the muscles them-
selves undoubtedly seem to exist ; but it is very difficult to
estimate their importance, as marks of varying position,
movement, and tension.
*
Op. clt., p. 1436. t James, Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., pp. 192-193.
t Titchener, An Outline of Psychology, p. 61.
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The distinction between position-sensations and move-
ment-sensations is important. The former are due to the
particular form of the tension of the organs when
quiescent, the latter to change in this form.
The sensations we have so far considered are peripheral
in their origin. They are produced by impressions pro-
ceeding from outlying portions of the body to the
nervous system. They are equally present when we move
by our own volition, and when we allow our limbs to be
moved by another person, or our muscles to be thrown
into contraction by such artificial means as the electric
current. But it has been maintained that besides these
sensations due to the actual state and changes of state of
muscles, joints, tendons, and skin, there is also a sensa-
tional experience, directly connected with the initiation of
movement, with the discharge from the nervous centre
independently of any effect produced by it on the muscles
and the tissues connected with them. Thus, according to
Bain, there is a direct sense of energy put forth which is
independent of any results the putting forth of energy
may produce. This peculiar modification of sensory
consciousness has been called the sense of effort, or the
innervation-seme. At the present time it is the fashion
wholly to deny its existence. The denial is mainly founded
on the fact that we can appreciate position, movement, and
tension as well when the limbs are passively moved as
when we move them by our own volition ; and that, on the
other hand, when in consequence of nervous diseases the
sensibility of the joints, tendons, etc., is impaired or
destroyed, there is a corresponding incapacity to appreciate
position, movement, and tension. But this argument lacks
logical cogency ; for if there be an innervation-sense it
cannot, from the nature of the case, inform us of the actual
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effects of the motor impulse. It can only tell us what we
are attempting to do, not what we are actually doing or
have done. Thus a patient may will to move an
anaesthetic limb with his eyes shut ; and he may suppose
that the movement has actually taken place, although the
limb has all the time been held in its original position by
another person. The patient does not know whether the
limb has changed its position or not ; but he none the less
knows that he has made an attempt to change its position.
Hence the argument does not positively disprove tho
existence of an innervation- sense. But it must be ad-
mitted that it throws the onus probandi on those who
maintain this peculiar mode of sentience. We have said
that the patient would in such a case be aware that he had
made an attempt ; but this only shows that he is conscious
of his volitions. But volition is by no means the same as
innervation-sense : it is not, in fact, a sensation at all, any
more than a belief is a sensation
;
it is a peculiar mode of
conation. It is true that in order to will a movement a
person must in some way be able to think of this move-
ment. But for this, ideal representation is enough : the
ideal representation may involve ideal reproduction of
motor sensations proper, or it may mainly consist of a
visual image. In neither case can it be regarded as a
peculiar sensation immediately accompanying the motor
discharge.
There is certainly a vital difference between the experience
of having a limb passively moved, and that of moving it
by our own initiative. But it is very far from clear that
the active movement involves a peculiar sensation which is
absent in the passive movement, a sensation comparable
with those which arise from joints and tendons. In
passing from a state of doubt to a state of belief there is a
Psych. J3
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peculiar change in consciousness, but it is not a sensation.
Similarly, in passing from a state of indecision to one of
voluntary determination, there is also a change in con-
sciousness
;
but it is in no way comparable to sensations
such as those of redness or greenness, of heat or cold.
There are, however, certain facts which lend support to
the assumption of an inriervation-sense. The patient who
attempts to move a paralysed limb not only knows that he
is making the attempt, but is also aware of differences
in the amount of effort which he puts forth. This may be
explained, at least in part, by the fact that the motor
impulse proceeds not only to the limb which is to be
moved, but also to other parts of the body which preserve
their sensibility, and especially to the organs of respiration.
But, as Wundt insists, there are certain cases of paralysis
of the muscles of the eye which are harder to deal with.
If the muscle which moves the eye to the right is com-
pletely paralysed, so that an outward movement of the eye
is no longer possible, the effort to move it produces an
apparent movement of the object looked at. The muscle
may be only partially disabled, so that it is still capable of
a lateral rotation of twenty degrees and of no more. In
this case, the patient, although he has moved his eye only
through the angle of twenty degrees, refers the objects
seen to the same position which they would occupy if they
were seen by the normal eye turned as far as possible in
an outward direction. This seems to show that the patient
measures the amount of movement by the amount of his
own effort, independently of any peripheral sensations
which this effort may produce. It seems impossible to
explain the illusion as- due to sympathetic movements in
the other eye : for when both eyes are open, either the
illusion does not occur, or the two eyes see Double, and the
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illusion is confined to the image presented to the diseased
eye. The illusion is constantly present when the normal
eye is closed.
It seems that the case for innervation-sensations cannot
be regarded as completely disproved by its opponents. It
is probably best at present to suspend judgment and wait
for further evidence. In conclusion, we must note one
very important point. There are two forms of the theory,
one advocated by Bain, and the other advocated by
Wundt. According to Bain, the innervation-experience is
primarily occasioned by the motor discharge itself : it is a
unique kind of sensation correlated with the active initia-
tion of movement. According to Wundt, on the contrary,
its specific quality is ultimately derived from a peripheral
source. The area of the cortex from which the motor
impulses are discharged is also the area in which motor
sensations in general are localised. Hence, the excitement
of this area in the process of motor discharge involves a
reproduction of experiences more or less similar to those
which arise from peripheral sources in the actual execution
of the movement
;
but the reproduction assumes the
character rather of an actual sensation than of an idea.*
There can be no doubt that, if we are to accept the
theory of innervation-sensations at all, we must accept it
in the form in which it is propounded by AVundt, and not
in that which Bain has given it.
4. Organic Sensations. The sensations we have so far
considered derive their main importance from the function
they fulfil in the perception of external objects. Their
specific qualities correspond not only to the specific modes
in which the organism is affected, but also to the specific
nature of the agencies which act upon it. It is true that
* On this point Wundt's own statements are somewhat vague.
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motor sensations do not arise from external impressions :
they originate within the organism itself. But they none
the less play a most important part in the perception of
external things. It is through them that we appreciate
weight, resistance, and space-relations. But there is
another class of sensations which mainly mark states of
the organism itself, and not the nature of external objects.
These are called organic sensations. Extreme heat and
extreme cold no longer produce sensations distinctive of
heat and cold at all
; they both produce a peculiar painful
experience, which is the same whether the external agency
is heat or cold. In like manner, the sensations result-
ing from a bruise, a blow, or a cut, may be similar, though
they are produced by very various external agencies. It is
characteristic of such sensations that they persist often for
a long time after the external agency has ceased to operate.
The bodily change which it has produced continues to act
as a persistent stimulus. A wound persists after the knife
which has inflicted it is withdrawn, and along with the
wound the sensation occasioned by it persists also. Organic
experiences may arise either through the operation of an
external agency, or merely through the changing states of
the internal organs. Hunger and thirst and the like
are familiar examples of sensations originating from
within the organism itself. Motor experiences, as we have
seen, generally mark the qualities and relations of external
things ; but the sensations of fatigue or of cramp are truly
organic, because they mark the state of the muscular
apparatus itself, and do not contribute to our knowledge
of the external world. In every moment of our lives
organic sensations constitute a most important element in
our experience. The general tone of our bodily feeling
depends on them. On them, depends the difference between
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feeling well and feeling ill, and the like. But this or that
organic sensation does not attract attention and emerge
clearly into consciousness, unless it attains a special pitch
of intensity. In general, organic experiences from mani-
fold sources are merged in a massive whole constituting
what is called the common sensibility or coenaesthesis. When,
from the general mass of common sensibility, a single
organic sensation detaches itself and becomes salient in
consciousness, it is usually intrusive and engrossing.
Such sensations are specially characterised by their
diffusiveness. They do not, like sensations of sight or
pressure, depend merely on the localised affection of a
circumscribed portion of the organism ; they also involve
a more or less widespread organic disturbance. For
instance, the pain-sensation produced by a cut or a blow
is a complex experience partly depending on the dis-
turbance of respiration, circulation, and the whole
motor apparatus of the body. The more intense the
sensation, the more conspicuous and widespread is this
general organic disturbance.
This brings us to another aspect of organic sensation.
It may arise, and usually does arise in part, from a
disturbance of the nervous system, which excites changes
throughout the organism, these changes in their turn
giving rise to sensations. In all the more intense
emotions, there is an accompaniment of organic sensation
originating in this manner. This is so important an
element in the total state that it has been held to con-
stitute the essential part of the emotional experience.
We have seen* that the possibility of central initiation
makes organic sensations reproducible as no other sensa-
tions are under normal conditions. Whatever reinstates
* Book I., chap, ii., 9, ad fin.
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a similar nervous disturbance, will indirectly produce
similar organic sensations. Tickling, for instance, is a
very diffusive experience ; and the mere anticipation will
produce the corresponding organic sensations, because it
produces the general disturbance of nervous equilibrium
on which they depend. The uncomfortable feelings which
arise in paying a visit to a dentist, even before he begins
operations, have the same source.
We shall have something to say about pain-sensations
in general in a subsequent chapter. "We need here
only refer to two organic experiences of special im-
portance, hunger and thirst. Thirst is usually produced
"by the diminution of the water present in the body
either through restriction of the intake, or through excess
of the output in the secretions, such as that of sweat,
or through both together Thirst thus brought about
may be temporarily assuaged by simple moistening of
the soft palate. From this we may infer that the
sensation of thirst is brought about by afferent sensory
impulses started in the mucous membrane of the soft
palate by a deficiency of water in that membrane."*
Hunger is usually
"
produced by the products of digestion
ceasing to be thrown into the blood." The sensation seems
"to be in some way specially connected with the condition
of the gastric walls, much in the same way that thirst is
specially connected with the palate ; the products of
digestion have a much greater power in appeasing hunger
when they act locally and directly on the gastric membrane
than when they are simply brought to bear on the body
at large, and a small quantity of food will immediately
satisfy hunger when introduced into the stomach, though
it will have no effect when introduced otherwise."!
*
Foster, op. cit., p. 1423. f Op. cit., p. 1424.
CHAPTEE VII.
THE WEBER-FECHNER LAW.
1. The Experimental Facts. We can compare any two
objects and pronounce them like or unlike. If the objects
are disparate in kind, we are unable to say more than that
they are unlike. This is the only result of comparing the
brightness of the sun with the immortality of the soul. If
we compare the brightness of a light with the loudness of
a sound, we can say that both possess intensity ; but we
cannot fix any definite relation between them. For
instance, we cannot affirm that the loudness of the sound
is equal to the brightness of the light. On the other
hand, if we compare the quantitative variations of the
same kind of object in the same respect, we can pronounce
more definite judgments. We can pronounce that one
sound is less or more loud or equal in loudness to another.
Besides this, we can compare degrees of unlikeness with
definite results. We can say that one sound, C, is as
much louder than B as B is louder than A. In this way
we can select two sounds of different loudness, and then
proceed to find a third exactly intermediate between them.
We may then compare the intermediate sound, .Z?, with each
of the extremes, A and C, so as to interpose between A
and B a D, unlike in loudness to A in the same degree in
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which, it is unlike in loudness to B
;
and to interpose
between and C an E unlike in loudness to B in the same
degree in which it is unlike in loudness to C. It is thus
possible to form a scale passing by equal gradations of
unlikeness from a very faint sound to a very loud one.
Similar scales can be formed for degrees of unlikeness in
pitch, in the brightness of light, in weight as appreciated
by pressure on the skin or by lifting, etc. Now the funda-
mental fact which underlies Weber's law is that equal
degrees of unlikeness in sensation do not correspond to
equal increase or decrease in the absolute intensity of the
stimulus. If a series of increasing intensities of stimula-
tion be denoted by R^ Jlz , ^3 , ^4 , and the corresponding
sensations by r1? r2 , r3 , r4 , the degree of unlikeness between
r
v
and r2 is equal to the degree of unlikeness between
7? 7?
rs and r4 , when -1 = ?, or to use an equivalent formula, in
-"a -^4
some respects more convenient, when
Long before quantitative methods in psychology were
thought of, astronomers had occasion to classify the stars
according to their relative brightness. The different
classes are arranged in a scale. At the top of the scale
comes the brightest ; the unlikeness in average brightness
between this and the second class is equal to the unlikeness
in average brightness between the second and third class,
and so on. The corresponding intensities of the physical
lights have since been determined; and it is found that




etc. Here each stimulus is the half of the preceding
stimulus. Obviously ::!:, an(i
In experimental investigations, attention has been chiefly
given to degrees of unlikeness which are barely discernible.
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Within limits, the stimulus may vary without any corre-
sponding unlikeness in the sensation becoming perceptible.*
The same law holds here also. The original stimulus,
whatever its absolute intensity may be, must be increased
by a certain constant fraction of its own amount, before
any unlikeness in the sensation is discernible. The constant
fraction is different for different kinds of sensation. In
estimating weight merely by pressure on the skin, the
ratio between original stimulus and increased stimulus
must be 3 : 4 before an unlikeness is perceptible ; or to
use technical language, before the difference-threshold is
passed. Difference-threshold is in some respects a mis-
leading term : the facts do not warrant us in saying that
there is no difference in the'"sensation before the threshold
is passed, but that there is no discernible unlikeness in the
sensation. It is better therefore to speak of the threshold
of discernment than of the threshold of difference. For
brightness of white light, unlikeness only becomes dis-
cernible when the ratio of the original stimulus to the
increased stimulus is 100 : 101, or, in other words, when
the increment is T^th of the original stimulus. " If we
place two candles so as throw two shadows of some object
on a white surface, the shadow caused by each light will be
illuminated by the other light, and the rest of the surface
will be illuminated by both lights. If now we move one
candle away we shall reach a point at which the shadow
caused by it ceases to be visible, that is to say, we fail at
this point to appreciate the difference between the surface
illuminated by the near light alone and that illuminated
by the near light and the far light together. If now,
having noted the distance to which the candle had to be
moved, we repeat the same experiment with two bright
* See book ii., chap, i., 3.
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lamps, moving one lamp away until the shadow it casts
ceases to be visible, Ave shall find that the lamp has to be
moved just as far as the candle ; that is to sav, the least
difference between the illumination of the bright lamps
which we can appreciate is the same as in the case of the
dimmer candles. Many similar examples might be given
showing a similar result, in fact, it is found by careful
observation that, within tolerably wide limits, the smallest
difference of light which we can appreciate by visual sen-
sations is a constant fraction (about T^oth) of the total
luminosity employed."*
It should be added that a stimulus must reach a certain
degree of intensity before it can produce any discernible
sensation at all. Physical light or physical sound may be
too faint to be distinguishable. The point at which it is
just indistinguishable, so that the least increase would
make it distinguishable, is called the stimulus-threshold.
2. Interpretation. The explanation of the facts de-
scribed has been much discussed. One hypothesis is that
increase in the intensity of the stimulus fails to produce an
increase in the intensity of the sensation until the increment
is a certain fraction of the original stimulus. On this hypo-
thesis the sensation ought to vary by leaps and bounds at
certain fixed points. The reason why no unlikeness in the
sensation is discernible before these points are reached is
that no unlikeness in the sensation exists. This view may
be definitely rejected. There are no such fixed points -of
transition. Whatever the intensity of the original sensation
may be, the same relative increment is required to make
unlikeness discernible. In gradually increasing the
intensity of the stimulus, it is not found that there are
certain points at which change in sensation becomes
*
.Foster, op. cit., p. 1211.
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perceptible in such, a way that any pair of stimuli gives rise
to distinguishable sensations, if they lie at opposite sides
of the point of transition, however closely they may
approach it. As a matter of fact, a sensation A. may be
indistinguishable from , and B from C, and yet A may
be distinguishable from C. If discernible unlikeness in
sensation were co-extensive with actual unlikeness, this
would be impossible. Another objection is that the power
of discriminating very small degrees of unlikeness is
greatly improved by practice, and varies greatly with
the concentration of attention. It seems improbable that
these conditions should have so great an effect on the actual
intensity of sensation produced by the stimulus.
Another explanation is that adopted by Fechner.
He rightly holds that the sensation varies with the
stimulus even when the variation is not perceptible. It
becomes perceptible when the degree of variation has
passed a certain limit. So far, we may follow him. But
he also holds that the increase in intensity of sensation
required to constitute a discernible unlikeness is not
relative but absolute, so that the variations of stimulus
form a geometrical series, while the corresponding
variations of the sensation form an arithmetical series.
In estimating weight by means of pressure, if we begin
with an ounce, we must add a third of an ounce before any
unlikeness is discernible
;
if we begin with a pound, we
must add a third of a pound before any unlikeness is
discernible. In both cases, according to Fechner the
increase in the intensity of the pressure-sensations is not
relatively the same but absolutely the same. There are
very serious objections to this view. If we compare the
weight of an ounce with no weight at all, according to
Fechner, the degree of unlikeness between the two
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experiences ought to be strictly proportional to the differ-
once between the intensity of sensation produced by one
ounce, and the complete absence of pressure sensation.
In other words, it ought to be proportional to the absolute
intensity of pressure produced by one ounce. But as a
matter of fact, the unlikeness between the zero value of a
sensation and any finite value is infinite. Hence, for this
limiting case, Fechner's interpretation breaks down. There
is a difficulty in testing it in other cases, because of the
peculiar nature of intensive magnitude. Intensive magni-
tude is indivisible. We cannot subtract a fainter sound
from a louder so as to be able to point to a certain degree of
loudness as the mathematical remainder. Hence we cannot
in such cases immediately test Fechner's contention that
the degree of unlikeness between two sensations is simply
proportional to their mathematical difference, to the
remainder which would be left if one could be subtracted
from the other. But there are other cases of the application
of Weber's law in which this difficulty does not present
itself. Weber's law holds good of extensive as well as
intensive magnitude, and it also holds good of number. If
we compare a line two inches long with a line three inches
long, and then compare a line six inches long with a line
seven inches long, according to Fechner the degree of
unlikeness between the two inch line and the three inch
line ought to be identical with the degree of unlikeness
between the six inch line and the seven inch line. In both
cases the mathematical difference is the same one inch.
This is true from the psychological as well as from the
physical point of view. For if we suppose the lines to be
presented to the eye under similar conditions, the mode
in which an inch affects the retina in the one case may
be virtually identical with the mode in which it affects the
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retina in the other case. The inches are not only equal
as measured by a rule ; they also appear equal as they are
presented to consciousness. We are therefore dealing
with psychical, and not merely with physical, magnitudes.
But in spite of the fact that 3 2 = 1, and that
7 6 also = 1, there is a greater degree of unlikeness
between the line of two inches taken as a whole, and
that of three inches taken as a whole, than there is
between the line of six and that of seven inches. The
same holds for least perceptible degrees of unlikeness.
If we have to increase the length of a line of six inches by
a certain amount in order that the unlikeness may be just
discernible, we must increase the length of a line of two
inches, not by the same amount, but in the same pro-
portion, in order that the unlikeness may be just discernible.
Number as well as extension affords illustration. If we
lay a group of three counters on the table beside a group
of two, and if we then lay a group of eight beside a group
of seven, it is clear that there is a greater resemblance
between the group of eight and the group of seven than
there is between the group of three and the group of two.
Yet in both cases the mathematical difference is the same
one counter
;
and it may appear to be the same as pre-
sented to consciousness. The principle holds also for
magnitudes which are not directly perceived, but thought
of. Everybody recognises that a billion and one is more
like a billion than eleven is like ten. So in the ordinary
dealings of life, if we have to pay or receive sums
amounting to hundreds of pounds, we feel that it does
not matter about odd pence ; but a penny more or less is
by no means negligible if the sum to be paid or received
is under a shilling.
We may then conclude that degree of unlikeness between
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the visible quantities is neither identical with their mathe-
matical difference nor proportioned to it.
In the case of intensive magnitudes, such as the loudness
of a sound, or the brightness of a light, there is, properly
speaking, no mathematical difference, because we cannot
divide such magnitudes into parts, so as to find a numerical
equivalent for each, and subtract the one from the other.
None the less, there may be in intensive magnitude
something analogous to the mathematical difference.
The velocity of a moving body is an intensive magni-
tude
;
but it is a magnitude which can be represented
by a number which is a function of the space traversed
and the time which it takes to traverse it. It may
thus be treated as if it were an extensive magnitude
capable of addition and subtraction. There is no
reason why the intensity of sensation should not be
conceived in the same way. At any rate, the mere
fact that we are dealing with intensive magnitude does
not in itself constitute an insuperable objection to the
abstract possibility of such a mode of treatment. Hence
there is in principle no objection to Fechner's attempt to
correlate increased intensity of sensation with increased in-
tensity of stimulus. But he was over-hasty in supposing
that equal degrees of unlikeness involved equal absolute
differences of quantity in the sensation. On the contrary,
the analogy of extensive magnitude seems to show that
degree of unlikeness is correlated with relative, not
absolute, differences in intensity of sensation. Fechner's
problem is yet to be solved. We do not yet know
the law which connects increase in the strength of
the stimulus with corresponding increments of sensation.
AVe cannot yet assign a number which shall represent
degrees of loudness or brightness, as the number obtained
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by dividing the sum of units of lime into the sum of units
of space represents velocity.
3. Further questions. It may cost more or less effort
to discern an unlikeness. .The difficulty is greatest when
the unlikeness is very small. Now it has been maintained
that what we really estimate when we suppose ourselves
to be estimating degrees of unlikeness, is the degree of
difficulty which we find in perceiving unlikeness at all;
the greater the difficulty, the less the unlikeness. A
simple consideration shows that this is untrue. The
lower grades of unlikeness are specially difficult to dis-
tinguish ; and, as the unlikeness is increased in degree, it
becomes more easily discernible. But this holds only up to a
certain point. When the unlikeness is sufficiently great
it is discernible without appreciable difficulty, and after
this further increase does not make it appreciably easier
to perceive. We must therefore conclude that our
judgment of unlikeness depends primarily on the actual
unlikeness, and not on the ease or difficulty of detecting
it. At the same time, the ease or difficulty of detecting
an unlikeness may more or less affect our judgment of its
amount. It may thus be a source of error, and may to
some extent explain apparent deviations from Weber's
law.
Here a question of some importance arises. It is often
assumed without discussion that all least perceptible
degrees of unlikeness between the same kinds of sensible
qualities are equal. Now this is by no means self-evident.
It is indeed not self-evident that degrees of unlikeness
which are just discernible, are therefore equally dis-
cernible, that is to say, discernible with equal ease. Even
if they are all discernible with equal ease, it does not
follow that they are themselves equal. The appeal in
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the last instance must be to actual comparison. A
valid reason for assuming them to be equal is that they
appear equal. Another reason is that they occur under the
conditions of Weber's law, which holds in general for
equal degrees of unlikeness.
A stimulus must reach a certain degree of intensity
before it can produce any discernible sensation at all.
The question arises whether it produces any sensation
before it produces a discernible sensation. Proceeding on
the general analogy of the results we have reached in
discussing Weber's law we must assume that in all proba-
bility it does. W'e have here a special case of the general
relation of stimulus to sensation. Within limits, the
sensation varies as the stimulus is increased, without the
variation becoming perceptible. It is most natural to
bring the case of a stimulus, which is not yet intense
enough to produce a discernible sensation at all, under the
same principle. It is still more improbable that sensations
which escape notice merely because our attention is other-
wise occupied have no existence as psychical facts. Thus,
from our present point of view, we can reinforce the
argument of Bk. II., ch. i., 2.
4. Limitations of TPeber's Law. We have spoken of
Weber's law as if it held good exactly and uniformly for
all sensations
;
but as a matter of fact this is far from
being the case. Many deviations and limitations have been
discovered by experiment. Verification commonly fails for
very high or very low intensities of sensation. In view of
the complexity of the operative conditions this is not in the
least surprising. Our power of discriminating may be
influenced by many factors besides the actual nature of the
sensations which we have to compare. The relation
between intensity of stimulus and absolute intensity of
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sensation may, and probably does, depend upon many
other conditions than the mere intensity of the stimulus
itself. We may suppose the law to be perfectly exact, in-
asmuch as it states that unlikeness between sensations
depends upon their relative difference, without supposing
that this relative difference is determined only by difference
of external stimulation. The special structure of the
different sense-organs is probably an important factor.
To speak of nothing else, the eye and the ear have sen-
sations of their own due to internal stimulation, which, it is
difficult to allow for.*
* The treatment of Weber's law in this Chapter follows Meinong,
Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes, etc.
Psych.
CHAPTER VIIL
THE FEELING-TO:NTE OF SENSATION.
1. Common Sensibility. The pleasure and pain con-
nected with, organic sensations are of fundamental and
all-pervading importance in our mental life. Normally,
these sensations are fused in a total mass of experience,
which can only be very partially analysed into its com-
ponents by attentive scrutiny. The membranes which line
our internal organs are generally supplied by sensory
nerves, which, from all parts of the body, are perpetually
conducting a multitude of impressions to the central nervous
system. On the resultant effect of these impulses it depends
whether at any moment we feel well or ill, cross or com-
placent. By the nature of our organic sensations in the
morning we can often predict whether the day's experiences
are going to be agreeable or disagreeable. The feeling-
tone of common sensibility determines in large measure
the feeling-tone of more special experiences in the way of
sensations, perceptions, and ideas. An incident which might
be pleasant or but slightly disagreeable if we were feeling
fresh and
"fit," is apt to be intensely disagreeable if our
organic functions are out of order. This is too well-known
a fact to need extended illustration. Smells and tastes
which are agreeable to the healthy person may be highly
unpleasant to the invalid. After a full meal, food which
210
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was previously delicious may become almost nauseous; even
the idea of it may be unpleasant. The very thought of
smoking a pipe in certain states of body may be repellent
in the case of persons who usually enjoy the use of tobacco.
The profound alteration of organic conditions which ac-
companies pregnancy produces curious ''longings" and
repugnances for articles of food. It thus appears that
organic sensations influence the whole state of the central
nervous system.* The neural processes connected with
special sensations are more definitely restricted and loca-
lised. The experiences due to common sensibility are
diffusive in their character. They give to the nervous
system a certain general predisposition, and on the psychical
side produce a certain general mood or temper.
By reflective scrutiny it is possible, as we have said, to
detect special components of the total complex of organic
sensation, such as those due to the heart-beat, and respi-
ration, and the shiverings of cold or glows of warmth
arising from contraction or dilatation of the blood-vessels at
the surface of the body. But there are occasions when no
special effort of attention is required to detect an organic
sensation. The experiences immediately due to a toothache,
to a colic, to muscular cramp, to a burn, a bruise, or a
blow, usually compel attention, whatever other interests
may compete with them. When one organic sensation
detaches itself from the mass of common sensibility, it is apt
to be overwhelmingly obtrusive. Such intense experiences
Besides receiving sensory impressions from the internal organs, the
central nervous system is also directly affected by general organic con-
ditions, and in particular by the character and amount of the blood-
supply which flows to it. This factor must also contribute to determine
the general nature of experience as pleasant or unpleasant. Its relative
importance as compared with the more indirect effect of sensory impres-
sions upon the inteinal organs is difficult to estimate.
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are much more often painful than pleasant; but they
also occur in agreeable phases. In general, the satis-
faction of organic cravings, such as hunger and thirst,
may be intensely agreeable. The peculiarly disagree-
able character of most organic sensations which are
intense enough to detach themselves from the general
mass, is marked by the usage of popular language which
applies to them in a restricted and distinctive sense the
word pains. A bitter taste or a discord may be disagreeable,
but it is not usually called a pain. On the other hand, we
currently speak of the pains of hunger, of scalding or
burning, or of toothache. The reason is that the main
importance of such experiences lies in their intrinsic
feeling-tone. They have comparatively little value for
cognitive consciousness. They contribute comparatively
little to the discrimination of the qualities of external
bodies
;
and they yield only more or less vague information
about the condition of our own bodies. "When we have
received a wound, we have to look at it to find out its
precise character and the proper mode of treating it.
The pain-sensation itself does not help us much.
It must be noted that those sensations which are
in popular language called, by a distinctive application
of the word, pains, have other characteristics besides
their mere unpleasantness. The feeling-tone does not
exist in abstract purity : it is always the feeling-tone
of some sensation having a more or less determinate
character of its own. It is through the character of
the accompanying sensation that we are able to dis-
tinguish different kinds of organic pain or pleasure.
Thus we discriminate from each other stinging, piercing,
gnawing, crushing, beating, shooting, burning, and
innumerable other kinds of pain. Hence it is possible to
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compare pain-sensations in other respects than the
intensity of their painfulness. The points of agreement
and difference are to a large extent to be found in the
temporal and local distribution of the constituents of a
complex experience. Local distribution is marked by
such terms as pricking, shooting. Temporal sequence and
rhythmic alternation are marked by such terms as throlling,
beating, and the like. These differentiating qualities
which we use in describing the varieties of pain-
sensation have usually little cognitive value of any
other kind. So far as cognitive consciousness is con-
cerned, their main function is fulfilled in enabling us to
detect and express the difference between one kind of pain
and another. It is therefore natural that in naming them
we should apply to all indifferently the common word pain.
But it is better to speak of pain-sensations than of pain, in
order to indicate that something besides mere unpleasant-
ness is involved. Markedly analogous experiences may also
occur without any intensely disagreeable feeling-tone. A
slight burn may retain much of the peculiar prickly, pungent,
quality of the original sensation when the painfulness has
almost or quite disappeared. So it is possible occasionally
to detect the peculiar throb characteristic of a toothache,
and the tenderness of the gum, when the acutely disagree-
able phase of the experience has passed away or has not
yet arrived. Hunger is usually unpleasant, but some-
times the beginning of it does not appear to be so.
So far we have referred only to those distinctive features
which serve us in describing the difference between one
pain-sensation and another. But there are undoubtedly
other differences which seem incapable of analysis and
description. This follows from the diffusive nature of
organic sensations. The particular sensation which we
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regard as painful may have its origin in a burn or a
wound in a particular part of the skin, or in a diseased
condition of the membrane of the stomach or bowels.
The specific nature of the experience will therefore be in
part determined by the character of this primary sensation.
But the disturbance set up by the localised impression
tends to involve more or less the whole nervous system,
and to overflow the whole organism. The diffused effect
on the nervous system, may be marked by some peculiarity
in the experience. Certainly, the impressions which arise
from the changed conditions of the organism as a whole
must modify the total experience in an important degree.
But these elements are not easily expressed in definite
language. They can, as people say, be felt but not
described.
Organic pains and pleasures in extreme degrees of
intensity reduce to a minimum cognitive process in general.
In having a tooth drawn, our consciousness seems to con-
sist in a single thrill of mere sensation. Attention to
definite objects ceases : we cannot be said to attend even
to the sensation itself, except in the vaguest way. We do
not take note of its peculiar qualities, we simply feel it.
The distinction between subject and object seems for the
moment almost lost. It remains true that the experience
has a peculiar quality which might be analysed and
described by a demon which had taken possession of us
and was watching our mental processes. But no approach
to such analysis and description is possible to us until the
experience is over, and we can calmly regard it in
retrospect.
Pain-sensations may arise through disintegration of
tissue or excessive stimulation in almost any part of the
surface of the body. The question arises, how far are they
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due to tlie existence of nerves of common sensibility
terminating in the skin and other sensitive surfaces, and
how far they may be produced by stimulation of the
nerves subserving the special senses. It appears probable
that stimulation of the nerves of sight and hearing does not
result of itself in pain-sensations, strictly so called. But the
case of cutaneous impressions is more doubtful. Grold-
scheider has found that a continued series of taps on a
point peculiarly sensitive to pressure may suddenly give
rise to a new sensation distinctly different in kind from
those of pressure which had previously accompanied the
several taps. This new sensation, due to the cumulative
effect of repeated impressions, is organic in its nature, and
bears the general character of a pain-sensation although it
may not be acutely painful. Now the question may be
raised whether the same nerve-endings which were the
medium of the sensation of pressure were also the medium
of this other sensation. Again, let us suppose a needle-
point thrust into the skin; at first only a sensation of
pressure is felt, which may be more or less disagreeable.
It is only after the lapse of an appreciable interval of time
that the pain-sensation of pricking occurs. The time-
interval points to the possibility that the pain-sensation
and the pressure-sensation, respectively, are subserved by
different nerves. This view appears to be reinforced by
certain pathological phenomena. There are cases
when sensitiveness to temperature and pressure remains
intact while pain-sensations are no longer producible.
This sometimes happens to patients under chloroform or
other anaesthetics. It also occurs in lead-poisoning and in
some cases of nervous disease. The inverse also may take
place. Susceptibility to pain-sensation may be retained,
though pressure- and temperature-sensations are no longer
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producible. These facts seem to sliow that the nerve of
common sensibility and those of special sensations are
distinct and separate. But there is one weak point in the
argument. The pathological phenomena only occur
under conditions which produce abnormal states of the
nervous system. We may explain the facts, not by
supposing separate and distinct sets of nerve-fibres termi-
nating in the skin, but by supposing that the effect of the
same impression on the same nerve is altered by the
altered state of the central nervous matter to which it is
conveyed. It has been found that removal or disablement
of the grey matter of the spinal cord produces insensibility
to pain-sensations, while sensibility to pressure- and
temperature-sensations is left unaffected so long as the
white strands of the cord remain intact. Conversely,
cutting through the white strands of the cord destroys
sensitiveness to pressure- and temperature-, but not to pain-
sensations. Now before a nervous impulse can be trans-
mitted through grey matter, it must first excite the grey cells
so that they discharge in an explosive manner. For this the
impulse communicated to them must reach a certain pitch
of intensity, and after their discharge the impulse is
transmitted in an intensified form. They thus serve as
accumulators of nervous energy. In this way we may
explain the sudden emergence of a new sensation as the
result of a series of successive taps on a pressure-point.
Each tap gives rise to a relatively feeble nervous impulse,
which by itself is insufficient to produce a discharge of the
grey cells of the cord. But the series of taps by its
cumulative effect ultimately succeeds in producing an
explosion of the grey matter, and with it a new sensation
of an organic character. WTien the grey matter of the
spinal cord is removed, the nervous impulses from the
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skin, "whatever their origin, may fail to produce pain-
sensations because they cannot attain the requisite intensity
in the absence of an apparatus for accumulation of nervous
energy. But there is no reason why they should not still
continue to produce pressure- and temperature-sensations.
Similarly, in the inverse case, all nervous impulses from
the skin, in order to produce any sensation at all, must
discharge the grey matter of the cord, and in so doing
reach a pitch of intensity that can only give rise to pain-
sensations. It seems, therefore, very possible that the
nerves which subserve temperature- and pressure-, may
also subserve pain-sensations, the difference between the
two kinds of experience depending upon more central
conditions.
2. The Special Sensations. We now turn to consider
the special sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, touch,
and temperature. The feeling-tone of these sensations
varies, first, with their intensity, secondly, with their
duration, and thirdly, with their quality.
(1) Many of them in a low grade of intensity appear to
be virtually neutral. All of them, acquire appreciable
feeling-tone as their intensity is increased. Some of them
are unpleasant even when they are weak. All of them
become unpleasant when intensified beyond a certain
point. Before reaching this point they nearly all have an
agreeable phase ; after reaching this point they continue
to be more and more disagreeable as intensity increases.
It is a matter of dispute whether there is any sensation
which is constantly disagreeable in whatever phase of
intensity it appears. It is always possible to urge that
though a sensation is generally disagreeable, it might be
agreeable if it could be made weak enough. As an example
of a pleasant phase of an experience which everybody would
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regard as absolutely disagreeable from its very quality, wo
may quote the following from Mr. H. E-. Marshall: "I
remember well once having been aroused from serious
thought in a railway carriage by a delicious odour, and
the words ' What a delightful perfume ! ' were actually
formed in thought. Almost immediately the smell changed
to disagreeableness with growing intensity, and there
appeared evident the intensely disagreeable smell emitted
by a polecat which had been killed by the train."* We
may formulate the general rule for the relation of intensity
and feeling-tone as follows. A sensation must reach a
certain minimum of intensity in order to have an appre-
ciable feeling-tone. Further rise in intensity of sensation
is accompanied by a rise in intensity of feeling-tone. If
the sensation is initially unpleasant, its unpleasantness
continues to increase as the sensation is intensified. If it
is initially pleasant, the pleasantness increases to a
certain maximum, at which it remains roughly constant
until the intensity of the sensation is increased beyond
a certain limit. When this limit is passed, the pleasant-
ness decreases, and finally passes into unpleasantness.f
The nature of the transition from pleasantness to un-
pleasantness requires further elucidation. An unpleasant
element appears to enter into the experience even while
the original sensation continues to be in itself agreeable.
This is sometimes distinctly traceable to other definitely
assignable sensations, which are superadded to the primary
one. Thus, at a certain pitch of intensity, warmth may
continue to be still agreeable in itself, although it is
accompanied by a distinctly disagreeable sensation of a
prickly or pungent character, probably due to stimulation
*
Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics, p. 288.
t See A. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefuhlslebens, p. 181.
2.] FEELING-TONE OF SEXSATION. 219
of pressure-points in the part of the skin affected. So a
bright light may continue to give pleasure when it is so
intense that the effort to accommodate the eye to it is
unpleasant. But there are other cases in which it is much
more difficult to assign definitely the source of the
collateral unpleasantness. However intense sweetness
may be, it scarcely seems to become in its own intrinsic
nature disagreeable. At the same time, it may excite
strong disgust, which seems to be connected with accom-
panying organic sensations not easy to analyse or describe.
(2) The dependence of feeling-tone on duration varies
in nature according as the sensation is continuously main-
tained or repeated intermittently.
There appears to be no appreciable interval of time
between the emergence of a sensation of given intensity
and the corresponding feeling-tone. Apparent exceptions
can be explained away. If we touch a disagreeably hot
object, the heat is felt before the unpleasantness; but this
is because the stimulus requires a certain time before it
can take full effect. On its first application the sensation
is not intense enough to be disagreeable.
The following is the general formula for variations of
feeling-tone with the continuous persistence of the sensa-
tion in time. The feeling-tone increases in intensity to a
maximum. If the sensation is pleasant, it continues for
some time at this maximum, and then gradually becomes
less agreeable, and in the end distinctly disagreeable. If
the sensation is initially unpleasant, the maximum persists
for a much longer period than in the case of agreeable
sensations. After this, the unpleasantness may become
fainter, but it never passes into pleasantness, and it is
always liable to reappear at intervals in more intense
phases.
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The same remarks which we made about the transition
from pleasantness to unpleasantness with rise in intensity,
apply to the same transition as dependent on continuous
persistence in time. Here also collateral elements of a
disagreeable kind are introduced into the experience before
the primary sensation becomes in itself unpleasant. The
illustrations of the bright colour and of the sweet taste
may be transferred, mutatis mutandis, to the case of
duration. A boy eating sugar-plums, if he continues to
indulge himself beyond a certain point, has disagreeable
sensations distinctly traceable to the stomach and other
internal organs, while the sweetness itself remains
sufficiently agreeable to tempt him to go on eating. But
even apart from such definitely assignable collateral
accompaniments, there may be a surfeit of sweetness,
though sweetness remains in itself an agreeable taste.
Doubtless this is due to some general organic effect
hard to define by introspective analysis. Sometimes the
disagreeableness is simply due to tedium ; if we gaze at
a bright colour too long we feel bored because of the
suspension of other activities, although the colour con-
tinues to be pleasing.
The case in which the sensation is repeated inter-
mittently is in many ways analogous to that in which it
persists continuously. If the repetition is too frequent,
a pleasant sensation tends to become less pleasant, and
often becomes unpleasant. Unpleasant sensations by
frequent repetition often, but by no means always, become
less unpleasant. They may even become virtually neutral
or even actually pleasant. Perhaps the best instance of
a disagreeable sensation becoming agreeable by repetition
is the " acquired taste
" for olives.
When a pleasant sensation by repetition does not lose
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its pleasantness and become disgusting, and when an
initially unpleasant sensation has become more or less
pleasant by repetition, its absence from consciousness will
at certain moments give rise to a craving for it. Tlie
craving of the smoker for tobacco, of the olive-eater for
olives, or of the drinker for his bitter beer, are cases in
point. Certainly, the effect is most marked when originally
unpleasant sensations have become pleasant by repetition.
The nervous system has adapted itself to certain modes
of excitation returning at certain intervals, and their
absence produces a disturbance of neural equilibrium. If
a person is in the habit of using tobacco only at fixed
times in the day, the craving is apt to arise exclusively
at these times. The omission of a customary early
morning pipe may trouble the smoker in the early morn-
ing, but the craving may pass away and not recur during
the day.
(3) We have seen that there are probably some sen-
sations which are disagreeable in all phases of intensity.
Others become disagreeable at a very low intensity. In
the case of others, such as sweetness, it is not quite certain
that they ever become intrinsically disagreeable, even when
they are most intense. It follows that quality of sensation
is a most important factor in determining feeling-tone.
We can do little to explain why one quality is predomi-
nantly agreeable and another predominantly disagreeable.
The nearest approach to an explanation is found in the
special case of complex sound-sensations. The disagreeable-
ness of dissonance is due to the presence of beats which
interrupt the uniform course of the periodic stimulation of
the organ of hearing. The central nervous matter has
adapted itself to a certain rhythm of excitation, and
this rhythm is disturbed by the beats. We have 110
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similar reasons to assign why certain combinations of
odours and tastes are agreeable, and others disagreeable.
3. Surplus Excitation. It is clear that the agreeable
or disagreeable feeling arising in connexion with the
occurrence of a sensation may not be wholly due to the
quality or intensity of the sensation itself. "If one is
listening to a series of sounds, or looking intently at some
object, the feeling of
* distraction ' caused by being spoken
to in a whisper, or lightly touched," is comparable with
sharp physical pain.* The whisper or the light touch
may be in no way disagreeable in themselves ; they may
be virtually neutral ; but they set up a general nervous
and bodily disturbance, correlated with a general mental
disturbance of an intensely unpleasant character. A
similar shock is experienced when, in the process of going
to sleep, we are startled by some sudden sound, which
need not be especially loud. There is in such cases a
diffused excitement of the nervous system, produced by
the sensation, and superadded to that special excitement
which is immediately correlated with the existence of the
sensation. Following Professor Ladd, we may call this
diffused effect the
''surplus" excitation. Its occurrence
is by no means confined to such exceptional experiences as
that of being startled; on the contrary, all sensations
which have a distinctly appreciable feeling-tone, appear to
have a more or less diffusive character. In this respect,
the difference between the organic sensation produced by
a wound, and the special sensation produced by a bright
light, is only one of degree. f To some extent this state-
ment may be directly verified by introspection : wherever
* Ladd's Descriptive Psychology, p. 199.
t Hence there is no sharply marked line of demarcation between pain-
sensation and the disagreeableness of special sensation. When unpleasant
organic accompaniments become prominent, pain-sensation arises.
3.] FEELIXG-TONE OF SENSATION. 223
feeling-tone is sufficiently intense, we can detect a diffused
bodily and mental excitement, and concomitant change in
our organic sensations. An intensely bitter taste may give
rise to a cold shiver
;
the piercing scream of a railway
whistle disturbs thought and perception, and is felt over
the whole organism. A delicious taste may not only tickle
the palate, but
"
set the whole man a-gog"; the strong
pleasure or displeasure sometimes produced by stroking,
tickling, or rubbing, is not immediately due to the quality
and intensity of the tactile sensations themselves, but to the
surplus excitement they produce. "We mentioned previously
that sensations in themselves agreeable may in their general
effect be unpleasing, and we found that the collateral
unpleasantness can only in part be accounted for by the
concomitance of definitely assignable and describable
experiences. But surplus excitation, with consequent
modification of common sensibility, adequately explains
these subtle and evasive affections of consciousness. In
the same way we are able to account for the qualitative
diversity of the feeling-tone of different sensations which
agree in being pleasant or unpleasant. The pleasure of a
sweet taste differs in kind from that of a bright colour or
of a musical note
;
and the difference cannot be wholly
identified with the qualitative diversity of the sensations of
sight, taste, and hearing themselves. Lesides the variety
of primary sensations, there is also a distinction between
the kinds of pleasure which they afford. The several
experiences contain elements which fulfil no other cog-
nitive function than that of enabling reflective analysis to
discriminate diverse modalities of feeling-tone. The
existence of these diverse modalities has been strongly
emphasized by Professor Ladd.
" The ivaij we feel is not by
any means precisely the same for all equally pleasurable
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or equally painful, tastes and smells. Some agreeable
sweet odours are described as ' heavy,
' and others as having
an
'enlivening' or 'spicy' quality."* Compare, for instance,
the heliotrope and the Japanese lily. The strong organic
effect which may be produced by a powerful odour is
shown by its sometimes causing highly susceptible persons
to faint. "Pleasant coolness is
'refreshing': pleasant
warmth is
'cherishing.' . . . Musicians have always attached
different distinct kinds of feeling to different musical




feeling belonging to the bass register is different




"f These various experiences
tend to induce certain moods having affinity with dis-
tinctive emotions. The same is true in a less degree of
colours. ' ' Bright light and mellow light produce differences
in the character of the equally pleasurable feeling which
may result.":]; Groethe contrasts the
"
cheerfulness " of a
view as seen through yellow glass with its "mournful-
ness
"
as seen through blue glass. These differences in
feeling-tone cannot be reduced to the mere difference
between pleasantness and unpleasantness ; and they
cannot be identified with the qualitative differences
between the sensible qualities which occupy attention, and
which are said to be pleasant or unpleasant. We must
refer them to a more or less diffused excitement of the
nervous system with its organic consequences, and the
resulting modifications of common sensibility.
We have asserted that "all sensations which have a dis-
tinctly appreciable feeling-tone, appear to have a more or
less diffusive character.
"|| But we have not so far adduced
evidence sufficient to justify this position in its full extent.
*
Op. cit , p. 184. t Op. cit.,p. 185.
+ Ibid.
\\ 3, p. 222.
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Fortunately the deficiency is supplied by experiments,
which, show that pleasant and unpleasant sensations in
general produce organic effects differing in a character-
istic way according as they are agreeable or disagreeable.
By suitable apparatus it is possible to measure variations
in the volume of the limbs, and in the respiratory move-
ments, while the subject is undergoing pleasant or
unpleasant experiences. The variations are recorded by a
curve traced upon a revolving cylinder. The curve for
the volume of the limb indicates, besides larger and longer
variations, also smaller and shorter variations due to the
beat of the pulse. The general results deduced from a
careful analysis of these experiments are as follows.
Pleasant sensations, such as that of a sweet taste or of
a good cigar smoked by a person who enjoys it, produce
increase in the volume of the limbs due to dilatation of the
blood-vessels at the surface of the body. They also pro-
duce an increase in the height of the pulse-beat, which
may be in part due to increased contraction of the heart.
The respiration is deepened, and probably the muscles
under the control of the will are in general more strongly
contracted.
The case of unpleasant sensations is more complicated.
On the first introduction of the unpleasant stimulus, the
volume of the limb is distinctly diminished, owing to con-
striction of the blood-vessels at the surface of the body.
The constriction at the surface of the body is probably
accompanied by a dilatation of the blood-vessels of the
internal organs. The amplitude of the pulse-beats is
diminished. At the same time, there is a deepening of
respiration ; and when the stimulus is strong, there is a
conspicuous contraction of the voluntary muscles in general.
Later phases of the process present different phenomena.
Psych. 15
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After its initial diminution, the volume of the limb begins
to increase, and continues increasing for some time. This
increase is not supposed to be in the first instance due to
dilatation of the blood-vessels, but to accumulation of venous
blood arising from decreased activity of the heart. But
dilatation of the blood-vessels following by way of reaction
on their previous constriction is supposed to contribute to
it at a later stage. The increased innervation of the
voluntary muscles is also followed by a corresponding
relaxation.
These experiments justify the assumption that all
sensations having a distinctly appreciable feeling-tone
produce a diffused organic effect, which differs in a
characteristic way, according as they are pleasant or
unpleasant.
There thus appear to be three factors which may con-
tribute to determine feeling-tone : (1) The sensation itself ;
(2) The diffused excitement of the nervous system which
it may produce ; (3) The effect of this diffused excitation
on the organism, by the consequent alterations of common
sensibility which arise from the altered state of the internal
organs. All three factors probably contribute to the result
in varying degrees according to circumstances. It seems
arbitrary to select one of them as alone important to
the exclusion of the others : but some writers show a
tendency to do so. For instance, Professor Ladd lays
stress exclusively on the diffused excitement of the nervous
system directly occasioned by the occurrence of the sensa-
tion. He seems to regard the sensation itself as devoid of
feeling-tone, and he seems to attach little or no importance
to the organic sensations which it indirectly produces. But
introspection shows that a sensation may be in itself agree-
able or disagreeable apart from its effects. Thus, sweetness
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may in its own intrinsic nature be agreeable, though
on the whole it awakens disgust. Another view, which
seems favoured by Professor James, is that feeling-tone
belongs exclusively, or almost exclusively, to organic
sensation. He is not very clear on the point, but it seems
to form part of his celebrated theory of emotion that, apart
from organic sensation, our mental states would consist
almost wholly in cold intellectual perception without feeling-
tone. At any rate, it is important to discuss the point, if
for no other reason, because of its bearing on a theory
which we shall have to examine later, the theory which
reduces emotion, and the pleasantness and unpleasantness
of emotion, to organic sensations and their feeling-tone.
On the psychological side, the distinction between
pleasantness and unpleasantness is simple and ultimate.
If it is duo to a difference in organic conditions, we should
expect this difference to be equally simple. Now we do not
find that the contrast between the organic processes is cor-
respondingly simple. On the contrary, even those organic
concomitants of feeling-tone which can be detected by experi-
ment are very complicated. Thus, in the case of unpleasant
experiences, initial constriction of the blood-vessels at the
surface of the body is accompanied by dilatation of the blood-
vessels of the internal organs. The constriction of the
rurface is in a subsequent phase of the process probably
followed by dilatation at the surface. The initial diminution
of the volume of the limb is followed by increase due to
accumulated venous blood. So increased contraction of
the voluntary muscles is followed by relaxation. Hence
we cannot single out any general form of organic stimu-
lation as the universal and uniform condition of unpleasant
feeling-tone. There is therefore no theoretical advantage
in ascribing feeling-tone exclusively to organic sensations.
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The same problem confronts us in regard to them as in the
case of the special senses. They constitute a heteroge-
neous group of experiences, some of which are pleasant
and some unpleasant. Each of them has, besides its feeling-
tone, its own specific quality as a sensation, and this quality
may be almost neutral in tone, or it may have both agree-
able and disagreeable phases according to its intensity, or
according to the general mental condition at the moment.
Neither in their internal nature, as analysed by introspec-
tion, nor in their mode of origin, do organic sensations
present any peculiar characteristics which would justify us
in making so vast and important a distinction between
them and the sensations of the special senses, as is involved
in affirming that they alone can be pleasant or painful,
while the sensations of the special senses are neutral. It
is true that organic sensations have a peculiarly diffusive
character, but even in this respect the distinction between
them and the special sensations is only one of degree. A
positive argument against the hypothesis may be derived
from the fact that the emergence of a simple sensation in a
given phase of intensity, and the emergence of its feeling-
tone, are not separated by any appreciable interval of time.
But the production of organic changes by the original
stimulation of the nervous system, and the production of
organic sensations in consequence of these changes, is a
process which must occupy an appreciable time. In fact,
the later addition of new elements to the original experience
can frequently be detected by introspection. A very bitter
taste may, as Lehmann remarks, appear at first merely as a
disagreeable bitterness, which is followed only after an
appreciable interval of time by a cold shiver due to con-
striction of the blood-vessels.
We conclude therefore that it is unjustifiable and
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arbitrary to ascribe feeling-tone exclusively either to the
primary sensation, or to the surplus nervous excitement
which it produces, or to the resulting organic sensations.
All three factors contribute, and they may contribute in
different proportions according to circumstances.
4. Feeling-tone and Organic Welfare. Most psychologists
support the general thesis that the processes corresponding
to agreeable sensation promote organic welfare, and that
those corresponding to disagreeable sensation are injurious.
Stated more definitely, this means that agreeable process
contributes to efficient discharge of function in the organs
which it affects, and that disagreeable process disables the
organs it affects. There are two senses in which the general
proposition can be understood. The meaning may be that
on the whole and in the long run a pleasant experience
contributes to the welfare of the organism. The pro-
position understood in this sense no doubt holds good as a
general rule, but it is a rule which has many exceptions.
Any race of animals which should as a rule be pleased by
conditions injurious to them and pained by conditions
beneficial to them, would certainly perish in the struggle
for existence. But to preserve the species in the struggle
for existence, it is not necessary that pleasure should
infallibly and universally coincide with ultimate benefit,
and that displeasure should infallibly and universally
coincide with ultimate injury. Hence we find that many
things may be agreeable which are injurious, and inversely
many poisons are palatable. Intoxication is very bad for
the health
;
but it may be very pleasant.
If we are to establish a universal law, we must consider
only the immediate vital activity at the moment in which
the pleasant or painful sensation occurs. Sugar of lead
has a sweet taste, which is pleasing at the moment $ this
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pleasing taste may in itself bo favourable to vital activity,
although the substance which occasions it, when introduced
into the blood, acts as a deadly poison. Similarly, a
bitter drug which is disagreeable to the taste may have a
beneficial medicinal effect. The beneficial effect is not
due to the disagreeable bitterness, but to subsequent
effects entirely disconnected with the original experience.
The case of intoxication by alcohol is different. Here the
very process which is correlated with pleasure involves a
disablement of the central nervous system. The efficiency
of the intoxicated person, both for thinking and acting, is
impaired. But this kind of exception also may be
explained away. The intoxicated person is disabled from
accurate methodical thinking, and from precise and delicate
co-ordination of movement with a view to an end. But in
general he makes no serious or strenuous attempt to fulfil
these functions. If he does make serious efforts of the
kind, he finds them very disagreeable. On the other hand,
the loose and varied flow of ideas which accompanies the
pleasing phases of intoxication, is much more free and
expansive than in a state of perfect sobriety. We all
know that champagne promotes conversation having a
certain kind of brilliancy ; and we all know that the
opinions expressed and the arguments used are not likely
to bear examination in sober moments. Even when there
is no varied flow of ideas, even when a man persists in
reiterating the same thing over and over again, his pleasure
is connected with the fact that the point he is urging
presents itself to him with peculiar vividness and intensity.
Thus it appears that in the pleasing stages of intoxi-
cation a man is disabled from certain higher forms of
mental function
;
but he does not have disagreeable
feelings, simply because conscious activity in these
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directions is suspended. On tlie otlier hand, the kind of
conscious activity which continues to go on is not impaired,
but intensified, and he consequently feels pleasure.
In this last example, we have referred especially to
process in the central nervous system. It is in this only
that, as psychologists, we have an essential interest.
Pleasure and pain are states of consciousness, and con-
sciousness is immediately correlated with neural process.
Hence, the question which really concerns us is whether
disagreeable processes are essentially connected with
obstruction or disablement of conscious and correlated
nervous activity, and agreeable processes with the free and
unobstructed flow of such activity. If we state the question
in this form it seems that the answer must be distinctly
affirmative. Disagreeable sensations, in proportion to
their intensity, obstruct and disturb mental process and
the motor activities which, for their effective discharge,
require conscious guidance. Everybody knows how diffi-
cult it is to think or act efficiently with a toothache or a
headache, even though the desire to do so is strong. It is
not merely that the painful sensations divert attention ;
this is true of pleasant sensations also, of similar intensity ;
the point is that the disagreeable sensations positively
disorder and enfeeble thought and action, when the
endeavour is made to think or act. Of course, if the
disagreeableness arising from this or that special sensation
is faint, and if the total state of consciousness is, on the
whole, agreeably toned, in spite of the presence of this or
that disagreeable item, the obstruction to mental activity
may not be appreciable. But in principle it seems a safe
generalisation that agreeable experience is favourable, and
disagreeable experience is unfavourable, to the effective
discharge of mental functions.
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5. Feeling-Tone and Conative Tendency. Some pleasures
of sense are dependent on pre-existing conations. There
are sense-cravings connected with the primary organic
needs, such as the need for food and drink ; and the gratifi-
cation of these cravings is a source of sense-pleasure.
Similarly, the induced cravings for tobacco and alcohol,
which recur of themselves at intervals, give a pleasure
when they are appeased which is quite distinguishable
from the pleasure immediately due to the stimulus apart
from the craving for it.
Every pleasing and every painful experience at the time
at which it is actually taking place has a conative, or at
least a quasi-conative, aspect. In so far as the experience
is pleasing, there is a tendency to maintain and develop it
by whatever means may be found effective, until its
pleasure-giving capacity is exhausted, or is overpowered
by the intermixture of unpleasing elements. In so far as
the experience is unpleasant, there is a tendency to dis-
continue it by whatever means may be found effective.
Thus, on the level of mere sensation, agreeable feeling-tone
corresponds to the positive phase of conation, and
disagreeable with the negative. The pleasant experience
is coincident with a conative tendency which requires for
its satisfaction the continuance of the experience. The
unpleasant experience is coincident with a conative
tendency which requires for its satisfaction the discon-
tinuance of the experience. While pleasure lasts, conation
is being satisfied ; it is working itself out. When satiety
is reached, it has been satisfied : it has worked itself out
and reached its termination. Until satiety is reached, there
is always a tendency for the process to go on. If the
pleasing sensory process is discontinued or obstructed
before satiety is reached, the conation continues and is
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intensified
;
there is added to the tendency to continue the
pleasing sensation the tendency to get rid of the
unpleasing- state due to its interruption. The original
conative tendency, which was in process of being gratified,
is transformed into a thwarted craving. Suddenly snatch
away the bottle from the baby who is complacently sucking
it, and you will have a picture of the situation referred to.
The reverse of all this holds good of disagreeable experi-
ences. To discontinue them, however abruptly, is to give
satisfaction and not dissatisfaction. Their continuance
always thwarts and never appeases the conative tendency,
which is essentially connected with their existence.
It should be carefully noted that we distinguish between
ultimate satisfaction and the process of becoming satisfied.
Ultimate satisfaction is attained only when satiety is
reached, only when the subject has had enough of the
pleasant experience, so that, if it were still maintained, it
would cease to please him. Pleasure is found in the
process of becoming satisfied, not in its completion. Its
completion is its termination, and therefore the termi-
nation of its feeling-tone.
We said that every agreeable or disagreeable sensation
has a conative or quasi-conative aspect. The words "or
quasi-conative
"
were added to meet a possible difficulty.
Some psychologists hold that certain pleasing sensations
appear purely passive, so far as introspection can analyse
them. They do not appear to involve any experience of
endeavour, or striving. I do not agree with these
psychologists ; but the question is a subtle one. It
seems therefore best to evade the difficulty by pointing
out that for our purpose it is not essential whether the
tendency is experienced or not, so long as it exists. It
will not be denied that there is at least an unconscious
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tendency to continue a pleasing experience until we have
had enough of it.
Any pleasing sense-experience, when it has once taken
place, will, on subsequent occasions, give rise to a
conation, when its conditions are only partially repeated,
as when the object with which it is connected is per-
ceived, or the corresponding idea is reproduced. The
impulses and desires thus occasioned have both agreeable
and disagreeable phases. They are for the most part
agreeable when gratification comes quickly, or is antici-
pated with confidence. They are disagreeable when
gratification is long witheld, especially if it be withheld in
a tantalising way, so as to produce disappointment, or a
series of disappointments. The experience is also apt to
be more or less disagreeable when anticipation is not
confident, but doubtful and hesitating.
6. General Theory. Whatever conditions further and
favour conation in the attainment of its end, yield pleasure.
Whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of
its end, are sources of displeasure. This is the widest
generalisation which we can frame, from a purely psycho-
logical point of view, as regards the conditions of pleasure
and displeasure respectively. Its application to the feeling-
tone of sensation is already contained in the last section.
A pleasing sense-experience operates as a positive factor
satisfying the conative tendency or quasi-conative tendency
which is essentially connected with it. On the contrary,
an unpleasing sense-experience operates as a positive
i factor thwarting the conative tendency or quasi-conative
tendency essentially connected with it. This is at the best
only a vague explanation of sense pleasure-pain. It can
only be regarded as being an explanation at all on one
assumption. If it is supposed that, first, pleasure exists,
6.] FEELING-TONE OF SENSATION. 235
and that, subsequently to its occurrence, the conative
tendency arises as a consequence, it is a logical circle to
explain the pleasure by reference to the conation. But, as
a matter of fact, there seems to be no reason whatever for
supposing that feeling-tone and conation are separated in
time. From the very beginning they appear to coincide.
From the very beginning a pleasing process is a process
which tends to maintain itself.
We may hope to attain a more definite insight into
the ultimate conditions which determine the feeling-tone of
sensation from the physiological side. But from that side
we have not at present any direct knowledge of the nervous
processes involved. We can only frame hypotheses to
cover the psychological data.
If we attempt to translate into physiological language
the general relations of pleasure and displeasure respectively
to conative tendencies, perhaps the best result we can
obtain is the following. Conation in general appears to
correspond to a disturbance of nervous equilibrium, and
its completed satisfaction to a restoration of equilibrium.
The conditions of displeasure not only disturb nervous
equilibrium, but also, so long as they continue, obstruct
the processes by which it tends to be restored. On the
other hand, the continuance of the conditions of pleasure
is a factor positively operative in the restoration of equili-
brium. It is evident that even if this view of the case be
granted, there is still abundant room for further speculation
as to the precise nature of the physiological processes
corresponding to pleasure and displeasure respectively.
The most favoured theories of the kind connect these
opposite feeling-tones with the relations of wear and repair
in the nervous system. Explanations based on this general
principle assume many different forms ; our ignorance of
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the exact nature of the complex chemical processes involved
in assimilation and dissimilation of tissue, and of their
connexion with functional activity and repose, leaves much
room for speculation. The simplest form of statement is
that when wear outruns repair the experience is dis-
pleasing, and that when repair outruns wear the experience
is pleasing. On this view it is difficult to account for the
fact that pleasures may be exhausting, and that when they
are long-continued, they diminish, and pass into displeasure.
Mr. H. E. Marshall has propounded a theory which lays
great stress on the building up of tissue during periods of
functional repose. Pleasure, according to him, depends
upon the building up of a surplus of stored energy
acquired during the inaction of the organ. "Where
this surplus does not exist or has been consumed, the
corresponding experience will be virtually neutral, so
long as repair keeps pace with wear in the course
of functional activity. If wear outruns repair, the
corresponding experience is unpleasant. There is much
to be said in favour of this view, and Mr. Marshall has
said it with great clearness and force. Fatigue is in
general a source of disagreeable, and freshness of
agreeable, experience. Of course, the fatigue or the
freshness must be that of the special tissues engaged in
the functional activity.
' ' After the quiet of the night-
hours the bird-song, as we awake, is more than usually
pleasurable ; the rested eye sees beauty in all colours.
The rubbing, at our morning bath, of the skin, which has
not during the night felt the normal friction of our
clothing ; the flavour of some special food to which we
have been accustomed, but which has not lately been
tasted, all are pleasurable."* A pleasant sensation,
* fain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics, p. 200.
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when too long continued, will become unpleasant, because
the stored surplus is used up. What is a surplus relatively
to one intensity of stimulation, will not be a surplus
relatively to a higher intensity ; hence by gradually
increasing the intensity of a stimulus, we pass from
pleasant to unpleasant phases of an experience. But along
with these advantages the theory presents grave diffi-
culties, if we attempt to base on it the whole explanation
of the feeling-tone of sensation ; and in my opinion it
presents insuperable difficulties if we attempt to cover by
its means all the pleasures and pains of perceptual and
ideational activity. At present we are only concerned
with sensation.
One obvious objection arises from the dependence of
feeling-tone on quality as well as quantity of sensation.
Why should some sensations be unpleasant at a very low
intensity, and others be pleasing even at a very high
intensity ? Why should a comparatively small degree of
bitterness or acidity be disagreeable, while a comparatively
high degree of sweetness is agreeable? Mr. Marshall
replies that there is a great variation in storage capacity,
in the case of different sensation-processes. This explana-
tion is probable enough in some cases. Where a function
recurs with great frequency and regularity, and without
much variation of intensity, as respiration does, we should
not expect any large storage of energy. On the other
hand, where stimuli occur irregularly, and with great varia-
tions of intensity, the organism can only provide against
them by storing up a surplus in advance. But there are a
large number of instances in which no such explanation
appears applicable. Why should the same person dislike
the smallest trace of vanilla, and keenly enjoy cloves or
cinnamon? Why should the same person enjoy beef and
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liate mutton ? To account for suck differences by variation
in storage capacity seems forced.
A more important difficulty is connected with tlie con-
ception of a surplus. How are we to fix what is, and what
is not, surplus energy ? Mr. Marshall says that there is a
pleasure-giving surplus "whenever the energy involved in
the reaction to a stimulus is greater than the energy which
the stimulus habitually calls forth," and that pain is
experienced
' ' whenever the physical action which deter-
mines the content is so related to the supply of nutriment
to its organ that the energy involved in the reaction to the
stimulus is less in amount than the energy which the
stimulus habitually calls forth."* There is ambiguity in
this statement. The effect produced by a stimulus varies
with its intensity; when Mr. Marshall speaks of "the
stimulus," does he mean the same kind of stimulus in the
same degree of intensity, or the same kind of stimulus
in varying degrees of intensity ? If he means to include
varying degrees of intensity, his case obviously breaks
down altogether ; for when a stimulus is unusually intense,
it is often unpleasant, although the effect which it produces
is greater, and not less, than that which we are accustomed
to. On the other hand, if he means the same stimulus in
the same degree of intensity, only a comparatively small
group of facts is available for verifying his hypothesis.
The instances in which the same kind and intensity of
stimulus yields alternately pleasure and pain to the same
person are relatively infrequent. The best example,
perhaps, is the gradual decrease of pleasure when a pleasing-
stimulus is prolonged. Here not merely the feeling-tone,
but the experience itself, appears to become fainter ; but
it is by no means so clear that it continues to remain fainter
*
Op. clt., pp. 204-205.
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when it becomes positively disagreeable. Unpleasant ex-
periences maybe continued for avery long time indeed before
they show any appreciable diminution of unpleasantness ;
and while they continue, it cannot be said that the effect of
the stimulus is smaller than its habitual effect. When
abatement of pain begins, the effect of the stimulus is
smaller, the total experience becoming fainter. On Mr.
Marshall's view we should expect, as an accompaniment
of the diminishing effect of the stimulus, an increase
and not an abatement of painfulness. This leads up to
another objection; the intensity of unpleasantness appears
to be in general proportioned to the intensity of the
unpleasant experience. If Mr. Marshall were right in
affirming that unpleasant stimulation produces a smaller
effect than pleasant stimulation, we should expect un-
pleasantness of all kinds to be very much fainter than we
actually find it to be.
We have discussed Mr. Marshall's views because they
form a very favourable example of the theory which
traces pleasure-pain to wear and repair of nervous
tissue. In general, AVO may conclude that a large part of
the explanation, at least for sense pleasure and pain, may
be found on these lines. But no theory framed on these
lines has been so formulated as to cover the whole ground
successfully even for sensation, and they are all beset by
special difficulties. After all, it is not, a priori, likely that
merely quantitative conditions will be found adequate to
account for the facts. Considering the great complexity
of the chemical processes in organic tissues in interaction
with the blood-supply, there may be all kinds of qualitative
as well as quantitative variations. For instance, the
accumulation of waste-products in the blood may be a
very important factor. It is possible that what takes
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place in repose and restores the freshness of organs is
rather the removal of these waste products than the actual
building up of tissues. There are considerations which
tend to show that the building up of tissue takes place
mainly during functional activity rather than during
functional repose. We know that tissues suffer atrophy
or degeneration if they are long disused. We merely
refer to this point in order to show how speculative and
insecure, in the present state of our knowledge, hypotheses
of this kind are.
BOOK III. PERCEPTION.
DIVISION I. PERCEPTUAL PROCESS IN GENERAL.
CHAPTER I.
DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERCEPTUAL
CONSCIOUSNESS.
1. Definition. Perception is essentially Cogni-
tion. We cannot perceive without perceiving some-
thing. Thus perception essentially involves that refer-
ence to an object which we disregarded in treating of
sensation. But perceiving is a special mode of cognition ;
it is that special mode which immediately depends on
the actual presence of an object to the senses. It may
in fact be denned as the cognitive function of sensation.
It is contrasted with that mode of cognition which takes
place through ideal images. Such images are not de-
pendent on the actual presence of an object to the senses.
They are representations of absent objects which have
already been perceived. Thus the existence of percep-
tion is a pre-condition of the existence of ideal images.
Direct cognisance of present objects must precede ideal
representation of absent objects.
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Even In the direct cognition of present objects, asso-
ciation and reproduction play a very important part.
But in perception, taken in the strictest sense of the
word, only those forms of association and reproduction
enter which we have called complication and acquire-
ment of meaning, together with that peculiar mode of
free reproduction by which general states of nervous
and mental excitement and their concomitant organic
sensations are revived.*
Though association and reproduction are essential to
the development of perceptual consciousness, they do
not seem to be necessary to its existence in the most
rudimentary form. This seems rather to depend on in-
herited constitution of the nervous system.
Perception is never merely cognition. It has also a
conative character and a feeling-tone. When we speak
of perceptual process, we include these factors.
2. Unity and Continuity ofPerceptualProcess.
Many perceptions are very brief and evanescent. They
satisfy a slight and momentary interest, after which
the mind passes to other occupations. Other perceptions
do not occur in this isolated manner : but enter into
more prolonged trains of mental activity as constituent
moments or phases. These more prolonged trajns may
be mainly trains of ideas : but they may also be mainly
composed of a sequence of perceptions. A man climbing
a precipitous cliff may have his attention fully occupied
in gaining and retaining foothold and handhold. His
activities mainly consist in muscular movement guided
by sense-perception. Such an act as threading a needle
* See bk. i., ch. ii., 8-9. The student should keep the whole of this
chapter in mind at the present point.
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does not necessarily involve ideal images ; attention
is fully occupied in the guidance of the hand, and the
delicate co-ordination of its movements by the aid of
the eye. The same holds broadly true of such perform-
ances as walking on a tight-rope, keeping one's balance
on a bicycle so far as it may require attention, and, in
general, of games of bodily skill. In these instances,
perceptions are not isolated facts ; they form series having
a certain unity and continuity similar to that of trains
of ideas or trains of thought. Any such series con-
stitutes a single complex perceptual process. It dif-
fers from a train of ideas inasniuch as the sequence
of its parts does not depend on direct mental repro-
duction. The sequence of its parts depends upon the
sequence of external impressions ; but as the sequence
of external impressions depends to a very large ex-
tent upon the bodily movements of the percipient
subject, it is to a very large extent under subjective
control.
It is in these complex forms that the distinctive char-
acteristics of perceptual process can best be studied. In
many ways, the best field for their study is animal life.
They are found in definite forms in the instinctive ac-
tivities of animals, viz. in those activities for which the
animals are pre-disposed and pre-adapted by the in-
herited constitution of their nervous systems. They fre-
quently arise at a period in the life of the animal at which
it has had no opportunity for the acquisition of corre-
sponding ideas ; so that there can be no doubt concern-
ing the predominantly or purely perceptual character
of the process. For instance, the train of actions in-
volved in hunting a living prey is shown in the play of
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the kitten before it has actually hunted, and often with-
out its having had opportunity for learning them by im-
itation.* The kitten will first assume the attitude of
watching or lying in wait ; it will then steal up to the
ball of thread or other object which forms its plaything,
in a noiseless snake-like manner; in the next place it
gathers itself for a spring, and pounces on the quasi-
prey, seizes it with teeth and claws, and worries it;
finally it lets the object go again, and re-commences the
process. The several acts of lying in wait, stealthy
approach, crouching for a spring, pouncing on the prey,
are phases in the development of the same activity. The
same is true of the hunting of an actual prey.
All such processes are guided by external impres-
sions; but each impression, as it occurs, only supplies
the occasion for the further development of an activity
which is already in existence. If the series were one of
purely reflex actions, each separate stimulus would inde-
pendently produce an isolated reaction, so that the pro-
cess would have no internal continuity. But it is just
the internal continuity which is distinctive of percept-
ual activity. The successive phases of perceptual pro-
cess are directed to one end, and this end is not merely
nature's end; it is what the animal itself is in some sense
striving after, or, if we may use such an expression, what
* We have no data which would enable us to characterise precisely
the cognitive attitude of an animal towards the object which for the first
time calls into play a train of instinctive movements having the internal
continuity which marks perceptual process. We cannot say the animal
recognises the object, for recognition pre-supposes previous experience.
But the mental attitude is probably more analogous to what we call recog-
nition than to anything else. There is no preparation by previous experi-
ence, but there is preparation by congenital endowment, which seems to
fulfil an analogous function.
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it is " driving at." This does not necessarily mean that
the animal presents to itself a mental image of the result
to be effected. It means that the felt tendency, conation,
or endeavour, with which the train of movements starts,
is not satisfied until the end is reached. Like the baby
in the advertisement of Pears' soap, the animal " won't
be happy till he gets it." With the final attainment of
the result, the conation ceases, because it has worked
itself out. Interruption, delay, or failure at any stage
of the process is a thwarting of the one continuous
conation
;
it is felt as displeasure and aversion, and is
accompanied by a tendency to vary the mode of pro-
cedure. The successful progress of the action is in
every stage felt as a pleasure and as a tendency to con-
tinue in the same course. Stated from the physiolog-
ical point of view, what happens is as follows. Given
a neural arrangement for the co-ordination of succes-
sive acts, the equilibrium of this arrangement is dis-
turbed by stimulation either from without the organism
or from within. It can only recover its own balance
and so become quiescent by a series of successive
processes leading to a certain result. By these its
initial excitement is allayed. The psychical activity
whereby a conation develops itself, and so brings
about its own end or termination, is the counterpart
of the activity whereby the neural system regains
equilibrium.
This unity and continuity of perceptual process is its
most general feature. The following special character-
istics may be regarded as bringing out in detail from
various points of view what is involved in this general
account.
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3. Attention. Perceptual activity can only fulfil
itself by the co-operation of a series of external condi-
tions which supply in turn occasions for its further de-
velopment. Now, if these external occasions are to be
utilised in an effective manner, the animal cannot re-
main purely passive in regard to them. On the contrary,
it must meet them half-way by watching for them, and
by keeping itself in readiness to act in an appropriate
way when they occur. Thus perceptual activity is es-
sentially characterised by attention.* Attention is con-
stantly directed towards the external conditions which
are relevant to the progress of the action so as to utilise
them. The activity is a train of distinct movements
guided by a corresponding train of distinct percepts.
Just as the successive movements express the develop-
ment of one continuous conation, so the distinct per-
cepts are parts of a continuous train in which each sets
the mind in an attitude of preparation for the next.
Such a train is the analogue on the perceptual level of
what, on the ideational,t we call a train of thought. Con-
sider even such a simple act as the chicken pecking, it
may be for the first time. The pecking is not an inde-
terminate pecking in any direction ; it is a pecking at a
certain object in a given direction and at a given dis-
tance. The act of pecking receives its determinateness
from the previous act of seeing, of attentively fixing the
eye on the object. Conversely, the tendency to peck
guides and controls the act of seeing. It is because the
animal is about to peck, or is engaged in pecking, that
it keeps its eye on the object; and it is because it keeps
its eye on the object that it is enabled to peck in a
* See bk. i., ch. i., p. 65. t See note, p. 249.
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purposeful manner. This mutual guidance lasts till the
moment of seizure, determining this act also, and bring-
ing it within the same total co-ordination.
Attention is always in some manner expectant or
prospective. So far as we already know a thing suf-
ficiently for our purpose, the work of attention is al-
ready accomplished. The direction of thought, whether
perceptual or ideational, coincides with the direction of
conation, of appetency or aversion ; conation is al-
ways pressing forward towards its end ; hence atten-
tion, which is nothing but conation defining itself in
cognition, and so guiding itself by means of cognition,
must also constantly be directed forward beyond the
" ignorant present," to meet what is to come. To attend
is always to watch, to await, to be on the alert. When
we take a light to lighten our path through a dark
place, we use it to make out whither we are going,
not where we have already arrived. It is to guide
our future steps, not the steps we have already taken.
Now if we care to use a bold metaphor, we may say
that attention is the light used by conation to make
out its path. Only we must remember that atten-
tion is no external illumination, but is simply identi-
cal with conation considered in its cognitive aspect.
Trains of perceptual activity are marked throughout
their course by this mental prospectiveness. Its ex-
ternal sign is the pre-adaptation of the sense-organs to
receive impressions, and the pre-adjustment of the body
in readiness to act when the opportunity presents itself.
The cat lying in wait for the mouse or bird is a suf-
ficient example. The sight and smell of the mouse-hole,
we may suppose, set it in action. Eye and ear are ad-
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justed so as to catch coming impressions, the appear-
ance of the mouse or any sound it makes ; the muscles
of the body are in a state of tension in preparation for
a spring, or other appropriate action. But the action is
suppressed and postponed until the occasion for it
emerges. Perhaps a doubt may be raised whether such
behaviour can be purely perceptual. Does it not of
necessity involve acquired ideas and association of ideas?
We may take another instance, in which this objection
can hardly be urged. A crab or flat-fish at the bottom
of the sea covers itself with sand, protruding only its
stalked eye. With this it keeps restlessly spying in all
directions. On the approach of an enemy, the eye is
rapidly withdrawn and hidden in the sand. On the
appearance of prey, the eye follows its motions. When
the prey is near enough, the observant animal darts
swiftly up and seizes it. It can scarcely be maintained
that this characteristic behaviour is acquired by associa-
tion of any kind, to say nothing of association of ideas.
If the flat-fish or crab had to learn to look out for prey,
where would its instruction come from ? It would cer-
tainly have a poor chance of survival. The attentive
attitude is frequently found in the very first perform-
ance of an instinctive activity.
That systematic watching and searching and atten-
tive behaviour in general are possible without mental
images, may be shown in the case of human beings, and
especially in certain pathological cases. One curiously
interesting case has been recently published.* A man
called Voit was quite unable to name objects or their
* Gustav Wolff, " Ueber krankhafte Dissoziation der Vorstellungen."
Zeitschriftf. Psych, u. Phys. der Sinnesorgane, Bd. xv., Heft 1, 2.
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properties, unless they were actually present to his
senses. Thus if he were asked, "What colour is a
meadow ? " he could not answer, if he did not see the
meadow. Similarly, he could not tell how many legs a
horse has unless he saw the horse. Yet he understood
language so far as. to be able to do what he was told,
appropriately and accurately. Nor was his inability
merely an inability to find words : when a number of
coloured tablets were laid before him, and among these
a green tablet, and when he was asked, " What colour
are the leaves of trees ? " he could not answer by point-
ing to the green tablet, but remained totally helpless.
When the questioner pointed to the green tablet, and
asked, " Are the leaves of trees like this ?
" Voit could
only reply, "Perhaps," and he made the same answer
when the question referred to the blue, yellow, or red
tablets. What held good of sight extended also to the
other senses in an even greater degree. Voit was quite
unable to assign any of the sensible qualities of objects
named to him. He could not so recall the idea of the
object as to bring to consciousness its visible, audible,
tangible, or other sensible characters.
Now the truly remarkable point is this : In spite of
his inability to recall by way of ideal representation*
the appearance of an object, he could none the less sys-
tematically search for anything named to him ; and in
* The student should, bear in mind the essential character of an idea
as stated in bk. i., ch. ii., 9: "(1) Any reproduction which can be called
an idea must have sufficient independence to be capable of forming a
distinct link in a train of thought ; (2) it must be the thought of an
object, such as a thing, quality, relation, or event, and not a mere crude
sensation, however faint." All ideas have two constituents, an image
and the meaning which the image has acquired in previous experience.
The image may be merely a mentally revived word.
250 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. in., i., CH. i.
so far as he actually perceived, he could accurately de-
scribe it. On being asked the colour of leaves, he went
to the window and looked for a tree. As soon as he saw
a tree, he said, " Green." Merely to see green objects
of any kind was of no assistance to him. But when he
saw the leaves themselves, he recognised their colour
and named it. When the object inquired about was of
such a nature that it was useless at the time to look for
it, he refrained from the attempt to do so. Thus, when
he was asked in summer what colour the snow was, he
made no attempt to look for snow, but was quite con-
tent to acquiesce in the suggestion that it was black.
On the other hand, when the question was, how many
legs a horse has, he would, if permitted, go to the
window and watch until a horse passed. When some
one remarked that people were walking about naked in
the street, he was quite content to accept the statement,
but only while there was no one passing. As soon as he
caught sight from the window of a passer-by, he ex-
claimed, "No, no, clothes !" Perhaps the most curious
illustration of the man's mental condition is the follow-
ing. He was asked what the colour of blood is. After
a period of bewilderment, in which he looked helplessly
about the room, he finally pressed a pustule which
happened to be on his hand, until the blood came. He
then answered, "Red." Note next that he could not,
on merely seeing an object, name any other of its sen-
sible qualities than those immediately presented to sight.
If he were shown a piece of sugar, he could name it and
say it was white ; but even with the sugar in full view,
he could not tell how it tasted merely by seeing it. He
sought to get hold of the sugar and put it into his mouth.
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Only when he succeeded in doing this could he find the
word, "Sweet." Again, Voit could not tell whether the
surface of a mirror was rough or smooth until he had
touched it himself. It was not enough for him to see
others pass their fingers up and down it.
The grand lesson of this case is to be found in the
conjunction of great impairment if not total absence of
ideational activity with comparatively unimpaired per-
ceptual activity. When Voit saw a thing, he knew how
to make proper use of it. He sat on a chair when he
saw it, covered his head with his hat when he saw it,
carried a glass to his mouth and drank when he saw the
glass with liquor in it. Words had meaning for him as
practical signals inciting to trains of action, though they
did not call up trains of ideas.
4. Persistency with Varied Effort. Even in
the earliest performance of its instinctive activities,
viz. those activities for which it is pre-disposed and
pre-adapted by the inherited constitution of its nervous
system, an animal may display persistency with varied
effort. It keeps on trying when it does not succeed at
first, varying its procedure so far as it is unsuccessful.
Professor Lloyd Morgan gives a good example, commu-
nicated by Mr. Batchelder. Mr. Batchelder had taken
squirrels from their nest when they were very young ;
they were at first unable to take solid food, and had to
be fed through a quill on a mixture of cream and hot
water. Afterwards they took to bread and milk, bis-
cuits, and bread crusts. Mr. Batchelder then gave
them some hickory-nuts. " They examined the nuts
attentively, evidently looking upon them as unusually
interesting novelties, and at last the more enterprising
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of the two set to work on a nut, as if he wished to find
out what prize it might contain. With hitherto unex-
ampled patience he laboured over it, until at last, after
more than half an hour's diligent gnawing, he gained
access to the kernel. With a few days' practice they
acquired skill and speed in extracting these hard-shelled
delicacies
;
and after that they lost all interest in such
things as biscuits, and hickory-nuts formed the princi-
pal item on their bill of fare."
*
Persistency with varied
effort also shows itself in more indefinite ways. "I
have noted it," says Lloyd Morgan, " again and again
in the case of young birds. It was especially notice-
able in jays. Every projecting bit of wire or piece of
wood in their cage was pulled at from all points, and
in varied ways. Every new object introduced into the
cage was turned over, carried about, pulled at, ham-
mered at, stuffed into this corner and into that, and
experimented with in all possible ways."|
Obviously, persistency with varied effort is a pre-
condition of learning by the results of by-gone experi-
ence, and not merely a consequence of it. In itself it
is an adaptation to present experience rather than to
past. Further, it is an adaptation which can only be
understood by reference to the continuous impulse or
conation which pervades and constitutes perceptual
process. Just because the impulse is a tendency
towards an end, it guides the course of the action.
When the action enters into a phase which checks
instead of furthering the return to equilibrium, the cur-
rent of activity diverts itself into a relatively new
channel. The process would not be a process towards
* Habit and Instinct, p. 122. Op. cit., p. 154.
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an end, if it could persist without variation in an un-
successful course.
5. Free Adaptation to Varying Conditions.
We have just seen that perceptual process exhibits
adaptive variation, according as activity is successful
or unsuccessful. But, besides this, we find in it also
adaptive variation in accordance with varying external
conditions. We may quote first a simple and rudi-
mentary example from Lloyd Morgan. " I took a
young pheasant, which had been hatched some time in
the night, from the incubator drawer at nine o'clock in
the morning. He was very unsteady on his legs, so I
held him in my hands, and tried to induce him to peck
at a piece of egg yolk held in a pair of forceps. He
did not do so; but he followed, with his head, every
movement of the object in a narrow circle about two
inches in front of his beak. Simple as the action
seems, it shows a striking example of congenital co-or-
dinated movements accurately related to movements in
the visual field, the whole performed without any pos-
sibility of learning or practice, and less than half an
hour after the bird had first seen the light of day.*
All adjustment of the sense-organs, in looking, listen-
ing, exploring by touch, and the like, must vary accord-
ing to the varying position, distance, and shape of the
object. Similarly, the act of darting upon a moving
prey and seizing with beak or claw or mouth involves
precise and delicate adaptation of movement to vary-
ing space relations. Think of swallows catching flies,
and similar instances.
The same kind of purely perceptual adaptation is
* Op. cit., pp. 38-39.
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often found in human beings. In boxing, in fencing,
and similar activities, rapid adaptation to constantly
varying conditions is required, adaptation which in-
volves perceptual attention, so that eye and hand may
keep pace, but which would frequently be hindered,
rather than helped, by mental imagery. Or take the
simple act of leaping from point to point. A man with
the avenger of blood behind him may have to jump from
crag to crag to save his life. His eye measures the dis-
tance to be crossed, and his muscles are adjusted accord-
ingly so as to land him in a certain spot. If he stopped
to mentally picture himself moving through the air over
a certain space, he would in all probability perish. He
must trust to his eye.
Perhaps the most striking instances of adaptation
to varying conditions determined purely by congenital
endowment, independent of prior experience, are to be
found in the behaviour of ants.* All the activities char-
acteristic of ants, as well as of bees and wasps, are in
their main outline instinctive. They are displayed by
ants which have been taken from their nest immediately
after being hatched, and set apart to form a new nest.
Independently of prior experience, the processes of
nest-building, the rearing of the young, the capture of
the so-called slaves, the maintenance of domestic ani-
mals, and the like, vary in adaptation to varying cir-
cumstances. The mode of building the nest varies with
the situation and accessible material. Change in the
weather causes them to make corresponding changes in
* These adaptations are not free in the same degree as those de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph. They are relative to comparatively
fixed and specific circumstances.
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their nest. When the nest is too damp, they pierce
holes in it so that it looks like a sponge. This facili-
tates evaporation and keeps their home drier. In the
tending of their young they show a similar plasticity.
The youngest larvae are generally kept in the deepest
chambers of the nest : the half
-grown in those above,
and the fully-grown, together with the pupae, in the
highest. When the weather is cold and rainy, they
carry the more mature larvae from the higher into
the lower chambers. The evidence seems to show that
these and similar adaptations to varying circumstances
are not learnt by experience, but are due to original
plasticity of congenital endowment.*
60 Learning by Experience. In contrast to the
sensation-reflex, perceptual activity profits by the results
of past experience. It can do so without any distinct
revival of the special items of sensation, as they originally
occurred. The unity and continuity of impulse which
binds a sequence of distinct acts into a single action has
its counterpart on the side of retentiveness in the for-
mation of a cumulative disposition. On the first occur-
rence of the process the traces left by prior phases per-
sist in and contribute to determine succeeding phases.
They unite in a single cumulative disposition. When
the activity is repeated, whatever stimulus prompts, it
re-excites the total cumulative disposition left behind by
its previous occurrence. The cumulative disposition has
been modified in the anterior experience, and accordingly
the re-aroused activity takes a correspondingly modified
* See Vergleichende Studien uber das Seelenleben der Ameisen und
der hohern Thiere. Von E. Wasmann S.J. Freiburg: Herdersche Ver-
lagshandlung, 1897. Pp. 122. Price, Is. 9rf.
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course. This is the process which we have described as
acquirement of meaning * Without this there can be
no learning by experience of an intelligent kind; and in-
telligent learning by experience may be due to it alone.
Where further processes of reproduction are present,
they co-operate with the acquirement of meaning, and
make it more definite
;
but the acquirement of meaning
is the primary and indispensable condition of the varia-
tion of future activity, in intelligent correspondence with
the results of past activity. We shall have hereafter to
discuss at what point learning by experience leaves the
merely perceptual level and involves ideas. We now
give instances of typically perceptual cases. Let us
refer once more to Mr. Lloyd Morgan's chickens. "A
young chick two days old .... had learnt to pick out
pieces of yolk from others of white of egg. I cut little
bits of orange-peel of about the same size as the pieces
of yolk, and one of these was soon seized, but at once
relinquished, the chick shaking his head. Seizing
another, he held it for a moment in the bill, but then
dropped it and scratched at the base of his beak. That
was enough ; he could not again be induced to seize a
piece of orange-peel. The obnoxious material was now
removed, and pieces of yolk of egg substituted, but they
were left untouched, being probably taken for orange-
peel. Subsequently, he looked at the yolk with hesita-
tion, but presently pecked doubtfully, not seizing, but
merely touching. Then he pecked again, seized, and
swallowed." | This illustration well brings out the in-
* See bk. i., ch. ii., 8-9. The examples which follow in the present
section will serve to give definiteness to the somewhat vague exposition
of the earlier chapter. t Op. cit,, pp. 40-41.
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telligent nature of the learning by experience. The
chicken looks hesitatingly at the yolk ; he then makes
a tentative peck, only touching it to try what it is like
before venturing to seize it. When this preliminary trial
proves satisfactory, he pecks again, seizes, and swallows.
Take another illustration from a widely different part
of the animal creation. Cephalopods, such as the octo-
pus, grope about in all directions with their arms on the
ground and on rocks for small mussels and prawns, or
they push their arm-like tentacles into holes or chinks
of rocks, in search of crabs. Now Schneider observed
a very young octopus seize a hermit-crab. The hermit-
crab covers the shell in which it takes up its abode with
stinging zoophytes. Stung by these the octopus imme-
diately recoiled and let its prey escape. Subsequently
it was observed to avoid hermit-crabs. Older animals
of the same species managed cleverly to pull the crab
out of its house without being stung.
Persistence with varying effort is in itself a learning
by experience, although it is in the first instance a learn-
ing by present experience rather than by past. But it
is also a most important pre-condition of profiting by
past experience. Repetition of trials with variation of
procedure is a sort of perceptual experiment. The re-
sults of previous experiment determine and facilitate
future action, inasmuch as unsuccessful modes of pro-
cedure are gradually eliminated and successful modes
alone survive. I quote from Dr. Wesley Mills' valuable
papers* on the "Psychical Development of Young Ani-
* Recently collected in part iii. of a book entitled: The Nature and
Development of Animal Intelligence. New York: The ?.iacmillan Ccui-
pany, 1898. Price, $2.00.
Psych.
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mals " a very good illustration of this process. The
method of Mills was to keep a very careful diary of the
behaviour of young animals from their birth. The fol-
lowing entries occur in the register of his observations
of a kitten. 26th day : The kitten " leaves its box and
goes to a part of the room where there are some book-
shelves, the lower ones of which are not completely
filled with books, but hold other things. The mother
follows it. The kitten is put back into its box. . . .
27th day : On getting out of box the kitten starts on a
little run for the book-shelves. It was taken from among
the objects on the shelf, turned towards the box and
given a few taps. It ran on to the box and got into
it. ... The kitten continues to show a strong desire to
get to the book-shelves. . . . 28th day : . . . About
5 P.M. the entrance to the book-shelf was barred up.
The kitten first tries every part of the barricade, then
pushes in the curtain cries with vexation climbs
upon a box near leaps from this on the curtain, hold-
ing on with the claws. After trying again and again,
desists, and after a few moments returns to the attack.
At last she gives it up, returns to her box, settles down
and sucks her mother, and then soon after falls asleep.
30th day : It makes many attempts to get into the book-
shelf, and at last succeeds. . . . 31st day : In the eve-
ning it is found behind the barricade of the book-shelf
sleeping on some books. It is taken out, but works its
way back again. It finds getting out difficult, but
perseveres. . . . 82nd day : . . . It tries the book-shelf
barricade, but, not succeeding, gives up and sits in its
box near by and grooms itself well. Later it makes a
more determined attempt on the barricade, and with
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success. It has difficulty in getting out; but soon goes
in again and remains from half to three-quarters of an
hour. . . . S8rd day : Found behind the barricade this
morning before daylight, when, trying to prevent its
advance in a certain direction the kitten evades me by
running under a rocking-chair where it is partly hid-
den. . . . Though the book-shelves were closed by a
curtain tacked on them, the kitten managed to get in,
though I do not know how. . . . 35th day : ... It
scrambles into the book-shelf by a new way and at
much greater height."
I have reproduced this book-shelf drama at length
because it is a typical instance of how animals learn by
experience. We must especially note the gradual nature
of the process. Having succeeded once, the kitten does
not therefore succeed the next time without further
trial and failure. What happens is that the amount of
tentative groping gradually diminishes, until at last the
end can be attained directly without let or hindrance.
The clever tricks of animals, which excite surprise by
their resemblance to behaviour distinctly human, seem
to be acquired in the same way. There is a sad lack of
systematic observation of the process by which animals
come to do such things as opening a door by lift-
ing a latch. But in the few instances in which the
successive steps have been examined, it has been
found that the perfect result only emerged after suc-
cessive trials and failures involving much tentative
groping, and that to succeed once by no means en-
tailed immediate success the next time. This view
has been corroborated by a series of experiments
conducted by Mr. Thorndike of Columbia Univer-
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sity, on dogs, cats, and chicks. " The method was to
put the animals when hungry in enclosures from which
they could escape (and so obtain food) by operating
some simple mechanism, e.g. by turning a wooden
button that held the door, pulling a loop attached
to the bolt, or pressing down a lever. Thus one
readily sees what sort of things the animals can learn
to do and just how they learn to do them. Not only
were the actions of the animals in effecting escape
observed, but also in every case an accurate record was
kept of the times taken to escape in the successive
trials. The first time that a cat is put into such an
enclosure, some minutes generally elapse before its
instinctive struggles hit upon the proper movement,
while after enough trials it will make the right move-
ment immediately upon being put into the box. The
time records [plotted down in curves] show exactly
the method and the rate of progress from the former
to the latter condition of affairs. . . . What happens
in all these cases is this : The animal on being put into
the box, and so confronted with the situation ' confine-
ment with food outside,' bursts forth into the instinc-
tive activities which have in the course of nature been
connected with such a situation. It tries to squeeze
through any openings, claws and bites at the walls con-
fining it, puts its paws through and claws at things out-
side, trying to pull itself out. It may rush around,
doing all this with extraordinary vehemence and per-
sistence. If these impulsive activities fail to include
any movement which succeeds in opening the door, the
animal finally stops them and remains quietly in the
box. If in their course the animal does accidentally
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work the mechanism (claw the button round, for in-
stance), and thus win freedom and food, the resulting
pleasure will stamp in the act, and when again put in
the box the animal will be likely to do it sooner. This
continues
;
all the squeezings and bitings and clawings
which do not hit the vital point of the mechanism, and
so do not result in any pleasure, get stamped out, while
the particular impulse, which made the successful claw-
ing or biting, gets stamped in, until finally it alone is
connected with the sense-impression of the box's in-
terior, and it is done at once when the animal is shut in.
. . . Although it was of the utmost importance to them
to get out of the various boxes, and it was therefore cer-
tain that they would use to the full their mental powers,
none of the animals gave any sign of the possession
of powers of inference, comparison or generalisation.
Moreover, certain of the experiments seem to take the
ground from beneath the feet of those who credit reason
to animals. For it was found that acts (e.g. opening
doors by depressing thumb-latches and turning buttons)
which these theorisers have declared incapable of per-
formance by mere accident certainly can be so done. It
is, therefore, unnecessary to invoke reasoning to account
for these and similar successes with mechanical contriv-
ances, and the argument based on them falls to the
ground. Moreover, besides destroying the value of the
evidence which has been offered for the presence of
reason in animals, the time-records give us positive evi-
dence that the subjects of these experiments could not
reason. For the slopes of the curves are gradual.
Surely if a cat made the movement from an inference
that it would open the door, it ought, when again put
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in, to make the movement immediately. If its first suc-
cess was due to an inference, all trials after the first
should take a minimum time. And if there were any
slightest rudiment of a reasoning faculty, even if no real
power of inference, the cat ought at least some time in
the course of ten or twenty successful trials to realise
that turning that button means getting out, and thence-
forth make the movement from a decision, not a mere
impulse. There ought, that is, to be a sudden change
from the long, irregular times of impulsive activity to a
regular minimum time. The change is as a fact very
gradual.*
Finally, experiments made in another connexion show
that these animals could not learn to perform even the
simplest acts by seeing another do them or by being put
through them by the experimenter. They were thus
unable to infer that since another by pulling a string
obtained fish, they might, or that since fish were gained
when I pushed round a bar with their paws it would be
gained if they pushed it round themselves.
"
t
The best examples in adult human beings of this grad-
ual emergence of the right way, and gradual disappear-
ance of wrong ways of doing a thing, are presented by
the process of acquiring bodily or other dexterity merely
through practice. The cook who can concoct a sauce
* "Thus the successive times taken by one cat in a certain box were
(in seconds) 160, 30, 90, 60, 15, 28, 20, 30, 22, 11, 15, 20, 12, 10, 14, 8, 8, 5, 10, 8, 6,
6, 7." The animals " would, in the case of some difficult associations,
happen to do the thing six or seven times, but after long periods of pro-
miscuous scrabbling, and then forever after would fail to do it." (Psy-
chological Review, vol. v., No. 5, p. 552.)
t Science, new series, vol. vii., No. 181 (June 17, 1898), pp. 818, 820-821;
an abstract of the original paper in Monograph Supplement, No. 8, of the
Psychological Review.
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in a peculiarly felicitous way, but cannot teach anybody
else to mix the ingredients in the right proportions,
must have attained success mainly by mere tentative
groping without the aid of definite comparison or gen-
eral ideas. Mr. Thorndike points out that association,
as it existed in his animals, " is not homologous with
anything in human association except such conscious
connexions as a man feels in playing tennis or billiards.
The essential thing in it is not the idea, but the impulse.
That this sort of human associations is homologous with
the animal sort is borne out by the fact that they are,
like the latter, formed gradually by the stamping in of
successes due to trial and error, and are not able to be
formed by imitation or by one's being put through
them." *
7. ^Reproduction, in Perceptual Process. In
purely perceptual process, the only forms of reproduc-
tion are (1) Acquirement of meaning
r
, (2) Complica-
tion, and (3) The revival of general states of nervous
excitement and their concomitant organic sensations.
(1) Acquirement of meaning is the most primary
and essential. It is grounded in the very nature of per-
ceptual process considered as appetitive activity. The
whole process, in so far as it is one and continuous,
leaves behind it a cumulative disposition. Hence, when
it is repeated, it is modified as a whole from the outset.
(2) Complication is a process for which there are
probably special pre-arrangements in the original con-
stitution of the nervous system. It consists in modifi-
* Psychological Review, vol. v., No. 5, pp. 552-553. I am greatly im-
pressed by the coincidence between the conclusion which Mr. Thorndike
draws from his experiments, and that which I had previously formed on
more general grounds.
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cation of the quality and increase of the complexity of
certain sensations by association with other kinds of
sensation in past experience. It mainly takes place
between sensations belonging to different senses such
as sight and touch. In looking at a hard object, our
visual experience is different from that which we have
in looking at a soft object, and the difference is due to
the corresponding tactile experiences.
(3) The revival of general states of nervous excite-
ment and their concomitant organic sensations is of
especial importance in connexion with emotion. A dog
which has been whipped will whine and display signs
of fear and distress at the sight of the lash. The orig-
inal pain-sensations produced a diffused nervous excite-
ment, which gave rise to a general disturbance of or
ganic functions, and to organic sensations. The sight
of the whip revives an analogous nervous and bodily
excitement and with it analogous experiences,,
8. Ideas accompanying Perceptual Process.
So far we have treated of perception and perceptual
process in its pure form. We have distinguished it
sharply from ideational process. But in the actual
mental life of man the two run into one another, so
that we do not usually find pure perceptual processes,
but rather what we may call perceptual processes not
absolutely, but only a potiori. The same is true to
some extent of the higher animals also. Free ideas
may accompany a process without interfering with its
essentially perceptual nature. The free ideas may fulfil
a function essentially analogous to that fulfilled by per-
ception, and not any function which by its very nature
requires the presence of ideas. This happens when the
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only office discharged by mental imagery is to prompt
or guide the execution of an action, and not to lay out
the plan of an action beforehand in the form of a train
of thought. Mr. Batchelder's squirrels gnawed at the
nuts and by reaching their contents satisfied their con-
genital craving without any mental image of the kernel
inside. Suppose that on a future occasion they start
with this mental image, the character of the process is
not essentially altered. The image of the kernel inside
now only contributes to prompt and guide the action,
just as the mere perception of the nut prompted and
guided it before. Free images may be especially useful
and even necessary in this way, when the activity is
comparatively complicated, and undetermined by defi-
nite congenital impulses. Take for instance the case of
a monkey imitating a train of actions which it has seen
performed by a man, those concerned in shaving, for
instance. Possibly percepts would alone suffice in such
a case. The sight of the razor might prompt the act of
sharpening it, and the act of sharpening it might next
prompt the lathering, and so on. But certainly it is
easier to understand the action if we suppose that in
different phases of its progress some mental image of
the behaviour of the man arises in the mind of the
monkey, and helps to guide him.
It would seem that in animals ideas, so far as they
exist* at all, are isolated and, so to speak, sporadic.
They do not as a rule give rise to further ideas follow-
ing each other in a train. Their function is rather to
* There is room for difference of opinion on this point. Personally, I
do not think that there is much evidence for the presence of ideal images
in the animal mind, except in the case of the more intelligent monkeys
and perhaps of elephants.
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guide the development of a motor impulse as percepts
guide it. As Mr. Thorndike says, the impulse and not
the idea is the essential thing.
In our own mental life, free ideas are almost con-
stantly present, so that purely perceptual activity is
comparatively exceptional. But it certainly takes
place. If I have once been bitten by a dog, and meet
the same dog on another occasion, I do not need to
summon up in my mind a mental image of being bitten
again in order to take practical measures of an intelli-
gent kind.
The vast interval which separates human achieve-
ments, so far as they depend on human intelligence,
from animal achievements, so far as they depend on
animal intelligence, is connected with the distinction
between perceptual and ideational process. Animal
activities are either purely perceptual, or, in so far as
they involve ideas, these ideas only serve to prompt and
guide an action in its actual execution.* On the other
hand, man constructs " in his head," by means of trains
of ideas, schemes of action before he begins to carry
them out. He is thus capable of overcoming difficulties
in advance. He can cross a bridge before he comes to it.
9. Impulsive Character ofPerceptual Process.
Any single train of perceptual activity has internal
unity and continuity. But where conscious life is
mainly perceptual, the several trains of activity are
relatively isolated and disconnected with each other.
They do not unite to form a continuous system, such as
is implied in the conception of a person. We must
* There may be exceptions to this rule, but the general statement is
broadly true.
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deny personality to animals. They are in the main
creatures of impulse. The word impulse is properly
applied to any conative tendency, so far as it operates
by its own isolated intensity, apart from its relation to
a general system of motives. Action on impulse is
thus contrasted with action which results from reflexion
or deliberation. In deliberation a man, instead of
following out the impulse arising from the circumstances
of the present moment, brings the contemplated course
of action into relation with the total system of his
mental life, past and future. He appeals from the Self
of the present moment to the total Self. If the strength
of the momentary impulse determine action without
giving time for deliberation, regret or remorse is likely
to follow. When the momentary impulse has ceased to
dominate consciousness, the idea of his past action may
come into conflict with the more general tendencies
which give unity and consistency to his life as a whole.
Regret or remorse of this kind is impossible on the
purely perceptual plane; simply because on the per-
ceptual plane there is no unified system of tendencies
with which the isolated impulse could collide; there is
no personal Self including in one whole past, present
and future experience. It is nonsense to punish a dog
for an action which he did a week ago. Thus the
purely perceptual consciousness is compact of relatively
detached impulses. The end attained in one perceptual
process does not constitute a starting-point for the
attainment of further ends. The several processes, each
having its own internal unity and continuity, are dis-
connected with each other much as games are discon-
nected with each other. We do not assume the result
268 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. m., i., CH. T.
of one game at chess or rubber at whist as the starting-
point of the succeeding game. Each game starts com-
pletely afresh on its own account. It is true that the
skill of the player is increased by practice, but this also
holds good of trains of perceptual activity, and makes
the analogy more perfect. Summing up, we may say
that on the perceptual plane there is no single con-
tinuous Self contrasted with a single continuous world.
Self as a whole uniting present, past and future phases,
and the world as a single coherent system of things and
processes, are ideal constructions, built up gradually in
the course of human development. The ideal construc-
tion of Self and of the world is comparatively rudi-
mentary in the lower races of mankind, and it never




1. Introductory. Imitation is a process of very
great importance for the development of mental life in
both men and animals. In its more complex forms, it
pre-supposes trains of ideas ; but in its essential features
it is present and operative at the perceptual level. It
is largely through imitation that the results of the expe-
rience of one generation are transmitted to the next, so
as to form the basis for further development. Where
trains of ideas play a relatively unimportant part, as in
the case of animals, imitation may be said to be the sole
form of social tradition. In the case of human beings,
the thought of past generations is embodied in language,
institutions, machinery, and the like. This distinctively
human tradition pre-supposes trains of ideas in past gen-
erations, which so mould the environment of a new
generation, that in apprehending and adapting itself to
this environment it must re-think the old trains of
thought. Tradition of this kind is not found in animal
life, because the animal mind does not proceed by way
of trains of ideas. None the less, the more intelligent
animals depend largely on tradition. This tradition
consists essentially in imitation by the young of the ac-
tions of their parents, or of other members of the com-
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munity in which they are born. The same directly
imitative process, though it is very far from forming
the whole of social tradition in human beings, forms a
very important part of it.
2. The Imitative Impulse. We must distinguish
between ability to imitate and impulse to imitate. We
may be already fully able to perform an action, and the
sight of it as performed by another may merely prompt
us to reproduce it. But the sight of an act performed
by another may also have an educational influence; it
may not only stimulate us to do what we are already
able to do without its aid
;
it may also enable us to do
what we could not do without having an example to
follow. When the cough of one man sets another
coughing, it is evident that imitation here consists only
in the impulse to follow suit. The second man does
not learn how to cough from the example of the first.
He is simply prompted to do on this particular occasion
what he is otherwise quite capable of doing. But if I
am learning billiards and some one shows me by his own
example how to make a particular stroke, the case is
different. It is not his example which in the first in-
stance prompts me to the action. He merely shows the
way to do what I already desire to do.*
We have then first to discuss the nature of the imitative
impulse the impulse to perform an action which arises
from the perception of it as performed by another.
This impulse may be due to varying conditions. But
so far as it is of importance in mental development, it
seems to be essentially connected with attention. The
perception of an action prompts us to reproduce it when
* So far as this is capable of being taught, and does not depend on
"practice."
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and so far as it excites interest or is at least intimately
connected with what does excite interest. Further, the
interest must be of such a nature that it is more fully
gratified by partially or wholly repeating the interesting
action. Thus imitation is a special development of at-
tention. Attention is always striving after a more vivid,
more definite, and more complete apprehension of its
object. Imitation is a way in which this endeavour
may gratify itself when the interest in the object is of a
certain kind. It is obvious that we do not try to imi-
tate all manner of actions without distinction, merely
because they take place under our eyes. What is
familiar and commonplace or what for any other reason
is unexciting and insipid, fails to stir us to re-enact it.
It is otherwise with what is strikingly novel or in any
way impressive, so that our attention dwells on it with
relish or fascination. It is of course not true that
whatever act fixes attention prompts to imitation. This
is only the case where imitation helps attention, where
it is in fact a special development of attention. This is
so when interest is directly concentrated on the activity
itself for its own sake rather than for the sake of its
possible consequences and the like ulterior motives.
But it is not necessary that the act in itself should be
interesting ; in a most important class of cases the in-
terest centres not directly in the external act imitated,
but in something else with which this act is so inti-
mately connected as virtually to form a part of it.
Thus there is a tendency not only to imitate interesting
acts, but also the acts of interesting persons. Dogs
often imitate their masters. Men are apt to imitate the
gestures and modes of speech of those who excite their
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admiration or affection or some other personal interest.
Children imitate their parents, or their leaders in the
playground. Even the mannerisms and tricks of speech
of a great man are often unconsciously copied by those
who regard him as a hero. In such instances the primary
interest is in the whole personality of the model ; but
this is more vividly and distinctly brought before con-
sciousness by reproducing his external peculiarities.*
Our result then is that interest in an action prompts
to imitation in proportion to its intensity, provided the
interest is of a kind which will be gratified or sustained
by imitative activity. But here we must make a dis-
tinction. The interest may be either primary or ac-
quired through previous experience. The imitative
impulse in young animals and children is to a large ex-
tent independent of previous experience. It depends
on congenital tendencies. A young duck brought up by
a hen among chickens imitates its social environment
only in a limited degree. Where there is an instinctive
tendency towards a certain form of action, the action is
interesting when another performs it, so that the imita-
tive impulse comes into play.
As a rule, this instinctive imitation not only prompts
the action, but also determines more or less its special
character. The child has a congenital tendency to utter
articulate sounds
;
but the special character of the
sounds it utters is largely determined by the sounds it
hears from the persons who surround it. The same is
true of the song of birds. But sometimes imitation
* Of course the society in which we live is always interesting to us.
Hence the tendency to acquire a provincial accent when we are con-
stantly associating with people who have it.
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seems only to supply an occasional impulse, and does not
in the first instance create the power of performing an
action or appreciably modify its character. As an ex-
ample in which the presence of a model simply stimu-
lates an activity and does not modify it, we may take
the repetition of a danger-cry by young birds when they
hear others utter it. The danger-cry itself is undoubt-
edly instinctive. Any disagreeable or disturbing ex-
perience will elicit it from a young chicken which has
not heard it before. Its effect also on the birds who
hear it is instinctive. When a parent-bird utters the
cry, the chick which is yet in the egg will suddenly
cease in its endeavour to pierce the shell and become
motionless. Tn just the same instinctive way, the sound
of the alarm-note uttered by one bird prompts another
to repeat it, so that the alarm may be communicated to
a whole group. It is mainly in this manner that birds
and other animals learn to avoid dangers which at first
they had disregarded. The sight of a man with a gun
on a previously desert island may evoke no alarm in its
feathered inhabitants
;
but after a few experiences of
the fatal consequences connected with a man so armed,
the birds in general will become shy. Those who have
actually been disturbed or wounded by the gun have
uttered the alarm-note
;
this has thrown yet others into
a state of alarm, and they also utter the alarm-note;
these, when they again see a man, utter the alarm-note,
although they have never experienced any harm from
human beings.
3. Learning by Imitation. Let us now turn to
the other side of the question. Let us consider the case
in which the power of performing an action is acquired
Psych. 18
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in and by the process of imitation itself. Here there is
a general rule which is obvious when once it is pointed
out. It is part of the still more general rule that
" to
him that hath shall be given." Our power of imitating
the activity of another is strictly proportioned to our
pre-existing power of performing the same general kind
of action independently.* For instance, one who is de-
void of musical faculty has practically no power of imi-
tating the violin playing of Joachim. Imitation may
develop and improve a power which already exists, but
it cannot create it. Consider the child beginning for
the first time to write in a copybook. He learns by imi-
tation
;
but it is only because he has already some rudi-
mentary ability to make such simple figures as pothooks
that the imitative process can get a start. At the out-
set, his pothooks are very unlike the model set before
him. Gradually he improves ; increased power of inde-
pendent production gives step by step increased power
of imitation, until he approaches too closely the limits
of his capacity in this direction to make any further
progress of an appreciable kind.
But this is an incomplete account of the matter. The
power of learning by imitation is part of the general
power of learning by experience ; it involves mental
plasticity. An animal which starts life with congenital
tendencies and aptitudes of a fixed and stereotyped kind,
so that they admit of but little modification in the course
of individual development, has correspondingly little
power of learning by imitation. Among animals, mon-
* Mr. Thorndike's animals, referred to in the previous chapter, failed
to imitate actions so strange and unfamiliar to them as the pressure of
buttons, etc. The result with an intelligent monkey would probably have
been different.
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keys have the greatest plasticity and the greatest apti-
tude for imitation. They are incessantly active in all
kinds of ways, and they are in a very high degree capable
of learning by experience. Thus, when admitted to the
company of human beings, they will spontaneously learn
the use of knives, forks, cups, plates, etc. In general,
the more intelligent monkeys have a wider and more
varied sphere of activity than other animals. They are
incessantly trying to do things, experimenting in all
sorts of ways, and learning rapidly by the success or
failure of their attempts. The wide range of their ac-
tivity involves a wide range of interest. They attend
to all kinds of things without any directly practical aim;
and the imitative impulse is, as we have seen, a special
development of this form of attention. The readiest
way of bringing before their consciousness vividly and
distinctly an action which interests them, is to re-enact
it themselves.
Of course at higher levels of mental development the
imitative impulse is far less conspicuous because im-
pulsive activity in general is checked and overruled by
activity organised in a unified system.* Civilised men
imitate not so much because of immediate interest in
the action imitated as with a view to the attainment of
desirable results.
* See last chapter, 9.
CHAPTER III.
PLEASURE-PAIN.
1. Introductory. The hedonic tone of percep-
tion is determined by varying conditions. We may
distinguish broadly the pleasure or displeasure which is
directly due in the first instance to the perceptual pro-
cess at the time of its occurrence, and that which arises
from pre-formed associations.
Whatever obstructs or disables perceptual process
at the time of its occurrence is disagreeable ; whatever
favours or furthers it is agreeable. Here it is important
to distinguish two functions of perception: (1) the
apprehension of objects, or mere attention ; (2) the
performance of actions which are guided by attention,
but do not merely consist in the process of attending.
2. Feeling -Tone of Attention. The conditions
of pleasure-pain in the process of attending, as such,
have been well stated by Dr. Ward : " There is pleasure
in proportion as a maximum of attention is effectively
exercised, and pain in proportion as such effective at-
tention is frustrated by distractions, shocks, or incom-
plete and faulty adaptations, or fails of exercise owing
to the narrowness of the field of consciousness and the
slowness and smallness of its changes."*
* Article on "Psychology" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edi-
tion, xx., p. 71.
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The monotonous continuance or repetition of the
same kind of presentation after its interest is exhausted,
involves a restriction of mental activity which may be
highly disagreeable, as in travelling along a road where
the scenery is uniform in character, and the villages all
similar and similarly situated. A certain amount of
variety is necessary for the free play of attention.
Where this is lacking, the mind will strive to find
objects to exercise its activity upon, and fail disagree-
ably. On the other hand, a too rapid succession of
varying external impressions may be equally unpleas-
ing. The mind, while pre-occupied with one object, is
interrupted by the obtrusion of another, and yet an-
other, so that attention is being perpetually warped.
This gives rise to the pain of distraction, which may
also occur when disconnected objects simultaneously
claim attention, so that it cannot be efficiently exer-
cised by any one of them. In attending to the same
complex object, pleasure or displeasure may arise from
the relation of its parts, which may or may not be
adapted to what Kant calls " our faculty of knowing."
Where the apprehension of the whole prepares and
facilitates the apprehension of the parts, where the ap-
prehension of one part prepares and facilitates the
apprehension of another, and where the apprehension
of the parts prepares and facilitates the apprehen-
sion of the whole, the total activity is pleasant, if it
has a sufficiently varied field for its exercise. On
the other hand, where at one stage of the process
the mind is prepared for a certain kind of continuation
and meets with another for which it is not pre-adjusted,
the activity is unpleasant. As examples we may refer
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to " the pleasurableness of a rhythmic succession of
sounds or movements, of symmetrical forms and curved
outlines, of gentle crescendos and diminuendos in
sound, and of gradual variations of shade in colour, and
the painfulness of nickering lights, false time, false
steps, false quantities, and the like. In all these, when-
ever the result is pleasurable, attention can be readily
accommodated, is, so to say, economically meted out;
and whenever the result is painful, attention is sur-
prised, balked, wasted."* To understand this, we
must remember the essentially prospective nature of
the attentive process. It is always a pre-adjustment
for what is coming, and the pre-adjustment varies in
its specific nature according to circumstances. If what
actually occurs is that for which a specific pre-adjust-
ment has been made, the mental activity proceeds
smoothly and successfully without waste of energy.
If on the other hand what actually occurs does not fit
in with the pre-adjustment, there is a shock of disap-
pointment and a waste of energy.
The pleasure or displeasure experienced in observing
movement on the part of other persons or things partly
depends on the same conditions as those which deter-
mine the feeling-tone of our own motor activities. In
discussing imitation, we saw that actions which by their
intrinsic interest attract attention, produce in the ob-
server a tendency to repeat them himself. This tendency
is always present, even when it does not issue in overt
imitation. The sight of external movement occasions
the revival of corresponding motor experiences in the
subject who is attending to it. This motor revival
* Op. cit. t p. 69.
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forms an integral part of the perceptual complex, not of
course a distinct idea. The conditions of pleasure and
displeasure which apply to motor process in general,
apply also to the reproduced motor process involved in
attending to a moving object. When it takes place
with special ease and facility and fineness of adjust-
ment, we call the external movement that excites it
"graceful." But it is not merely the perception of
movement that involves the revival of motor activity on
the part of the subject. A slender column supporting
an apparently disproportionate weight has a disagree-
able effect on the spectator. It is as if he himself were
supporting a burden to which he is not equal. The
mere thought of Atlas bearing up the heavens on his
shoulders makes one uncomfortable. The pleasing or
unpleasing effect of geometrical forms is also to a large
extent due to the motor activity involved in perceiving
them. In part, this motor activity consists in actual
movements, such as those of the eye following an out-
line
;
but in a great measure it arises from our mode of
apprehending lines and surfaces as if they were in
themselves active. We speak of a column " raising it-
self " into the air
;




Language of this kind marks a fundamental feature of
perceptual process. The direction of lines and surfaces
is apprehended as if it were a direction which the lines
and surfaces themselves actively take and maintain.
Hence, in apprehending them there is a sympathetic
revival of motor activity in us, which may be pleasing
or unpleasing.* When the geometrical outline is so ir-
*This view is developed in full detail in Dr. Lipps' recent work
Baumasthetik und geometrisch-optische Tduschungen.
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regular in its course as to defeat pre-adjustments on
our part, and to demand abrupt changes for which we
are unprepared, it is disagreeable. On the other hand,
a gently flowing curve is agreeable. Of course, if the
figure is too simple, it will be almost neutral in feeling-
tone, but when it is at once complex and graceful, it
may give rise to considerable pleasure. Marked dis-
pleasure occurs when sufficient regularity is present to
create a pre-adjustment which other conditions dis-
appoint. The experience is also unpleasant when, ow-
ing to the simplicity or monotonous repetition of the
object, attention is not sufficiently occupied. In this
case an active tendency is thwarted because it does not
find adequate material for its exercise. Of course what
is too simple or too complex for one person may not be
too simple or too complex for another.
3. Success and Defeat as Determining Pleasure
and Pain. Under the second head is included a
very extensive class of cases so familiar and obvious
that it scarcely seems necessary to mention them.
Everybody knows that it is unpleasant to be defeated
in an endeavour by adverse external circumstances,
and that circumstances which facilitate the attainment
of the end of an activity are for that reason pleasing.
The cat is displeased when the mouse escapes it; the
golf-player is displeased when he digs up the turf in-
stead of hitting his ball ; the sportsman is displeased
when he misses his bird. An analysis of such cases is
unnecessary. We need only insist on their importance
for the general theory of pleasure-pain. The very fact
that they are obvious and familiar makes them impor-
tant. If we can reduce other instances in which the
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conditions of the feeling-tone are less obvious to the
same general principle, we may fairly claim to have
given an explanation. It should be noted that the phys-
iological theory which refers all pleasure-pain to rela-
tions of wear and repair in nervous tissue can scarcely
be made to apply here. We are pleased when we hit
a nail on the head and displeased when we miss it;
there seems to be no reason whatever for supposing
that in the one case surplus-stored energy is being used
up, and in the other not. One would suppose that
whatever surplus existed would be common to both.
These remarks apply to those conditions of success or
failure which arise from external circumstances.
There is another group of cases in which the condi-
tions of efficiency or inefficiency are found, not in ex-
ternal circumstances, but in the activity itself as a
subjective process. The simultaneous and successive
co-ordination of movements directed towards one end
involves delicate adjustment of innumerable motor
impulses. Each of these must have a certain in-
tensity, duration, and rapidity, and they must accom-
pany and succeed each other in a certain order. In
general, failure in adjustment, disturbing the activity
as a whole and rendering it inefficient, is unpleasant.
The peculiar experience of losing one's balance is a
good illustration. Part of the unpleasantness of ex-
treme fatigue lies in the muscular tremblings and con-
vulsive jerks to which it gives rise. On the other hand,
ease and certainty of adjustment in performing com-
plex movements is a source of pleasure when the move-
ments have not become so habitual as to lose feeling-
tone. A free and easy flow of delicately adjusted
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movements is
.pleasurable, as such. The pleasures of
play in children and young animals are largely of this
kind. Compare the mental state of a dog in its strug-
gle to keep standing on its hind legs with that of the
same dog in its natural gambols, its mock-fights with
its companions, and the like.
There are certain general conditions which contri-
bute to easy and effective motor adjustment. Among
these perhaps the most important is rhythm. In rhyth-
mic movements the same adjustment is repeated at
regular intervals, so that it is possible to prepare for it
beforehand. In this way waste of energy is avoided,
and the maximum of efficiency is attained. All work-
men who have to repeat a movement again and again,
as in striking with a hammer, or hauling on a rope, fall
into a regular rhythm. Concurrence in rhythm be-
tween two distinct and simultaneous processes, greatly
facilitates both. Each process is not only facilitated
by its own rhythm, but also by that of the other, and
the result is often intensely agreeable. The best in-
stances are dancing and marching to music.*
4. Feeling-Tone due to Pre-Formed Associations.
Acquirement of meaning, complication, and associa-
tive re-excitement of organic sensation, play an ex-
tremely important part in determining the feeling-tone
of perception.
" The cawing of a rook ... in itself,
is certainly not agreeable. This sound, in the case of
those who have lived in the country in early life, and
enjoyed its scenes and its adventures, is well known to
* Rhythmic activity also produces a diffused excitement of an agree-
able kind which intensifies the effect of other pleasure-giving conditions.
Thus the rhythm of verse intensifies the effect of poetic ideas and senti-
ments.
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become a particularly agreeable one. . . . The ex-
planation is that this particular sound, having been
heard again and again among surroundings . . . which
have a marked accompaniment of pleasure, . . . pro-
duces a faint re-excitation of the many currents of en-
joyment which accompanied these." * To take a sim-
pler instance, the sight of a delicious fruit may give
pleasure more because of previous experiences of taste
than because of its appearance to the eye. It is impor-
tant to note that in such cases it is not merely the feel-
ing-tone, the abstract pleasantness or painfulness which
is revived
;
the feeling-tone of the pleasant perception
is determined by previous experience only because the
perception itself in its cognitive and conative aspect
has been modified and developed by this experience.
The acquired feeling-tone of the cawing of rooks is the
feeling-tone of its acquired meaning. It re-excites a
total disposition left behind by previous perceptual
experience, and this is the source of its pleasantness.
Probably the re-excitement of organic sensations also
plays an important part in this instance. In other in-
stances it is very prominent. The sight of food dis-
gusting to the taste may produce actual nausea. The
sight of a drawn sword produced in James I. a highly
unpleasant organic disturbance. The mere sight of
another person sucking a lemon makes some people
vividly experience the corresponding organic sensa-
tions which may be to them highly disagreeable.
* Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii., p. 78.
CHAPTER IV.
EMOTIONS.
1. General Characteristics. If we ask the ques-
tion, What is an emotion ? the first answer that occurs
to common sense is a list of specific emotions, fear,
anger, hope, suspense, jealousy, and the like. When
we push the inquiry further, and ask what character
these states have in common which leads us to apply the
same name, Emotion, to all of them, we find psycholo-
gists giving varying and inconsistent answers. Accord-
ing to some, emotion is essentially a kind of sensation,
due to general organic disturbance. According to
others, it is the massive revival by association of past
pleasures and pains. According to others, it is a
tendency to behave in a particular way, and must be
regarded as a mode of conative consciousness. The
best course for us to pursue in view of this disagree-
ment, is to take certain typical emotions, and to attempt
to fix characteristics distinctive of them and common to
them in all their manifestations.
(1) There is one prominent fact about emotion
which confronts us at the outset
;
its wide range.
The same specific kind of emotion may occur at very
various levels of mental development. Sometimes it





may be readily provoked in the case of the
average infant by firmly grasping and holding one of
the movable members of his body, or by causing him
any sudden, strong, and not overpoweringly painful
sensation."* From the lower forms of perceptual con-
sciousness up to the higher forms of ideational and con-
ceptual activity, the same typical kinds of emotion are
everywhere present. Anger may arise in connexion
with the pain of a wound or the smart of a blow. The
wounded lion bites at sticks and stones and at its own
wounds. The cat will become angry if you interfere
with its kittens. A child will become angry if you take
away its toy. A man will become angry if you fail to
understand his argument or if you unfavourably criticise
his book. A saint may also be angry qua saint, as St.
Paul was angry with the foolish Galatians. It follows
from this wide distribution of emotion over different
stages of mental development, that we must be very
careful to avoid giving too limited a definition of its
specific forms. Bain, for instance, seems to err in this
direction when he says that anger " contains an impulse
knowingly to inflict suffering upon another sentient
being, and a positive gratification in the fact of suffering
inflicted." | This would only apply to a somewhat
developed stage of ideational consciousness ; and even
then it would not cover such cases as St. Paul's righteous
anger with the foolish Galatians.
(2) Closely connected with the wide distribution oi
emotion is the varied nature of the conditions that
arouse it. Any kind of thwarting or opposition may
*Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 538.
t Mental and Moral Science, p. 261.
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excite anger. Any kind of danger may excite fear.
You may produce anger in a dog by disturbing it while
eating, or by interfering with its young, or by pulling
its tail. It is a certain general kind of situation, not a
specific class of objects, which excites a certain kind of
emotion.
The behaviour in which emotion finds expression is
correspondingly general in its character. It is not an
adaptation to the specific nature of this or that specific
object, but a general mode of action adapted to a certain
kind of situation. The behaviour of the angry dog is
generically the same, however the anger is excited. It
adopts the same bodily attitude, shows its teeth, growls,
attempts to bite, and the like.
(3) There are two sources of emotional states which
it is important to distinguish. Emotions may arise in
connexion with definite perceptions or ideas, as when
good news excites joy ; on the other hand, they may be
primarily due to organic changes, such as those which
follow the use of alcohol or other drugs. A man's
temper varies with the state of his health. The organic
changes may operate in one or both of two ways.
They may directly change the condition of the nervous
system by altering the nature or amount of nutrition
with which it is supplied, or in other ways. They may
also, by altering the general state of the body, alter the
nature of the impulses received by the central nervous
system from the internal organs. Owing to the diffusive
nature of organic sensations, this occasions a general
change in the state of the nervous system, which on the
psychological side is experienced as an emotional mood.
An emotional mood is not quite the same thing as an
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emotion properly so called. An emotion properly so
called must be felt in relation to some definite object;
to be angry we must be angry about something. But
the general state of irritation due, let us say, to a sleep-
less night, has not, as such, any definite object. As we
shall see under (4), it tends to find objects for itself,
and it may pass from one object to another, giving rise
to a series of emotions of the same kind. In general,
the occurrence of a definite emotion tends to leave be-
hind it an emotional mood of a corresponding nature.
(4) An emotional mood, whatever may be its primary
origin, tends to persist when once it is aroused, and to
fasten upon any object which presents itself. Ill-temper
or gloomy depression or hilarity may originate in the first
instance in the use of drugs ; but when these moods are
once in existence they create objects for themselves. A
man who gets up in the morning in a bad temper, due
to want of sleep or similar causes, is apt to be irritated
by almost everything that occurs; though in another
mood the same incidents would be received with com-
placency. The cook angered by her mistress will box
the ears of the scullion
;
a herd of cattle, enraged by
the sight of a comrade in distress, will vent their fury
on their unfortunate companion ; the reason being
simply that he is the only object on which their atten-
tion is fixed. Their excitement must find an outlet
;
and in the absence of any other definite channel for
it, it discharges itself on the injured animal. " It is
sometimes seen in dogs, when three or four or five are
met together, that if one suddenly utters a howl or cry
of pain, when no man is near it and no cause apparent,
the others run to it, and seeing nothing turn round
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and attack each other." * So it is dangerous to ap-
proach the males of many species of animals in breeding
time, when their angry passions are aroused by sexual
rivalry. An emotion involves a certain general trend
or direction of activity, which particularises itself in
whatever way it can, according to circumstances.
(5) The fifth feature of emotion is what we may
call its parasitical character. So far as emotions are
excited by general situations, and not merely by
general organic changes, they are usually secondary
phenomena, and pre-suppose the existence of more
specific tendencies. This is true of all but the simplest
and most primitive emotional states. The anger pro-
duced in a dog by taking away its bone pre-supposes
the specific appetite for food. The anger produced in it
by interfering with its young pre-supposes the specific
tendency to guard and tend its offspring. So the pres-
ence of a rival who interferes with its wooing causes
anger because of the pre-existence of the sexual im-
pulse.
(6) In all the more intense phases of emotion,
organic sensations form an important constituent of the
total state of consciousness. This is true whether the
emotion has been primarily introduced by organic
changes, or whether it has in the first instance arisen in
connexion with definite perceptions or ideas. This
fact has been made the basis of a general theory, accord-
ing to which the essential nature of the emotional con-
sciousness consists in sensations arising from change in
the internal organs of the body, including both viscera
and muscles.
* Hudson, The Naturalist in La Plata, ch. xxii. (towards end).
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2. General Theory. The general theory of emo-
tion which is most favoured at the present time is that
to which we have just referred. It is at least as old as
Descartes, but is now specially connected with the
name of Professor James, who has advocated its claims
with great force and eloquence. We cannot do better
than quote his statement of the main argument in favour
of the view that emotion is simply organic sensation
and nothing else. "I now proceed to urge the vital
point of my whole theory, which is this: If we fancy
some strong emotion, and then try to abstractfrom our
consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symp-
toms, vie find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-
stuff ' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and
that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is
all that remains. . . . What kind of an emotion of fear
would be left if the feeling neither of quickened heart-
beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling
lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of
visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible
for me to think. Can one fancy the state of ragf
and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of
the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of
the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their
stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face ?
The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The
rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of
its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that
can possibly be supposed to take its place is some
cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, con-
fined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect
that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for
Psych.
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their sins. . . . The more closely I scrutinise my
states, the more persuaded I become that whatever
moods, affections, and passions I have are in very truth
constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes
which we ordinarily call their expression or conse-
quence ; and the more it seems to me that if I were to
become corporeally anaesthetic, I should be excluded
from the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike,
and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or intel-
lectual form." *
This passage is certainly eloquent, but it lacks logical
stringency. It does not follow that because A is neces-
sarily and essentially connected with .Z?, that A and B
are identical. A stone cannot fall into water without
making ripples, but the ripples are not the stone. A
line cannot have length without direction, but length
and direction are not the same. There is no smoke
without fire, but smoke is one thing and fire another.
So it may be impossible for emotion to exist without
expressing itself; but it does not therefore follow that
the expression constitutes the whole emotion. Suppos-
ing Professor James's thesis to be true, it is evident
that we cannot invert it. Certainly not all organic
sensation is emotion
; hunger and stomach-ache are not
emotional experiences. To complete the theory there-
fore it is necessary to distinguish the kinds of organic re-
action which produce emotion from those which do not.
So far as we can gather Professor James's view on this
point from his own statement, it would seem that he
connects emotion with diffused disturbance affecting
many organs. But all organic disturbances are diffused
* Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., pp, 451-453.
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in this way. The experience of a cold douche, or of
being shampooed after a Turkish bath, ought on this
theory to be emotional.
It is evident that the organic sensations which enter
into an emotional state must either occasion, be pre-
ceded by, or accompany, a special kind of disturbance
in the nervous system, which is not present in the case
of all organic sensations. Now no doubt to some ex-
tent organic sensations can produce such specific ner-
vous excitations. They do so in so far as the emotional
mood is traceable to such causes as the state of health or
the use of drugs. But here we must allow for the direct
effect of organic conditions on the nervous system itself
and its nutrition, as well as for the sensory impulses
which proceed to it from the internal organs ; and even
when the neural disturbance is due to sensory impulses,
it cannot for that reason be directly identified with the
organic sensations themselves. When we consider the
emotions which arise in connexion with definite per-
ceptions and ideas, the inadequacy of the theory be-
comes still more evident. In such instances the diffused
organic disturbance has its primary origin in a disturb-
ance of the nervous system, which is propagated over
the body as a whole. It follows that the first stage of
the process by which the emotion arises, cannot be, as
James says it is, a "cold and neutral intellectual per-
ception." I have at this moment a somewhat cold and
neutral intellectual perception that I shall some day
die : but this awakens in me no perturbation of vis-
ceral or motor consciousness. On the other hand, a
madman presents a pistol at me : here too, I have an
intellectual perception of the madman as presenting
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the pistol; but this time it is followed by general
organic disturbance. Now what is the difference be-
tween the two intellectual perceptions which accounts
for the difference in their result in the two cases ? On
the physiological side, the perception of the presented
pistol must correspond to an intense and diffused dis-
turbance of neural equilibrium ; for otherwise there is
nothing to account for the intense and diffused disturb-
ance of organic equilibrium. On the other hand, the
mere recognition that I shall die some day does not
upset my nervous balance so as to cause an organic
shock. Now on the psychical side, what corresponds
to the original neural disturbance which pre-conditions
the organic disturbance ? If the correlated psychical
state is not of the nature of emotion, what can it be ?
It is perfectly arbitrary to suppose that organic sensa-
tions have a mystic efficacy which can belong to no
other sensations. After all, they only occur in the
same way as other sensations : they arise like the rest
only through stimulation of the brain by impulses pass-
ing along afferent nerves. If they contribute to pro-
duce or heighten emotion it can only be because they
help to excite an intense and widespread nervous dis-
turbance. But there is no reason in the world why
impressions coming from external objects should not
operate in the same way. In fact they must do so if
we are to account for the organic disturbance at all,
and this agrees with what we may call the normal, un-
sophisticated view, that emotion essentially precedes
and pre-conditions its expression. There is nothing in
the perception of a bear, as such, to produce symptoms
of fear. The symptoms of fear arise only when the
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sight of a bear startles a man, either because it is a
strange and big animal approaching, or because pre-
vious experience has taught him to apprehend it as
dangerous. In any case, it is not the visual perception,
as such, but its startling character, which is essential.
The only mode of attempting to escape this confusion
is by saying that the organic disturbance arises in the
first instance in a mechanical way. On this theory
there are certain innate or acquired physiological pre-
arrangements owing to which certain visual or other
perceptions set up organic disturbances. Such a view
is irreconcilable with the facts. Emotions accompanied
by marked organic disturbance are not occasioned
merely by the perception of certain objects. They are
occasioned only by occurrences which powerfully
thwart or further pre-existing conative tendencies.
A man does not feel fear merely because he sees a
bear, but because his life is threatened, and " all that a
man has will he give for his life." The theory of James
simply ignores this relation of the circumstances which
produce emotion to pre-existing conative tendencies.
According to this theory, it is the mere sight of a kitten
being removed which excites anger in the mother-cat.
Parental affection has nothing to do with it. But
obviously the interference with parental instinct is a
most essential constituent of the emotional state. It is
directly accompanied by a nervous disturbance which
precedes and conditions the organic reaction. If the
organic disturbances accompanying emotion were oc-
casioned in the mechanical way assumed in James's
theory they would arise from excitement of the lower
nervous centres. But the organic shock of emotion
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arises only from impressions which excite the highei
nervous centres in an especially intense way. The
lower nervous centres are just those which are most
stable, and which behave in a calm and equable manner.
They discharge automatic functions which are matters
of routine. We cannot ascribe to them widespread
and irregular perturbations of the whole system. In-
deed Professor Dewey, who advocates this theory, con-
tradicts himself when he says that emotion arises from
the interruption of normal and habitual, co-ordinations.
Such interruptions are occurrences which essentially
involve the higher centres, and are accompanied by
intense consciousness, not by " cold and neutral per-
ceptions."
We might go on discussing this question interminably.
I shall only draw attention to one point more and
then leave it. I refer to the variability of the organic
symptoms in what is specifically the same emotion and
their similarity in different emotions. This is already
recognised as regards motor expressions. Thus Mr.
Lloyd Morgan, who in general accepts James's theory
without criticism, yet denies that what is specially
characteristic of emotion as such, takes its origin in the
motor elements. " Take the case of a young frightened
moorhen. On land he runs away, and perhaps crouches
in the rushes
;
in the water he dives, and comes up
quietly under the bank and there stays still. The
activities involved in running and diving are very
different; must not the activity-feelings be very different
too ? And yet we must surely suppose them to have a
common emotional element. Again, when a moorhen
catches sight of a worm and runs hard to secure it, the
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activity-feelings must, as such, one would suppose, be
very similar to those experienced when the moorhen
runs vigorously away from a goose. And yet in the
one case he is frightened and in the other case he
is not. Here similar activity-feelings are associated
with wholly different emotional states."
* This conten-
tion appears to me to be perfectly justified. There is
indeed an identity in the general trend or direction of
the activity displayed in a certain kind of emotion.
But this cannot be reduced to any kind of identity or
similarity in the actual movements or the joint-, tendon-,
and muscle-sensations arising from them. But Lloyd
Morgan and others seem to suppose that visceral sensa-
tions at least are fairly constant in the same emotion
on different occasions and in different circumstances.
Now the problem is an obscure one ; for visceral sen-
sations are difficult to investigate. But so far as any
distinct appeal to experience can be made, it seems that
they also may be more or less similar in different emo-
tions, and variable in the same emotion. The Maori
women of New Zealand when they meet for festive
purposes enjoy themselves by squealing and crying, so
that a stranger would suppose them to be in a state of
intense grief. One traveller tells how he was roused at
night by the most doleful cries, and went out to see
what human creature was in misery. He found that it
was a woman rejoicing over a meeting with her long-
lost son. Here the respiratory changes and increased
secretion in the lachrymal glands were the natural ex-
pression of joy. Consider, too, the different expressions
for anger. There is "white" anger and "red" anger.
* Habit and Instinct, p. 201.
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The circulation of the blood must be different in the
two cases.
This criticism leaves untouched the thesis with which
Professor James starts. It would seem that this thesis
must be admitted. We cannot imagine what an emo-
tion would be like apart from the organic sensations
which it includes. Even in faint and transient emo-
tional experiences, the organic element appears to be
present. It accompanies a slight touch of irritation or
a slight tinge of contempt, as it accompanies intense
disdain or wild fury.* The difference seems to be only
one of degree. But in admitting that organic sensation
is an essential factor in the constitution of those states
which we call emotional, we do not admit that it is the
sole factor. Where the emotion arises in connexion
with perceptions and ideas, it involves a primary dis-
turbance of mental equilibrium, connected with the
furtherance or hindrance in special ways of pre-exist-
ing conative tendencies. This primary disturbance,
being the pre-condition of the organic reaction, cannot
be regarded as its effect. It is therefore an indepen-
dent factor in the constitution of the emotion. In so
far as the primary source of the emotion lies in organic
conditions, the case for Professor James seems stronger.
But there are two points to be considered. (1) The
organic changes may directly involve the brain itself
and its nutrition, so that the whole effect cannot be
referred to sensory impulses coming from the internal
i
* Of course overt expressional movements, or other bodily changes
visible to the external observer, may be absent in slight, and sometimes
even in intense emotions. But what is important is not this overt ex-
pression, but internal organic changes, affecting for example the circula-
tion and respiration.
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organs. (2) We must allow for what Professor Ladd
calls " surplus excitation." The sensory impulses, be-
sides producing the special sensations corresponding to
their specific character, also tend to produce a more or
less diffused excitement of a vague kind, which may be
similar for sensations differing in their special qualities.
This surplus excitation may be analogous in its charac-
ter to that which arises in connexion with perceptions
or ideas, so that the emotional mood of irritation may
have its primary source either in the annoying beha-
viour of a companion, or in a bad state of health.*
* James's theory of emotion has recently been more or less modified
both by himself and others. In the text, I deal with it in its most original
and distinctive form. Some would correct James's statement by saying
that the expression is not a pre-condition of the emotion, but one aspect
of the occurrence of which the emotion is another. I do not dispute this,
but I should like to know definitely what it means. Velocity and direction
may be said to be two aspects of motion, but emotion and expression are
not connected in this way. The brain is a locally separate part of the
organism ; and organic changes occasioned by brain excitement follow
the neural process both logically and in time. It may be admitted that
the neural process could not exist if it could not discharge itself; and in
this sense expression and primary neural disturbances may be regarded as
different aspects of the same occurrence. The real question is, whether
the primary neural disturbance is itself correlated with consciousness
of an emotional kind, or at any rate with consciousness which forms an
essential constituent of the complete emotion. According to James, as
I understand him, this is not so: according to him, the primary nervous
disturbance must first produce changes in the other organs of the body;
and these changes must by a backstroke react on the nervous system
before the emotion can begin. Emotion is in his view the consciousness
connected with the re-impression following expression. The initial ner-
vous excitement is on this view excitement of the lower centres and has
no appreciable concomitant in consciousness. James does indeed speak
of the initial perception which gives rise to an emotion as being the per-
ception of an exciting fact. But he does not refer to mental excitement.
The fact is exciting because the perception of it sets up organic changes
which in their turn by way of backstroke give rise to mental excitement.
As he says, the feeling of these changes as they occur is the emotion.
Thus his phrase, "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
the exciting fact," means that they follow the fact that excites them,
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3. Relation to Pleasure-Pain and Conation.
Every special kind of emotion essentially involves a
characteristic end or direction of activity, mental or
bodily. Anger tends to destroy or disable its object;
fear, to avoid or evade it. The relation of special emo-
tions to pleasure-pain is not so definite as their conative
aspect. Some emotions are invariably pleasant and
others unpleasant; grief for instance is always dis-
agreeable,* and joy agreeable. So fear is constantly
disagreeable. But other emotions may be either plea-
sant or unpleasant, according to circumstances. A sur-
prise may be either welcome or unwelcome. Anger is
highly disagreeable when it is impotent; but when it
can wreak itself on the enemy, it may be intensely
agreeable. In general we may say that an emotion is
agreeable or disagreeable according as the conative
tendencies involved in it are thwarted or gratified. In
fear and grief, they are from the nature of the case
not the fact that excites us. If he does not mean this there is nothing
distinctive in his theory at all. Very few would dispute that organic
resonance is an essential factor in fully formed emotion. Bain has said
this as clearly as James; and the present writer would be the last to
deny it. But if there is a mental excitement preceding the organic
resonance, this also must be counted as belonging to the emotion. His
whole theory seems to be a counterpart of his theory of motor conscious-
ness. Just as motor consciousness is according to him wholly due to
re-impressions from muscles, joints and tendons, while the primary ner-
vous discharge has nothing to do with it, so emotion is wholly due to
re-impressions following bodily changes which originate in a primary ner-
vous discharge; and the primary nervous excitement itself is not di-
rectly a factor in it, but only an antecedent condition.
* There is such a thing as the "luxury of grief,"but the mere exist-
ence of the grief does not constitute the luxury. A person may be
grieved and at the same time he may be pleased to know that he is
grieved. Sorrow over the loss of a beloved object may be accompanied
by the pleasure due to tender reminiscences, and this pleasure may
overbalance the pain of grief. But grief in and for itself is never
pleasant.
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obstructed; when the obstruction ceases, the emotion
ceases also. In joy, on the other hand, they are grati-
fied by the very nature of the conditions which occa-
sion it.
4. Ultimate Qualitative Differences. Emotion
in its various specific forms involves correspondingly
specific kinds of feeling which cannot be explained
away as resultants or complications of more simple ele-
ments. When we have said that a specific emotion is
characterised by a certain trend or direction of activity,
that it is accompanied by certain kinds of organic sen-
sation, that it is pleasant or painful, and the like, though
all this may be true, it is not exhaustive. Each specific
kind of emotion has also something in it peculiar and
undefinable. It is a unique kind of feeling-attitude
towards an object. As Professor James observes :
" There are infinite shades and tones in the various
emotional excitements which are as distinct as sensa-
tions of colour are." Besides its own specific quality
of feeling, an emotion has no doubt also a feeling-tone
of pleasure or pain. But its peculiar colouring cannot
be resolved into mere pleasantness or unpleasantness.
It stands out as a fact unique and irreducible.
5. Emotional Dispositions. An emotion is al-
ways an actual state of consciousness ; an emotional
disposition is a persistent tendency to feel a certain
kind of emotion in the presence of a certain object.
Thus the cat, after having its tail pulled frequently by
a child, has a permanent tendency to feel angry when-
ever the child approaches it. We have pointed out
that the original conditions of emotion are rather cer-
tain general kinds of situation than specific persons
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or things. But in the course of experience they come
to be connected with specific persons or things, as the
anger of the cat comes to be connected with the ap-
proach of the child who pulls its tail. In this way
emotional dispositions are formed which manifest them-
selves in the form of actual emotion on appropriate
occasions. An emotional disposition is not the same
thing as an emotional mood. The mood is an actual
affection of consciousness
;
but the disposition persists
when neither the mood nor the emotion itself is being
felt. Such words as liking and disliking, hate and
love, indicate emotional dispositions rather than actual
emotions. We say that the cat dislikes the child, mean-
ing, not that it is actually feeling angry with the child
at the moment, but that it has a permanent tendency
to feel the emotion of anger whenever it sees the child
in its neighbourhood. On the higher levels of mental
life, wnere ideas and concepts play a prominent part,
emotional dispositions are very complex, and are called
Sentiments or Interests*
6. Analysis of Fear. To describe and analyse
all the various kinds of emotion would be an endless
task. We therefore select for special treatment two
typical forms, fear and anger. We shall have occa-
sion to deal with some other modes of emotional ex-
perience at a later stage, when we come to treat of idea-
tional as distinguished from perceptual activity.
In fear, as in all painful feeling, conative tendency is
at once excited and obstructed. But the conation must
be of a special kind. It must be a tendency to practi-
cal adjustment more or less imperatively demanded by
* See bk. iv., ch. ix., 5.
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a practical emergency of a serious nature. Thus the
conditions which cause fear must be aggressive or
otherwise obtrusive in their character. The occasion
of fear must not come before consciousness as some-
thing that can be avoided or evaded with ease and
certainty.
The experience must invade consciousness in a more
or less violent and persistent way so as to call impera-
tively for a practical adjustment to the situation. At the
same time it must be of a nature to destroy efficiency,
to disorganise and disable the activity which it ex-
cites. It may seem from this account of the matter
that fear is always disadvantageous, and that it can be
nothing but a drawback in the struggle for existence.
This inference is partially true. Fright often serves
the predatory animal rather than the frightened prey.
"Many birds, though scarcely wounded by small shot,
fall to the ground as though struck by lightning, pant-
ing with wide open mouth."* Seal-hunters often make
use of the paralysing effect of fright in order to secure
their prey. But even when terror strikes an animal
motionless the result is not always disadvantageous.
By becoming quiescent it is more likely to escape notice.
Where mental and bodily perturbation are not violent
enough to deprive the animal of all power of effective
action, it takes to flight or hides itself. So far as these
movements of escape or evasion are the direct expres-
sion of fear, they are to be explained on the general
principle that psychical activity, when its way is barred
in certain directions, diverts itself into whatever chan-
nel it can find. Thus an animal disabled by fear from
* Hudson, Naturalist in La Plata, ch. xv.
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more positive and complex modes of adjustment, will
have recourse to flight. Now the circumstances may
be actually such that flight is the best course or the only
course that can be of use. When this is so, the fear
that expresses itself in flight is an advantage. In point
of fact when animals run away or hide, it is generally
the best thing they can do. But this is not always so.
A dog that runs away scared at the noise of a cracker,
derives no benefit from so doing. Further, fright is to
some extent a disadvantage to an animal even in escap-
ing from an enemy. The excitement of the emotion
may indeed accelerate its movements. But at the same
time presence of mind is more or less lost. Watchful-
ness and readinesa of resource are diminished. Thus
the animal rushes wildly into the danger which it is
striving to avoid, or into some other danger of a yet
mo T>e deadly nature. The game old fox may be but little
influenced by fear when in escaping from the hunters
it displays its wonderful command of all kinds of cun-
ning resources, its wariness and keenness of perception.
Whyte-Melville says of such a fox :
" His heart like his
little body was multum in parvo, tough, tameless, and
as strong as brandy." As regards the general question
of the utility of fear, we may say that on the whole it
is a means of preservation from injury and death. But
it is rather a clumsy means, and in part defeats itself,
especially when the emotion is very violent. As Mosso
remarks : " The graver the peril becomes, the more do
the reactions which are positively harmful to the ani-
mal prevail in number and in efficacy. . . . We might
almost say that nature had not been able to frame a
substance which should be excitable enough to com-
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pose the brain and spinal marrow, and yet which
should not be so excited by exceptional stimulation as
to overstep in its reactions those physiological bounds
which are useful to the conservation of the creature." *
We may now enumerate the conditions which gener-
ate fear.
(a) Actual bodily pain produced by wounds is, when
sufficiently intense, accompanied by the same kind of
impotent excitement, the same kind of disablement
of bodily and mental activity which is characteristic
of fright. Wild efforts to escape, laboured breath-
ing, palpitation, trembling, etc., are expressions of
actual bodily pain as well as of strong fear. Now we
find not only analogy but genetic relation between the
two states. When an object which has previously
caused pain is again perceived, the emotional tone is
one of fear, unless fear is displaced or overpowered by
anger. This has suggested to Herbert Spencer the
theory that the fear consists in the revival of bygone
painful sensations produced by the object feared.
"
Everyone," he says,
" can testify that the psychical
state called fear consists of mental representations of
painful results." f Against this view we urge that
whereas the painful sensations vary greatly in specific
quality, the emotion of fear which they generate is sub-
stantially identical, and differs more in its character
from them than they do from each other ; we urge also
that the emotion of fear is sometimes more violent and
disagreeable than the original experiences of which it
is supposed to be a revival, or mental representation.
* La Paura, Appendice, p. 295; quoted and translated byJames, Prin-
ciples of Psychology, vol. ii., pp. 483-484. f Psychology, 213.
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What appears really to happen when a previous ex-
perience of pain gives rise on a subsequent occasion
to the emotion of fear, may be illustrated as follows.
A child, attracted by the brightness of a flame, grasps
it and is badly burnt in consequence. Subsequently,
on seeing the flame, he feels fear. The emotional tone
belongs to the present perception because of the pre-
vious painful sensation inflicted by the perceived object.
The original painful sensation, when it actually occurred,
occurred as part of a perceptual activity which was one
and continuous in all its aspects. The painful sensation
was not merely superadded to the visual perception of
the object as a separate and isolated event, it was an
integral phase of the same continuous process. The
visual perception and the sensation of burning form
part of the perception of one and the same object. The
advent of the burning pain must therefore make a pro-
found difference in the character of the perceptual
process as a whole, and in the total disposition which
the experience as a whole leaves behind it. Hence,
when the object is again seen, the mere sight of it, even
before previous painful experiences recur, will be a pro-
foundly different state of perceptual consciousness from
what it would have been if they had never existed. The
motor attitude will be essentially modified. There will be
a tendency to retreat from or avoid the flame, instead of
grasping it. Further, a state of diffused nervous excite-
ment analogous to that which accompanied the actual
burning will be re-excited ; and this will overflow the
organism as a whole, producing constriction of the su-
perficial blood-vessels, palpitation, trembling, and the
like, with the corresponding organic sensations.
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(b) That this account of the matter is correct
becomes clearer when we consider that fear arises in
other ways than through experience of previous pain
or injury. The mere suddenness or intensity, or the
combined suddenness and intensity, of an impression are
sufficient to cause fear. A loud noise for which we are
unprepared startles us with momentary alarm. Many
people cannot help being scared by a reverberating
peal of thunder, though they know that it is harmless.
Of course much depends on the nervous organisation or
on its state at a given time. It is extremely easy to
startle a hare or a rabbit. Even a slight noise will give
us a disagreeable shock of alarm if we are half-asleep.
In some pathological states the patient is liable to be
frightened by almost anything. Fledgelings shrink down
in the nest when a strange animal or object suddenly
approaches, though they may show no uneasiness when
their deadliest enemy approaches them unobtrusively as
snakes do. " A piece of paper blown suddenly by the
wind is as great an object of terror to a young bird as a
buzzard sweeping down with death in its talons."*
The sudden approach of an object, the abrupt oc-
currence of an intense sensation, stimulate to action :
there is a demand for practical adjustment to the
obtrusive experience. At the same time its very sud-
denness . or intensity disconcert and startle, so that
efficient reaction is impossible. This is the more con-
spicuously so, where the impression is not only sud-
den but unfamiliar. Mere unfamiliarity or strange-
ness, apart from suddenness or exceptional intensity,
suffice to cause fear even in a violent form. The
* Hudson, Naturalist in La Plata, eh. v.
Psijcfi. 20
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young gorilla brought home by the members of the
Loango expedition much disliked strange noises.
"Thunder, the rain falling on the sky-light, and espe-
cially the long-drawn note of a pipe or trumpet threw
him into such agitation as to cause a sudden affection
of the digestive organs, and it became expedient to keep
him at a distance." * The kind of unfamiliarity which
so disturbed the gorilla consisted apparently in mere
novelty.
Unfamiliarity may, as I have said, consist in mere
novelty. But there is another kind of unfamiliarity
which involves not only novelty but direct conflict with
ordinary experience. Strangeness of this sort may
cause profound alarm. An experience may be so dis-
cordant with the normal course of events as to utterly
check and disorder the process of conscious life and
destroy the possibility of effective adjustment. In the
case of human beings the fright caused by a ghostly
apparition is a good illustration. This is not so much
due to any definite or indefinite anticipation of posi-
tive evil as to the utterly abnormal character of the
experience. It lies so wholly outside the circle of
ordinary events, and is so completely opposed to the
conditions of ordinary experience, that it destroys all
presence of mind. It stimulates intensely by its
strangeness, and at the same time, owing to this very
strangeness, all lines of activity, theoretical and practi-
cal, are obstructed. It is instructive to contrast this
overwhelming terror in the supposed presence of a
ghostly apparition with the predominantly agreeable
* R. Hartmann, Anthropoid Apes, p. 265; quoted by James, Principles
of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 417 (note).
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experience of reading or listening to a tale of marvel.
The actual fact obtrudes itself as actual, and demands
immediate practical adjustment to it, and yet by its
very nature makes such adjustment impossible. Where
this practical need is not felt, the free play of imagina-
tion liberated from the trammels of ordinary experience
may be a source of delight.
Animals are capable of analogous experiences. James
gives a good example.* A dog belonging to Professor
Brooks, the well-known biologist, was frightened into a
sort of epileptic fit by a bone being drawn across the
floor by a thread which he did not see. As James re-
marks, any man's heart would stop beating, if he per-
ceived his chair sliding unassisted across the floor.
7. Analysis of Anger. The child manifests this
emotion at an early stage. " Anger initially expresses
and satisfies itself by a peculiar form of violent motor
discharge. Even at the outset it takes the form of an
effort to overcome resistance by main force. The
young child who has acquired no definite mode of
wreaking its passion, shows it by vague kicking and
struggling, by movements which antagonise each other,
and which encounter resistance in external objects.
The development of cognitive consciousness simply
serves to restrict this diffused mobility within more
definite channels. The child in a later stage throws
his plaything violently to the ground, or pushes it
away, or breaks it, or in the case of a person who
thwarts his will, he kicks, pushes, or strikes. Even the
adult may find some satisfaction for his irritation in
destroying furniture, and he nearly always has a strong
* Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 420.
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disposition to break, crush, tear, or rend something.
Inasmuch as his anger has become enlightened and
defined, his destructive impulse will become more spe-
cially directed against the object by which his desires
are crossed or thwarted. But when the conditions
deny him this satisfaction, it is well known that the
angry man is very apt to wreak his anger on inoffen-
sive things or persons, thus approximating to the con-
dition of the child. Though the tendency to overcome
resistance by violent exertion of bodily force seems
always to play some part in anger, yet with the advance
of intellectual development it gives place more and
more to an ideal satisfaction
;
it becomes enough to
know, or sometimes even to imagine, that the opposing
forces have been crushed by our agency. This is of
course a direct consequence of the growing importance
of the life of ideas as compared with that of percep-
tion. But even in the ideal satisfaction of anger the
impulse to destroy or break down opposition may
be satisfied to some extent by wreaking it on other
objects than those which immediately awaken resent-
ment. The relief afforded by swearing comes under
this head. It is a breaking down of the ideal bar-
riers which social convention or religious sentiment
sets up."
*
Turning now to animals, we find that their proneness
to anger depends to a great degree on inherited organi-
sation and general habits of life. Spencer observes:
" The destructive passion is shown in a general tension
of the muscular system, in gnashing of teeth and pro-
trusion of claws, in dilated eyes and nostrils, in growls :
* Analytic Psychology, vol. ii., pp. 96-97.
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and these are weaker forms of the actions that accom-
pany the killing of prey."* Here there are two im-
plications that deserve notice. It is implied that the
expression of emotion consists in actions which are
only rudiments of more developed activities. This is
of course untrue. Actual tearing and rending may be
as much an expression of the destructive passion as the
gnashing of teeth and protrusion of claws. In the
second place it is implied that anger is distinctive of
predatory animals. But this is not the case. The
elephant is not a beast of prey, but can be easily roused
to fury. It is the combative rather than the hunting
instinct which is essential. Many graminivorous
animals which are usually peaceful are highly dangerous
in the breeding season, when the combative impulse is
excited in connexion with the sexual, and finds its
proper field in sexual rivalry. In general we may say
that some animals, such as the elephant, meet danger
and opposition by main force ; others, such as the rab-
bit and hare, by flight and concealment. Yet others
mostly resort to evasion and escape, but become com-
bative and even aggressive at certain seasons. The
combative tendency is the pre-disposing cause of that
emotional seizure we call anger. All animals whose
play takes the form of mock-fights may be roused to
fury. Any kind of opposition, any thwarting or re-
striction of psychical activity may cause anger. It is the
more likely to do so the more distinctly the interference
wears the appearance of coming from some positive
external agency and especially from some other animal.
We may be merely grieved at the loss of a valued
* Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 546.
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object if we accidentally mislay it ourselves : but if
somebody or something breaks it before our eyes we
are more apt to be angry. It must not however be
supposed that the emotion of anger vents itself exclu-
sively on an offending object. On the contrary the
emotion is essentially a general impulse to crush and
destroy. It fastens by preference on the cause of irrita-
tion
;
but failing this it may vent itself impartially on
anything which comes in its way. It is only through
experience and education that it becomes restricted and
defined.
The conditions which occasion fear in one animal
may occasion anger in another. Any condition which
thwarts conation may give rise to an outburst of de-
structive violence. But in fear mental and bodily
activity is at once stimulated and thwarted. Now the
obstruction and oppression which in a timid creature
paralyses or disorganises all activities, save those of
flight and concealment, may in a combative animal
rouse to active resistance and counter-aggression. This
holds good of actual bodily pain. The attitude of a
man in bearing bodily pain is different according as he
gives way to it or fights against it. The smart of a
wound received in the heat of combat usually infuriates
the combatant. All fierce animals, such as the lion or
tiger, become fiercely aggressive when they are hurt.
Belt supplies an interesting illustration from insect life.
Speaking of leaf-cutting ants he says : " The effect of a
little corrosive sublimate sprinkled on one of their
paths in dry weather is to make them mad and exter-
minate one another. ... In a couple of hours, round
balls of the ants will be found all biting each other;
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and numerous individuals will be seen bitten in two,
while others have lost their legs or antennae."
*
8. Emotional Gestures. Darwin, in his great
work Expression of the Emotions, has attempted
to account for the distinctive gestures accompanying
the various specific forms of emotional conscious-
ness. The principle of explanation on which he lays
most stress is that of Serviceable Associated Habits.
Many expressive movements are partial survivals of ac-
tions which have proved useful to the subject himself
or to his ancestors in situations exciting analogous
emotions. " So slight a symptom as the snarl or sneer,
the one-sided uncovering of the upper teeth, is ac-
counted for by Darwin as a survival from the time
when our ancestors had large canines, and unfleshed
them (as dogs do now) for attack. Similarly the rais-
ing of the eyebrows in outward attention, the opening
of the mouth in astonishment, come, according to the
same author, from the utility of these movements in
extreme cases. The raising of the eyebrows goes with
the opening of the eye for better vision ; the opening
of the mouth with the intensest listening, and with
the rapid catching of the breath which precedes mus-
cular effort."! A fainter form of the act of ejecting an
unsavory morsel constitutes the facial gesture express-
ive of all forms of disgust. A smile calls into play the
same muscles as those employed in sucking the breast,
and in a similar manner.
* Naturalist in Nicaragua, p. 79.
t James, Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 479.
DIVISION II. SPECIAL PERCEPTS.
CHAPTER I.
CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
CATEGORIES are forms of cognitive consciousness;
they are universal principles or relations pre-supposed
either in all cognition or in all cognition of a certain
kind. It was a main part of the work of Kant to
exhibit the categories involved in our knowledge of
the external world, such as Quantity, extensive and
intensive, Causality, Substance, etc. These are the
ultimate relations between the specific contents of our
experience, and constitute the forms of synthesis which
give unity to that experience.
Now in a rudimentary way these forms of synthesis,
or some of them, appear at the level of perceptual
activity. There are five which require special treat-
ment, External or Physical Reality, Space, Time,
Causality, and what for want of a more familiar word
we must call Thinghood. The first three of these will
receive consideration in chapters especially devoted to
them.* Of course such forms are not distinctly appre-
hended by the perceptual consciousness in abstraction
* We shall deal with Causality and Thinghood in the present chapter.
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from the concrete matter of experience to which they
give order and unity. But neither are the categories
of human thought distinctly apprehended, a8 such, un-
til a comparatively advanced stage of development is
reached. Even then, they are only imperfectly and
incompletely detached from the more concrete matter
in which they are, so to speak, embedded. If this were
not so, Logic and Theory of Knowledge would have
nothing to do.
J. F. Ferrier puts the case extremely well. "Men
reasoned generation after generation long before they
knew a single dialectical rule, or had any notion of
the construction of the syllogism. The principles of
logic were operative in every ratiocination, yet the
reasoner was incognisant of their influence until Ar-
istotle anatomised the process."* Ferrier further il-
lustrates by referring to other constitutive forms
which have only been gradually disengaged by re-
flective analysis from their specific embodiment. "It
is," he says, " always very late in the day before the
seminal principles of speech are detected and ex-
plained. Indeed, the language which owed to them
both birth and growth may have ceased to be a living
tongue before these, the regulating elements of its
formation, come to light and are embodied in written
grammar. That most elementary species of instruction
which we familiarly term the A, B, C, had no express
or articulate existence in the minds or on the lips of
men, until thousands of years after the invention and
employment of language ; yet these, the vital constitu-
ents of all speech, were there from the beginning." f
* Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 15. | Ibid., p, 14.
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It is only in this sense that we suppose the categories
of perceptual thought to exist for the percipient. They
exist for him as the alphabet existed before its discovery.
Now in this sense Causality is undoubtedly a category
of perceptual consciousness. Perceptual process is
directed towards practical ends ; and it learns by expe-
rience how to attain these ends. Actions which prove
ineffective are gradually discontinued, and actions
which prove effective are maintained and repeated.
Consider the dog or cat in Mr. Thorndike's experiment
previously quoted.
* The animal is confined in a box,
with food outside. It can only escape by turning a
wooden button, pulling a loop, or pressing down a
lever. It struggles to escape in all kinds of ways,
squeezing and biting and clawing. Ineffective modes
of action are discontinued and give place to others,
which in their turn are discontinued if they prove fruit-
less. If in this way the animal does accidentally work
the mechanism, it is likely to do it sooner when again
put into the box. Thus in repeated experiments "all
the squeezings and bitings and claAvings which do not
hit the vital point of the mechanism . . . get stamped
out, while the particular impulse which made the suc-
cessful clawing or biting, gets stamped in," until it alone
is executed. This gradual adaptation of means for the
attainment of ends involves in a rudimentary way the
category of Causality. It involves the distinction be-
tween efficiency and inefficiency. It is the starting-point
and pro-supposition of all subsequent developments of
thought which proceed according to this category.
But we must notice the essential difference which
* Seep. 259.0'.
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separates the merely perceptual category from that of
ideational and conceptual thought. The perceptual
category is always purely and immediately practical in
its operation. It is a constitutive form of thought only
because it is a constitutive form of action. The ques-
tion Why ? has no existence for the merely perceptual
consciousness. It does not and can not inquire how it is
that a certain cause produces a certain effect. It does
not and can not endeavour to explain, to analyse condi-
tions so as to present a cause as also a reason. It does
not compare different modes of procedure or different
groups of circumstances, so as to contradistinguish the
precise points in which they agree from those in which
they disagree, and in this way to explain why a certain
result should follow in one case and a different result
in another case. Causality in this sense can only exist
for the ideational consciousness, and the development of
the ideational consciousness in this direction is a de-
velopment of conceptual thinking, of generalisation.
What corresponds on the perceptual level to Kant's
category of Substance is a category which I can only
describe as that of Thinghood. In considering it
we must lay aside the notions which connect them-
selves with the scientific view of substance as a stuff or
material which persists and passes into various forms
and combinations without increase or diminution of
quantity. We must rather think of that unity and
identity, and independence, which characterises what
in ordinary practical life we call a "thing." A thing
is a portion of matter which is apprehended as identi-
cal with itself and distinct from all else under its vary-
ing aspects and throughout its varying changes of state.
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This distinctness and unity depend on distinctness
and unity of interest. Thus different sensible qualities
as severally presented to touch, sight, hearing, etc., are
united in one thing because they have unity of interest,
and on the perceptual level this interest is purely prac-
tical. The practical Interest lies in the power of the
subject to act on the thing, and of the thing to act on
the subject. But in all such activity the different
senses co-operate so that the experiences they yield
form part of one continuous whole. The visual ap-
pearance of the thing serves as a guide to the move-
ments which lead to contact. Tactual and visual ex-
tension correspond point for point, and the practical
value of the visual appearance lies in this correspond-
ence. There is a similar practical relation between
sounds or smells proceeding from an object, and its
space-relations as presented to sight and touch. By
approaching the object the sounds and smells become
intensified. Action on the object, though initially
prompted by sound or smell, must by guided by sight
and touch. In this way an object comes to exist for
perceptual consciousness as the same in its diverse
appearances to different senses. But this, so to speak,
only accounts for the stuff of which things are made ;
it does not account for the division of this material
into separate things. We have therefore to inquire
why this or that group of sensible qualities is separated
from its surroundings and treated as one thing. For
ordinary common sense the world is mapped out into a
plurality of these relatively independent units. Each
of them emerges from its environment like an island
from the sea. It is detached from its surroundings by
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its separateness and unity of interest. This interest is
ordinarily of a practical kind ; and the further we trace
back the course of human development the more exclu-
sively practical it becomes. It is true that for our high-
ly complex consciousness the form of Thinghood has
become very variable and fluctuating in its application.
A stone is a single thing to a boy about to fling it at
another boy. To the geologist examining its structure
it may be several distinct things. It is nearly always
possible to mentally break up what appears as one ob-
ject into parts each of which has an identity and dis-
tinctness of its own. But we only do so in so far as
the interest of the moment leads us to do it. The rela-
tivity and variability of our application of the category
of Thinghood depends on this fluctuation of interest.
In general however the division of the world into sepa-
rate things is determined by more or less permanent
and common interests of a practical nature. Thus if I
were asked what things are in a room in which I hap-
pen to be lecturing I should say there was a blackboard,
a desk, and so on. I should not begin to enumerate the
dints and scratches on the blackboard, or the different
planks in the flooring. I should be still less likely to
mentally divide the uniform surface of the blackboard
into different compartments and count each of these as
a distinct thing. I should not do this unless I had a
special interest to serve.
In more primitive stages of mental development,
human interests are at once more exclusively practical
in their nature and more limited in their range and less
fluctuating. Hence for primitive man the division of
the external world into separate units called things is
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more fixed and absolute. But the limit in this direc-
tion is reached in the perceptual consciousness. Ani-
mals distinguish from its environment and treat as a
separate thing whatever portion of matter appeals to
their peculiar instincts and affords occasion for their
characteristic modes of activity. Thus what is a sepa-
rate thing for one animal is not so for another. The
interests of each species are to a very large extent de-
termined by the connate pre-dispositions which belong
to it like other specific characters. What possesses
unity and distinctness of interest to an ant is nothing
to the cat, and so on.
There are however also more general conditions
under which a thing may detach itself from its environ-
ment and become a separate centre of interest for the
animal consciousness. Thus it may be a source of
peculiarly intense sensations, or it may move in an ob-
trusive manner. Moving objects have a peculiar power
of attracting attention. This is partly because the
sensory experience which they produce is more intense
than that produced by things at rest. But the chief
reason is that a thing which moves in an obtrusive way,
challenges practical adjustment. There is need to run
away from it, or at any rate keep a watch on it ; for no
one knows what it may do.
In general, whatever appears to the perceptual con-
sciousness as separate is so because it is a centre of
practical interest. It is capable, in its relation to the
percipient, of acting independently and as a whole or
of being acted on independently and as a whole. Thus
Thinghood as a perceptual category is, like causality,
purely and immediately practical. Like causality it is
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a constitutive form of cognition only because it is a
constitutive form of action. And just as the perceptual
consciousness is incapable of inquiring how or why a
certain cause produces a certain effect, so it is inca-
pable of inquiring how or why a thing possesses its
unity and independence and its peculiar modes of
behaviour. For the perceptual consciousness individ-
uality is unanalysed and unexplained, unanalysable
and unexplainable. In this respect the perceptual
consciousness stands at the one extreme, and modern
science at the opposite extreme. Modern science ex-
plains things till it appears almost to explain them
away. It would do so altogether if it could. It ob-
literates the lines of demarcation drawn by common
sense
;
it seeks to dissolve the self-subsistent units of
common sense, and exhibits them as mere modes or
phases of one continuous process embracing the whole
material world. It must indeed have distinct units of
its own to serve as centres of action and reaction. But
the ultimate units which it seeks for and more or less
succeeds in finding are merely vehicles of the applica-
tion of abstract and universal laws, without intrinsic
character or quality of their own. It is the ideal of
science to exhibit the internal unity and the distinctive
behaviour of individual things as mere resultants of the
complex interaction of these characterless units. For
the perceptual consciousness, as we have seen, the ex-
treme opposite is true. The unity and distinctive be-
haviour of the individual thing is for it unconditional
and ultimate. For primitive human thinking it is also
in a large measure unconditional and ultimate. The
tendency of the primitive man is rather to use the unity
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of the individual as a principle of explanation than to
regard it as something to be explained. Herein lies, as
we shall see in the sequel, a most important clue to the
nature and origin of primitive beliefs, magical, mytho-
logical and religious.
CHAPTER II.
PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL REALITY.
ALL animals whose conscious processes rise above the
level of the sensation-reflex must have some kind of ap-
prehension of physical reality. It may be very rudi-
mentary, and it may differ very much in its specific
nature from our own perception of the external world,
But there must exist for them some difference between
experience so far as it merely involves their own chang-
ing states, and experience so far as it involves the pres-
ence and operation of external objects. The very con-
ditions of their existence, from a purely biological point
of view, render necessary a different mode of behaviour,
according as the processes occurring in their nervous
system are or are not due to the present operation of
agencies external to their own organism.
I say external to their organism. The Self at this
stage in the development of mental life is an embodied
Self. The distinction between the pure stream of con-
scious experience and the body with which it is con-
nected is a late product of psychical evolution. But
there is a subtlety involved here which must be care-
fully noted. The body is directly identified with the
Self only in so far as it is the instrument of sense-per-
ception. But one part of the body may be perceived by
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another part ; the eye may look at the hand ; in this case
the hand as seen belongs pro tanto to the Not-Self; the
eye, as instrument of perception, to the Self.
There are, as a matter of fact, two groups of experi-
ences originating in different ways which we from our
own point of view can clearly distinguish in the case of
any animal which has to maintain its existence by per-
ceptual adaptation to its environment. On the one
hand, there are all kinds of organic sensations and ap-
petites and active impulses and emotions which are
relatively independent of external impressions on the
organism. Their specific nature does not correspond
in any definite manner with the specific nature of ex-
ternal agencies affecting the senses, and they may orig-
inate quite apart from the operation of such agencies.
On the other hand, there is the stream of special sen-
sations produced by external conditions, and varying
from moment to moment as these conditions vary.
We from our point of view can easily draw this
distinction. The problem for the psychologist is to
inquire how the distinction manifests itself in the ex-
periences of the percipient subject. The essence of
the answer lies in the different relation of the two
groups of experiences to motor activity. The sensa-
tions which vary in a specific or definite manner with
the operation of external agencies, also vary continually
with the movements of the animal itself. Visual sensa-
tions alter as the eye is moved j tactual sensations as
the hand is moved.
The animal's movements alter its spatial relations to
the things which surround it; and in this way deter-
mine, to a large extent, the nature and intensity of the
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impressions which it receives from its environment.
But experiences occurring independently of the present
operation of any external stimulus are unaffected by
the changing position of the organism and its parts in
relation to surrounding objects. The hungry animal
carries its hunger about with it, and the wounded ani-
mal carries its wound about with it.
Our first result, then, is that the presentation of ex-
ternal objects arises in connexion with those experi-
ences which vary with the changing position of the
organism and its parts. It arises in connexion with
experiences which are dependent on motor activity.
But this result is not final. It only serves to bring
us to the threshold of our inquiry. For it turns out
on closer examination that in so far as an experience
is merely dependent on motor activity it is not a pres-
entation of an external object. If I walk towards an
object, the visual sensation which it produces changes;
it changes precisely as it would change if I had re-
mained still and, instead of my moving, the object
itself had moved towards me or had increased in size.
But the change being produced by my own movement
the object itself is not apprehended by me as moving
or becoming larger. Similarly, if I get up from my
chair I do not apprehend this as a movement on the
part of the chair, but the case is different if the chair
gives way under me. An animal, if it acted as if
changes purely due to its own changing position were
due to change in things themselves, would inevitably
perish. So far as they depend merely on the changing
positions and movements of the organism, they do not
correspond to external conditions, and cannot therefore
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determine actions effectively adapted to these conditions.
Just so far as they are due to the animal itself and not
to its environment, they must be useless as determin-
ants of the actual course of practical activity. There is
a libellous story about the ostrich burying its head in the
sand on the approach of danger, and resting satisfied
with this sage precaution. To behave in this manner
would be to behave as if the mere disappearance of an
object from sight were equivalent to its actual removal.
This is so only in case the conditions are such that, if
it were present, it would be seen. The closure of the
eyes, or the burying of the head in the sand, makes no
difference in the external conditions
;
the consequent
discontinuance of impressions arising from the danger-
ous object is merely a self-initiated change without
practical significance.
We appear to have involved ourselves in paradox.
On the one hand the presentation of external ob-
jects occurs only through those experiences which
vary with the motor activity of the subject : on the
other hand, the presentation of external objects oc-
curs only through experiences which are independent
of the motor activity of the subject. This seems a
plain contradiction. But the inconsistency disappears
when we consider that the kinds of experience which
vary with our own movements may also vary in par-
tial or complete independence of these movements.
Thus the contradiction is removed, as many appar-
ent contradictions are
;
the contradiction is present
when we assert that A is at once B and not-B;
it disappears when we say that A is partly JB and
partly not-B. The change in visual sensation, which
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occurs when we approach an object, may also occur
when it approaches us ; only in the second case does
it constitute presentation of movement on the part
of the object. In this simple instance the contrast
may without serious inaccuracy be regarded as a con-
trast between change which is exclusively due to the
animal's own activity and change in other respects
similar which occurs in the absence of such activity.
But for the most part the antithesis is of a subtler kind.
The two factors co-operate so that the resulting change
in part depends, and in part does not depend, on the
varying position and movements of the organism. A
given movement may always give rise to altered impres-
sions from surrounding things. But the specific nature
of the change is not entirely determined by the specific
nature of the movements. On the contrary, the same
movement yields varying results under varying circum-
stances. Opening of the eyes permits access to the
light, but it does not determine the special nature of
the optical stimulation received. Movement of the eye
in a certain direction produces a sequence of optical
impressions, but it does not determine what the im-
pressions shall be which succeed each other, or in what
order they shall occur. Similarly, the initiation of
movement or of effort to move depends on the animal ;
but various and fluctuating external conditions deter-
mine whether a movement in a given direction shall be
free or impeded, and if it is impeded what kind and
degree of resistance it shall encounter. If the same
motor activity always produced the same effect, there
would be no such thing as adaptation to environment:
the phrase would be meaningless. We may imagine
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the case of an animal able to command all the external
conditions affecting its nervous system purely by its
own initiative, so as to obtain any impression on any
occasion merely by a suitable innervation of its mus-
cles. Specific olfactory, optical, tactile, and other
stimulations of the organs of sense would then be free-
ly producible in the same manner as the specific im-
pressions arising from the changing states of muscles,
joints, and tendons, which accompany movements of
the body and limbs. A certain mode of sniffing would
always yield the smell of roses, and a certain movement
of the eye would always yield the sight of roses, and so
forth. Similarly, we may suppose that want of food or
drink could be satisfied by merely going through the
formal motions of eating and drinking, as at the ban-
quet of the Barmecide in the Arabian Nights. Evi-
dently, for such a creature as we have imagined, the
external world would be virtually non-existent. Such
a creature would be a world complete in itself.
Our general result is as follows : (1) The presentation
of external objects takes place through those experiences
to which the subject must adapt itself if its action is to be
efficient for the attainment of practical ends. (2) These
experiences which correspond to external conditions and
make possible practical adjustment must be of a kind
which vary concomitantly with the movements of the
animal. (3) But they must only do so in part. They
yield effective guidance only in so far as they actually
occur partially in independence of the movements of
the animal. In other words, an external world exists
for the animal only in so far as the same movement
may give rise to different consequences, or different
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movements to the same consequences. We have now
to apply this general principle to a special case of para-
mount importance. In general, the action which sub-
serves the primary ends of animal life is effective only
if and so far as it consists in or prepares the way for
what we may call the direct manipulation of objects.
It is difficult to find a better word; but it should be
clearly understood tha when we say manipulation
we imply no exclusive reference to the hand. What is
meant is all alteration or endeavour to alter the posi-
tion, shape, arrangement, etc., of things, by direct put-
ting forth of effort against resistance. All pulling,
pressing, rending, tearing, combining, separating,
breaking, bending, crushing, moulding, and the like,
are included under this conception. It is obvious that
in all such operations what lies in the power of the
agent is only to make efforts in certain directions and
in a certain order. The result varies with the nature
of the material manipulated. To be effective the
course of action must be constantly guided by varying
experiences corresponding to the varying nature of the
material. Now the paramount practical importance of
the actual manipulation of objects constitutes it the
ultimate and dominant test of what is physically real
and what is not. The real size or shape of a thing is
its size or shape so far as it has a practical bearing on
actual manipulation. A man at a distance may look as
small as a doll on the table
;
but he is not really so
small, because if I went out and tried to pick him up
and bring him away, I should not succeed. So the
real size of a hole to an animal is essentially deter-
mined by reference to such questions as whether it can
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creep into the hole or not. This point is simple and
obvious when once stated, but it is of the greatest im-
portance for the whole psychology of perception.
We may now sum up. Perception of physical reality
always arises in essential connexion with the experi-
ence of active movement. But the connexion is one of
antithesis or contrast. Experience of active movement
is not, as such, a presentation of external object. Only
so far as the motor activity is limited or circumscribed
in the attainment of the ends of animal life by varying
conditions, is physical reality apprehended. The ex-
periences which determine the adjustment of active
movement to these conditions are, as such, presentations
of the Not-Self, or external object. In the actual course
of practical activity attention in the form of watching,
searching, scrutinising, and the like, must be directed
predominantly, if not wholly, to the external object.
Only those experiences which determine adjustment
have an objective reference. All else is ignored by
attention. The psychological correlate of inter-organic
disturbance of the nervous system consists in animal
appetites, emotions, instinctive impulses, and the like.
These are merely changing states of the Self. In a
sense they may be called passive, inasmuch as they
arise and persist independently of the effects of motor
activity. But in another and more important sense they
are essentially active, inasmuch as they constitute the
primary impulses or tendencies in which motor activity
has its source. They do not of themselves contain any
special contents of consciousness distinctive of external
objects. In the actual course of practical activity they
do not by their specific quality enable attention to dis-
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criminate the conditions to which active movement
must adjust itself. On the other hand, as being the
source of activity, they constitute the interest which
keeps attention alive and at work.
The case is different in the intervals of practical
activity. Here attention not being pre-occupied by
external object may be directed to the Self and its
states. The hungry lion deprived of the opportunity
of satisfying its hunger, may attend to the hunger it-
self, instead of to its prey, and the like. It is very im-
portant, however, to note that in all primitive percep-
tion of the Self, it is not what is called the pure Self
which is presented, but always the embodied Self. In
other words, the apprehension of Self is always bound
up with the apprehension of a particular external ob-
ject. For the bodily organism has a two-fold nature.
On the one hand it behaves just as other external ob-
jects do. One hand can perceive and explore the
other hand, or the eyes can perceive and explore other
parts of the body, just as eye or hand can perceive or
explore external bodies. If we select one sentient
portion of the organism, the rest may be regarded as
external object to it. So far the body is an external
thing. On the other hand, the body as a vehicle of
active movement and of sense-perception, and the body
in its peculiar and intimate relation to organic sensa-
tions, appetites, etc., belongs to the Self. Thus an
animal's perception of its own organism constitutes a
connecting link between the perception of Self and
Not-Self.
CHAPTER III.
SPATIAL PERCEPTION IX GENERAL.
1. Nature of the Problem. We have to inquire
how the spatial perception develops from indefinite and
imperfect to more definite and perfect forms. We
have then to consider whether the same conditions
which determine its development may not also explain
its first origin. To begin with, our inquiry must be
limited to the perception of extension, strictly so called.
This is a narrower inquiry than that concerning space
in general. Sound and smell have spatial determina-
tions. We speak of their direction and distance. But
they are not extended. Extension is a continuous ex-
panse composed of positions separated and connected
by distances. Now sound and smell are never spread
out in this way into an expanse composed of audible or
odorous positions separated and connected by audible
or odorous distances. Objects are extended only as
presented to sight and touch. Our primary concern is
therefore with these senses.
2. Analysis of Extension. If we consider ex-
tension as it is presented to the developed conscious-
ness, we find in it two constituents, a material and a
formal. The formal constituent consists in the rela-
tions of the parts of an extended whole in the way of
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position and distance. But position and distance must
be position and distance of something : and this some-
thing is the material constituent. It is plain that the
mere conception of position and distance is not suf-
ficient to constitute the conception of an extended
whole. For these determinations are found apart from
extension. They are found in merely qualitative series,
such as those in which colour sensations may be ar-
ranged. For instance, in the series of intermediate
gradations connecting pure blue and pure green, any
blue-green or green-blue has a definite position, and a
definite distance from other blue-greens or green-blues.
If we select the interval between one blue-green and
another as a unit, we may measure the distance be-
tween any positions in the scale in terms of this unit.
But this series of qualitative gradations is not a line
in space : it does not depend on the juxtaposition of
the colours, but only on their differences and likenesses
as revealed to attentive comparison. It may be repre-
sented as a line in space, but only by analogy. In itself,
it has no distinctively spatial character. What fixes the
position of any special colour in the series is its own in-
trinsic quality. But in an extended whole, qua extended,
this is not the case. If we ask why a point in an ex-
tended whole has a certain position, we cannot find the
answer by considering the intrinsic sensible quality of
the point itself, and by comparing it with the intrinsic
sensible qualities of other points. Since position and
distance do not constitute the whole of our conception
of space, we must ask what is left when we think away
these determinations. In the case of the colour-series
Che answer to this question would be easy. If we
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cease to arrange the colours in a series, each of them
none the less retains unaffected its own intrinsic qual-
ity. In the case of an extended whole the answer
must be partially similar. Its parts are distinguishable,
and capable of being added and subtracted. There
must therefore be some qualitative difference by which
they are distinguished. This difference is commonly
called a difference of local sign. Local signature is
that differential quality of sensation which varies with
the part of the sensitive surface stimulated and not
with the nature of the stimulus. There must be some
qualitative difference between a contact affecting the
tip of the nose, and one affecting the big toe. Other-
wise we could not with our eyes shut tell when the one
and when the other was touched. It is sometimes said
that this difference may be due to association. But
this is impossible, because unless the qualities of con-
tact n and contact t were different, association with
n would be the same as association with t. t would
tend to reproduce whatever n tended to reproduce,
and there would be no distinction between them.
We may therefore affirm that there is a difference in
the quality of sensation according to the point of the
tactile surface affected, and we must assume the same
for the surface of the retina.* But two points must be
carefully noted which distinguish this difference of lo-
cal sign from other qualitative differences. In the first
place, it does not depend on the nature of the stimulus
applied, but only on the part of the sensitive surface
affected. Difference of local signature cannot there-
* It is difficult to determine the physiqlogical conditions of local
signature. They are probably rather central than peripheral.
2.] SPATIAL PERCEPTION. 333
fore be classed with the ordinary differences of colour
and tactile sensations. The local sign of a visual sen-
sation is not a colour-quality such as red, green, white
or black, and that of a tactile sensation is not a touch
quality, such as roughness, smoothness, and the like.
This brings us to the second point. Local sign differ-
ences exist unaffected, whether the sensitive surface is
stimulated in a uniform manner or not. A uniform ex-
panse of white or blue is still an expanse and contains
local differences in spite of the sameness of the colouring.
Local sign qualities differ from the qualities of the
special senses inasmuch as they are not discrete and in-
dependent. They unite in one continuous total im-
pression, forming a kind of quantity called extensive
quantity or simply extensity. "Suppose," says Dr.
Ward, " a postage stamp pasted on the back of the
hand; we have in consequence a certain sensation. If
another be added beside it, the new experience would
not be adequately described by merely saying we have
a greater quantity of sensation, for intensity involves
quantity, and increased intensity is not what is meant.
For a sensation of a certain intensity, say a sensation
of red, cannot be changed into one having two qual-
ities, red and blue, leaving the intensity unchanged;
but with extensity this change is possible. For one
of the postage stamps a piece of wet cloth of the same
size might be substituted and the massiveness of the
compound sensation remain very much the same."*
Now the two postage stamps in this instance present
to the touch an object which has not only extensity but
* Article "Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edition,
xx., p. 54.
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extension. One stamp lies to the right or to the left of
the other. A certain shape is presented, and within the
whole we can distinguish distance, direction, and posi-
tion. But we must abstract from all these determina-
tions, and consider only the quantitative difference be-
tween the one postage stamp and the two. If we fix
our attention purely on the quantitative aspect, we are
considering extensity as distinguished from extension.
3.
^Extensity. So far we have only attempted to
show that extensity is a constituent of the fully devel-
oped percept of extension, and can be distinguished in
it by analysis. The next question is whether exten-
sity is not merely distinguishable, but actually separable
from extension. Is there such a thing as an extensive
quantum in which local sign differences are not dis-
tinguished by positions separated and connected by
distances ? Can the quantitative aspect of space exist
without a spatial order ? The answer is that though it
is perhaps not possible to give examples of absolutely
pure extensity, we can nevertheless exhibit many ap-
proximations to it. We can point to sensible experi-
ences which have extensive diffusion with a relatively
vague spatial arrangement.
The first set of examples is supplied by experiments
on tactile sensibility. If the skin receives two puncti-
form impressions, such as those produced by the points
of two needles, or of the legs of a pair of compasses, it
is found, as Weber first showed, that the points must be
at a certain distance apart, if the two impressions are
to be distinguished.* At less than this distance only one
* The distance varies with the part of the skin affected. " In general,
it is finest in those regions, as the fingers and lips, which are known by
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continuous tactile impression is felt. It might be sup-
posed that this is due to an absence of any local sign
differences in the sensation : but the facts prove that
this is not the case. Even when the two points are
not discriminated, the sensation is often recognised as
having a certain indefinite diffusion ; and this may even
happen when only one point is used. It is also found
that the power of discrimination varies greatly accord-
ing as the impressions are applied successively or
simultaneously. When one needle point is removed be-
fore another is applied, the two contacts can be dis-
tinguished at a very much smaller distance than when
they occur simultaneously. This shows that they may
be simultaneously applied without being distinguished,
although the sensation they produce contains a com-
plexity of local sign differences. The local sign dif-
ferences unite in one continuous extensive quantum,
without internal distinction of position, direction, and
distance. When the needle points are successively
applied, they may be distinguished without their rela-
tive position being apprehended. For apprehension of
their relative position or direction they must be a cer-
tain distance apart. The experiment may be further
varied by applying one needle and afterwards applying
the other without removing the first. In this case, they
must be somewhat further apart to be distinguished.
But what most interests us is that the application of
the second point is sometimes only recognised as pro-
ducing a blunter or more diffuse contact. Finally, the
every-day observation to have high tactual sensibility. It is much finer
in the mobile parts, hands, feet, and lips, than in the comparatively fixed
parts (the trunk). It is about twice as fine on the anterior as on the pos-
terior surface of the fingers." (Sully, The Human Mind, vol. i., p. 106.)
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skin may be stimulated by continuous lines such as the
edge of a strip of cardboard, instead of by separate
points. It is found that this linear impression can be
distinguished from a punctiform impression when its
end-points are separated by a much smaller distance
than what is required for discriminating two separate
points simultaneously applied. The linear impression
does not give rise to the impression of a line unless its
end-points are a certain distance apart ; at shorter dis-
tances the experience is merely one of indefinite dif-
fusion. Longitudinal direction gradually comes to be
perceived as the linear impression is lengthened : but
in this process the line is apprehended as such before
its direction is apprehended.*
It thus appears that in these experiments on tactile
sensibility we have all kinds of gradations between pure
extensity and fully definite extension. If we turn from
touch to sight, there is more difficulty in exhibiting in-
termediate stages of this kind, because the optical per-
ception of space is far more completely developed in
the adult consciousness than the tactile. But there is
a marked distinction in this respect between the cen-
tral parts of the field of vision and its margin. There
is an outer zone of dim imagery which has extensive
diffusion, but a comparatively vague spatial order.
This is best seen in the gray field which is presented
when the eyes are closed. The edges of this field have
no definite outline. It is impossible to assign its shape.
But perhaps the best example is supplied when one eye
is kept open in a fairly strong light, and the other closed.
* " Ueber die Wahrnehmung zweier Punkte mittelst des Tastsinnes,
etc." Von G. A. Tawney. Philosophische Studien, Band xiii., 2, Heft.
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A diffused blackness is presented to the closed eye, but
its partial determinations are of the vaguest kind.
Typical cases of extensive diffuseness or massiveness
are afforded by organic sensations. Professor James
speaks of the "vast discomfort of a colic or a lum-
bago."* Let us consider such a sensation as that of
hunger or of stomach-ache. This is spatial in so far as
it is localised in a certain portion of the body, but it is
almost entirely without internal spatial arrangement.
We do not distinguish in it points of hunger having
definite relations of position to each other, points of
hunger separated and connected by hunger-distances.
At any rate, if we do so at all it is in the very vaguest
way. But there is no doubt that the hunger has exten-
sive quantity. It is, as James says, "voluminous or
massive."
It is also sometimes urged that the other special
senses, such as sound or smell, have an extensive char-
acter. " The reverberations of a thunder-storm," says
James, " are more voluminous than the squeaking of a
slate-pencil." f But this voluminousness is not a purely
auditory experience. It is urged with some show of
reason that the extensity belongs not to the sound as
such, but to accompanying tactile sensation due to vi-
brations of the tympanum, and of the external ear, and
to similar conditions. However this may be, the fact
remains that the voluminousness is present, and that it
has no distinctively spatial character, no internal order
of positions and distances.
4. Active Movement. Extensity, in order to be-
come extension, must assume more or less definite order
* Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 134. t Ibid.
Psych. 22
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of parts. How is this acquired ? The serial arrange-
ment of colours in a qualitative scale is directly based
on the intrinsic quality of the colours themselves, and
it is obtained by deliberate comparison of these quali-
ties. The arrangement into positions and distances
which constitutes extension is not arrived at in this
way. We cannot take local sign qualities obtained by
stimulating different parts of the body, and arrange
them by comparison in a qualitative scale. Indeed it
is probable that there is less difference between the
local signatures of corresponding parts of the two
hands, than there is between sensation in the finger-
tips and sensation on the back of the hand. In order
to account for spatial order, we must have recourse to
some factor distinct altogether from extensity. This
factor must show definite serial arrangement in the way
of position and distance. It must also be so intimately
connected with experiences of extensity that the defi-
nite arrangements which belong to it may be transferred
to them : for it is not enough to have a pure experience
of extensity externally conjoined with another expe-
rience showing a definite order of positions and dis-
tances. Position and distance must come to belong to
the extensity itself.
Now the only factor which fulfils these conditions is
movement, and, in particular, active movement of the
eyes or hands. In any movement of the limbs or of
the body as a whole, a series of varying sensations
arises, due to the changing conditions of muscles,
joints, and tendons. Following Dr. Ward, we may
symbolise such a series as Pl P2 Ps P. " PI cannot
be presented along with Pz and from P it is impos-
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sible to reach Pl again save through P3 and P2 "* or
through some other determinate motor series. These
motor experiences have therefore a definite arrange-
ment. Pz lies between Pl and Ps . P2 and P3 consti-
tute a distance separating and connecting P1 and jP4 .
Further, if the movement is not merely made in free
space, but explores the contours of some object, there
is another concomitant and corresponding series having
definite arrangement. Suppose the instrument of ex-
ploration is the hand. As the finger-tips pass from one
part of the object to another, there is a series of tac-
tile experiences having a definite order, and varying
concomitantly with the sensations arising from muscle,
joint, and tendon. If the object explored is part of
the cutaneous surface of the body itself, there is still
another definitely ordered series. As the finger-tip
passes along the palm of the other hand, the contact is
felt not only in the finger but in the hand explored.
The successive stimulation of the parts of the hand
yields a succession of local sign experiences which
occur in a fixed order, and correspond to the succession
of motor experiences. All these series have a definite
arrangement of positions and distances : but the ar-
rangement is not spatial. It is purely an order of time-
sequence. Extension can only exist when the definite
order is the order of the parts of an extensive quantum
simultaneously presented.
It is essential to the possibility of this that the
experience of extensity and the experience of active
movement should enter as co-operative factors into a
* Article "Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edition,
XX., p. 54.
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process having unity and continuity of interest. A
process having unity and continuity of interest leaves
behind it as a whole a total disposition, a disposition
to which each and all of its component factors in their
conjoint interaction have contributed. This cumula-
tive disposition is re-excited as a whole when the pro-
cess is repeated in part. In this way the factors which
enter into the process may become profoundly modified
by their previous combination, so that each separately
assumes a character which it has acquired from its com-
bination with the others. It comes to mean or stand
for the others. When an extensive experience has
come to mean or stand for a system of active move-
ments, the extensive experience has become a percep-
tion of extension. If, on clasping an object in the
hand, you know at once how to make a systematic ex-
ploration of its parts, so that you will have nothing to
learn by actually executing exploring movements, then
you have an adequate perception of its shape and other
spatial determinations. If, on the other hand, mere
contact with the object does not fully supply precise
and definite guidance to the movements of exploration,
the spatial perception is pro tanto inadequate. When
the perception is adequate, any two local signs or any
group of local signs prompts at once the appropriate
movements for passing from part to part of the object.
Extensity which has thus acquired meaning is no longer
mere extensity, but a continuous complex of positions
and distances. Just as the passive touch acquires in this
way a properly spatial significance, so the active touch
which is at first a purely successive series, also acquires
a spatial character. As the finger-tips pass over an
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object, the successive tactile experiences do not present
themselves as merely a time-sequence. They become
for consciousness the successive presentation of a whole
of co-existent parts.
Extensity and active movement must, as we have
said, be combined as essential factors in processes
having continuity of interest : otherwise they could not
modify each other in the way described. Their con-
joint operation must leave behind it a total disposition
which is the cumulative after-effect of the whole pro-
cess into which they enter. Each, when it occurs
separately, will occur modified by its previous con-
junction with the other, because it will re-excite the
total disposition due to their conjoint operation. Now,
if we inquire what the appetitive processes are into
which extensity and active movement enter as co-oper-
ative factors, we may answer by referring to all the
primitive activities by which the ends of animal life
are secured. Such practical activity can only be effect-
ive in so far as active movement is delicately adjusted
to the shape, size, distance, etc., of objects. The guid-
ing clues to such motor adjustment can only be found
in touch- and sight-experiences. But just in so far as
the touch- or sight-experiences either originally possess
or subsequently acquire the power of guiding active
movement, they are or become perceptions of spatial
order.
We have now at once to explain and to justify these
general statements by an account of the special condi-
tions by which the development of (1) the tactual, (2) the
visual, perceptions of space is determined.
CHAPTER IV.
SPATIAL PERCEPTION BY TOUCH.
1. Spatial Perception of the Blind. The exist-
ence of blind persons enables us to study touch-space
dissevered from sight-space. But it is essential for this
that the blind persons should either be blind from their
birth, or have lost their sight in the first year of their
lives
;
and also that they should retain no trace of sen-
sibility to light or colour.* Those who have become
blind in their fourth year translate their tactile impres-
sions into visual imagery as we ourselves do in the
dark.
The chief instrument used by the blind in perceiving
the shape and size of objects is the hand, or rather the
two hands. These are used in a two-fold way. (1) The
hand, either open or closed, may touch simultane-
ously the parts of the object. This may be called pas-
sive touch, because it does not involve active movement
from one part of an object to another. It may also be
called synthetic touch, because it yields a total simulta-
neous impression of all or many parts of the object.
(2) A portion of the hand, such as the finger-tips, may
explore the parts and contours of the object by grad-
* The facts adduced in this section are almost entirely due to Theodor
Heller's most valuable " Studien zur Blinden-Psychologie
" in the Philo-
sophische Studien, xi., 1895, pp. 226, 406, 531.
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ually moving over them. This may be called active
touch, because it essentially consists in active move-
ment. It may also be called analytic touch, because it
analyses or breaks up into a series of successive impres-
sions what synthetic touch presents as a simultaneous
whole. Now the main lesson that we learn from study
of the blind is that all development in the definiteness
of the perception of spatial order is essentially due to
the intimate union and co-operation of synthetic and
analytic touch. It must be understood that the obser-
vations and experiments on which we rely are all made
on blind persons who have already acquired consider-
able experience. Their spatial perception is therefore
at the outset developed in a large measure. What we
can observe therefore is only the process by which
greater precision and accuracy are acquired. It is for-
tunate for psychological purposes that spatial percep-
tion by touch does not reach full maturity with nearly
the same rapidity as spatial perception by sight. Hence,
even in the adult blind, it is possible to observe it in the
process of growth. The first question with which we
have to deal is, What information concerning shape and
other spatial determinations is conveyed by synthetic
touch apart from analytic ? Of course, we cannot bring
synthetic touch into play in absolute severance from
analytic, for the blind have already had considerable
experience in the exploration of objects and especially
of their own bodies. In the case of simple and familiar
things which they have already often explored by
active touch, they can at once recognise shape, size,
etc., by merely passive contact. But when objects are
presented to them with which they are quite unfamiliar,
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it is found that for precise apprehension analytic touch
must be combined with synthetic. Synthetic touch
alone without the aid of previous experience yields at
the most a general and schematic total impression. For
instance, they can tell whether the object is round or
angular, and whether it is regular or irregular. But
for more precise determination of its shape, analytic
movements are required. It is particularly noteworthy
that the blind are almost incapable of confining them-
selves to purely synthetic touch when the object is at
all unfamiliar. Involuntary twitchings of the hand
occur which they find it difficult or impossible to sup-
press.
In the active exploration of objects there is a great
difference in the method of procedure in different per-
sons, and in different stages of development of the same
person. The more highly the spatial perception has
been developed, the more systematic and appropriate
are the movements and their combination. At the
highest stage the blind use a plan of procedure identical
in its main features in different individuals. This is
sometimes acquired in early childhood where the con-
ditions are favourable. If the blind have to work with
their hands, they always acquire the power of appre-
hending simple spatial relations. On the other hand,
adults of otherwise good intelligence, who have not
been compelled to acquire control over objects by pres-
sure of practical needs, often show great helplessness,
and do not appear to have any interest in spatial rela-
tions. In such cases, a special education of perceptual
activity is required for adequate apprehension of the
shape of objects. As education advances, the blind
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person becomes more and more capable of determining
the size and shape of objects presented to him. At the
same time, his active movements of exploration show a
more and more systematic and purposeful character.
In higher stages of development the process of
analytic touch takes a form such as the following. One
hand holds the object in position, and turns it so that
it may be conveniently explored by the other. Finger
and thumb are the instruments of exploration, and they
are used simultaneously. The finger glides along one
contour of the object, and the thumb along an opposite
contour. The varying distance of finger and thumb, as
they proceed from their starting-point, measures and
determines the distance and direction of the boundary
lines. If finger and thumb retain the same relative
position, the boundary lines are parallel ; if they move
apart, the boundary lines are divergent; if they ap-
proach each other, the boundary lines are convergent.
Many blind persons have wonderful power of discrim-
inating distance in this way. They can, for example,
determine the various thickness of different kinds of
paper. When in this process of analytic exploration
the object is pushed backwards till it touches the sur-
face of the hand, analytic touch passes into synthetic.
The two hands sometimes interchange functions, and at
intervals synthetic touch intervenes, the object being
clasped and pressed. As a rule, synthetic touch comes
first, and introduces analytic. All active exploration is
brought into connexion with the total presentation of
the object, as it exists for passive touch. The more
practised a blind person is in the apprehension of the
configuration of bodies, the more rapid and sketchy are
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the active movements necessary for adequate percep-
tion. Indeed, all the facts show that neither active nor
passive touch alone suffices. The perception of spatial
order is a product of their union and interaction. This
co-operation of synthetic and analytic touch is possible
only for objects small enough to be taken in the hand,
or at least in both hands. Larger objects cannot be
apprehended as a whole by synthetic touch. Active
movement, it would seem, must in these cases be the
main resource. But this is not quite true. The blind
person can often measure the dimensions of the object
by the dimensions of his own body, comparing, for in-
stance, its height with his own height.* The signifi-
cance of analytic touch as applied to larger objects de-
pends upon the significance which it has acquired in
co-operation with synthetic touch. Large numbers of
blind persons are unable to acquire precise spatial ap-
prehension of those objects which cannot be immediate-
ly clasped by the hand. This inability manifests itself
in their movements of active touch, which are for the
most part limited to the discovery of some striking and
distinctive feature of the object which can serve as a
sign of it. But it is often possible to induce these per-
sons to undertake a systematic exploration of larger
objects in the way of active movement, by putting
before them models of these objects on a reduced scale.
They are thus prompted to compare originals and
copies. Afterwards they freely apply the system of
movements thus acquired to all objects which require
and admit of them. As in the active exploration of
* We shall presently have to consider the conditions under which the
spatial relations of the body itself come to be presented.
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small objects the convergence and divergence of thumb
and finger play a prominent part, so in the exploration
of larger objects, the convergence and divergence of
the two arms is of the greatest value. There is a link
of connexion between these two methods, inasmuch as
it is possible to use either of the two methods for
smaller objects. A thing may either be taken between
the opposing thumb and finger-tip or between the op-
posing fingers of the two hands.
So far, we have dealt with the exploration of com-
paratively limited spaces. We have kept within what
may be called the touch horizon. This is very much
more restricted than the visual horizon. Its utmost
limit is the space that can be embraced by the out-
stretched arms. Larger spaces than these can only be
explored by locomotion of the whole body, in which ex-
tension previously presented is completely left behind.
We thus have a series of fragmentary presentations.
For fully precise spatial apprehension these must be
gathered together into a single simultaneously presented
whole. It is conceivable that this might be effected by
ideal reproduction of the parts not immediately per-
ceived. To a certain extent the blind may actually
proceed in this way. But they can only do so by re-
producing the whole on a reduced scale. The scale of
their imagination is limited by the range of their actual
perception. The same is true of those who can see.
We cannot mentally visualise a spatial expanse larger
than the field of view as given in actual perception.* If
we are to include in the purely mental field of view
* Of course we can think of such an expanse, although we cannot
picture it.
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objects beyond the range of actual vision, we must make
a schematic representation of them on a reduced scale.
Those who are confined to the sense of touch may follow
an analogous plan; but their power in this respect
varies with the individual, and is in any case very much
more restricted than that of persons who can see. But
we must not suppose that where the apprehension of the
parts of a spatial whole becomes purely successive, the
parts themselves are presented as successive, so as to
transform a spatial perception into a temporal perception.
On the contrary the movements of exploration have al-
ready acquired a spatial significance through the ex-
periences obtained within the limits of the touch hori-
zon. Hence the parts of the spatial whole which
successively present themselves are apprehended as
related in the way of co-existence, although they
cannot be simultaneously presented. Similarly, a per-
son who can see, in walking along a road for ten
miles, has a number of successive fields of view which
cannot be simultaneously presented either actually or
ideally. But he does not apprehend these fields of
view as forming a time series : he apprehends them
as successively presented parts of a co-existent whole.
The reason for this will become clearer in the next
section.
2. Extension as Physically Real. We may now
proceed to consider the movements of exploration con-
cerned in the apprehension of size and configuration
from another point of view. They not only contribute
to perception of size and figure, as mere modes of ex-
tension
; they at the same time yield a perception of
external reality. The configuration and size perceived
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by their means is essentially the configuration and size
of bodies existing and persisting independently of us
and of percipient activity. In following the contours of
an object, our movements are not wholly free, but are
bound by certain conditions. We must on the one
hand keep in contact with the object, continually pre-
serving the experience of resistance. If contact and
resistance cease, we are no longer exploring the object.
On the other hand we avoid any effort to overcome re-
sistance by main force ; when a body is soft or fragile,
this wrould actually prevent us from attaining our ends,
for it would alter the configuration we are exploring ;
and, in any case, it would be futile. We only feel the
resistance in order to yield to it ; in this way, it is a con-
dition continually determining our subjective activity.
So far as this condition operates, the whole experience is
determined for us, not by us, and is therefore the pres-
entation of an external reality. The size and configur-
ation perceived are apprehended as existing independ-
ently of our action in perceiving them. The cessation
of our activity does not involve the cessation of their ex-
istence
; they are therefore regarded as persisting even
when they are no longer actually presented. This it is
which gives the experience practical value, value in the
manipulation of objects for the attainment of practical
ends. It also explains the sharp antithesis between
the successive presentation of the parts of a whole, and
their spatial co-existence. The succession is a succes-
sion of our subjective states ; but the successively ap-
prehended parts persist independently of us and our
doings. They therefore co-exist independently of us
and our doings.
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3. The Spatial Significance of Free Movements.
So far, we have dealt only with what may be called
restricted movements, movements restricted by the
conditions which determine the actual exploration of
bodies. But the experiences thus acquired cannot be
without effect on free movements. The spatial signifi-
cance acquired in the exploration of bodies must in
some degree cling to analogous movements when they
take place without contact with external things. As a
matter of fact such movements yield the perception of
what may be called geometric configuration, configura-
tion in which the spatial character is not regarded as
belonging to any external body, but as the product of
our subjective activity. To quote Professor James :
"
If, with closed eyes, we trace figures in the air
with the extended forefinger (the motions may occur
from the metacarpal-, the wrist-, the elbow-, or the
shoulder-joint indifferently) what we are conscious of
in each case, and indeed most acutely conscious of, is
the geometric path described by the finger- tip. Its
angles, its sub-divisions, are all as distinctly felt as if
seen by the eye ; and yet the surface of the finger-tip re-
ceives no impression at all. ... In persons born blind
the phenomenon in question is even more perfect than
in ourselves." * In these geometric tracings we are mak-
ing an express experiment, and concentrating attention
on the movements of the finger, as such. Under such
conditions there is present a very distinct mental image
of the path described by the moving finger. It is as if
the finger actually left a marked track behind it, and so
drew figures in the air. The outline is generally visu-
* Principles of Psychology, vol. it, p. 190.
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alised in the case of seeing persons;* the blind presum-
ably image it in the way of passive touch.f It does not
appear however that in ordinary movements, on which
we do not expressly concentrate attention, this ideal
imagery is distinctly present, or indeed present at all.
None the less they still possess a spatial significance.
The sweep of a limb, or the movement of the whole body,
means extension, differing in amount and direction ac-
cording to the direction and amount of the movement.
This extension is not that of any external body; it is
free or empty space. Inasmuch as the presentation of it
depends purely on free movement, it ought according to
principles laid down in the preceding chapter to lack the
character of external reality. This is true of geometric
tracings in which attention is wholly concentrated on the
free movement itself. But, in general, free space is, as
Kant says, a form of the external world. This is so, be-
cause free movements are usually not wholly free, but in
a certain respect conditioned. They take place in the
service of practical ends, and they are useful in this
way mainly in so far as they effect a transition from
one resisting body to another, or from one part of a
* Mr. Welton, who is by no means blind, gives me the following ac-
count of his own experience. " I can't get the visual image even in this
case, or at any rate it is of the vaguest character, and then only seems to
arise when I as it were make up my mind I will see it. But it has no
colour and I'm not really sure it isn't a touch image after all, so vague
is it. What is plainer far is the touch image, my finger seems to go
round the outside or inside (either at will) boundary of the figure. I cer-
tainly seem to feel the figure much more than see it. If I try writing in
the air I seem to vaguely apprehend a nearly invisible finger moving,
but I don't see a tracing of the letters made after they are made."
t Unless they have lost their sight after the fourth year; in that case
they will probably visualise. It is noteworthy that the blind usually talk
as if they saw. This arises because they have to use the same language
as those who see, and dislike appearing peculiar.
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resisting body to another part. But the necessity of
proceeding from one definite point to another definite
point imposes restriction on the amount and direction
of the movement. This has been well put by Dr. Bain.
"Let us suppose the hand moving between two fixed
obstacles, for example, from one side of a box to
another. There is, to commence with, the contact with
one side of the box felt more or less as a sense of touch,
pressure, and resistance, . . . the abrupt departure from
this state is a mark in consciousness, a call to attention;
and the mind is awakened to the feeling of movement
that follows. After a time, the other side is struck, and
the mind is again roused and takes note of the cessation
of the movement." * In this way free space acquires the
character of a space separating and connecting external
bodies and thus itself partakes of external reality.
4. Perception of the Organism as Extended.
Up to this point, we have been dealing with the further
development of a spatial perception which has already
attained considerable advancement. The blind persons
we have been speaking about were already so far ad-
vanced that, by purely synthetic or passive touch, they
could obtain at least a vague and schematic apprehen-
sion of the shape even of unfamiliar objects. Also it is
evident that the movements which they use in the ex-
ploration of objects have already acquired a more or
less definite spatial value. For example, the relative
degree of separation between finger and thumb means
for them corresponding spatial distances. We have
now to go further down in the scale of development,
and to trace the rudimentary beginnings of spatial per-
* The Senses and the Intellect, fourth edition, p. 197.
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ception. This will be best done by considering the
way in which we come to perceive our own body as
extended. On this point I may quote Professor Croom
Robertson. " I have not the slightest doubt that the
first object that we become aware of as resisting, and
at the same time spread out, is our own body. Of
course, the child from the very beginning sees as well
as touches, but I am putting aside vision for the pres-
ent, and suppose that we have a child, at first unable to
discern a difference between subject and object, begin-
ning to acquire objective experience by way of touch.
And I say . . . that the first object it would come
to apprehend vaguely is not any other body, but its
own. That one object it has always with it ; other
objects come and go, but it has always the power of
touching its own body and thus of finding the activity
of its own hand impeded."* He also points out with
great distinctness one important circumstance which im-
mensely facilitates spatial perception in the case of our
own body and its absence in the case of other bodies.
This is the fact of double contact. " There is this special
feature in " the child's " tactile experience of its own
body, that whereas in touching another body it has an
intensification of touch on the hand through which it is
exerting pressure, in pressing the hand against its own
face it gets, in connexion with the activity put forth
and resisted, an intensification of two touches : it both
touches and is touched. This gives peculiar and better
data for the ordering of touch sensations. If, as we have
reason to suppose, there is a qualitative difference of
touch in every part of the body, then the child can-
* Elements of Psychology, pp. 113-114.
Psych.
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not but have its attention drawn to this, that through
the fingers it has a variety of touches according to the
part touched, both by way of the latter and also of the
part that touches. Thus it is helped to finding its body
as extended in this double way of learning to discrim-
inate different parts, a way in which it is not helped
when touching anything else."*
There is yet another consideration of paramount im-
portance which should always be borne in mind when
the perception of the organism is in question. Cutane-
ous sensation does not wholly depend on contact of the
skin with an external object. Such contact gives what
Robertson calls an intensification of touch ; but the
sensitive surface of the skin is normally in a state of
excitation, apart from its occasional contact with ex-
ternal bodies. We have only to attend to any special
area of the tactile surface, to detect the presence of
cutaneous and temperature sensations. Besides this, an
external body moving over the skin often leaves behind
it in the path which it has traversed an after-sensation,
which lasts for an appreciable time. Thus in the case
of the organism, synthetic and analytic touch are com-
bined as they cannot be combined in the case of ex-
ternal bodies. In the case of external bodies, active
exploration of the parts of a whole, and simultaneous
contact with the whole, cannot co-exist; so that syn-
thetic and analytic touch can only come into play alter-
nately; but when the finger-tip passes over a tactile
surface, we have not merely a series of successive
touches, but also a persistent sensation over the whole
of the surface explored. By continual exploration of
* Ibid.
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the body in various directions, this synthetic touch,
which has its organ in the surface touched, acquires
a spatial significance. There thus arises a direct sense-
perception of the configuration of the body and its
parts which is always with us, whatever other spatial
perception we may or may not have at any moment.
This primitive spatial presentation of our own bodies
is of great importance as a preparation for the percep-
tion of spatial relations in external bodies. Owing to it,
both synthetic and analytic touch as applied to external
bodies have from the outset a certain spatial signifi-
cance. Take for example the act of grasping an object
between finger and thumb. When the object grasped
is a part of our own organism, such as the hand or the
leg, the skin surface which lies between the contact of
the thumb and the contact of the finger, is itself the
seat of cutaneous sensation which has acquired spatial
significance. Thus the interval between finger and
thumb is directly perceived as an extended whole by
synthetic touch. The extension is greater or less ac-
cording as the thumb and finger are more or less widely
apart. Hence, when an external body is taken between
finger and thumb, the interval between them and the
variations in the amount of this interval already stand
for spatial distance and its varying degrees. There is
yet one experience which we have not considered, that
in which one cutaneous area is passively imposed upon
another, as when one hand is laid on the other. Here
there are two contacts ; but it does not appear that they
are usually discriminated. Supposing that perceptual
development is so far advanced that both have spatial
significance, the perception is not of two surfaces but
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of a common surface. If the two hands are in contact,
this surface may be regarded either as the surface of
the left hand or of the right, or of both simultaneously.
The sensations in each surface contribute to the result.
Now in the case of external objects one surface alone
can be applied. But the spatial perception will be the
more full and distinct, because of previous contact be-
tween surfaces both of which are sensitive. Further,
when one part of the skin comes in contact with
another, the area touched is apprehended as part of a
wider area surrounding it; or rather of two wider
areas surrounding it. For instance, when the palm
of one hand is laid upon the palm of the other, the
area of contact is apprehended both as a portion of
the total surface of the right hand and arm, and as
a portion of the total surface of the left hand and
arm. When the palm of the hand is applied to an
external object, the area of contact is immediately per-
ceived by synthetic touch as part of the total surface of
the hand and arm. It is not directly apprehended by
synthetic touch as only a portion of the surface of the
external body. But previous experiences of the kind
in which one hand is laid on the other must constitute
a certain preparation for regarding the area of contact
as a portion not only of the body surface, but of the
surface of the object touched; and it must therefore
help to give significance to the active movements by
which other parts of the external object are explored.
5. Localisation and Projection. When a sensi-
tive surface is affected by a stimulus, we may attend
principally either to the locality of the part affected,
and its relation to the spatial map of the organism as a
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whole, or to space-relations in an object external to the
organ of sense. Thus if a fly crawls across the face,
our attention will be directed to the surface of the face
and to that part of it in which the tickling irritation
occurs. On the other hand, if we actively explore the
contours of an external object, we attend chiefly to the
spatial relations of the parts of this object, and not
to the spatial relations of the sensitive surface of the
body. Localisation is the technical term used for
perception of the spatial relations of the part of the
sensitive surface affected by a stimulus. Projec-
tion is the technical word used for perception of the
spatial relations of an object external to the organ
itself.
Localisation and projection are combined in a pecul-
iarly intimate way, when one part of the tactile surface
actively explores another, as when we pass the hand
over the face. In relation to the exploring hand, the
face is an external object. If the skin of the face were
insensible to touch, the face would be just like any
other external object. But the face itself feels when
the hand touches it, and the successive experiences
which thus arise yield perception of the parts of the
face successively affected, and not of the parts of the
hand which explores it.
It is a noteworthy fact that in the case of sight there
is projection but no localisation. When we see a thing
we are aware of the spatial relations of the parts of the
object seen, but never of the spatial relations of the re-
tina itself. The reason is that we have no spatial map
of the retina to begin with. The conditions for obtain-
ing a spatial apprehension of the retina itself are ab-
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sent. We cannot explore it by active touch, as one
hand may explore the other, and of course there is no
possibility of seeing it. The impossibility of localising
retinal impressions in the retina itself shows that local-
isation pre-supposes projection. We can only localise
in those parts of the body which have been previously
explored by active sight and touch in the same manner
as external objects.
6. Tactual Perception of the Third Dimension.
There is one point which ought to be made clear from
the outset. We do not and can not have a perception
of solid volume of the same kind as the perception of
surfaces. The reason in the case of touch may be easily
stated. We cannot touch one thing behind another.
We come in contact with things only at their surfaces.
What lies behind a surface in the solid volume of
the object is intercepted by the parts in front of it.
When we apprehend a surface, we have presented at
once all its parts. The points, lines, and areas which
we distinguish within it may be found by analysis of
the total presentation as simultaneously given to synthe-
tic touch. But the indefinite multiplicity of surfaces
intersecting each other and connected by cross surfaces
in an indefinite multiplicity of ways which compose
solid volume, can never be presented to synthetic
touch.
It is free movement which plays the leading part in
our fully developed perception of the third dimension.
We have seen in 3 that " the sweep of a limb, or the
movement of the whole body, comes to mean extension,
differing in amount and direction according to the
direction and amount of the movement." Now, the
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extended arm starting from any given position may
move either up and down, or right and left, or in any
intermediate direction. Each sweep of the arm to and
fro means for consciousness an extended surface
;
and
all these surfaces intersect each other in a line corre-
sponding to the original position of the arm. Or again,
consider the movements by which the extended palm
becomes the clenched fist. The various intermediate
positions form a continuous series : and each of them
has an acquired spatial significance, which has arisen
through the actual grasping of objects of varying size
and shape. When the surface of the fingers meets the
surface of the palm, the two surfaces become for per-
ception one. At each intermediate position, they are
distinguishable, and are apprehended not merely as
part of the superficies of the body, but as surfaces of
objects which might possibly be clasped in the hand.
Thus we have a series of surfaces which, instead of form-
ing part of one surface, overlie and underlie each other
in layers. Hence in clasping an actual object, the
position of the hand derives a spatial significance from
its place in this serial movement by which we pass from
the outstretched palm to the clenched fist. In this way
we may account for that peculiarly distinct presenta-
tion of solidity which accompanies the grasping of an
object.
In exploring an object with the hand by way of
active touch, the actual path of the movement as de-
termined by the configuration of the object is only
one of an indefinite number of possible paths of free
movement. At any given moment the surface which
has been actually explored may have an indefinite num-
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her of possible continuations. The relation of the act-
ual continuation to these possible continuations, each of
which might have been actual in the case of a different
object, is a relation in the third dimension of space.
Finally, the constant presentation of our own organism
as extended, is a great help towards the presentation of
the third dimension. For whenever we touch either
our own organism or an external body, two surfaces
must be presented simultaneously, with a common part
and independent continuations. This is only saying
over again what we have already said in 4. When
the palm of one hand is laid upon the palm of the other,
the area of contact is apprehended on the one hand as
a portion of the total surface of the right hand and arm,
on the other as a portion of the total surface of the left
hand and arm. When the palm of the hand is applied
to an external object, the area of contact is apprehended
both as a part of the body surface and of the surface
of the object. It has thus two independent contin-
uations, which diverge from each other in the third
dimension.
Many other details might be referred to. But the
principle is the same in all. We apprehend the third
dimension by touch, in so far as we apprehend the
same surface as having more than one independent con-
tinuation.
7. Origin of Spatial Perception. When we be-
gan to discuss spatial perception at the beginning of
the previous chapter, we propounded two questions.
So far, we have only considered the first of these, relat-
ing to the development of the perception from more
indefinite and imperfect to more definite and perfect
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forms. It is now time to take up the second inquiry.
Do the same conditions which account for development
of the spatial perception also account for its first origin ?
This seems at first sight at least abstractly conceivable.
We may suppose at the outset on the one hand experi-
ence of mere extensity, and on the other experience of
active movement. Neither of these experiences is in it-
self, properly speaking, spatial. Spatial relations begin
to exist for consciousness only in so far as the experi-
ence of extensity combines with the experience of act-
ive movement in the manner which we have already
described. If the combination is to begin with entirely
absent, so that it only arises in the history of the indi-
vidual consciousness, spatial perception has not only a
psychological development but a psychological origin.
If we adopt this view, we commit ourselves to what is
called a genetic as opposed to a nativistic theory of
spatial perception.
The corresponding nativistic view would assume the
following form. From the outset of mental develop-
ment there are certain connexions between experiences
in the way of extensity and appropriate motor activity,
connexions not learnt by experience, but due to con-
genital constitution. So far as these original connex-
ions exist, some kind of spatial perception is born with
the individual, not acquired by him.
The evidence for the nativistic view is strong in the
case of many animals. The chick, for instance, on
emerging from its shell, pecks from the outset at a
suitable object in such a way as to show that without
the help of experience it is in some manner aware of
the direction, situation, and distance of the object. It
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would seem therefore that with it spatial perception is
to a large extent innate. Human beings, on the con-
trary, have to learn by a gradual process to discern the
shape, situation, distance, etc., of objects. The higher
animals, such as dogs and monkeys, go through a simi-
lar process, though not to nearly the same degree. But
even in the case of human beings there is evidence that
some original connexion exists between local sign ex-
perience and motor activity, though it may be at the
outset very indefinite.* The evidence is strongest for
sight. Apart from some congenital connexion, how-
ever indeterminate, between local sign experiences
and movements, it is difficult to see how subsequent
development in this respect could have a starting-
point. Thus the most probable conclusion is that a
vague spatial perception is congenital even in human
beings. So much may be conceded to the nativistic
theory. But it will be clear from what we have said
and are about to say that this original endowment only
supplies a rudimentary starting-point for a highly elab-
orate and complex development.
* It should be noted that what is congenital in the human being does
not necessarily appear in the new-born infant. The nervous system of
the new-born infant is very far from being fully grown. Much comes to
it by mere physiological growth as distinguished from learning by ex-
perience. The same is also to some extent true of the new-born dog and
other higher animals, though the growth in this case is much more rapid.
CHAPTER V.
SPATIAL PERCEPTION BY SIGHT.
1. Perception of Surface. There is no difference
in principle between the process by which the visual
perception of space is developed, and that by which the
tactual perception is developed. Both depend on a
combination of analysis and synthesis. Active sight
corresponds to active touch, and passive sight to pas-
sive touch. There is however this important differ-
ence, that in the case of sight synthesis and analysis are
much more intimately combined. They are for the
most part simultaneous rather than successive. We
have in the eye an expanded surface sensitive to light,
but near the centre of this surface there is one spot in
which visual sensation is peculiarly delicate and dis-
tinct. Thus there is at any moment of vision a general
field of view seen by the eye as a whole, and a limited
area within it seen with peculiar clearness and distinct-
ness by the central spot, called from its colour the
yellow spot. Within the yellow spot there is a pit
or depression called the fovea centralis, and here dis-
crimination is most delicate of all. Now, active sight
consists in movements of the eye which successively
bring the outlying parts of the field of view within
the area of distinct vision. A certain amount and
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direction of movement is required in order that a
stimulation situated in a given position in an outlying
part of the retina may be transferred to the yellow
spot. Thus by a highly organised system of definite
movements the eye is perpetually passing to and fro
within the field of vision, bringing its parts successively
into the area of distinct vision. The development of
the spatial perception is coincident with the perfecting
of these movements, and of others connected with the
co-operation of the two eyes.
Though the visual and tactual perception of space
depend on essentially similar conditions, there are
specific peculiarities in the case of sight which re-
quire separate treatment. In the first place, visual
perception of space cannot be adequately discussed
unless we take into account its relation to the tactual
experiences which arise in the actual manipulation of
objects. The spatial perception is throughout its de-
velopment determined by practical interest. The ob-
ject of perception is always ultimately real extension,
figure, and magnitude ; but these are much more directly
and accurately revealed in tactual experience than in
visual. Variations of the visual experience are con-
stantly occurring, which imply no variations in the size,
figure, and position of the objects seen, but only varia-
tions in the position of the body or eyes of the obser-
ver. Since what we are interested in is the real space-
determinations of the objects themselves, we tend to
ignore these variations in their relation to the nature of
the object. So far as they have meaning for us, they
condition the perception of the relative position of
the object to the body of the observer. For instance,
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the area of the retina stimulated by the object varies
greatly according to our distance from it. By intro-
spective analysis, we can discern a varying apparent
magnitude of the object corresponding to the varying
distances. But in ordinary practical experience, these
variations are largely ignored. A man crossing the
room towards us does not appear to become twice as
tall in the process. His distance appears to vary, but
his size to remain the same.* In the second place, the
eye has means of perceiving the third dimension which
are denied to touch. This arises from the fact that the
eye is stimulated by objects at a distance from the body.
2. Visual Perception ofthe Third Dimension. (a)
As Conditioned by Tactual Experience. The conditions
on which the perception of the third dimension by sight
depend are manifold and complex. A celebrated theory
was advanced by Bishop Berkeley according to which
the eye has no power of directly perceiving distance
from the body at all. Its apparent power of doing so
is merely due to association between visual and tactual
experiences. The sight of an object at a distance is
supposed to call up a mental representation of the
movement of the body required to reach it. This sug-
gested image of tactile and motor experiences consti-
tuted, according to Berkeley, the perception of distance.
Similarly, the perception of solid shape by the eye was
supposed simply to consist in an ideal revival of experi-
ences of active and passive touch. This theory is con-
* This applies to the developed consciousness, but it is probable that
the variation in size is a marked feature of the conscious condition
before its meaning is apprehended. Persons blind from infancy, who
have recovered their sight by an operation, express wonder that a room
should be capable of appearing as big as the whole house which contains
it, and so on.
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futed by a simple appeal to experience. We have, as a
matter of fact, a perception of solid figure and of dis-
tance, which is essentially visual. None the less, there
is in Berkeley's theory an underlying thought which is
true and valuable. It cannot be maintained that the
visual experience as such remains unchanged, and that
tactual elements are superadded to it merely in the way
of ideal revival. But it is certain that the tactual per-
ception of extension must play a great part in moulding
the visual perception. Tactual and visual perception
develop together. The practical interest of sight de-
pends mainly on its power to guide active touch and
the practical manipulation of objects.
The presentation of visual extension depends primar-
ily for its value on its intimate correlation with exten-
sion as revealed to touch. There is between them a
unity of practical interest, in which the tactual element
plays the dominant part. In practice, they are per-
petually combined. In exploring a thing by touch, the
eye follows the motion of the hand. In so far as sight
comes first, it is constantly followed by touch, and is
useful only in so far as it guides touch. Now this in-
timate union cannot exist without mutual modification,
and since the tactual experience more directly reveals
real extension, the modification of the visual experience
will be the more profound. To explain what we mean
by this modification, let us take the case of a man
handling an object in the dark. As he explores the
outlines of the object, he at the same time constructs a
visual image of it.* The visual image is throughout de-
* The vast majority of mankind does so. There appear however to be
exceptions.
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termined by tactual experience. With each feature of
tactual extension there is correlated a corresponding
feature of visual extension. The visual image is
throughout moulded by the touch. Now we are here
concerned, not with visual imagery, but with visual
perception. What we say is that owing to the frequent
and intimate union of tactual with visual perceptions,
the visual perception, when it exists without the tactual,
will be moulded by previous tactual experiences, much
as the visual image of an object in the dark is moulded
by a present tactual experience. This is only a
special application of the general principle which un-
derlies the whole development of the spatial perception.
In the development of the tactual perception of space
passive or synthetic touch acquires a certain serial
order and arrangement of parts from its connexion
with active and analytic touch. In like manner, the
visual perception of extension acquires a certain order
and arrangement of its parts from its connexion with
the tactual perception of extension. It would thus ap-
pear that though the eye had no independent means of
apprehending those relations of surfaces and lines
which pre-suppose the third dimension, it would none
the less become capable of apprehending them in some
degree through its intimate practical union with touch.
The whole process is a case of complication.* It is
difficult to say precisely how much of our perception of
solid figure and distance is gained in this way, and how
much is due to other factors. But there does not seem
much room for doubt that the combination of visual
and tactile experience plays a part of primary impor-
* See pp. 90-93.
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tance. What it does not account for is the great
superiority of vision over touch in the apprehension of
the distances of objects from each other and from the
body. To explain this, we must take into account con-
ditions peculiar to vision. Among these the most im-
portant is connected with the fact that we normally use
two eyes to see, and not one only.
(b) As Dependent on the Use of Two Eyes.
Whenever we look at an object with both eyes, we re-
ceive from it two impressions, one affecting each eye.
But the result is a single presentation of the object.
This is so because similar impressions fall on corre-
sponding points of the two retinas. The two points of
most distinct vision constituted by ihefoveae centrales,
or central pits, correspond to each other in this way, so
that light-impressions falling on them give rise to the
vision of a single object. Other points of the two re-
tinas also correspond when they are symmetrically
situated with reference to the central pit. In general,
the left half of one eye corresponds to the left half of
the other, and the right half to the right half. Thus a
point in the left half of one eye will correspond to a
point in the left half of the other when both have the
same situation relatively to the centre of distinct vision.
If the retina of one eye could be applied to the retina
of the other, so as to superpose the nasal half of each on
the temporal half of the other, their points of contact
would be, roughly speaking, corresponding points.
Single vision occurs when corresponding points are
stimulated in a similar way. But it also occurs when
the points thus stimulated do not exactly correspond,
but when the deviation from correspondence, or dis-
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parateness, as it is called, is small. When this hap-
pens, a single object is seen, but it is seen as lying
behind or before that area of the field of vision which
is most distinctly presented, or, in other words, that
part of the field of vision which we are directly looking
at. When the disparateness between the points affected
is relatively great, double vision may result.
If a finger is held between the eyes and an object,
and if we then fix our eyes on the object so as to bring
it into the centre of distinct vision, we see the finger
doubled. The greater the distance between the finger
and the object, the wider apart are the two images of
the finger. If the right eye is closed, the left image
disappears ; if the left eye is closed, the right image
disappears. If now, instead of fixing our gaze on the
object, we fix it on the finger, the finger is seen as sin-
gle, and the object as double. The greater the distance
between finger and object the wider apart are the two
images. When the right eye is closed, the right image
disappears. When the left eye is closed, the left image
disappears. This experiment succeeds with most peo-
ple, but not with every one. There are some few who
can hardly be brought to see things double at all. But
even these, if they really use their two eyes in a normal
way, will in all probability be able to see a double im-
age of such a bright object as a lighted candle. The spe-
cial conditions of the experiment are that the eye should
be fixed on one object, and the attention fixed on another,
either beyond it or in front of it. Apart from these spe-
cial conditions, it would appear that double images are
not ordinarily discerned by normal persons. When the
eyes are moving in a free and natural way from object
Psych. 24
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to object, and attention is concentrated only on what is
seen in the area of distinct vision, double images are
not discerned. It should be carefully noted that when
vision is distinctly doubled, the distance of the two
images from the object which is distinctly seen is very
indeterminately apprehended. We may see it now at
one distance and now at another, either arbitrarily, or
in consequence of some casual suggestion. So far as
the distance is determinately apprehended, our percep-
tion of it may be referred to other conditions than the
disparate position of the two impressions on the retinas
of the two eyes. It would seem that this disparateness
either yields a definite perception of distance, or a
double image, but not both at once.
These facts are well illustrated by the stereoscope.
In looking through this instrument, there is set before
each eye only a surface and not a solid figure. It is
not the same surface which is set before both eyes, but
a separate one before each. On these surfaces there
is outlined a drawing of the same solid object, but
the one surface presents it as seen from a point of
view to the left, the other from a point of view to the
right. The one figure represents the solid object as seen
by the right eye, the other as seen by the left, when both
are fixed on it. The result is the presentation, not of
two superficial delineations, but of one solid object.
The reason is, that when the two eyes are respectively
fixed on corresponding parts of the two outlines, other
parts of the field of view produce disparate impressions
on the retina, just as they would do in looking at the
same point of the actual object. The further they lie
behind or before this point in the actual object, the
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more disparately situated are the impressions they pro-
duce, and the same is the case in looking through the
stereoscope. The solid effect in the stereoscope is
greatest when the eyes are allowed to move freely from
one point to another. But it is also unmistakably pres-
ent when the illumination by which the two pictures
are seen is so transient as not to allow time for move-
ments of the eyes. Of course as the eyes fixate one
point after the other of the apparently solid object,
retinal impressions which have been previously dispar-
ate come to affect corresponding points, and those which
previously affected corresponding points become dispar-
ate. The appearance of solidity is more distinct and
impressive, the fewer are the double images discerned.
Old and practised experimenters, who concentrate their
attention with the view of finding double images, be-
come in time unable to obtain the stereoscopic effect.
They see only a flat surface.
Now there is a theory which would regard the above
statement as a complete account of the binocular per-
ception of solid figures. Distance from the area of dis-
tinct vision, behind or before it, is supposed to find its
full and ultimate explanation in the disparateness of the
position of like impressions in the two retinas, the de-
gree of distance corresponding to the degree of dis-
parateness. This view seems plausible if we consider
visual perception in its fully developed form. It does
not appear that any other conditions can be operative
when the two slides of the stereoscope are lit by a
momentary illumination which allows no time for move-
ments of the eyes. But when movements of the eyes
are thus excluded, the stereoscopic effect is compara-
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tively dim and imperfect. It must also be borne in
mind that when in ordinary vision we steadily fixate a
single point in the field of view, and attend to objects
before or behind it, we obtain double images rather than
a perception of distance from the point fixated. These
facts point to active exploration by movements of the
eye as an important factor in the perception of the
third dimension. An even more powerful reason for
introducing this factor is the general analogy of the
way in which the spatial perception develops. The ap-
prehension of tactual space develops through a co-opera-
tion of active and passive touch. What we know about
children and about persons blind from early infancy
who have recovered their sight by an operation, shows
that the same is true of sight. In a case of operation
for congenital cataract,* a boy could not count even
as few as two objects by means of passive sight, al-
though he had learnt to count by means of touch.
When two objects were placed before him, and he was
called on to say how many they were, using sight only,
he could do so only by fixing his eyes on each of them
in turn. At the outset, it was necessary for him to
point to each of them successively with the finger.
Pointing without touching was sufficient. At a later
stage he was able to count merely by fixing his glance
on each object in turn. This he did at first not by
movements of the eye, but by lateral movements of the
head. It was not till much later that he learnt to count
a number of objects at a single glance. In all cases of
* Uhthoff, " Sehenlernen blindgeborener und spater mit Erfolg
operierter Menschen," in Zcitschrift fur Psychologic und Physiologic
der Sinnesorgane, Bd. xiv., Heft 3 und 4.
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this kind, the perception of distance in the third dimen-
sion develops very gradually. At the outset, the patient
appears to have only the analogies of his tactual experi-
ence to guide him.
We may then assume that active as well as passive
vision is required for the development of the perception
of the third dimension. In principle, this development
takes place in a way precisely analogous to the develop-
ment of the spatial perception in general. When the
eyes are fixed on any point in the field of view, those
parts of the field which lie behind or before this point
are perceived by means of disparate retinal impressions.
If and so far as the disparateness does not give rise to
double images, it gives rise to a peculiar modification of
visual sensation, varying concomitantly with the nature
and degree of the disparateness. Thus there are differ-
ences in the passive sensibility of the retina correspond-
ing minutely with the varying distances of other objects
from the object which is at any moment fixated by the
two eyes.
Thus we have given in the way of synthetic or pas-
sive sensibility the material for the perception of the
third dimension. But this synthetic and passive expe-
rience can only acquire spatial order in which its parts
become positions separated and connected by distances,
when active sight successively explores the data simul-
taneously given to passive sight. Active sight takes
the form of increasing or decreasing convergence of
the two eyes. When the eyes are turned inwards,
so that the lines of vision* converge, objects nearer
* The line of vision is an imaginary straight line connecting ihefovea
and any point to which the gaze is directed.
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than the point first fixed by the eyes, which have for
that reason previously produced disparate impressions
on the retina, come to produce impressions on corre-
sponding points. Decreasing convergence has the same
effect for objects lying beyond the point originally
fixated. This process is perpetually going on in every
moment of waking life ; and it is perpetually required
for practical adjustment to the environment. Hence
the two co-operative factors, active or analytic and
passive or synthetic vision, must combine to form a
total disposition, which is excited as a whole by each of
them. In this way each acquires spatial significance
which it would not have in isolation from the other.
The peculiar qualitative differences due to varying
disparateness of the retinal impressions become percep-
tions of relative distance from the point on which the
eyes are fixed and the combined movement of the two
eyes becomes for consciousness a movement over a tract
of space.
In this way we may account for the perception of
relative distance from the point on which the eyes are
fixed at any moment. But the question still remains,
How is the distance of the fixation-point itself deter-
mined ? Part of the answer has already been given by
implication. Whatever determines the relative distance
of other points from the fixation-point must also de-
termine the relative distance of the fixation-point from
these other points. Thus all objects intervening between
the body and the eye contribute to fix the absolute dis-
tance from the body of the point distinctly seen. But
besides this another factor is no doubt operative in a
greater or less degree, the sensations due to the vary-
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ing position of the eyes themselves. There are no
joint-sensations because the muscles of the eye do not
work on joints. But this defect is compensated by the
tactile experiences due to the movement of the eye in
its socket
;
and muscular sensations proper are probably
contributory factors. Thus the varying degrees of con-
vergence will be marked by varying tactual and motor
sensations in the eyes. These will also help to mark
varying direction and extent of movement. But it
should not be forgotten that the movements of the eyes,
whether in the way of convergence or otherwise, are
optical as well as motor experiences. They are accom-
panied by displacement of impressions of the retina.
In converging movements, disparate impressions are in
process of becoming correspondent, and vice versa. It
has been urged by Professor Hering and others that
this purely optical process admits of greater delicacy of
discrimination and therefore is a more important factor
in our experience of movement and position of the
eyes, than the motor sensations themselves. The ques-
tion is still under debate, but the probability is that
Hering is right.
(c) As Monocular. Under this head we have to
consider conditions which remain operative even when
only one eye is used. These conditions are mainly of
an auxiliary kind. They do not in the first instance
enter into the constitution of the perception of depth;
but when once it has been otherwise formed, they re-
produce it by association. There is only one monocular
experience which appears capable of directly constitut-
ing the perception of depth. This is the varying ac-
commodation of the lens by which distinct vision is se-
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cured at varying distances of the object from the eye.
The importance of this factor seems small in comparison
with the part played by movements of convergence of the
two eyes. But it does seem to supply within limits the
sort of combination of passive and active sight required
for perception of the third dimension. The nearer the
object, the more convex must the surface of the lens be,
if a distinct image is to be focussed on the retina ; and
the more remote the object, the natter must it be. If the
lens is too convex or too flat, what are called " circles
of diffusion " occur on the retina, and the image is in-
distinct. Thus, in fixing the eye successively on more
and more distant points of a line, the lens will be ac-
commodated at any moment for the point looked at
and yield a distinct image of this. Points nearer or
more remote will produce progressively more indistinct
and diffused impressions, the greater is their distance
from the fixation-point. As the glance moves to and
fro along the line, the indistinct becomes progressively
distinct, and vice versd. Thus we have a total expe-
rience analogous to that accompanying increasing or
decreasing convergence of the two eyes. The result in
this case also is a perception of position and distance
in the third dimension. Here too, muscular sensations
probably contribute to the result. The adjustment of
the lens depends upon a muscle which by its contrac-
tion slackens a ligament to which the lens is attached.
When the ligament is slackened, the lens, owing to
its own elasticity, bulges and becomes more convex.
There are distinct motor sensations accompanying this
process of motor accommodation. As in the case of
binocular vision, a series of motor experiences, accom-
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panying movement of the eyeball, are conjoined with a
series of optical experiences, due to the varying dis-
parateness of retinal impressions; so, in monocular
vision, a series of motor experiences accompanying
accommodation of the lens, is conjoined with a series
of optical experiences, due to varying distinctness and
diffusion of retinal impressions.
We have now to turn to another class of conditions
operative in monocular as well as binocular vision,
which may be called secondary or associative. They
would not of themselves produce the perception of
depth, but their variations are so intimately conjoined
in experience, with varying distance and position in the
third dimension, that a process of complication has
taken place, so that now they produce depth-perceptions
as immediately and distinctly as if they were themselves
contributive factors in the apprehension of the third
dimension. All conditions of this kind, and no others,
are used by the artist in producing the perception of
depth in pictures. It should be noted that depth and
solid figure as they appear in the work of an artist are
actually perceived. We do not in looking at a picture
merely see combinations of lines on a plane surface,
which call up mental images of objects in the third
dimension. On the contrary, the drawing is seen in
the third dimension from the outset. The artifices used
by the painter do not merely suggest ideal representa-
tions of depth, but actually produce the perception of
depth. This perception is doubtless different in na-
ture from that which is produced by the actual ob-
ject, but none the less it truly belongs to the percep-
tual and not to the ideational consciousness. Among
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these associative conditions we may refer first to the
variation in the area covered by the retinal impression
of an object, according to its varying distance from the
eye. This might in itself produce merely a correspond-
ing variation in the apparent magnitude of the thing
seen : indeed, by concentrating our attention on the
visual sensation, as such, we can detect changes in the
size of the object according to its changing distance :
but normally our attention is otherwise directed. The
real object does not vary in size ; and what we are in-
terested in is the real object and not our own sensa-
tions. We accordingly tend to ignore these differences
in the extensity of retinal sensation except in so far as
they mark different distances in the third dimension.
This is of course only possible if the actual size of the
objects is otherwise known by previous experiences in
which we have moved close up to them, so that the
retinal image has passed through a series of changes
giving place at last to that image which accompanies
and guides actual contact. To appreciate the full
importance of this condition, we must remember that
all the objects within the field of view and the dif-
ferent parts of the same object produce retinal im-
pressions varying in extent in a systematic and regular
way, according to their distance from the eye. The
imitation of this systematic diminution of size with in-
creasing distance is in the hands of the artist a most
potent means of producing stereoscopic effect. Where
the varying distance of an object is fixed by other
means, the extent of the retinal impression mainly de-
termines perception of magnitude. This is well seen in
the case of after-images.
" Produce an after-image of
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the sun and look at your finger-tip ; it will be smallei
than your nail. Project it on the table, and it will be
as big as a strawberry ; on the wall, as large as a plate ;
on yonder mountain, bigger than a house. And yet it
is an unchanged retinal impression."* An actual object
producing a retinal excitation of the same extent would
vary in size according to its distance. Hence the after-
image appears of different sizes, when it is perceived at
different distances. But the actual retinal sensation is
in all cases the same.
Another group of conditions depends on variation
not in the size but in the nature of the retinal impres-
sion produced by the same line or curve looked at from
different points of view. If we look straight at a rect-
angular cross, with the lines of vision parallel or equal-
ly converging, the impression on the retina also has the
form of a rectangular cross. The same is the case if
we look straight up at it or straight down at it, or
directly to the right, or directly to the left ; but if we
turn our eyes obliquely upwards and rightwards, up-
wards and leftwards, downwards and rightwards, down-
wards and leftwards, the legs of the retinal cross no
longer make a right angle with each other, but are dis-
torted so as to slant in varying degrees and in varying
ways according to the point of view. The correspond-
ing modifications of retinal sensations are not normally
attended to, because they answer to no real differences
in the shape of the cross itself. Thus a slanting retinal
cross, when the slant is merely produced by the point
of view, gives rise to the perception of a rectangular
cross lying in a certain direction. Conversely, a
* James, Psychology, vol. ii., p. 231.
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rectangular retinal cross, produced by an object in
the same direction and position, gives rise to the
perception of a slanting cross, because a slanting
cross under such conditions would actually produce a
square retinal impression. After-images admirably il-
lustrate this point. If we have obtained an after-image
of a rectangular cross by looking straight at it, and if
we then look straight at the wall of the room in front
of us, the after-image is outlined on the wall as a
rectangular cross. If we turn our eyes to the upper
left-hand part of the wall, we see a slanting cross, as
represented in Fig. 3 ; if we then turn our eyes to the
Fig. 3. Fig. 4.
upper right-hand corner, we see a slanting cross, as in
Fig. 4.
In all cases, the retinal impression and the visual sen-
sation remain unchanged. The above is only a spe-
cimen of what is continually taking place. The nature
of the retinal impressions produced by straight or
curved lines and their combinations, is constantly vary-
ing in a regular and systematic manner with the posi-
tion of the eyes relatively to the object looked at. The
variation depends in a very large measure on the shape
of surfaces and on their relative position in the third
dimension. Thus the after-image of the square cross
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if it is seen on a perpendicular wall directly in front of
the eye, produces a square cross on the retina. But if
the plane on which it is projected is tilted away from
or towards the spectator, the retinal cross is distorted.
Even an " inclined wall, in a picture, will, if an after-
image be thrown upon it, distort the shape thereof, and
make us see a form of which our after-image would be
the natural projection on the retina, were that form
laid upon the wall. Thus a signboard is painted in per-
spective on a screen, and the eye, after steadily look-
ing at a rectangular cross, is turned to the painted sign-
board. The after-image appears as an oblique-legged
cross upon the signboard."
* In looking at any solid
figure from a given point of view, the lines and con-
tours presented by its bounding surfaces produce vary-
ing retinal images according to the shape of the sur-
faces and their position relatively to the eye. These
retinal differences correspond to no real differences in
the shape of the lines and contours themselves. Our
tendency is therefore as far as possible to ignore them,
except in so far as they mark position in the third
dimension. In so far as the variation in optical sensa-
tion as such is disregarded, it fulfils the function of
determining our perception of depth and solid figure.
The artist avails himself of these perspective distortions
in producing stereoscopic effect.
The play of light and shade also contributes in a
very large measure to determine our perception of
depth. The mode in which light is intercepted varies
with the shape of the solid object on which it falls.
The distribution of shade among the parts of the ob-
* Op. cU., p. 254.
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ject itself is also determined by its shape. Thus the
play of light and shade is exactly opposite in the case
of a hollow mask and a projecting face. This "mod-
elling," as it is called by the artist, takes the most
subtle gradations, according to the various minute hol-
lows and elevations in the surface of an object, as for
instance in the folds of drapery. Besides this what
is called the "cast-shadow," viz. the shadow thrown
by an object as a whole, plays a very important part.
"
Objects in a landscape stand out much better in
morning and evening light when strong and distinct
cast-shadows are thrown, than in noonday light."*
Other factors have a peculiar importance in the case
of very remote objects. These are covered by the term
aerial perspective, and include indistinctness of out-
line and modification of colouring. If two mountains
are seen in the distance, and one appears bluish, and
the other green, the green is perceived as nearer. The
green of the vegetation is only visible at a certain dis-
tance
;
at a greater distance it gives place to a blue tint
derived from the intervening air. These associative
conditions do not themselves enter into the constitution
of the perception of depth, but are able to reproduce it
when it has once been formed by other means. It is'
frequently said that they are signs which the mind
interprets. Such phrases are only permissible if we are
careful to explain the nature of the signs and of their
interpretations. Usually when we speak of interpreting
a sign, it is implied that the sign is itself distinctly and
separately noticed, and that the interpretation is an
additional distinct act of thought. But this is not the
* Sully, Human Mind, vol. i., p. 252.
2.] SPATIAL PERCEPTION. 383
case with the perceptual signs which we have been dis-
cussing. They themselves are in the main ignored, and
only their meaning comes before consciousness. They
have no independent existence for consciousness apart
from their meaning. The meaning being inseparably
one with the sensations that are its signs, has the im-
mediacy, the obtrusiveness, the fixity, and the detailed
definiteness of impressional experience. In other words,
it is a percept and not an idea. The connexion between




1. Introductory. The apprehension of temporal
relations, as they exist for human consciousness, is an
extremely complex product of mental development.
The part played in it by ideal representation is of
predominant importance. Without ideal representa-
tion there could be no such thing as the definite ap-
prehension of a time-series, having a distinguishable
beginning and end, connected by a train of inter-
mediate events, each having its own position in the
series determined by its relation to other events
which come before and after it. For perceptual con-
sciousness it is evident that time cannot exist in this
form. On the other hand, we find in perceptual con-
sciousness those primary experiences on which our
developed apprehension of time is ultimately based.
2. Immediate Experience of Time- Transience.
The first fact we have to take account of is that con-
sciousness itself is a process in time. We must here
avoid two opposing fallacies. On the one hand, it
must be sharply and distinctly recognised that transi-
tion of one conscious state into another is by no means
identical with the perception of this transition. The
mere fact that follows A in consciousness does not
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of itself constitute the consciousness of It as following
A. On the other hand, we must not jump to the con-
clusion that because the sequence AB is not in itself
the cognition of that sequence, it is therefore not ex-
perienced at all in any way. We must distinguish be-
tween consciousness of change or duration, and change-
consciousness or duration-consciousness. Change in
consciousness may be felt without being cognised as
change, and duration may also be felt without being
cognised as duration. Even in a consciousness which
has no distinct perception of temporal relations, experi-
ence would be different according as change took place
in it rapidly or slowly, suddenly or gradually, and the
like. Without an immediate change-experience, " cog-
nition of change would be impossible for lack of pre-
sentative material. The thought of succession in time
must be based on the direct experience of time-tran-
sience, as the thought of red colour is based on the cor-
responding sensation. As the perception or idea of
colour-quality is impossible to the blind, so the percep-
tion or idea of change would be impossible to a being
without the change-sentience."*
3. Perception of Lapse of Time. The immedi-
ate experience of time-transience is probably univer-
sal in all conscious life. Some rudimentary form of it
probably exists even at the level of the sensation-reflex.
But in the case of the higher animals, the facts require
us to assume much more than this. Their actions are
intelligently adjusted so as to occur at the right mo-
ment. To explain this, we need more than the im-
mediate experience of time-transience. We must as-
* Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 160.
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sume that a succession of different experiences, or the
duration of the same experience, produces a cumulative
effect varying with the lapse of time. We have seen
that the earlier stages of any process having continuity
of interest leave behind them a cumulative disposition
which modifies succeeding stages of the total experi-
ence. We must now add that this cumulative effect
varies in its nature with the amount of time which the
process has taken. In this way we can explain why an
animal or a human being in preparing for action should
be able to wait for the right moment, having no means
of determining the right moment except lapse of time.
What measures the lapse of time is the cumulative
effect of the process of attending. When we are list-
ening to a sound, our experience is different at the end
of one minute from what it is at the end of two min-
utes, although the sound itself may not have altered in
quality. This experience is unique in kind, and it cer-
tainly does not consist in having the parts of the sound-
sensation as they successively occur, spread out before
us in a sort of duration-line or duration-block. The
same explanation applies to what is called empty time.
In music, the several notes are separated by temporal
intervals. To keep time is to measure these intervals
correctly. But it is difficult to say by what means we
can measure them, except by the process of expectant
attention itself. Certainly it is by no ideal reproduc-
tion of a series of events. Of course, empty time is
only relatively empty; what is absent from it is the
special kind of experience which marks its beginning
and end. There are always other experiences going
on, especially of a motor and organic kind.
3.] TEMPORAL PERCEPTION. 387
The immediate estimate of lapse of time is most
accurate for small intervals.* It appears to become
progressively less precise as the intervals become lar-
ger. If we go for a walk and ask ourselves at any
moment how long we have been walking, we can say
immediately without any explicit process of calculation
that we have been about half-an-hour or about an hour.
The limits of error are indeed very wide, but undoubt-
edly there seems to be some power of estimating lapse
of time, even for these comparatively long periods. It
is not quite a fair test to try this experiment without
previous practice ; a man may be able to estimate lapse
of time with a fair amount of accuracy, and yet not
have established an accurate relation between his sub-
jective estimate and time as measured by the clock.
With practice it is found that a person can tell with
a tolerable approach to accuracy and without express
calculation when an hour, or two hours, or half-an-hour
has elapsed.
It should be noted that continuity of interest has
varying degrees. We may pass from occupation to
occupation, and so have a series of distinct mental pro-
cesses each having its own special interest. But from
another point of view they may all have a certain unity
and continuity with each other. We may successively
read a book, go for a walk, and eat our dinner. Each
of these processes has its own special interest relatively
disconnected from the others. But they have unity of
interest, as parts of our personal life-history. Hence
* Many experiments have been made to determine more precisely the
conditions on which it depends: but the results obtained are so am-
biguous and conflicting, that I have not thought it advisable to trouble
the student with them.
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they may collectively contribute to determine our im-
mediate estimate of lapse of time.
The part played by attention in determining this im-
mediate estimate is illustrated by the fact that condi-
tions affecting attention affect it also. When we are
bored by monotony, or when we are distracted by a too
great variety and rapidity of experiences, the dura-
tion of time is so to speak magnified. We say that it
"
passes very slowly." When attention is very in
tensely and disagreeably aroused, as in moments of
acute danger, minutes may appear as hours. On the
other hand, when attention passes easily from object to
object, and is agreeably absorbed by each in turn, time
passes rapidly. After an entertaining conversation, we
may be astonished to find that the hands of the clock
have travelled over so much space. This contrast only
holds good for the immediate estimate of lapse of time
due to the cumulative effect of past process. When we
ideally recall a period of time, and estimate it by the
number and variety of the events which have taken
place in it, the period which has been agreeably spent
is apt to appear relatively longer, and the period in
which we have been bored, shorter. In ideal retro-
spect, periods which appeared interminable while they
were passing, shrink as it were ; whereas periods that
seemed on their actual occurrence to pass rapidly are
correspondingly expanded when we review them in the
form of a train of ideas.
4. The Organism as Time -Keeper. Some per-
sons before going to sleep at night can determine to
wake at a pre-appointed hour in the morning, and suc-
ceed in doing so with remarkable accuracy. There are
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many who can approximately tell the hour of the day
or night without looking at the clock. The explanation
of such facts seems to lie in the time-keeping function
of the bodily organism. The organism goes through re-
current series of regular changes in periods, and the cor-
responding organic sensations serve as temporal marks
or signs. "All my life," says Professor James, "I have
been struck by the accuracy with which I will wake at
the same exact minute night after night and morning
after morning, if only the habit fortuitously begins.
The organic registration in me is independent of sleep.
After lying in bed a long time awake I suddenly rise
without knowing the time, and for days and weeks to-
gether will do so at an identical minute by the clock,
as if some inward physiological process caused the act
by punctually running down."*
5. Present, Past, and Future. Actual sensation
is the mark or stamp of present time. The present
time as distinguished from the past or future, is the
time which contains the moment of actual sensation.
The present is never an indivisible instant ; it always
has a certain duration which is longer or shorter ac-
cording to circumstances. On the perceptual level it
is longer when conation is obstructed or delayed, arid
shorter when conation proceeds successfully and easily
towards the attainment of its end. The present is long
to the hungry child or the hungry dog compelled to
wait for its food
;
whereas one present rapidly succeeds
another when the child or the dog is enjoying its
play.
Distinction between past, present, and future can
* Principles of Psychology, vol. i., p. 623, note.
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only be apprehended in a rudimentary way at the per-
ceptual level. But there is, even at this level, what we
may call a " not yet
"
consciousness and a " no more "
consciousness. The "not yet" consciousness is con-
tained in the prospective attitude of attention, in the
pre-adaptation for what is to come which it involves.
This " not yet
"
consciousness is emphasised when cona-
tion is delayed or obstructed, as when the dog is kept
waiting for its bone. In this experience not only is the
present lengthened, but the contrast between present
and future is heightened. The " no more
"
conscious-
ness emerges most distinctly when conation is abruptly
disappointed or frustrated. The dog in the fable which
lets go its actual bone in order to seize the reflected
bone in the water, would have this experience in a
marked manner.
With the advent of ideal representation the "no
more " and the " not yet
"
experiences become much
more definite. This must be the case even when ideas
occur only as supplements of perceptual process, and
not as components of ideational trains. The hungry
child seeing preparations for food, may call up a men-
tal picture of itself eating the food. The ideally rep-
resented satisfaction stands in sharp contrast with its
present impatient hunger. In this case the " not yet
"
consciousness assumes a very definite form. Sully, who
gives this example, illustrates the corresponding "no
more" consciousness in the following manner. "A
child is watching some interesting object, say the play
of the sunbeam on the wall of his nursery. Suddenly
the sun is obscured by a cloud and the marvel of the
dancing light vanishes. In place of the golden bril-
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liance there now stands the dull commonplace wall-
paper. . . . The [ideal] image persists, and attracts the
attention by reason of its interestingness. At the same
time there is the actual present, the sight of the sunless
wall. Here, then, both actual experience of the present
and represented experience which is not now, occur
simultaneously, and so supply the most favourable con-
ditions for the development of a consciousness of their
difference or contrast."*
In general, temporal perception is bound up with the
process of attention. The primary experience of " past-
ness
"
is involved in the cumulative effect of attention
on its own process. The primary experience of "fu-
tureness," if we may allow the expression, is involved
in the essentially prospective nature of attention. The
present is characterised by the actual sensations which
serve to guide and determine attention at the moment.
* The Human Mind, vol. i., pp. 320-321.





1. Introductory. We now pass from perceptual
to ideational process, from those trains of mental ac-
tivity which are prompted and guided by external im-
pressions and directly worked out in bodily movement
to those which proceed independently of external stimu-
lation and are worked out " in the head." Up to this
point we have taken into account ideas or images only
in so far as they enter into the composition of processes
which are in their essential character perceptual : we
have now to consider processes which reach their end
through mental images succeeding each other in a se-
ries independently of actual perception. Before ex-
pounding the distinctive nature and function of this
higher mode of mental activity, it is necessary to ex-
amine with some care the characteristic features of a
mental image. In what respects does an object as
merely imaged differ from the same object as actually
perceived ?
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It should be clearly understood that those visual ex-
periences which are called " after-images
" both positive
and negative are in reality " after-sensations." They
are due to the continued excitement of the organ of
sense after the external stimulus has ceased to operate,
and cannot therefore be regarded as ideas. They are
easily distinguishable from what has been called the
primary memory-image. This is the peculiarly vivid
and definite ideal representation of an object which we
can maintain or recall by a suitable effort of attention
immediately after perceiving it. The persistence of the
after-image does not depend on an effort of attention,
but on the abiding effect of the external stimulus. It
passes, for the most part, very rapidly from a positive
to a negative phase and undergoes other modifications
which do not affect the primary memory-image. There
is also another conspicuous and important distinction :
whatever may have been the spatial arrangement of the
perceived objects, the corresponding after-images are
spread out in a flat expanse ; but the solidity and per-
spective of objects as actually seen reappear in the
primary memory-image and in ideal images generally.
2. Distinction and Relation of Image and Idea.
An idea can no more exist without an image than
perception can exist without sensation. But the image
is no more identical with the idea than sensation is
identical with perception. The image is only one con-
stituent of the idea
;
the other and more important
constituent is the meaning which the image conveys.
If I think about the Duke of Wellington, the image
present to my consciousness may be only the shadowy
outline of an aquiline nose. But this of course is not
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my idea of the Duke of Wellington. My idea includes
the cumulative result of many complex mental pro-
cesses, such as the reading of Napier's Peninsula War,
etc. If I had been thinking of some one else with an
aquiline nose, my mental attitude would have been very
different indeed. This example shows that virtually the
same mental image may have very different meanings
according to context and circumstances. The meaning
varies with the train of thought in which the image
occurs.
There are some people, especially those who are
much occupied with abstract thinking, who are in-
clined to deny that they have any mental imagery at all.
They are almost or quite unable to visualise objects,
and their general power of mentally reviving auditory
and tactile experiences may also be rudimentary. The
images which with them mark the successive steps in
a train of ideas are mainly or wholly verbal. What
they mentally reinstate in the way of an image is the
motor process of articulation, or the sound of spoken
words, or both. The words and their meaning are
all that are present to consciousness in such cases.
Images resembling features or concomitants of the ob-
ject thought about, are absent. But it is inaccurate to
say that such persons think without images; for the
verbal image is just as much an image in the psycho-
logical sense as a visual picture of the object is.
It should be noted however that the verbal image is
capable of conveying a kind of meaning which the
visual picture or other revivals imitative of the object
itself cannot of themselves convey. All higher modes
of conceptual thinking are possible only by means of
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words. To conceive is to think of the general or uni-
versal in contradistinction from the particulars which it
embraces and connects. If I think of life, for instance,
I think of a general kind of process manifested in an
indefinite diversity of special ways. The word life
enables me to fix attention on the common form of
process in contradistinction to its manifold modes of
manifestation. A mental picture imitative of the ob-
ject could not fulfil the same function if it were not
accompanied by the word life. At any rate it could do
so only very imperfectly ; and certainly a mind which
depended merely on such pictures or similar images
could never have formed the conception of life in gen-
eral for the first time. An imitative image may represent
some very special and obvious manifestation of life, but
not life in general in contradistinction from its partic-
ular phenomena.
Conceptual process may be regarded as a higher de-
velopment of ideational process. As we shall see later
on, the transition is a gradual one, and the germs of
conception are present even in rudimentary trains of
ideas. What concerns us here is that even the highest
developments of conception still involve imagery, though
the imagery may be and often is, purely verbal. In the
present chapter we have to deal with the nature of
mental imagery in general as distinguished from per-
ceptual experiences.
3. Likeness of Object as Perceived and Object as
Imaged.* The image is a reproduction of the percept;
these must therefore agree in their nature. But the
* In what follows the object as perceived is simply called the "per-
cept," and the object as imaged, the "image."
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reproduction is easily distinguishable from the original;
there must therefore be an important difference or dif-
ferences. The points of agreement are at least in part
easy to assign. The sensible qualities such as colour,
sound, etc., in all their varieties enter into the composi-
tion both of the percept and of the image, and these
qualities can only appear in an image because they have
previously appeared in a percept. The complication
also and in general the spatial and temporal form of
these qualities are common to both percept and image.
Both the sensible qualities and their forms of com-
bination originate primarily in the percept and are
merely reproduced in the image. The reproduction
varies greatly in degree of accuracy and completeness.
Here individual differences are very conspicuous. Some
can scarcely recall colours at all ; others can do so with
great vividness and accuracy. A person who almost
entirely lacks the power to image colours may be ca-
pable of reproducing sounds with precision and distinct-
ness. Some men seem quite incapable of reproducing
odours
;
others can reproduce odours more vividly than
any other sensible qualities.
These differences have an important influence on the
general character of ideational process in different in-
dividuals. There are some who work mainly with visual
imagery, others with auditory and others with ideal
revivals of motor experiences. Between these extreme
types there are of course manifold intermediate grada-
tions.
4. Characteristic Differences ofPercept and Im-
age. (a) Intensity. Hume is perfectly right in affirm-
ing that percepts differ from images " in the force or
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liveliness with which they strike upon the mind." But
the statement is ambiguous.
We must examine with great care the nature of this
force and liveliness, which according to Hume and
others is distinctive of sensations.
We cannot affirm that a sound or a colour as men-
tally revived is always louder or brighter than the cor-
responding sensation. On the contrary, it would seem
that variations in the degree of a sensible quality are
reproducible in much the same way as variations in
kind. I may mentally recall the brightness of an electric
light, and I may then actually look at the comparatively
dim flame of a candle. On comparing the image with
the percept, I may recognise that the electric light as
mentally revived has a higher degree of brightness than
the candle-flame as actually seen. It is true that the
power of representing gradations of sensible quality
varies in different persons, just as the power of repre-
senting the qualities themselves varies. But good vis-
ualisers seem to possess it in a very high degree. A
person so endowed, in giving an account of his mental
picture of the morning breakfast-table, says : " I have
more power to recall colour than any other one thing;
if, for example, I were to recall a plate decorated with
flowers I could reproduce in a drawing the exact tone,
etc. The colour of anything that was on the table is
perfectly vivid."
*
Are we then to reject the distinction between images
and percepts as respectively "faint" and "vivid"? This
is a possible course. There are other differences which
may be regarded as ordinarily sufficient to prevent con-
* James, Principles of Psychology.
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fusion between them. But we ought to hesitate before
discarding a distinction generally accepted both by
psychology and common sense. On the other hand, if
we accept it, we must mean by "vividness" something
different from those degrees of sensible quality which
may be equally present in the sensible quality as act-
ually perceived and as mentally reproduced. What is
this vividness? The answer seems to be contained in
Hume's words. According to him the distinctive char-
acteristic of percepts as compared with images is the
force and liveliness with which they strike the mind.
This
"striking the mind" is the essential point. At
bottom the difference is a difference of quality, not of
degree. Images do not strike the mind in the same way
as percepts.
To bring out the nature of the difference it will be
most convenient to consider first cases in which it is
conspicuous. It is most conspicuous where the sensa-
tion breaks in upon consciousness in a violent manner,
so as to interrupt and disturb the flow of mental activity.
A dazzling flash of lightning or the piercing scream of
a steam-whistle may serve as illustrations. The shriek
of the steam-whistle invades consciousness in a violently
disturbing way. The degree of loudness of the sound
might perhaps be mentally reproduced with tolerable
accuracy by a person possessed of exceptional powers
in this direction. But the mode of occurrence in con-
sciousness would be different. The mentally revived
sound would not " strike the mind " like the sound as
actually heard. No mere image ever does strike the
mind in this manner.
In such experiences as that of the steam-whistle the
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primary sensation is by no means the only factor at
work. The whole organism receives a shock giving
rise to a mass of organic and motor sensations. In ideal
revival these concomitant sensations fail to be recalled
except in a very imperfect way. It may be suggested
that it is their presence in the actual sense-experience
which gives to this experience its aggressive character.
Now it seems evident that they cannot give an aggress-
ive character to the experience unless they possess this
character themselves, and as a matter of fact they are
highly intrusive and obtrusive. But if organic sensa-
tion can "strike the mind" in this way, there is no
reason why other sensation should not do so too. The
ultimate appeal must be to introspection. This shows
in the case of the steam-whistle that the sound itself is
aggressive in the same way as the organic sensations
which accompany it. The organic sensations follow the
beginning of the sound after the lapse of about a second,
but the sound itself is aggressive from the outset.
The steam-whistle is an extreme case, involving vi-
olent shock and disturbance. But there are abundant
instances in which sensations strike the mind without
overwhelming it in this painful manner. The chimes
of a bell heard as we are passing in front of a church
break in upon consciousness with notable force and
liveliness. But they need not have a disturbing effect,
and they need not be accompanied by conspicuous
organic sensations. None the less they have an im-
pressiveness or aggressiveness analogous to that of the
steam-whistle. The same holds true generally of sen-
sations produced by a stimulus which is stronger than
we are accustomed to. But there is a certain normal
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level of intensity of stimulus at which and below which
we do not naturally notice the aggressive character of
the sensation, unless it occurs suddenly and finds us
unprepared. At these lower intensities the aggressive-
ness of the sensation does not under ordinary conditions
catch our attention: but it would be wrong to conclude
that it has therefore ceased to exist. We do not usually
take note of what is familiar to us, but only of what is
relatively unfamiliar. It is therefore natural that the
characteristic of sense-experience, which is expressed
by such metaphors as " striking
" the mind or " laying
hold" on the mind, should only be noticed when it is
present in an unusual degree of intensity.
Its presence even in these lower phases of intensity
may be detected if we pass from the comparison of sen-
sations with sensations to the comparison of sensations
with the sensory element of the image. If we look at a
sheet of white paper, and then, closing our eyes, call up
a mental picture of the paper, its brightness as actually
seen may be revived with approximate accuracy in the
image. But if we again open our eyes, and pass from
the mental picture to the actual percept, we may note
in the moment of transition a difference which can only
be described by saying that the image does not strike
the mind as the actual percept does. We may vary the
experiment by first calling up mentally the image of an
electric light, and then looking at a dimmer object, such
as a candle-fiame. The imaged brightness of the electric
light is greater than that of the candle-flame ; but the
actual sensation of brightness which we have in looking
at the candle-flame enters and persists in consciousness
in a different manner from the mental picture of the
Psych. 20
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electric light. It strikes the mind with some degree of
force and liveliness; whereas the mental image does not
strike the mind in the same way.
Our conclusion is that at bottom the distinction be-
tween image and percept, as respectively faint and vivid
states, is based on a difference of quality. The percept
has an aggressiveness which does not belong to the
image. It strikes the mind with varying degrees of
force or liveliness according to the varying intensity of
the stimulus. This degree of force or liveliness is part
of what we ordinarily mean by the intensity of a sensa-
tion. But this constituent of the intensity of sensations
is absent in mental imagery. Since it is distinctive of
sensation, we may call it sensational intensity. Sensa-
tional intensity may depend on the suddenness of an
external impression. A slight sound, when we are
totally unprepared for it, may enter consciousness in a
violent manner
;
but in the main sensational intensity
increases or decreases concomitantly with the intensity
of the stimulus. The smaller it is the less effectively
will it serve as a mark distinguishing percept from
image. Hence when it is very slight it may be prac-
tically inoperative. Thus we may fail to distinguish
between a very slight sound as actually heard, and the
mental representation of it. The possibility of this has
been shown experimentally ; but it does not, as has
been supposed, constitute a valid argument for regard-
ing the distinction between image and percept as merely
one of degree.
(b) Distinctness. Images as compared with per-
cepts have for the most part a sketchy or schematic
character. Part of the filling in of the actual sense-
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experience fails to reappear in its reproduction, which
is therefore blurred and hazy.
This does not apply without exception to all mental
imagery. Most persons, if not all, can reproduce in
a precise and delicately differentiated manner cer-
tain kinds of experience. The internal language by
which trains of thought are habitually carried on in
human beings is usually a very precise reinstatement of
signs used in the interchange of ideas between different
persons. In most cases, probably, words as mentally
reproduced are fairly exact counterparts of words as
actually spoken. Both sound and motor articulation
are revived in a precise and clear-cut way. The image
lacks sensational intensity ; but its qualitative content
is indistinguishable from that of the percept. In some
persons the motor activity of articulation is very pre-
cisely revived, but the auditory element is absent or
almost absent. Others mentally envisage printed or
written characters either in addition to, or instead of,
internal speech.
Even those persons who can reproduce articulate
sounds with maximum distinctness may be unable to
recall inarticulate noises except in the vaguest manner.
When they make the attempt, they tend to substitute
some imitation by the human voice for the noises them-
selves.
The schematic character of ideal representation is
best exemplified in the mental reproduction of the ap-
pearance of material things as they are presented to
sight and touch, and explored by movements of the eye
and hand. In most persons this reproduction is pre-
dominantly visual, though some depend mainly on
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motor and tactual revivals. We shall here only con-
sider visual imagery. This includes motor revival : for
the " inward eye
" follows the contours of objects and
scans their parts successively much as the bodily eye
does.
It is well known that there are very great differences
between the visualising powers of different individuals.
Some few seem to be capable of calling up mental pic-
tures of what they have seen, possessing a vividness, dis-
tinctness, and wealth of detail, little short of actual vision.
But the accounts which these people give of themselves
must certainly be accepted in many instances cum
grano salts. They are usually untrained in introspec-
tion, and they probably do not express themselves with
rigorous precision. In any case we must make a point
of distinguishing between what a man is capable of in the
way of visualising when the occasion requires him to do
his best and the imagery which enters into his ordinary
trains of thought. We shall see at a later stage that
the habitual recall of all the concrete detail of actual
perception would in ordinary thinking, such as takes
place by means of words, be not only a superfluity, but
an encumbrance, destroying efficiency. A man who
can call up mental pictures equal in distinctness to the
reality is no more likely to do so habitually, than a man
who can take very long leaps is likely to substitute
these for ordinary walking. Setting aside certain ex-
ceptional cases as not yet sufficiently investigated, we
may affirm that ordinary visual imagery is more or less
sketchy and blurred in comparison with actual vision.
In some men, including the best introspective psy-
chologists, such as Fechner, it is so very blurred and
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sketchy that it could scarcely become more so, without
ceasing to exist altogether.* The mental pictures of
these persons can scarcely be called pictures at all.
They are rather the indescribably attenuated ghosts of
pictures. They are, to use Fechner's language, " airy,
unsubstantial and vaporous." Persons possessing a
much higher visualising power than Fechner will read-
ily recognise the aptness of these terms as applied to
the greater part of their own visual imagery.
Very poor visualisers often find the greatest difficulty
in indicating what it is that they actually see with the
mental eye. Thus one of James's pupils, asked to call
up a picture of his breakfast-table, replies,
" There is
nothing definite about it. Everything is vague. I can-
not say what I see. I could not possibly count the chairs,
but I happen to know that there are ten. I see nothing
in detail. The chief thing is a general impression that
I cannot tell exactly what I do see."f This is a some-
what extreme case. But it brings out the point which
most requires to be emphasised in this connexion. The
indistinctness of mental imagery is to a large extent of
a quite peculiar character. It is different in kind from
the indistinctness of percepts such as may be due to
dimness of light, distance, and the like. It is also
different in kind from the indistinctness of positive and
negative after-images in the various phases through
which they pass. An ideal image is sketchy and sche-
matic, because it contains only an extract from the con-
* There are a few exceptional cases, in which the power of visualising
appears to be completely absent. Mr. Welton, of the Yorkshire College,
Victoria University, assures me that he does not possess even the rudi-
ments of visualising capacity.
t Op. cit., vol. ii., p. 54.
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tent of sense-perception. But it is a surprise to most
people, who subject these images to introspective scru-
tiny, when they discover how the extract is often made.
It becomes quite intelligible to them that Alice in Won-
derland could see the grin without the cat. This applies
not only to complex objects, but also in the experience
of some persons to apparently simple sensible qualities
such as colours and sounds. I attempt to recall a cer-
tain definite shade of red and I succeed. On comparing
the imaged red with the perceived, I am able to identify
the two as the same colour. But they are the same
with a difference which does not wholly consist in ab-
sence of sensational intensity. There is a " filling in
"
in the percept which is non-existent in the idea. What
this " filling in
"
may be I cannot say. All that I am
confident about is that it is conspicuously present in
the percept and conspicuously absent in the image.*
The comparative indistinctness of images is traceable
to various causes. It is partly due to what Dr. Ward
has called " obliviscence." Some parts of the percepts
have disappeared from the ideal representation, simply
because of a deficiency in our power to retain or at least
reproduce them. The vagueness of the mental image is
also increased by what Dr. Ward calls " reduplication."
It is the product, not of a single perception, but of a
plurality of perceptions which agree only in certain
points, and differ in others. Only the points of agree-
ment are recalled in a fixed and definite manner. The
divergent details by their very divergence obstruct the
process of reproduction. Hence, so far as they are con-
* I am also confident that the " filling in
" does not wholly consist in
accompanying motor and organic sensations.
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cerned, the image is vague and fluctuating. "One who
had seen the queen but once would scarcely be likely
to think of her without finding the attendant circum-
stances recur as well
;
this could not happen after see-
ing her in a hundred different scenes."
*
But there is a still more important reason for the com-
parative indefiniteness of ideal revival. It would be
not only useless, but disadvantageous, to recall all the
details of actual perception. A train of ideational
thought is in its character conative. It takes place in
the service of some practical or theoretical interest.
Only so much need be revived as may be required by
the dominant interest of the moment
;
all else being
irrelevant would be a mere encumbrance, hindering and
embarrassing the course of mental activity. If I wish
to recall what I did yesterday, in order to find out how
far I have fallen short of the moral ideal, or for any
other practical reason, a few minutes will probably suf-
fice for retrospect. But how is it that I can recall in a
few minutes experiences wThich occupied twelve hours ?
Only by omission. " We simply make an outline
sketch, in which the salient characters of things and
events and actions appear, without their individualis-




but there is much also which I do not
forget, and yet do not recall. I pass it over simply
because it would not help me, being irrelevant to my
guiding interest. "If I picture myself as eating my
breakfast at the beginning of the day, it is enough to
have a generic image of the breakfast-table and the
* Ward, Article "Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth
edition, xx., p. 62.
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succession of particular incidents which took up the
half-hour spent in eating. Hence it is possible for me
to recall the whole event of taking breakfast, which
occupied half an hour, in the fraction of a minute, and
then to pass on to something else." * In general, men-
tal imagery is more detailed and vivid in persons whose
interests are concrete rather than abstract. The sav-
age, the uneducated person, and the poet or artist, have
usually far more power at least of mental visualisa-
tion and often of other modes of imagery than the
mathematician or the philosopher. As we noted above,
persons habituated to abstract thinking have often little
or no ideal imagery, except reproductions of words.
(c) Relation to /Subjective Activity. In perception
we are relatively passive and receptive, because sensa-
tions are determined by a factor which is not psychical
at all, the stimulus. What the stimulus does for us
in perception, we have to do for ourselves in idea-
tion. Images are attended to only so far and so long
as they connect themselves with the general direction
of mental activity at the moment or arouse a new cur-
rent of activity by bringing into play pre-existing cona-
tive tendencies. Sensations on the other hand tend
by their sensational intensity to compel attention. If
they are sufficiently intense they may forcibly divert
attention from the most absorbing train of thought.
Percepts, so long as the stimulus persists on which
they depend, display a steadiness w
rhich is absent in case
of images. Images are maintained before consciousness
purely by an effort of attention ; when we are attending
to a percept, sensational intensity due to the stimu-
* Analytic Psychology, vol. ii., p. 185.
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lus co-operates with our subjective activity, steadfastly
sustaining it. Now attention is never perfectly fixed
and continuous. It flags at intervals and constantly
tends to pass from one point to another ; it is probably
subject to a regular rhythm of remission and concentra-
tion. Hence the peculiar unsteadiness of images even
when we deliberately attempt to arrest and detain them.
As Dr. Ward says, the image, in spite of our efforts to
fix it, "varies continually in clearness and completeness,
reminding one of nothing so much as of the illuminated
devices made of gas jets common at fetes, when the
wind sweeps across them. . . . There is not this perpet-
ual flow and flicker in what we perceive."* Dr. Ward
perhaps goes too far in attributing this "flow and
flicker" to all mental imagery. The statistical evidence
seems to show that some exceptionally gifted persons can
maintain a visual image before their mental view without
these fluctuations. But even in these cases the deten-
tion of the image costs a kind and degree of mental
exertion which is not required in attending to percepts.
The same contrast manifests itself in another way
when we compare perceptual change and transition with
the sequence of ideas. Ideas follow each other in ac-
cordance with purely psychological conditions; their
sequence is determined by preformed associations to-
gether with the general trend of mental activity at the
moment. The flow of ideas thus partakes of the nature
of a continuous development of the attention-process.
Changes in the content of perception, on the contrary,
are only partially initiated by the changing direction of
attention. They are determined to a very large extent
* Article " Psychology," p. 58.
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by alterations in the nature of the stimulation affecting
the organs of sense. So far as this is the case they
bear the character not of a continuous development of
conscious process, but of something which happens in
consciousness. This character is most conspicuous when
external changes suddenly introduce experiences for
which the mind is unprepared, as when the chair we
are sitting on unexpectedly gives way beneath us. But
even when we are awaiting an event and are prepared
to act appropriately when it comes, there is still a cer-
tain discontinuity or abruptness in the mode of its occur-
rence in consciousness as compared with the sequence
of ideas in a train of thought. It is not a continuation
of our own mental activity; it is something which
happens to us, something which strikes upon the mind
from without.
(d) Relation to Motor Activity. Inasmuch as per-
cepts depend on external stimulation proceeding from
surrounding things, they must vary with the spatial rela-
tions of the organism and its parts to environing condi-
tions. Hence our perceptions vary with our movements.
We can carry our ideas about with us; but if we turn our
head away or close our eyes we can no longer see what
we saw before. In particular the sensations we receive
vary with the adaptation of our sense-organs. For most
distinct vision we bring the eye into such a position
that the rays from the object fall on the yellow spot; we
accommodate the lens so that they form a distinct image
on the retina, and so forth. The presence of these motor
adjustments forms an important distinction between ac-
tual vision and visual imagery. The same holds good
mutatis mutandis of the other senses.
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It is true that there is also an adjustment to images,
and that this adjustment consists in great part of a
revival of the motor experiences which enter into actual
perception. But the revival is easily distinguishable
from actual movement. There is a difference of general
attitude. In merely imaging "the attention feels as if
drawn backward, towards the brain." The motor
revival exists side by side with the sensations due to
the actual state of the organism and its parts. We may
be scanning a mental picture, and this may involve some
ideal revival of the motor processes involved in actual
vision. But at the same time we abstain from the
corresponding active movements of the eye. The
bodily eye may even be closed. Thus the motor revival
is the more easily distinguished from actual movement,
because the actual sensations of position and movement
which we receive from the eye are incompatible with
the movements which are ideally reproduced. The ideal
movements appear therefore to occupy an inner circle.
Extruded from the periphery they seem to take place
within the head.
5. Relative Independence of Percept and Image.
Gazing at the blue sky, we may, as Dr. Ward ob-
serves, mentally picture a portion of it as red instead
of blue. Now it is very important to note that most
people, while they are imaging the sky as red, do not
cease to see it as blue. The red does not get between
them and the sky so as to hide its blueness. Similarly,
in calling up with closed eyes a visual image, most
persons find that this image does not form part of
the grey field which is due to the retina's own light.
It may sometimes appear to be merging itself in the
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grey field. But when this happens it is in reality
disappearing altogether. The more distinct it is, the
more disconnected and independent it appears rela-
tively to the sensations which have their source in the
state of the retina.
The case is similar with other senses. I can imagine
how the fingers which are now holding my pen would
feel if they were dipped in warm water. But the men-
tal image does not annul actual sensation. Similarly, I
can clearly distinguish a mentally articulated word, how-
ever faint it may be, though my ears are simultaneously
assailed by a deafening din. I can also articulate a
word mentally when my organs of speech are motion-
less or engaged in uttering other sounds.
Facts of this kind show that percepts and images
possess a relative independence. This can be accounted
for if we suppose that the nervous tracts excited in per-
ceptual process are not wholly coincident with those
excited in ideational process.
This view is borne out by pathological cases. We
have already quoted cases in which the power of recall-
ing ideal images, visual, tactual and auditory, was ap-
parently non-existent, whereas the corresponding per-
ceptual processes were comparatively intact. Instances
of the converse are not wanting. Wilbrand describes
the case of a lady who, sitting in her arm-chair with
eyes closed, could distinctly describe streets and houses
in their right order, though she could not recognise them
when she saw them, and was soon hopelessly lost when
left to find her way by herself.*
* See Professor Ward's Article on "Assimilation and Association,
ii.," Mind, Oct. 1894.
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The question as to the relation of the nervous seats
of sensations and percepts on the one hand, and of
ideas on the other, is still a vexed one. But the most
probable conclusion appears to be that, though they are
continuous and more or less overlap, they are by no
means necessarily coincident.
In any case it is plain from ordinary experience that
the existence of percepts does not imply the possibility
of corresponding images. Persons who have little or
no power of visual imagery can see actual objects as
well as the best visualisers. Similarly, those who have
very limited power of mentally reviving sounds may
have quite keen auditory perception. Few people, if
any, have in a considerable degree the power of calling
up mental images of organic sensations. In animals
generally, well-developed perceptual powers may be
combined with little or no capacity for ideal revival.
6. Hallucinations, Illusions, and Dreams.
Two conditions are necessary to constitute an hallucin-
ation. On the one hand, a presentation must exist,
having some or all of the distinctive characteristics of
actual sense-perception. On the other hand, the
object as it appears to be perceived must not be act-
ually present to the senses. The specific nature of the
object presented must be constituted by subjective con-
ditions, not by the present operation of an external
stimulus. Some sort of stimulation may be present
and nearly always is present; but it does not determine
the nature of the object presented; it only serves to
give the experience a sensational character.
In illusion an object is actually present to the senses,
and produces to some extent sensations such as it would
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normally produce : but these sensations are wrongly
interpreted. A presentation may be partly an illusion,
and partly an hallucination. Thus we may see a man,
when what is actually present is a suit of clothes. The
special nature of the sensations experienced may be due
partly to the suit of clothes, and partly to subjective
conditions
;
so far as the sensations which arise in a
normal manner from the external stimulus are wrongly
interpreted, there is illusion ; so far as other sensations
due to subjective conditions enter into experience, there
is hallucination. It may happen in such a case that no
other sensations are present except those which the suit
of clothes would normally produce : and that the error
lies wholly in a wrong interpretation. When this is so,
the illusion is a pure illusion without any element of
hallucination.
It is not necessary that all the characteristics of per-
ceptual experience should be present in hallucinations.
Dreams partake of the nature of hallucinations in so
far as the dreamer appears to see and hear what is not
actually present to his senses. But it often happens
that these dream-experiences are indistinct and lack
sensational intensity; and in general they are without
that dependence on motor activity which marks per-
cepts. Their perceptual character is mainly due to
their independence of subjective activity, the dis-
continuity and abruptness of the mode of their emerg-
ence into consciousness. We are passive in relation to
them in the same way in which W
TC are passive in rela-
tion to actual objects present to the senses. Probably
the hallucinations produced by suggestion in hypnotised
subjects are of a similar kind.
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But dream-experiences and other hallucinations
have often in a greater or less degree the sensational
intensity and the detailed distinctness of actual sense-
perceptions. They are in fact actual perceptions in all
respects except that the nature of the object perceived
is determined by subjective conditions rather than by
external stimulation. When this is so, some kind of
stimulation is generally if not always present. Among
these the most essential modes of stimulation consist of
certain variations in the nature and distribution of the
blood-supply within the brain, or in pathological affec-
tion of the brain-substance. The blood may contain
poisonous substances, such as alcohol, opium, ether,
chloroform, and the like, which have an irritant effect
on the nervous system. In sleep, owing to lowered
respiration, the blood becomes charged with carbonic
acid, which may have an exciting effect on the sensory
centres of the brain.
Besides these general modes of stimulation, in most
cases external conditions of a more special kind operate.
So far as this is so, hallucinations assume the character
of illusions. In an illusion, there is present some
stimulation proceeding from the excitement of a sense-
organ ; but the object perceived differs more or less
widely from that which would be perceived under
normal conditions if the sense-organ were excited in
the same way. Dream-experiences are to a large
extent illusions. A slight pain in the ribs makes the
sleeper dream of a stab from the dagger of a threatening
enemy or the bite of a dog. Contact with a cold body
may give rise to the dream of a corpse. That constant
stimulation of the retina which is called the retina's
416
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own light* plays a very important part in constituting
dream-pictures. On this subject we may quote the in-
teresting experiences of Professor Ladd. "Almost
without exception, when I am able to recall the visual
images of my dream and to observe the character of
the retinal field quickly enough to compare the two, the
schemata of the luminous and coloured retinal phan-
tasms afford the undoubted clue to the origin of the
things just seen in my dream-life." t By long practice
Professor Ladd has acquired the power of dropping
gradually into a dreaming sleep and then suddenly
awaking with his attention fixed on the comparison of
his dream-pictures with the experiences of light and
colour due to the internal stimulation of the retina,
which in his case are peculiarly brilliant and varied.
"The most elaborate visual dreams may originate in
intraorganic retinal excitement. Perhaps a harder prob-
lem could not be given to my experiments to solve than
the following: How can one be made by such excitement
to see a printed page of words clearly spread out before
one in a dream ? . . . But I have several times verily
caught my dreaming automaton in the feat of having
just performed this transformation. On waking from a
dream, in which I had distinctly seen lines of printed
letters forming words and sentences, and had been
engaged in reading these lines by sight, I have clearly
detected the character of that retinal field which had
originated such an extraordinary hallucination. The
minute light and dark spots which the activity of the
rods and cones occasions, had arranged themselves in
parallel lines extending across the retinal field." $
* See p. 151. t Mind, N.S., vol. i. (1892), p. 301. $ ibid., p. 302.
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Pure illusions are illusions in which no element of
hallucination is present. The impressions made on the
senses of the observer may give rise to just the same
sensations as they would normally produce, and yet the
things and processes apparently perceived may not act-
ually exist or take place. It is mainly this pure illusion,
unmixed with hallucination, which is exemplified in the
tricks of ventriloquists and conjurers. When a juggler
swallows a sword merely in appearance, the sensory im-
pressions made on the eye of a spectator are very much
the same as if the juggler had swallowed the sword in
actual fact. For this reason, pure illusions may be
shared by a great number of persons simultaneously.
On the other hand, collective hallucinations, though
their existence is guaranteed by the Psychical Research




1. Two-fold Aspect of Ideational Process. In
the last chapter we considered the characteristics of
images as compared with percepts. We have now to
deal with trains of ideas, with the sequence and
combination of images and their meanings. Trains of
ideas, like trains of perceptual activity, have in general
a certain unity and continuity of interest. They sub-
serve some end, practical or theoretical. Those transi-
tions in the flow of ideas which show a break in con-
tinuity of interest are in general transitions from one
train to another. It should be noted that the interest
which gives unity to a single train may be very slight
and evanescent. Thus the train may be no more than a
passing thought. It may appear to consist of a single
idea; but if it tends to gratify any interest, however
evanescent, it may none the less be regarded as a con-
tinuous train.
The course of a train of ideas is determined by two
distinct groups of conditions. On the one hand it is
reproductive, and on the other productive. The mate-
rial for it must be derived from past experience. But
this material is variously shaped and transformed by
the total mental condition existing when the ideal
418
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revival takes place. Even when we are interested in
reviving past events, as such, preserving as far as pos-
sible their original nature and order, yet the mode in
which they appear to consciousness is determined by the
circumstances of the present, and by all that has taken
place since their original occurrence. It is for this reason
that on their revival they come before consciousness
as past events; whereas on their original occurrence
they bore the character of present experiences.
Every train of ideas has both a reproductive and a
productive aspect; though the relative dominance of
the two aspects may vary indefinitely. We shall first
consider the reproductive side of the process, under the
head, Association of Ideas; and then the productive,
under the head, Ideal Construction.
2. Association of Ideas. For a general account
of the nature of Association, we must refer to bk. i.,
ch. ii., 7-9. The basis of all associative connexion
is the concurrence of distinct experiences in the forma-
tion of a single cumulative disposition, which tends to
be re-excited as a whole whenever any of the experi-
ences recur which have combined to produce it. If we
suppose that two experiences, a and #, have been united
in this way so as to form the total disposition Dab, the
re-occurrence of an experience similar to a will re-ex-
cite Dab. If the reproduction takes the form of mere
acquirement of meaning or of complication, the result
is a modification of a, which we may represent by ab .
But in ideal reproduction something more takes place.
The occurrence of ab is followed by the ideal revival
of b
a>
as a relatively independent phase in the succes-
sive flow of mental process.
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It must be noted that the tendency is to the revival of
the total experience ab. Hence, apart from interfer-
ing conditions, b will tend to be revived in the same
relation to a as that in which it originally occurred. If
in the original experience one object has been ap-
prehended as succeeding another, or as situated on the
top of another, or as logically dependent on another,
the tendency of the ideal revival will be to represent
the object in the same relations. It is evident that
these objective relations may be indefinitely numerous
and diverse in nature. Hence it is impossible to base
on them a classification of the various forms of associa-
tion of ideas. As Reid remarks:
"Every relation of
things has a tendency, more or less, to lead the thought,
in a thinking mind, from one to the other."* It follows
that in classifying the forms of association of ideas, we
must consider relations between psychical states, as
such, as distinguished from relations between the ob-
jects of which they take cognisance. Ultimately, all
depends on continuity of interest: but this continuity
may be direct or indirect, giving rise to two forms of
association which are commonly called association by
contiguity and by similarity.
3. Different Forms of the Association of Ideas.
(a) Contiguity ( Continuity of Interest). The law
of Contiguity, as ordinarily understood, may be stated
as follows, If B has been perceived or thought of to-
gether with A or immediately after A, then, on a future
occasion, the perception or idea of A will tend to call
up the idea of B. In other words, the sequence of
ideas follows the order in which their objects have
* Works, Hamilton's edition, vol. i., p. 386.
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been attended to in previous experience. The under-
lying principle is that mental activity when partially
revived tends to repeat itself ; it can only repeat itself
if its original direction and order are reproduced.
This perhaps is the best form which can be given to
the law of Contiguity, as ordinarily understood. But
even in this form it requires qualification. It is by
no means true that association of this kind connects
only those objects which occupy attention in im-
mediate succession. This has been shown experimen-
tally. Professor Ebbinghaus found that after learning
by heart a series of disconnected words, which we
may denote by A, J3, (7, .Z), etc., it cost him a much
shorter time to learn the same series with regular gaps
in it, e.g. A D - G - , etc. Repetition of the
series A, IB, C, D served to establish associative links
not only between A and J?, J? and (7, C and D, etc.,
but also between A and D, D and G, G and H, etc.
The same point is more conspicuously illustrated in
ordinary experience. In recalling a train of events
we usually pass from one salient occurrence to an-
other, leaving out the relatively unimportant details
which actually intervened between them. Similarly,
in describing an object, I do not mention all the
details which I actually observed in the exact order in
which I noticed them. On the contrary, I pass from one
characteristic and distinctive feature to another, oblivi-
ous of much which is not characteristic and distinctive.
The dominant interest of the original experience and
the dominant interest at the time I recall it, determine
a selection of items which is by no means tied down by
the condition that objects which introduce each other in
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the train of ideal revival must have been attended to in
immediate succession.
The truth is that the fundamental principle of asso-
ciation is not contiguity in the strict sense of the
word, but rather continuity of interest. The stronger
the dominant interest, the conative tendency guiding
the whole process, the more selective is the revival apt
to be, links being dropped out which are relatively
unimportant to the general trend of mental activity.
This is well brought out in the special case in which
some process having continuity of interest is carried
out with interruptions occurring at intervals. If the
interruptions are not themselves of a specially inter-
esting kind, we tend to omit them altogether in recall-
ing the main activity. The gaps, so to speak, close up.
It may be asked why in any case we should remem-
ber the interruptions, even when they are specially in-
teresting. For where there is interruption, there is
not continuity, but rather discontinuity of interest.
The answer is that at the moment at which the inter-
ruption takes place there is continuity between the two
processes which are otherwise disconnected. The in-
terruption is itself an experience which belongs to both
equally and serves to link them together.
Immediate succession, then, is not the fundamental
condition of the association which is called association
by contiguity. Ideal revival may and often does pro-
ceed by leaps and bounds. But it must be conceded
that the immediacy of the succession does count as a
very important factor. Other things equal, the direct
transition of attention from A to B will be repeated
in ideal revival, rather than a transition from A to C
3.] TRAINS OF IDEAS. 423
which originally took place through the intermediate
link J3. In proportion as the control of a dominant
interest is weak and intermittent, the tendency is to
exactly repeat the original order without omissions
and inclusive of interruptions. This is well seen in
the conversations of feeble-minded persons. Of course
the original order will be exactly repeated, where
there is an interest in exact repetition, as in learning
by heart.
(b) Similarity. The characteristic feature of repro-
duction by similarity is, as Dr. Bain observes, that it is
opposed to routine and counteracts its effects. In such
reproduction one object may recall another with which
it has never been connected in previous experience. I
see a man who reminds me of the Duke of Wellington
by some resemblance in his personal appearance. I
have never had occasion before to think of this man
and the Duke in any kind of connexion with each
other. The ideal revival seems to give rise to a com-
pletely novel combination instead of reproducing a past
combination.
If this were really so, we could not properly speak of
association as having anything to do with the matter.
Association must at least imply that revival depends
on objects having somehow come together in previous
experience.
In fact a closer analysis shows that this actually is so
in the example chosen and in all instances of so-called
association by similarity. What is really operative
in calling up the idea of the Duke of Wellington, is the
personal appearance of the man in so far as it resembles
that of the Duke. The experience I have now in look-
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ing at the man is partially the same in character as the
experiences which I have previously had in looking at
the Duke's portraits. The mental disposition left be-
hind by these experiences is partially re-excited, and in
consequence it tends to be re-excited as a whole. But
this re-excitement of the whole in consequence of the
re-excitement of the part is due to continuity of inter-
est, and not to any essentially distinct principle. The
principle of continuity alone is operative, but it oper-
ates in a very different manner and produces a very
different result : reproduction by similarity and repro-
duction by contiguity respectively. Reproduction by
similarity is most aptly described by reference to its
effect. It ought to be called reproduction of similars
rather than reproduction by similarity. Reproduction
by contiguity may be called by way of distinction repe-
titive reproduction. Both repetitive reproduction and
the reproduction of similars are in a sense cases of
reproduction by similarity. Neither involves com-
plete identity. Smoke reminds one of fire because of
preformed associations. This is repetitive reproduc-
tion. But the smoke I now see may have features of
its own in which it differs from previous experiences.
It may be more voluminous, lighter or darker in
colour, and so on. In other words, there need only be
similarity, not complete identity. The points of differ-
ence do not contribute to bring about the reproduction.
The partial identity is alone operative in this. But the
specific differences none the less play a positive part in
the process. Though they do not help to bring about
the reproduction, they modify the nature of what is re-
produced. A thin thread of smoke suggests a small
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fire
;
a large volume suggests a big fire. Smoke on a
moorland and smoke rising from a house in London
both suggest fires, but with very important differences.
The reproduction is due to their identical character;
the difference in what is reproduced is due to their
different mental setting.
Now in the reproduction of similars the points of
divergence between the reproducing presentation and
that which is reproduced play no positive part in de-
termining the reproduction. The partial identity of
personal appearance between a man whom I meet casu-
ally and the Duke of Wellington calls up in my mind
the idea of the Duke. But this idea is not transformed
in a special manner by the divergent characters which
distinguish the man before me from the victor of
Waterloo.
We must carefully distinguish between the actual
reproduction of similars and the processes which fre-
quently follow on it. When one presentation has
called up another similar to it, the mind may proceed
to compare them, and it may make the partial identity
which is discernible between them the basis for work-
ing out a parallelism in other respects by means of
repetitive reproduction. The relation of an apple to
the earth reminds Newton, according to the familiar
legend, of the relation of the moon to the earth. But
he does not stop here. Fixing attention on the partial
identity, he strives to enlarge it by tracing identity in
other respects also. This takes place by trains of
thought in which the effect of repetitive association is
profoundly modified, but not arrested by the difference
of the two.
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4. Competition of Divergent Associations. The
same experience may have, and generally has, a great
many connexions in the way of association. The ques-
tion naturally arises, why one of these rather than an-
other should be operative on any given occasion. " If
the sight of a picture, for example, can recall to me the
person whom it resembles, the artist who painted it, the
friend who presented it to me, the room in which it
formerly was hung, the series of portraits of which it
then formed a part, and perhaps many circumstances
and events that have been accidentally connected with
it, why does it suggest one of these rather than the
others ? " * Stated in symbolic terms, the question is as
follows : If a has become associated with &, c, and J,
severally, why on any given occasion should it recall
one of these, b, in preference to the others? Brown
enumerates a number of special circumstances, depend-
ing on the conditions under which the association has
been originally formed. The greater and more pro-
longed the attention given to a and b and to their
connexion at the time they became associated, the
firmer will be the association, and the stronger the
tendency of a to recall b. Again, the frequency with
which a and b have been previously combined is a
very important factor. " It is thus we remember, after
reading them three or four times over, the verses
which we could not repeat, when we had read them
only once." f We must also take account of the
recency of the association. "Immediately after reading
any single line of poetry, we are able to repeat it,
* Thomas Brown, Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii., pp. 271-272.
t Op. cit., p. 273.
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though we may have paid no particular attention to it ;
in a very few minutes, unless when we have paid par-
ticular attention to it, we are no longer able to repeat it
accurately, and in a very short time we forget it alto-
gether."
*
Lastly, much depends on whether b has been
associated in a similar way with other objects besides a.
"The song, which we have never heard but from one
person, can scarcely be heard again by us, without re-
calling that person to our memory ; but there is obvi-
ously much less chance of this particular suggestion, if
we have heard the same air and words frequently sung
by others." f As Dr. Ward remarks, " the average
Englishman is continually surprised without his um-
brella," t just because the weather is so changeable that
no fixed association can be formed.
These conditions are important, but they are not the
most important. The predominant factors determining
the actual lines which ideal reproduction takes, are to
be found not in the conditions under which associations
have been previously formed, but in the total mental
state at the time when revival takes place. Those ob-
jects tend to be ideally re-instated which are relevant
to the general trend of mental activity at the moment.
The sight of rain will suggest an umbrella if we are in-
tending to go out; otherwise it may only suggest the
idea of somebody else getting wet. If our minds are
occupied with scientific discussion, the word proofs will
suggest one group of ideas ; if we are engaged in pre-
paring a book for the press, it will suggest something
quite different.
* Ibid., p. 274. t fbid.
% Encyclopaedia Article, p. 63.
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5. Ideal Construction. - - We have seen in the
last section that the total mental state, at the time at
which ideal revival takes place, is a most important
factor in determining what ideas shall be revived. We
have now to add that the ideally revived objects are in
various manners and degrees modified and transformed
by the conditions under which their re-instatement
takes place. They enter into new combinations and
acquire new relations, so that they appear under fresh
aspects. If in the past the sight of a house has become
associated with the ideal representation of a person
living in it, whenever I see or think of the house I
shall tend to think of the person inside it. Supposing
that I see the house on fire, or hear that it is on fire,
the ideal representation of the person who lives in it
will be transformed by the special circumstances of the
case. I shall think of him as in danger of being burnt.
The same transforming influence also comes into 'play
in association of similars. A draper serving at the
counter may remind me by his personal appearance of
Napoleon ; but the special circumstances will tend to
make me think of Napoleon in a special way. My
mind will dwell on the contrast between the life of the
great conqueror and that of the man before me.
In these instances, the object ideally recalled is modi-
fied by the relations into which it enters at the time of
its recall. In some manner or degree, this always takes
place. But there is another kind of transformation
which only becomes prominent under special conditions.
The ideally revived object may not only be modified by
the new relations into which it enters ; it may require
to be modified as a pre-condition of its entering into
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these relations. The nature of any whole is deter-
mined, not merely by the nature of its constituent
parts, but also by the form of their combination. Now
suppose that we have two terms b and d so related as
to form a whole bd. If the relation which constitutes
this wThole is to be maintained while one of its con-
stituents is altered, it may be necessary for the other
constituent to be changed in a corresponding manner.
If instead of l> we substitute /3, we must substitute &
instead of d. A familiar illustration is supplied by
mathematical ratios. Suppose that we have given the
ratio 1:4; if 1 be changed into 5, we must change 4
into 20, in order to preserve the same ratio.
Now in ideal revival based on preformed association,
it may and frequently does happen that the trend of
mental activity at the moment requires the relation
between the associated terms b and d to be re-instated.
But the given term may be only similar to b, not iden-
tical in its nature with it. Let us call the given term
/3; /3 may so differ from b that it can no longer enter
into the same relation with d, so as to form the same
kind of whole. In order to re-constitute the form of
combination characteristic of this whole, it may be
necessary that the ideal revival should take the form
instead of d.
A simple instance " is supplied by the singing or
mental repetition of a tune in a different key from that
in which it has been previously heard. The absolute
pitch of the notes is determined by the keynote, which
may vary. The identity of the tune is preserved by
correspondence in the transitions between the notes." *
* Analytic Psychology, vol. ii., p. 57.
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To take an example of a more common type, suppose
that the sight of a piece of sugar arouses the ideal re-
presentation of its sweetness. It is this special piece of
sugar as seen by me at this moment which recalls the
sweet taste. The special conditions operative at the
moment of reproduction enter into and modify process
and result. "If the sugar seen is beyond my reach, then
the sweetness suggested is a sweetness beyond my reach,
though in all my past experiences the sugar may have
been easily attainable."* "Mr. Lloyd Morgan tells a
story of a little boy who i after gazing intently at a
spirited picture of a storm at sea with a ship being
struck by lightning, asked, Mother, why doesn't it
rumble ? ' Now, what kind of a rumble was in this
case actually suggested to the boy ? Was it anything
in the nature
^of a literal reproduction of any thunder-
clap which he had ever heard? If he had heard an
actual peal of thunder at the moment, this would not
have fitted itself in as a natural complement of the
painted scene. If his mother had told him that painted
lightning could only be accompanied by painted thun-
der, the answer would in all probability have appeared
to him a satisfactory one." t A little girl, playing
with a doll, treats it as if it were a baby. The doll
becomes a centre from which a train of associated ideas
starts, analogous to those which would be suggested by
a living child. But the fact that she has not to deal
with a living child, but only with a doll, makes a differ-
ence. She puts food to its mouth, but does not expect
the food to be swallowed. | She would certainly be very
* Op. cit., pp. 44-45. t Ibid., p. 46.
t
" Some children, it seems, have a way of putting food on the floor
near the doll; others go further, and hold the food long to the doll's
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much startled if it actually began to cry. The train of
ideas connected with babies is only reproduced in
analogue.
In these examples, the relations which determine the
ideal construction are revived by association. But in
other cases, the form of combination is entirely deter-
mined by the predominant interest at the moment at
which revival takes place ; so that objects are brought
into relations in which they have never occured before.
If a man is in the mood for making puns, or for draw-
ing epigrammatic contrasts, or for tracing relations of
cause and effect, these modes of combination will im-
pose themselves on the objects revived by association,
and will tend to transform these objects so far as may
be necessary to make them fit into the ideally con-
structed whole. I once heard a man propound the
riddle, Why is a sparrow like a chimney ? The answer,
which of course nobody guessed, was, Because it has
a crooked flue ! Obviously, his mind must have been
very bent on riddle-making, before he could have perpe-
trated such an atrocity. Hence he utilised most unpro-
mising material and transformed it to suit his purpose
in the most uncompromising way. The first clue is
probably the verbal resemblance viflue withjftew; but
in working out the analogy he had mentally to turn
flight into flew and to do violence to the nature both of
sparrows and chimneys. This is probably the worst
mouth; or, insisting on a still more realistic performance, break out
some of its teeth, and push the food into the mouth with a pin. Others,
again, stopping short of such violent realism, cover the unreality by a
dodge, as when one child, after holding the food to the doll's mouth for a
while, slipped it down its neck." Sully, Article on "Dollatry," Contem-
porary Review, Jan. 1899.
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joke on record ; yet many a better has evoked less
laughter. Another, I hope more serious example, is the
state of my own mind when this illustration occurred
to me. I had never before thought of the sparrow and
chimney joke as connected with the psychological doc-
trine I am now expounding, yet my mind, pre-occupied
with this doctrine, and bent on using all material which
could help in its development, summoned up this rem-
iniscence and wove it into its ideal construction.
It should be noted that differences in the mental con-
stitution of individuals largely consist in differences in
the kind of relation in wrhich they are predominantly
interested. Some attend by preference to mere rela-
tions of contiguity and time and space ; others to met-
aphorical analogy ; others to rhetorical contrast ; others
to logical connexion ; and the kind of transition which is
relatively dominant in the sequence of their ideas varies
accordingly. In the mind of a schoolman, the ruling
scheme of connexion was apt to be the form of the syllo-
gism. In many minds, and especially in those which are
saturated with the study of Hegel, a special form of tran-
sition is favoured, which consists in a triple movement,
passing from a one-sided view of the case to the opposite
one-sided view, and then to a more comprehensive view
which embraces the two extremes in harmony.*
6. Obstructions in the Flow of Ideal Activity.
Ideal activity, like perceptual activity, may be success-
ful or unsuccessful. In so far as it is unsuccessful, it
tends, like perceptual activity, to persist with variation
* The examples of oonstructiveness given in this section are elemen*
tary; but such complex constructions as the invention of the steam-
engine or novel-writing depend essentially on the same conditions.
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of procedure. The tendency is of course proportioned
to the strength of the interest involved.
The conditions which obstruct and delay the flow of
ideas are of various kinds. The hitch may occur either
on the reproductive or on the constructive side of the
process. When it occurs on the reproductive side, it is
merely what is called a failure to remember ; as when
we find ourselves unable to recall the name of a person
or the title of a book. If we are sufficiently interested,
such failure is followed by a more or less prolonged
effort to recollect. In this effort we vary our procedure,
using all the means which present themselves. Suppos-
ing it is the name of a person we are endeavouring to
recall. We try various clues in succession. We fix
attention on objects and circumstances connected with
the person. We perhaps inquire of a bystander, or
look in a book
;
or go through a list of names on the
chance that we may hit on the right one.
When the hitch occurs on the constructive side, the
mental processes which are directed to overcome it may
be extremely complex. The guessing of riddles fur-
nishes a good example. We have ideally to reproduce
something which shall satisfy all the conditions of the
riddle. Certain relations are given, and we have to
find another term which shall fit in with these in a
harmonious whole. We make trial after trial, we think
of this, and then we think of that ; but each suggested
solution in turn, though it may fulfil part, fails to fulfil
all conditions of the problem. Finally w
r
e may or may
not succeed in completing the ideal scheme, by making
the right guess. We may take as another example a
case in which the flow of ideas is controlled by the
Psych .
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urgency of a practical need. Suppose a man shut up
in prison and bent on devising a mode of escape. Let
us assume that the main difficulty lies in the height
which has to be descended before he can reach the
ground. The notion of letting himself down from a
height by means of a rope may be familiar to him by
past experience : but in this case he has no rope. What
he needs therefore is something which will take the
place of a rope, something which will fit into his
ideal scheme as the rope would if he had it. He may
proceed to think of various expedients, and he may at
last light on the idea of using his sheets and blankets.
The first time this suggestion occurs to him, it may not
help him out of his difficulty ; but it comes nearer to
what he wants than anything else he has thought of,
therefore his mind tends to dwell on it, and to give it a
new shape which will suit his purpose. At last he hits
on the idea of tearing up the sheets and twisting them
into a rope. Of course we are supposing that our
supposed prisoner has not already heard of this ex-
pedient. We may assume that he is the first man who
invented it. In this, as in similar instances, association
by similarity plays an important part. His own case
calls up to the mind of the man analogous cases in
which ropes have been used. He then proceeds to




1. Definition of Memory. Sometimes the word
memory is used as synonymous with retentiveness in
general. This application of the term is inconveniently
wide. It is better to confine it to ideal revival, so far
as ideal revival is merely reproductive, and does not
involve transformation of what is revived in accordance
with present conditions. This reproductive aspect of
ideal revival is best exemplified in those cases in which
the controlling interest requires the objects of past
experiences to be re-instated as far as possible in the
order and manner of their original occurrence. Hence
the word memory is applied with special appropriate-
ness to these cases. A witness giving evidence in a
law-court is a typical example. His mind is bent on
recalling past objects and events, as they actually
occurred in his previous experience, omitting the in-
ferences which he has subsequently drawn from them,
or is inclined to draw at the present moment. The in-
ferences which he drew from them when they occurred
he recalls as far as possible only as inferences, and not
as actual percepts.
The witness in a law-court recalls his own personal
experiences as far as possible in the same time-relations
in which they actually occurred. This may be called
435
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personal memory ; but there is a large class of cases in
which memory is impersonal. What is remembered in
these instances is the knowledge acquired by personal
experience, and not the particular incidents connected
with the process of acquiring it. When a boy first
begins to study his Euclid, his natural tendency is to
learn the propositions by heart, so as to reproduce the
very words of the book. When the process of learning
is complete, what remains in his mind may be only the
general method of proof. He will to a large extent
have forgotten the words of the book, and he will cer-
tainly have forgotten much that happened in the process
of learning; the particular occasions on which he sat
down with Euclid in hand to learn a proposition ; his
blunders in attempting to reproduce it, and so on. He
will finally tend to recall only what he has an interest
in recalling, forgetting what is irrelevant. The process
is quite analogous to the formation of Habit, as de-
scribed in bk. i., ch. ii., 11. As in the formation of
habit, two distinct conditions are involved : " The first
is retentiveness
;
the second lies in the essential nature
of conation, according to which conative processes
cease, if and so far as their end is attained."* This
holds good even in learning by rote. In learning by
rote the dates of accession and death of the kings of
England, a boy will go over them again and again in
his book, and will again and again attempt to repeat
them
;
but in the long run he will forget these partic-
ular incidents. He will forget his successive attempts
to "commit to memory" and his occasional failures and
errors in attempting to reproduce.
* See p. 101.
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2. Good and Bad Memory. The marks of a
good memory are, (1) The rapidity with which the
power of recalling an experience is acquired ; (2) The
length of time during which the power of remembering
lasts without being refreshed; (3) The rapidity and
accuracy of the actual revival. Some persons can learn
quickly and easily, but soon forget ; others take a long
time to learn, but also retain for a long time what they
have once learned. Even when memory is retentive,
so that what is once learned is not easily forgotten,
there may yet be slowness and hesitancy in the actual
process of reminiscence.
As a fourth mark of good memory, we may mention
its serviceableness, or in other words the readiness with
which it reproduces what is relevant to the prevail-
ing interest of the moment. A memory may be ex-
tremely extensive without being in this sense service-
able. Dominic Sampson's mind, for instance, was like
"the magazine of a pawnbroker, stowed with goods of
every description, but so cumbrously piled together,
and in such total disorganisation, that the owner can
never lay his hands on any one article at the moment
he has occasion for it." * Those who cram for examina-
tions often realise this in a painful manner. So long
as the questions are straightforward, so that the answers
may be taken directly from the books they have used,
they may find no difficulty. But as soon as a question
is asked which requires them to record their acquired
knowledge in a different order and manner from that
in which it is given in their text-book, they break down.
The materials for an answer may really be contained in
* Guy Mannering, ch. xxxix.
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what they have learned, and yet they may not be able to
recall what is wanted, because the particular question
has never been associated in their minds with the par-
ticular answer.
The rapidity with which the power of recalling is
acquired depends to a large extent on the keenness of
the interest attaching to the original experience. Much
that attracts attention only transiently and faintly fails
to be remembered at all. It is to be noted that we
tend to remember, not only what is in itself interesting,
but also connected circumstances which may in them-
selves have little interest. A young child takes little
interest in the alphabet for its own sake, but if the
letters are made of gingerbread, it is more likely to
remember them. So far as the power of acquiring a
memory does not depend on interest, it must be set
down to the account of congenital constitution. But
it may be doubted how far congenital constitution gives
the power of remembering without giving capacity for
interest in what is remembered. Mozart as a boy of
fourteen years old could write down from memory an
extremely complex piece of music after having heard it
only once ; but the musical genius of Mozart caused
him to take a most intense and absorbing interest
in the actual hearing. Some idiots show remarkable
power of memory. They can for instance repeat long
lists of disconnected words which they have heard only
once. Probably this is connected with the fact that
the range of interest in the idiot is excessively narrow
and correspondingly concentrated. They are scarcely
capable of apprehending any relations except those of
bare contiguity in time and space. Hence their re-
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markable powers of recalling series of objects which
are only connected in this manner. There are no other
divergent lines of association to compete with those
which are formed by the mere sequence of external
impressions.
Differences in the length of time during which the
power of recall is retained also depend largely on in-
terest. It is to be remarked that the kind of interest
which facilitates the acquisition of memory is not neces-
sarily the same as that which is most effective in causing
its permanent retention. The barrister learns the facts
bearing on a particular case, but rapidly forgets many
of them, which have only a transient interest, when the
case is over. The properly legal aspects of the case,
on the contrary, will tend to be retained because he has
in them a permanent interest.
Another very important factor in determining dura-
tion of the power of recall is the frequency with which
the remembered experience has been repeated. A boy
learning a passage by heart will go over it again and
again until he has thoroughly stamped it in. Differ-
ences in the retentiveness of memory which are not
traceable either to interest or to frequent repetition must
be referred to congenital constitution. Here again it
is doubtful how far congenital constitution can favour
memory without favouring interest.
The conditions on which serviceableness depends are
of a different kind. A man who can readily recall what
he needs at the time he needs it is said to have his
knowledge well-arranged or organised. The mass of
his acquirements may be much smaller than that of
another man whose knowledge takes the form of cum-
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brous and disjointed erudition. Yet his memory may
be incomparably more effective both for practical and
theoretical purposes, and even in the answering of
examination papers. To understand the distinction we
must note that a man may be perfectly able to call
something to mind when a certain prompting cue is
given, and quite unable to do so in the absence of this
cue. I may be quite able to recall a line of verse if I
have first heard or recalled the previous lines ; but
I may be quite unable to recall the same line of verse
as a quotation illustrating some point in which I am
interested at the moment. The reason is that I have
never thought of the meaning of this line of verse, or
of similar objects, in connexion with this particular
point or similar points. It is not necessary that the
particular line of verse should have been thought of in
a special connexion for it to be recalled in this con-
nexion. All that is necessary is that the general kind
of relation involved should be more or less familiar to
the mind. I may for instance wish to illustrate the
fact that in poetic metaphor the connexion between the
metaphorical expression and the reality which it ex-
presses is often identity in the form of combination of
a complex whole rather than identity in the nature
of its material constituents. For this purpose I may
quote Tennyson's line,
"A doubtful throne is ice in summer seas."
A throne is not in the least like ice, nor the dangers to
which it is exposed like the warmth of summer seas.
There is only analogy of relation. Now for this line of
Tennyson to occur to me as an illustration of my point,
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it is not necessary that I should have thought of it
before in this connexion. But it is necessary that I
should previously have thought of other similar illustra-
tions. The more I have done this, so as to familiarise
myself with this kind of mental transition, the more
readily shall I be able both to recall old illustrations
and to produce new ones. Thus we may say that the
serviceableness of memory depends on our forming the
right kind of associations. The tendency of A to recall
J5 in a certain kind of relation, r, depends on our hav-
ing previously attended to A and B in this relation, or
to things similar to A and IB in similar relations.
3. Decay of Memory with Lapse of Time. -
Though particular memories last for various periods in
different cases and with different persons, yet it is the
general law that they tend to die away in course of time
if they are not refreshed. Professor Ebbinghaus has
made experiments with the view of determining the
quantitative relation between lapse of time and decay
of the power of recall. For this purpose he learnt by
heart lists of unmeaning syllables of three letters each ;
each list contained from twelve to thirty-six syllables.
After learning a list so as to be able to repeat it, an
interval of time was allowed to intervene before again
attempting to recall the syllables. Memory had in the
interim become more or less partial and fragmentary.
The point of the experiment was to determine the
amount of time required for re-learning the list as com-
pared with the time originally required. This yields
a measure of the degree of decay of the mental dis-
positions, and shows the relation between decay and
lapse of time. After an interval of 20 minutes, about
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40 per cent of the original time was required for
re-learning, after 64 minutes, about 56 per cent, after
526 minutes, about 65 per cent, after two days, about
72 per cent, and so on. From this we see that though
the amount of decay increases with the lapse of time,
yet relatively it is smaller the longer the interval.
4. Variety of Memories. In ordinary language
we speak of a person having a good memory for num-
bers but a bad one for names; a good memory for places
but a bad one for faces, and so on. Theoretically, we
must carry this division very much further. As memory
consists in the power of ideal revival, there must be a
relatively separate memory for every experience ideally
revived. There must not only be a separate memory for
names, but a separate memory for each particular name.
But ordinary language is undoubtedly right in re-
cognising distinct memories for general departments of
experience. Mozart had an extraordinary memory for
music; but he may have been very bad at recalling
numbers. The most wonderful memory for words may
be accompanied by a poor memory for dates and events.
These differences are very largely due to congenital
constitution
;
but special kinds of memory may also be
cultivated.
5. Improvement of Memory by Practice. It is
certainly true that the exercise of memory in a special
direction improves it in that direction. By long
practice actors come to learn their parts more rapidly
and easily. The same is true of clergymen who learn
their sermons by heart. These effects of practice
appear to be strictly confined to the special kinds of
ideal revival which are exercised. A man who im-
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proves his memory for words does not thereby improve
his memory for places.
It has been denied that memory can be directly
improved by practice. The power of remembering
depends on the kind and degree of attention given to
the original experience. It has been urged that what
is educated by practice is the attention, and not the
power of recall. Professor James for instance main-
tains that " all improvement of memory consists in the
improvement of one's habitual method of recording
facts."* It is the power of learning, not the power of
retaining, which is increased by practice. " I have,"
says James,
"
carefully questioned several mature actors
on the point, and all have denied that the practice of
learning parts has made any such difference as is alleged.
What it has done for them is to improve their power of
studying a part systematically. Their mind is now full
of precedents in the way of intonation, emphasis, gesti-
culation,"f There can be no doubt that Professor
James is right in assigning increased and better directed
attention as a cause of the improvement of memory by
practice. It may even be admitted that it is the most
important factor. The endeavour to remember is an
endeavour to attend; and by repeated and prolonged
attention to objects, we not only make the traces more
permanent which our experience of them leaves behind:
we also bring them into relation with other objects :
and so multiply the associations which may severally
and conjointly contribute to their revival.
But it may be doubted whether Professor James's
* Principles of Psychology, vol. i., p. 667.
t Ibid., p. 664.
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account of the matter contains the whole truth. Ac-
cording to him, the power of retentiveness is born with
each individual as an essential part of his general phy-
siological constitution. It is "a physiological quality,
given once for all with his organisation, and which he
can never hope to change. It differs no doubt in dis-
ease and health
;
and it is a fact of observation that it is
better in fresh and vigorous hours than when we are
fagged or ill. . . . But more than this we cannot say."*
On this point also we may admit that Professor James
is right. But it seems to have escaped his notice that
the congenital constitution which gives superior re-
tentiveness in a certain direction is often connected
with special interest in this direction. It might be
argued that congenital constitution gives power of
remembering only by giving the aptitude and impulse
for attending. This is at least true in part, if it is not
the whole truth. But if it be so, the distinction between
native power of retention and that acquired by practice
is not so sharp as Professor James supposes.
Admitting that native power of retentiveness is a
fixed quantity, unchangeable by exercise or education,
we may none the less demur to the conclusion which
Professor James appears to draw from this theory.
To maintain this conclusion, he stands in need of an
additional hypothesis the hypothesis that all mental
dispositions corresponding to particular objects are ab-
solutely and not merely relatively distinct. If different
dispositions have common factors; if they partially in-
terpenetrate each other, then the experiences by which
one is formed will have already done part of the work
* Op. cit., p. 664.
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requisite for the formation of another.* But the facts of
association show that the dispositions corresponding to
similar experiences must be regarded as partially the
same. This is peculiarly clear in association by simi-
larity. One man, by some similarity in his personal
appearance, may remind me of another; I may not dis-
cover, even after careful scrutiny, what the point of
resemblance is. It has not formed a separate link of
association. Yet the disposition left behind by my ex-
perience of the one person has been re-excited by the
sight of the other. The dispositions left behind by the
two experiences must therefore have some common fac-
tor. They must partially interpenetrate. In general, so
far as the revival of similars by similars is possible, there
must be a partial coincidence of mental dispositions.
The same applies to association by contiguity. If /3
recalls
<y
because b and c have been associated, the dis-
position left behind by b must be partially re-excited
on the occurrence of /3; the dispositions left behind by
b and ft cannot therefore be absolutely independent.
Just in so far as this interpenetration of mental dis-
positions exists, the exercise of the memory for certain
experiences will improve the memory for analogous ex-
periences. When a man has made a certain amount of
progress in the learning of a foreign language, further
progress is facilitated, just because he has become famil-
iar with certain general characteristics of the language,
which do not need to be learnt over again for every par-
ticular case. Of course it does not follow that memory
in general is improved by its exercise in this or that
* Probably James does not really mean to deny this ; but if so, his
language is misleading.
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particular direction. The progress will only extend to
analogous experiences in precise proportion to the de-
gree of analogy. Exercise of the memory in the study
of languages will do little to improve it for the reten-
tion of chemical formulae.
6. Memory and Past Time. There is one most
important aspect of memory which we have not touched
upon. When we remember objects or events, we often
apprehend them as having been presented to us in our
past experience. It is not necessary or convenient to
discuss this point now. It is part of the general question
of the origin and development of the ideal representation
of time-relations, which will be discussed in the chap-
ters on "The World as Ideal Construction" and "The
Self as Ideal Construction."
CHAPTER IV.
IDEATION, COMPARISON, AND CONCEPTION.
1. Ideal Pre-arrangement distinguished from
Perceptual Pre-adjustment. Perceptual activity is
guided by the actual presence of perceived objects. It
is true that perceptual activity constantly involves
pre-adjustment of the body and sense-organs for com-
ing impressions. But this pre-adjustment is directly
prompted by present or past impressions, and it con-
sists, not in a pre-determination of the future, but
merely in an appropriate waiting attitude. The only
means by which the perceptual consciousness can con-
trol the course of its experience is through actual
bodily movement. But no bodily movement can over-
leap a period of time. The most agile animal cannot
take a spring into the future. But the ideational
consciousness can cross a bridge before coming to it.
It can begin by the ideal anticipation of the end, and it
can move freely to and fro over the series of links inter-
vening between end and starting-point. Thus, if it meets
a difficulty midway in the series, it need not provide for
that difficulty at the point where it emerges. It may
go backward to an earlier stage or even to the begin-
ning, and there make a suitable re-arrangement. It is
plain that the process admits of all kinds of variations,
447
448 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., en. iv.
and re-adjustments of part to part, which are impos-
sible for perceptual consciousness.
2. Conceptual Analysis and Synthesis. All idea-
tional activity as compared with perceptual activity in-
volves some kind and degree of generalisation. We
have seen that mental images are in general fainter and
much less detailed than the corresponding percepts.
They lack the determinate particularity of actual sense-
experience. But indeterminateness in the image in-
volves indeterminateness in the meaning of the image
in so far as expression of the meaning depends merely
on the presence of the image without being otherwise
denned and developed. Hence any given mental image
taken by itself may be equally capable of representing
a great number of diverse objects. If I think of
wealth, I may have in my mind a vague mental picture
of a bale of goods : but the same mental image might
equally have been present in my mind had I been
thinking of a wharf, of commerce, or of a ware-
house. Similarly, a bag of sovereigns might stand
either for wealth, or a miser, or the Bank of Eng-
land. The mental picture of a spade might stand
either for the act of digging, for a garden, for a
navvy, or for a grave-digger. But the mere indeter-
minateness of the mental image is very far from ex-
plaining the beginnings of general thinking. We give
an essentially inadequate view of the generalising func-
tion of thought, when we dwell exclusively on what it
omits. This negative side of the process has for its
indispensable correlate a positive side. In any train of
thought, we are under the guidance of a controlling in-
terest constructing an ideal whole. Each of the several
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ideal representations which successively emerge con-
tributes its part to this ideal structure. The details of
actual perception which are omitted in the ideal repre-
sentation are omitted, because they will not fit in to our
ideal combinations. We can no more use the complete
details of actual perception in building up our mental
structure than we can use unhewTn stones in building a
house. But in this account of the matter it is indirectly
implied that the indeterminateness of ideal representa-
tion is compensated for by another kind of determina-
tion. What is vague and indefinite in the several
images and their meanings is made relatively definite
and complete by the combination of ideas as the train
of thought advances. The several ideas are defined
by their relations to each other in the ideal whole.
Thus we have side by side a process of analysis and
one of synthesis. By the process of analysis, the
concrete detail of actual sense-perception is broken up,
and certain aspects of it selected. In contrast with the
concrete totality of perception, these partial aspects
have a more or less general or conceptual character.
The analysis may therefore be called conceptual analy-
sis, and the corresponding synthesis, conceptual syn-
thesis. By conceptual synthesis, the partial aspects
are recombined into a new whole. Similarly, in
building a house, we have first to go to the quarry
and detach the single stones from it, afterwards hew
them into shape, and then build with them a new
structure. This may be illustrated by the simple recall
of a series of events in the order in which they actually
occur in sense-experience, or of a number of objects in
the order in which they were actually presented in
Psych. 29
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space. The word now and the word here have different
meanings from the point of view of sense-perception and
of ideal combination. From the point of view of sense-
perception the word now means the actual moment of
sensation, and here means the direct presence of an ob-
ject to our percipient organism, as immediately revealed
by the sensation which produces it. But in ideally recall-
ing a series of events in time, or a grouping of objects
in space, actual sensation is absent, and can no longer
serve as a distinguishing mark of what is now present
or what is here present. The individualising details of
present perception are to a very large extent absent
from the ideal reproduction. The now and the here
must therefore be otherwise denned. In fact, they are
denned by the combinations into which they enter.
They become purely relative terms. To go back to the
old example, suppose that I picture myself as eating my
breakfast.* I pass in review successive events. I men-
tally enter the breakfast-room ; then sit down at the
table; then pour out the tea; then open a newspaper;
then help myself to fish, and so on. If I want to repre-
sent vividly what took place, I may say now instead
of then, and think in the historic present. Now I am
entering the breakfast-room, now I am sitting down,
now I am pouring out the tea, and so on. Whether I
say now or then, obviously what I am doing is to define
the temporal position of each event by its relation to
* I have supposed this train of ideas to take place by means of a series
of visual images. I have done so because the treatment of the function
of language is reserved for the next chapter. But as a matter of fact
most people would naturally recall a series of past events in the way of
verbal description, either as a substitute for, or an accompaniment of,
verbal imagery. It is the peculiarity of words that they are indeterminate
in their meaning, not in their nature as mental images,
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others in a series. The word now becomes purely
relative in its application. Any part of the series
may be regarded as a now in relation to what comes
before it and what comes after it. Similarly, by
changing the point of view, any part of the series
which was previously regarded as a now, may become
a then. It all depends upon our point of departure.
If we mentally pass from an earlier part of the train
to a later, what was previously a now becomes a then,
what was previously future becomes present or past,
and so on.
This example is typical. In all trains of ideational
thinking, the several parts are made definite and deter-
minate by their relations within the ideal whole which
is being constructed. In this way the concrete deter-
minateness of sense perception is replaced by a new
kind of determinateness, that which is due to conceptual
synthesis. In this sense we are to understand the dic-
tum of Hegel, that thought passes always from the
abstract to the concrete. One abstraction combines
with and supplements another, so as to make the whole
more and more concrete. The concreteness thus at-
tained is of course different in kind from that of actual
perception, and must always fall short of it. But it is
at least equally true that the concreteness of actual per-
ception falls short of that which is attained by ideal
synthesis. In the process of ideal synthesis distinctions
and relations are apprehended of which sense percep-
tion can never become aware. By ideal combination
the world comes to be presented as a unified system of
which only a very small part is ever actually present to
the senses of an individual percipient. Thus sense per-
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ception is fragmentary as compared with ideal combina-
tion, and in this sense is less concrete.
3. Comparison. " The growing mind, we may
suppose, passes beyond simple perception when some
striking difference in what is at the moment per-
ceived is the occasion of a conflict of presentations.
The stalking hunter is not instantly recognised as
the destroying biped, because he crawls on all fours :
or the scarecrow looks like him, and yet not like
him, for, though it stands on two legs, it never moves.
There is no immediate assimilation ; percept and idea
remain distinct till, on being severally attended to
and compared, what is there is known in spite of the
differences."*
Such a comparison is a complex process, involving a
series of judgments, such as " It crawls ; It does not
move
;
and the like." f There are abundant occasions
in animal life which might usefully call into play mental
operations of this kind. Whenever things are in ap-
pearance different, although they are for practical pur-
poses the same, or whenever they are in appearance
similar, although for practical purposes they differ, a
problem arises which would be most effectively solved
by deliberate comparison. By deliberate comparison I
mean a mental confronting of the two objects, and a
transition of attention from the one to the other, so as
to discover some respect in which similar things differ
in spite of their similarity, or in which different things
agree in spite of their diversity, and also a fixing of the
precise nature of this agreement or difference. If an
* Ward, Article "Psychology" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth
edition, xx., p. 78. f Ibid.
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unpalatable moth resembles in its markings a palatable
moth, a bird will be apt to confuse them, and so meet
with disagreeable disappointment. The bird might con-
ceivably attempt to overcome the difficulty by setting a
specimen of the disagreeable species side by side with
one of the agreeable species, and then, examining them
alternately, might consider first one character and then
another of each, so as to find out distinguishing differ-
ences. Or again, without bringing the two actual ob-
jects together, it might examine the one as perceived
and the other as ideally represented, and go through
the same process. This would be much harder because
it would require a strong and persistent effort of idea-
tional thinking to keep before the mind a sufficiently
accurate image of the absent object. Now the supposed
case of the bird actually confronting the two objects,
alternately scrutinising each, and passing in turn from
one characteristic to another, has a strong air of impro-
bability. As a matter of fact, we never observe animals
behaving in such a manner as to make this interpreta-
tion of their actions necessary or even probable. But if
they do not compare two objects when both are per-
ceived, it is a fortiori unlikely that they should do so
when one has to be ideally recalled, for, as we have
said, this is the harder task. In fact, we have good
reason to re-affirm Locke's dictum that " brutes compare
but imperfectly." " It seems to me," he says, " to be
the prerogative of human understanding, . . . when it
has sufficiently distinguished any idea, ... to cast about
and consider in what circumstances they are capable to
be compared." *
* Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (Fraser), vol. i.,
pp. 204-205.
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We have seen that systematic observation of animals
confirms this view. 1* It is the one result most distinctly
brought out in Mr. Lloyd Morgan's book on Comparative
Psychology. I may here quote an experiment which he
carried out with great care and patience. Taking with
him a dog which had been trained to fetch and carry,
he threw a stick into a field surrounded by railings.
The dog bounded after the stick, and brought it back in
his mouth as far as the railings. But here he was con-
fronted with a difficulty ; he could get through himself,
but he could not get the stick through. His experience
had not taught him that the only way of succeeding
was by grasping the end of the stick ; instead of this,
he tugged now here, now there, in a perfectly uncriti-
cal way. If, by accident, he did get hold of the right
end of the stick, or if Mr. Morgan showed him how to
proceed, this seemed to yield him no assistance on the
repetition of the experiment. He had stumbled on the
solution, but could not do the trick again. This was no
casual observation
;
it was a systematic experiment re-
peated day after day, and only one of a course of simi-
lar experiments. It is evident that the dog here passed
from one alternative to another without selective com-
parison ; so that when he hit on the right one or was
shown it, he failed to note the points in which it dif-
fered from unsuccessful attempts.
The process by which animals learn to distinguish
what they have previously confused, or to identify for
practical purposes what they have previously treated
as different is rather one of tentative groping than of
* Cf. the account of Mr. Thorndike's experiments, bk. iii., div. i.,
ch. i.f 6.
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express comparison. " Even in a blindly tentative
process, the failure of the wrong alternatives will grad-
ually decrease the chance of their renewal."* Under
circumstances in which it has been previously de-
ceived, an animal will become more cautious and atten-
tive, thus affording opportunity for the presentation of
differences, definite or indefinite, which have previously
escaped its notice. In so far as this takes place, its
behaviour will become gradually altered in the two
cases, respectively. The unsuccessful action will be-
come fainter and less persistent until it disappears, and
the converse will hold of the successful action. All
this may take place without express comparison of two
objects, groups of circumstances, or lines of conduct,
having for its aim the marking off of points of differ-
ence from points of agreement or of points of agree-
ment from points of difference. Thus a dog, in first
learning the trick of opening a gate by a latch, will, to
begin with, scratch all over the gate. In doing so, he
accidentally hits upon the right movement. On the
next occasion, there may be almost as much prelimin-
ary groping as before. It is only gradually that the
unsuccessful activity is discontinued, and the successful
method adopted unhesitatingly from the outset. This
is simply a case of the general principle that activity,
obstructed in one direction, tends to divert itself into
other channels. When animals learn in this way, they
are not aware why one course is right and another
wrong. The right course is simply forced upon their
attention by the circumstances of the case.
Comparison in all but a most rudimentary form is an
* Analytic Psychology, vol. ii.
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ideational activity. Even when the objects compared
are both present to the senses, each is scrutinised in
turn. For anything more than a vague awareness of
resemblance or difference, it is necessary to keep before
the mind the ideal representation of the one object in
the very act of examining the other. Only in this way
can each detail and characteristic in turn be selected
for comparison, so as to distinguish the points of differ-
ence from the points of agreement. Hence we may at-
tribute the absence of comparison in animals in all but
its most vague and rudimentary form, to the absence or
extremely imperfect development of ideational activity
in general.
When the process of deliberate comparison plays an
important part in the mental life, it involves a corre-
sponding development in conceptual thinking, in the
distinction of the general or universal from the particu-
lar. To compare is always to compare in some special
respect. Some theoretical or practical end is to be
subserved by the comparison. The difference or agree-
ment to be discovered is not any difference or agree-
ment, but one which has significance for the guidance
of conduct or for the solution of a theoretical difficulty.
Thus comparison takes place only in regard to the
characteristics which happen to be interesting at the
moment, other characteristics being disregarded or set
aside as unimportant. Objects in other ways most
diverse may yet in a certain respect be compared
and found more or less similar, and objects in other
ways most similar may be compared in a certain re-
spect and found more or less unlike. Hence, as the
process advances it becomes possible to group objects
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according to the degrees of their difference or resem-
blance in this or that respect without taking into ac-
count their other attributes. We may arrange musical
tones according to the degree of their loudness, disre-
garding their pitch, or according to their pitch dis-
regarding their loudness. In the scale of loudness,
sounds most different in pitch might occupy the same
position, and sounds of the same pitch widely different
positions. A shrill note and a low one may be of
equal loudness, and sounds of the same pitch may be
of different loudness.
It is evident that in this way what we have called
the conceptual analysis of the concrete details of sense-
perception receives a great development. A complex
object becomes mentally separated into a plurality of
partial aspects, each of which can form a starting-point
for a series of comparisons, giving rise to different
series of graduated resemblances such as those of pitch
and loudness, and objects which are far apart in one
series will be close together in another. To each of
the different series there corresponds an abstract char-
acter or attribute of the object consciously distin-
guished from other abstract characters or attributes.
Thus the category of Thinghood assumes a new form in
ideational thinking from that which attaches to it in
perceptual. The unity of the thing is distinguished
from the plurality of its qualities, and that kind of pre-
dication becomes possible which is embodied in Lan-
guage. The necessity of doing one thing at a time has
led us to describe the nature and progress of compari-
son without reference to the use of language. But in
fact the ideational activity which comparison involves
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could not proceed far unless it were guided and sup-
ported by expressive signs, i.e. signs directly express-
ing ideas and their relations. The nature, function,




1. Language as an Instrument of Conceptual
Analysis and Synthesis. In speaking of Language,
we must remember that what primarily concerns the
psychologist is not any special system of external signs
such as gestures, articulate sounds, or written characters,
but a certain psychical function, a peculiar mode of
mental activity. It is a unique and most important
characteristic of this function or activity that many
minds can co-operate in it as if they constituted a single
mind. But the possibility of this co-operative thinking
must be grounded in the nature of the mental process
as it takes place in the individual mind I do not mean
that the use of language in individual thinking was or
could be prior to its use as a means of intercommunica-
tion. What I do mean is that the earliest communica-
tion could only take place between minds capable of a
certain kind of mental process. Merely perceptual ex-
perience cannot be communicated except in presence of
the perceived object. In order that A and B may inter-
change ideas, it is evident that they must start from a
basis of common experience. It is impossible to dis-
cuss Greek particles with a person who does not know
a word of Greek. But if communication is to be real
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and valuable, it must be possible for A not merely to
convey to B what B already knows, but also what he
does not know. A must be able to communicate to B
something of which A has had experience and of which
B has not had experience. How is this possible ? Let
us consider an analogous case. I wish to show some
one how to pronounce a word which he has never heard.
He is either deaf or at a distance, so that I cannot adopt
the simple expedient of pronouncing it myself in his
presence. My only resource is to write it down for
him in phonetic spelling. I thus convey to him the
new sound by exhibiting it as a combination of sounds
with which he is already familiar,, I reconstruct it and
thus enable him to reconstruct it out of its phonetic
elements. In like manner, A can communicate a new
fact to B by reconstructing it out of elements which B
has become acquainted with in the course of his previ-
ous experience. Intercommunication of ideas therefore
implies analysis of the objects and processes presented
to perception into certain constituents which recur in
varying combinations in various particular cases. The
use of language, then, involves the analysis of objects
and processes into common factors and their free re-
construction out of these common factors.
It must not, however, be supposed that these common
factors have each a rigid and unalterable nature which
remains unchanged in the various combinations into
which they enter. They are not like printers' types,
which merely change their mode of external juxtaposi-
tion without inward modification. On the contrary, the
elements of experience which are being continually
combined in all kinds of varying ways in spoken or
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written discourse, mutually transform each other. The
meaning of a word varies with its context. Paul em-
phasises this point in his valuable work, the Principles
of the History of Language. " In sentences like, ' I
never laid a hand upon him
'
;
* John never drew bridle,'
the hand referred to is not a hand in general, but my
hand, the bridle referred to is not a bridle in general,
but that which was held by John. Compare such in-
stances as ' a good point,' ' a point of honour,' ' the
bar of an hotel,' ' the bar of justice,' ' the tongue of a
woman,'
' the tongue of a balance.'
" * The special mean-
ing assumed by a word in a special context or special
circumstances may be called its occasional meaning,
It is only at a late stage of mental development that an
express attempt is made to distinguish an identical and
persistent element of meaning prevading the varying
occasional significations of a word. When the attempt
is made it constitutes an epoch in the history of thought.
It is the beginning of definition and of the scientific
concept. The fame of Socrates rests largely on his
having been the first to insist on a systematic inquiry
of this nature. In popular and pre-scientific thinking
the occasional meaning is the only one which comes to
clear consciousness.
It follows from this account of language as a means
of communication that words and their combinations
express that process of analysis and synthesis which
essentially constitutes a train of ideational thought.
The use of language pre-supposes the breaking of the
concrete content of actual perception into its partial
aspects and constituents, and the re-combination of
* Ch. iv., p. 73. It Avill repay the student to read the whole chapter.
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these to form new ideal wholes. The variation of
meaning with context is due to the nature of the con-
structive process. The word only calls up what is
relevant to the controlling interest guiding the train of
thought.
Ideational activity would seem from this account of
the matter to be a prior condition of the existence of
language. In logical strictness, this is so, but it is
equally true that ideational thinking could only exist in
a most rudimentary and inchoate form apart from the
use of some kind of expressive signs. Language is not
merely an accompaniment of ideational activity ; it is
an instrument essential to its development. It is an
appropriate means of fixing attention upon ideally re-
presented objects as distinguished from percepts. It
becomes the more necessary the more abstract ideal
representation is, in other words, the less it contains
of the concrete details of actual sense-perception. The
precise mode in which expressive signs serve to fix
attention on ideas will be considered later on. Here
we content ourselves with provisionally affirming that
language in some form is an indispensable tool to think
with. Within the mind of the individual thinker it
serves to fix attention on the object of his own ideas ;
in communication with others, it serves to fix the atten-
tion of the hearer on the ideally represented objects
present to the mind of the speaker.*
For illustration of conceptual analysis and synthesis,
we may take any sentence or intelligible combination
* It is unfortunate that there is no word corresponding to idea as per-
cept corresponds to perception. In ordinary language idea is used both
for the psychical state and for the object apprehended in it.
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of words. Each word stands for some partial aspect of
the concrete detail of actual perception, in other
words, it stands for what is called a universal or con-
cept, the object of the psychical process called a con-
ception. The universals expressed by the several words
combine in a unity, each helping to determine and
particularise the rest, so as to form an ideal whole. Take
such a sentence as "Nansen skates." "Nansen" is a
proper name, and may therefore be supposed to stand
for a particular, not for a universal. This is true from
a certain point of view. The word " Nansen
"
desig-
nates a particular human being. But from another
point of view it is a universal. The individual Nansen
is a universal as the unity and connecting identity of
his own manifold and varying states, relations, quali-
ties, and activities. Nansen as perceived must be
Nansen eating, or Nansen sleeping, or Nansen lectur-
ing, or Nansen skating, or determined in some other
specific way. But the word " Nansen
"
by itself does
not stand for any of these particular determinations
rather than others. It stands for Nansen in gen-
eral. The word "skates" particularises the universal
"Nansen." But it does so by means of another
universal. Other people skate besides Nansen, in
varying manners and in varying times and places.
Thus the universal " skating
"
not only particularises
the universal "Nansen," but receives particular deter-
mination from it. The skating is not any skating, but
the skating of a Nansen. Now if instead of framing
the proposition
" Nansen skates," we actually saw him
skating without any inward or outward translation of
the experience into words or equivalent signs, there
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would be no conscious contradistinction between the
agent in general and his particular act, or between the
act in general and the particular agent. The psychical
function, then, which is involved in the use of language,
is conceptual analysis and synthesis. Discourse is the
expression of discursive thinking.
We now pass to an old and well-worn problem,
that of the origin of language. Of course the question
is not capable of what may be called a historical an-
swer. There are no records or remains of remote pre-
historic ages which would enable us to state on histori-
cal evidence the circumstances under which intercom-
munication of ideas by means of expressive signs first
originated. But we are by no means at a loss on that
account. Language actually grows and develops under
our eyes, and we can apply the general laws of its
growth and development to account for its origin. Be-
sides this, we have in savage races examples of stages
of mental development incomparably more rudimentary
than our own
;
and by noting the points in which they
differ from us we may obtain a clue to the nature of
the differences between ourselves and primitive man.
2. The Motor Element in Ideal Revival. Per-
ceptual process is penetrated through and through by
experiences of movement. Passive sensations only
serve to guide and define motor activities. Besides the
movements which directly subserve the attainment of
practical ends, there are also constantly present the
adjustments of the organs of sense involved in attend-
ing to percepts. There are the movements of explora-
tion by which touch and sight follow the contours of
objects. There are the attitudes of listening for sounds,
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and sniffing for smells, and the like. Ideal process,
being a reproduction of perceptual, tends to reinstate
the movements which form an essential part of it. In
mentally reproducing the visual appearance of a thing
we mentally follow the outline of it with the eye, and
in general we tend to repeat in idea the movements cf
ocular adjustment. Similarly, in recalling a sound, we
may mentally repeat the attitude of listening, or better
still, mentally imitate the movements by which the
sound is produced. If it is a sound which w
r
e are able
more or less successfully to imitate by means of our
own vocal organs, we mentally articulate it. Our
power in this respect is greatest with the words
of ordinary speech, so that when we recall them in
the form of mental images, we constantly reproduce
the motor process of articulation as well as the mere
sound.
This revived motor element has a peculiar impor-
tance, because our power of freely controlling, detain-
ing, modifying, and repeating mental images depends
in a very large measure on our power of controlling
their motor constituents or accompaniments. " The
reason why revived movement is capable of discharg-
ing this special function is that our control over it is
analogous and proportionate to our power of control-
ling actual movements."* "To show that this is so,
we have only to point out that the more intimately a
given experience is connected with motor processes
peculiar to it and distinctive of it, the greater is our
command over it in ideal representation."f A good
example is supplied by the articulate sounds of ordi-
* Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 213. t Ibid., p. 215.
f'si/rh. 30
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nary speech. "Let any one select for mental experi-
mentation any word or sentence ; he will find that he
has almost as great a control over the internal articula-
tion as over the external. The chief restriction appears
to lie in the inability to make the represented sound as
loud as the actual sensation
; but, apart from this, one
may do almost what one likes with it. We may repeat
it thousands of times with unfailing definiteness, pre-
cision, and certainty ; we may say it rapidly or slowly,
with emphasis or without emphasis or with emphasis
that varies
;
we may even invert the order of the sound
with as much freedom as in actual utterance. The
same holds good with the simpler geometrical figures.
We can trace them mentally much as we trace them
physically."* Contrast such cases as that of smells, or
of organic sensations. Many persons can mentally re-
produce odours with great vividness and accuracy ; but
vivid and accurate reproduction is one thing, and free
control is another. We cannot, as in the case of articu-
late words, pass from one odour to another in a series,
with greater or less rapidity, varying the order of suc-
cession according to our caprice or convenience. We
cannot repeat the same odour " thousands of times with
unfailing definiteness, precision, and certainty"; we
cannot vary its intensity at will as we can the loudness
of articulate sounds. So far as we have any power in
this respect, it appears to be indirect and depends on
the recall of the appearance of odorous objects or of
other associative circumstances. We cannot simply
take some smell, and in idea freely run up and down
the scale of its varying intensities ; according to all
* Ibid.
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analogy, we should be able to do this, if we possessed
and habitually exercised the power of actually produc-
ing the smell, and varying its intensity by our own
movements.
It is in the motor elements of the mental image, and
in the control which they yield over the image as a
whole, that we have ultimately to look for the origin of
expressive signs, or in other words, of language, in the
broadest sense of the term. We have said that language
is an appropriate means of fixing attention on ideally
represented objects, as distinguished from perceived
objects. Since the means of controlling ideal represen-
tations lies in the motor constituents of mental images,
the source of language must be found here or nowhere.
The first definite stage in the development of expres-
sive signs is constituted by the tendency of ideas in
so far as they have a motor aspect to issue in actual
movements.
3. Tendency of Motor Reproduction to pass into
Actual Movement. No one has done more than Dr.
Bain to bring into prominence the importance of the
motor constituents of ideas, and he has also laid great
emphasis on the tendency of ideal movement to pass into
actual movement. In the mental revival of experiences
of energetic action,
" it is," he says, " a notorious cir-
cumstance that, if there be much excitement attending
the recollection, we can only with great difficulty pre-
vent ourselves from getting up to repeat them. ... A
child cannot describe anything that it was engaged in,
without acting it out to the full length that the circum-
stances will permit. . . . No better example could be
furnished than the vocal recollections. When we
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recall the impression of a word or a sentence, if we do
not speak it out, we feel the twitter of the organs just
about to come to that point. The articulating parts
the larynx, the tongue, the lips are all sensibly ex-
cited. . . . Some persons of weak or incontinent nerves
can hardly think without muttering they talk to
themselves." *
"
Thinking is restrained speaking or acting." f Since
Dr. Bain first wrote these words, psychological investi-
gation has very strongly confirmed their general pur-
port. The tendency of ideas to act themselves out is
now a commonplace of psychology. Probably Dr. Bain
exaggerates the degree in which this tendency is ordi-
narily realised. The twitter of the organs of speech
about to come to the point is not a constant feature of
inward articulation in all persons. But there is no
doubt that it is very frequent, and in some people al-
most invariably present. In what he says about think-
ing aloud, he rather understates his case ; this habit is
by no means confined to persons of weak or incontinent
nerves. It is often found in those who become in-
tensely absorbed in their own trains of thought to the
disregard of their social surroundings. Social conven-
tion has a great deal to do with the restraint which
we ordinarily put on the actual utterance of the
thoughts which pass through our minds.
The general theory of the tendency of ideas to pass
into movements is as follows. Ideational process is
correlated with brain process. The brain is so inti-
mately one with the rest of the organism, that processes
* The Senses and the Intellect, fourth edition, p. 357.
t Op. cit., p. 358.
3.] LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTION. 469
in it cannot take place without in some measure over-
flowing to other parts of the body ; and in particular to
those parts with which it is most directly connected
the muscles. The whole complex apparatus of efferent
nerves creates a functional unity between brain and
muscle. This overflow of excitation to the muscles
may, and constantly does, take place without the subject
being at all aware of it. Thus in thought-reading the
place where an object has been hidden is revealed to
the thought-reader by slight muscular pressures and
twitches unconsciously produced by his guide, who all
the time concentrates his attention on the idea of the
hidden object and the place where it is to be found.
On the whole, at the level of our present mental
development, ideational trains of thought proceed for
the most part without any distinct and conspicuous
embodiment in actual movement, unless a need arises
for communicating them to others. But the conditions
are very different in more primitive stages of evolu-
tion. Where ideational activity is just struggling into
independent existence, so that it may be regarded as
little more than an extension or supplement of per-
ceptual activity, ideas can scarcely fail to pass into
overt movements. The more life in general is a life of
bodily activity, the more likely is bodily activity to
enter into ideal process. Besides this, we must remem-
ber that the less developed and habitual are trains of
thought, the more difficult they are to sustain ; so that
whatever means offer themselves for the furtherance
and support of the process will be utilised. But the
partial repetition of the ideally represented object by
means of actual movements yields a ready and effective
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means of fixing attention on the object. Hence we
may regard the actual expression of ideas by move-
ments as primary, and the absence of such expression
as the result of a comparatively high degree of mental
development.*
But even if we suppose that the tendency to act out
an idea does not find distinct realisation in the individ-
ual's own private trains of thought, it must do so when
occasion arises to communicate with others. Suppose
that A and B are co-operating in some important work.
It is .Z?'s turn to do something, and ^4's to wait ex-
pectantly. B either fails to do what is required of him
or does it wrongly. Suppose that A has no conven-
tional language to express himself in, or even that he
has not used language of any sort until that moment.
If he is capable of ideally representing what he wants
JB to do, he can scarcely fail in his impatient eagerness
to make movements indicating what is required. It
may be sufficient to point to some object actually pres-
ent. This does not strictly speaking involve the use of
language. But if he uses a truly imitative gesture or
combination of imitative gestures, then his action is the
birth of language. He may, for instance, point to a
rope and imitate the act of hauling. The imitation of
the act of hauling is simply his own idea of hauling
issuing in actual movement. Thus from a psycholog-
ical point of view the most primitive form of language
* " I fancy the main body of the lower classes of Africa think ex-
ternally instead of internally . . . even when you are sitting alone in the
forest you will hear a man or woman coming down the narrow bush path
chattering away with such energy and expression that you can hardly
believe your eyes when you learn from them that he has no companion."
M. H. Kingsley, West African Studies.
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is the imitative gesture. We shall now proceed to give
evidence in favour of this position.
4. Natural Signs. Many writers appear to as-
sume that all language worthy of the name must con-
sist of conventional signs. Such a view creates alto-
gether unnecessary difficulties. The essential function
of language as a means of conceptual analysis and
synthesis may be fulfilled by a system of natural signs
such as uninstructed deaf-mutes employ and largely
devise for themselves. A natural sign bears in its own
nature a resemblance to the thing signified, to the mode
of using or producing it, or at least to some action,
state, or adjunct characteristic of it. Merely demon-
strative gestures which stand alone and not as part of a
context, expressed or understood, are not to be counted
as part of the language of natural signs. It is true
that they are signs and that they are natural. But they
are not language in the only sense which is relevant;
for they are not means of conceptual analysis and syn-
thesis. They consist in acts drawing attention to an
object actually present or to be found in a certain
direction. But if the object thus indicated is pointed to
not for its own sake, but merely as a sign of some
absent object which it happens to resemble or with
which it has some kind of natural connexion, the ges-
ture is a true expression of ideas and therefore belongs
to language in the strict sense. Demonstrative signs
also become part of language when they belong to a
context. Thus if a man imitates an action and then
points to another man, the act of pointing is a sign of
gesture-language. For it does not merely draw atten-
tion to the man as he presents himself at the moment;
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on the contrary the presence of the man at the moment
is only used as a means of representing something else ;
it is used as a means of representing the man as per-
forming an action which at the moment he is not per-
forming. Similarly, the direct expression of emotion
cannot be regarded as language. But it is otherwise
when the expression of a special emotion is imitated, so
as to convey the idea of the emotion. Thus if A notic-
ing B preparing to act in a certain way points to C and
frowns, this is true language. For ^4's act is not a
direct expression of his own emotion, but only a way of
conveying to B his idea that C will be angry if B does
not alter his conduct. So, too, the imitation of a char-
acteristic sound made by some animal or thing is not in
itself language ; it only becomes so when the mimicry
is meant to convey the idea of the thing or animal
which makes the sound.
Earlier writers on the origin of language have been
much perplexed by the difficulty of explaining how a
convention as to the meaning of words could be estab-
lished between the different members of a community
who were not already in possession of a means of com-
municating their ideas. This difficulty has been fre-
quently used as an argument for referring the origin of
language to a divine revelation. But it disappears if
we suppose the natural expression of ideas to be prior
to the use of arbitrary signs.
Positive evidence for the primitive nature of natural
signs may be drawn from the case of deaf-mutes and
savages. A deaf-mute called Kruse, a highly educated
man and a distinguished teacher, has left on record an
account of the spontaneous origin of natural language
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in the minds of those who cannot command conven-
tional signs. He says : " What strikes " the deaf-mute
"most, or what makes a distinction to him between one
thing and another, such distinctive signs of objects
are at once signs by which he knows these objects, and
knows them again ; they become tokens of things. And
while he elaborates the signs he has found for single ob-
jects, that is, while he describes their forms for himself in
the air, or imitates them in thought with hands, fingers,
and gestures, he develops for himself suitable signs to
represent ideas, which serve him as a means of fixing
ideas of different kinds in his mind and recalling them
to his memory. And thus he makes himself a language,
the so-called gesture-language ; and with the few scanty
and imperfect signs, a way for thought is already
broken, and with his thought as it now opens out, the
language cultivates and forms itself further and fur-
ther."* According to Schmalz, the more intelligent
deaf-mutes form natural signs spontaneously, if they are
not altogether neglected by their fellow-men., At first
they point to the objects in which they are interested,
in order to indicate their wishes. If the objects are not
in sight they fetch them or conduct others to them.
The deaf-mute points to a dish or a jug and so indicates
his desire for what the dish or jug contains. "If he
wants bread he brings the whole loaf, together with a
knife, and he hands both to the person who is to cut a
slice for him." There is not much to distinguish such
signs from the demonstrative gestures an intelligent
monkey may employ. But cases occur in which devices
of the kind described are inadequate. " The deaf-mute,
* Quoted by Tylor, Early History of Mankind.
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it may be, wants a drink of water ; he sees neither water
nor drinking-glass in the room, so that he cannot point
to the one or fetch the other. He takes some one by
the hand in order to lead him to the place where the
water is. The person to whom the appeal is made re-
fuses to move. The deaf-mute is perplexed and em-
barrassed. Finally he adopts the device of pointing to
his mouth." This is something more than a practical
expedient. It is the expression of an idea. But the
sign is ambiguous. The person addressed may, through
a real or pretended misunderstanding, give the deaf-
mute something to eat instead of something to drink.
He is thus driven to define his meaning by a combina-
tion of gestures a context of natural signs. He di-
rects his hand towards his mouth again, but now he
curves it as if it held a glass, at the same time imitating
the act of drinking.
" At last he makes himself under-
stood," and "from this time forward, he learns to
describe absent objects, and he forms for himself a
language of natural signs, at once betokening and pro-
ducing a distinctively human power of thought." *
In a certain degree what has been said of deaf-mutes
applies also to ordinary children.
" A child's gestures
are intelligent long before it has any extensive com-
mand of intelligent speech, although very early and
persistent attempts are made to instruct it in the use
of words, and no such attempts are made to instruct
them in the use of gestures." f " Missionaries, explor-
ers, and shipwrecked mariners acquire the language of
* Ueber die Taubstummen, pp. 267 seq.
t Col. Mallery in the Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology of the
Smithsonian Institute, vol. i., p. 276.
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savage races through the medium of natural signs. They
point to objects and make gesticulations, at the same
time observing what articulate sounds are associated
with these motions by the persons addressed."* When-
ever a person is at a loss to express himself by means of
words he naturally has recourse to gestures if the sub-
ject-matter admits of it. "Without having ever before
seen or made one of the signs used by Indians or deaf-
mutes, he will soon not only catch the meaning of
their's but produce his own, which they will likewise
comprehend."! The primitive character of gesture-
language is indicated by its widespread use among
savages. This is partly due to the inadequacy of the
signs of their conventional language, and partly to the
diversities of speech which make the spoken words of
neighbouring tribes unintelligible to each other. Travel-
lers have reported the existence of tribes whose oral
language is inadequate even for ordinary intercourse.
Their evidence has been called in doubt, but apparently
without sufficient reason. It is wTell established that the
Bubis of the island of Fernando Po cannot understand
each other in the dark. Miss Kingsley in her Travels
in West Africa tells us that among the Fans it is com-
mon to propose to go to the fire in order to see what
people are saying. But the second reason we have
assigned is probably the more important. The fullest
development of natural signs is found among the
North American Indians, where the diversities of con-
ventional languages within a limited area are very
numerous.
The free and copious use of imitative gestures is al-
* Ibid. t Ibid.
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most universal all over North America, and it is also
very widely spread in South America. It must not be
supposed that the same signs are everywhere in common
use. This is far from being the case. There is no
common code. A common code is only possible by
convention. It must be fixed by usage. But the vast
distance which separates different tribes does not per-
mit of this arbitrary uniformity arising from habit. An
imitative gesture delineates the most striking outlines
of an object or the most characteristic features of an
action. But different individuals and different bodies
of people do not always agree in the selection of these
outlines and features. A deer for instance may be de-
signated "by various modes of expressing fleetness, by
his gait when not in rapid motion, by the shape of his
horns, and sometimes by combinations of several of
these characteristics." * Besides this, when a sign has be-
come fixed by usage it may become modified and abbre-
viated in various ways, as conventional understanding
takes the place of self-interpreting pantomime. It might
therefore be expected that Indians using one dialect of
natural signs would not understand other Indians, using
a diverse dialect. It would appear still less probable
that an Indian should on the first encounter understand
a deaf-mute or vice versd. But in fact it is found that
in spite of the diversity of signs mutual understanding
is possible between all who have any expertness in the
use of imitative gestures. However special signs may
vary, the formative principle remains the same, and this
formative principle adapts itself in the most flexible
way to varying conditions. A man may understand at
* Col. Mallery, op. cit.
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once a gesture which he has never seen before. If any
one of the more conventional signs is not comprehended,
an Indian skilled in the art of imitative suggestion tries
new ways of conveying his meaning. It is often suffi-
cient to reproduce in full pantomimic detail a gesture
which had first been given in an abbreviated form. If
this expedient fail, it is always easy to try other modes
of representation. In one way or another experts in
sign-language manage to interchange ideas in the form
of long dialogues and narrative without any prior con-
vention. Of course it is assumed that there is a basis
for mutual understanding in community of interest and
experience.
5. Natural Signs as Instruments of Conceptual
Thinking. Expression by natural signs fulfils the
essential function of language as a means of conceptual
analysis and synthesis ; by it the content of concrete
experience is resolved into relatively elementary con-
stituents which are freely recombined in new ideal
structures. That the signs of gesture-language bring
with them an apprehension of the general or universal
aspects as distinct from the particular and specific de-
tails of perceptual experience is plain from their very
nature. An imitative gesture can only suggest general
characters or features common to a class of objects or
actions. The thought it expresses or evokes is only a
fragment of a thought and demands completion. It is
indeterminate and requires further definition from a
context expressed or understood. The context itself
consists of other imitative gestures, each expressing a
relatively indeterminate universal. Each of these rel-
atively indeterminate universals particularises and
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defines the others, and is by them particularised and
defined. Just as we can illustrate this process by tak-
ing at random any intelligible combination of conven-
tional words, so we can illustrate it by taking at random
any intelligible combination of imitative gestures. The
analogy holds good in another respect also. The natural
sign, like the conventional word, becomes modified inO * '
meaning in varying contexts and under varying circum-
stances.
We may illustrate both points simultaneously. An
acquaintance of Colonel Mallery's once asked the same
favour of two chiefs successively. Each in replying
used the common sign for repletion after eating, "viz.
the index and thumb turned towards the body, passed
up from the abdomen to the throat ; but in the one case
being made with a gentle motion and pleasant look, it
meant 4 1 am satisfied,' and granted the request ; in the
other, made violently, with the accompaniment of a
truculent frown, it read, 'I have had enough of that.'"
Here the sign used for bodily repletion derives a meta-
phorical meaning from the context in both cases, and a
different meaning in each.
6. Conventional Element in Gesture-Language.
The theory that natural signs are psychologically the
most primitive form of language has two advantages.
The first of these is, that self-interpreting signs arise
naturally and spontaneously wherever there is any need
for them. The second is, that they rapidly tend to
become more or less conventional between members of
the same community so as to pave the way for a system
of purely arbitrary signs. The imitative gesture tends
to become more or less conventional inasmuch as the
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understanding of it comes to depend, not merely on its
own intrinsic value as a self-interpreting sign, but also
on its having been employed and understood before.
On a first occasion, the sign may occur in circumstances
or in a context which leave no doubt as to the mean-
ing; on a subsequent occasion these circumstances or
this special context may be absent, so that if the sign
were then made for the first time, it would not be
understood
; nevertheless, it may be understood on
the second occasion just because it had been under-
stood on the first occasion. "The deaf and dumb
teacher in the Berlin institute was named among the
children by the action of cutting off the left arm with
the edge of the right hand ; the reason of this sign was
not that there was anything peculiar about his arms,
but that he came from Spandau, and it so happened
that one of the children had been at Spandau and had
seen there a man with one arm."* It is evident that
this sign might come to be understood and used by
members of the institution who knew nothing of its
derivation.
One highly important way in which natural signs
tend to become relatively conventional is through ab-
breviation. There is a strong disposition to abbreviate
familiar gestures. The mere hint of a movement comes
to be substituted for the movement itself. Colonel
Mallery observed a Cheyenne Indian attempting to
convey the idea of old-man. " He held his right hand
forward bent at elbow, fingers and thumbs closed side-
wise. This not conveying any sense, he found a long
stick, bent his back, and supported his frame in a
*
Tylor, Early History of Mankind.
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tottering step by the stick held as was before only
imagined."*
By processes of this kind, those who employ gesture-
language must become familiar with the possibility of
a conventional arrangement for the expression of ideas.
But the natural system never actually passes in this man-
ner into a conventional system. Its formative principle
remains all through essentially that of imitative repre-
sentation. The deaf-mute and the Indian rarely lose
sight altogether of the natural connexion between sign
and signification. A bystander may be totally unable to
detect the meaning of the signs used in conversation,
owing to abridgment of natural pantomime. But the
deaf-mute, or the savage, is able if required to act out
in detail his abbreviated gesture. Natural signs may
lead up to a conventional language, but they do not
develop into one.
7. Origin of Conventional Language. The lan-
guage of natural signs is pervaded by the systematic
unity of a single formative principle that of imita-
tion. This gives it so strong and tenacious a hold upon
the mind that it can only be displaced by a conventional
language which has also a systematic unity of plan. It
can never be displaced by a chaotic multiplicity of de-
tached and disconnected signs, each of which has to be
separately remembered by an independent mental effort.
The human mind could not endure so burdensome a load.
The conventional signs which are to displace imitative
gestures must therefore form some kind of system, uni-
fied by general formative principles. Now visible ges-
tures are theoretically and practically capable of forrn-
* Annual Report of Bureau of Ethnology, vol. i., loc. cit.
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ing a conventional system. The deaf-mute is sometimes
taught a finger-language which is purely conventional.
He makes a limited number of easily remembered man-
ual signs, each corresponding to a letter of the alphabet,
and by successively combining these he spells out words
and sentences. Such a language has a unity of com-
position which makes it manageable. There is in it
a systematic correspondence between expression and
meaning. Where meaning is partially similar, expres-
sion is partially similar ; where meaning is modified,
expression is modified in a corresponding manner and
degree. But the important point is that the systematic
unity of composition belongs in the first instance to
articulate speech. The manual alphabet is merely a
translation of the oral alphabet. Further, it could only
have been devised after articulate utterance had been
already analysed into its elementary constituents. Now
a conventional system of manual or other visible move-
ments analogous to the conventional finger-alphabet
could not grow up spontaneously out of a previous
system of imitative gestures. We might as well expect
a deaf-mute or an untutored savage to invent the steam-
engine or the electric light. A limited and easily man-
ageable set of manual signs is required. But on what
principle are the signs to be selected, and on what prin-
ciple are they to be limited ? Oral language had been in
use for long ages before its alphabet was discovered.
But the invention of a similar system of visible signs
would have been incomparably harder than the dis-
covery of the alphabet. The discovery of the alphabet
was the discovery of unity of composition in a structure
already existing and familiar to mankind. But the in-
Psych. 31
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dependent invention of a visible alphabet would have
been not a discovery arising through reflective scrutiny
of familiar experience, but a highly artificial creation.
On the other hand, articulate utterance is as a natural
process characterised by unity of composition. This
unity of composition is determined by the structure of
the organs of speech. There is no need to invent an
alphabet before combining elementary sounds in syl-
lables and words. The alphabetical sounds which form
the vital constituents of all speech were, as Ferrier says,
"there from the beginning." Undetected, but yet
present and operative, they made possible a systematic
correspondence between meaning and expression. This
correspondence is not indeed of the same kind as that
which characterises the imitative gesture. Any isolated
imitative gesture has a direct affinity with the thing it
represents. The absence of this direct self-interpreting
affinity is just what distinguishes the conventional from
the natural sign. None the less, systematic correspond-
ence is possible where there is no direct resemblance.
The rise and fall of the mercury in the thermometer
corresponds to the rise and fall of temperature, but it
does not resemble it. So, apart from all similarity be-
tween sounds and what they signify, there may be a
correspondence between the relations of sounds and re-
lations of meaning. Where meaning is partially similar,
its utterance may be partially similar; where meaning
varies more or less in this or that special manner, ex-
pression may vary more or less in a corresponding
manner. This we find to be the case in all known
languages.
It is here that philological analysis becomes impor-
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tant. In all languages there are traceable certain com-
paratively elementary phonetic components called roots,
expressing primary universals or products of conceptual
analysis ; and these roots variously modified and enter-
ing into various combinations express conceptual syn-
thesis or discursive thinking. They blend and combine
in continuous speech just as the corresponding concepts
blend and combine in continuous thought. This is
possible because of the ultimate unity of composition
of the phonetic material, which is resolvable into ele-
mentary alphabetic sounds which do not occur in isola-
tion but as parts of an articulate complex.
8. Certain Other Theories of the Origin of Speech.
Attempts have been made to explain the origin of lan-
guage without emphasising the importance of the visi-
ble gesture as the starting-point. There are three main
theories of this kind, which have been nicknamed by
Max Muller the pooli-pooh theory, the bow-wow theory,-
and the ding-dong theory. Their more pretentious
titles are the Interjectional, the Onomatopoeic, and the
Pathognomic theories. The principle involved in all
these theories is essentially the same. They all attempt
to trace back conventional signs to natural signs ;
but they exclude from consideration visible gestures,
and confine attention only to vocal signs. It is evident
that to mimic the mewing of a cat, in order to convey
the idea of that animal, is as much an imitative gesture
as going on all fours and humping the back for the
same purpose. It is mimicry of this kind on which the
bow-wow theory relies for explanation. The same
holds good of imitating the cry of fear, in order either
to convey the idea of the emotion or of the approach of
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a dangerous object. This is the sort of expressive sign
which is most primitive according to the pooh-pooh
theory.
The ding-dong theory is more subtle, and it has the
distinction of being advocated by Professor Steinthal.
According to it specific kinds of objects so affected
primitive man as to elicit from him, or to use Max
Miiller's metaphor, to ring out of him, correspondingly
specific utterances. The most primitive words would
therefore be phonetic types rung out from the organism
of the first man or men when struck with an idea.
There is a harmony of sound and sense which does not
depend on the imitation of one sound by another. The
charm of literary style and especially of poetry consists
largely in the subtle affinity between vocal expression
and the objects or activities expressed, which may exist
apart from any resemblance of sounds to one another.
The word zigzag is a good illustration. The zig goes
this way, and the zag goes that way, thus describing a
zigzag course. Again, take the line
"The vorpal blade went snicker snack."
The sound is expressive of the gleaming and rapid
motion of the blade, rather than of the sound of it.
What philologists call reduplication has often this in-
trinsic expressiveness, e.g. a "big big man"; a "wide
wide sea"; "far far away." Among the Botocudos of
Brazil ouatou stands for stream, ouatou-ou-ou-ou is the
sea.
In this metaphorical expressiveness of vocal utter-
ance we may detect under a somewhat deceptive dis-
guise the essential principle of the imitative gesture.
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Even the disguise is not present in the case of redupli-
cation
;
here more of the same kind of sound represents
more of the same kind of thing. Other instances may
look more mysterious. But the mystery to a large ex-
tent disappears when we consider that articulate speech
consists not merely in articulate sounds, but also and as
well in the motor process of articulation. The tongue
actually does go zigzag in uttering the word zigzag.
Tick-tack imitates not only the sounds of the clock, but
the rhythmic movement of the pendulum by a corre-
sponding movement of the tongue. Even born deaf-
mutes use the organs of articulation in this imitative
way. Heinicke, as quoted by Tylor, mentions a " deaf-
mute, nineteen years old, who had invented many write-
able words for things." Some of these were arbitrary ;
but at least two, mumm for eating, and schupt for
drinking, were, as Tylor remarks, an imitation of the
movements of the mouth in eating and drinking. In
like manner njan means to eat in the Negro-English
dialect of Surinan, and njan njan means food.* Thus
the ding-dong theory is in its more obvious applica-
tions reducible to the general principle of the imitative
gesture. That part of it which is not so reducible is of
little value as an explanation of the origin of language.
Vague and recondite affinities between sound and sense
cannot in the first instance constitute a natural and
spontaneous language, because they are not sufficient to
make the vocal utterance self-significant or self-inter-
preting. For this it is not enough that a word should
be dimly felt to be appropriate when its application is
already known. It is necessary that the sign should be
* Tylor, Early History of Mankind, p. 73.
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so stamped with the character of the thing signified as
to make clear its application in a given context and
under given circumstances. On the other hand, it must
be admitted that when once the meaning of a word has
become a matter of convention a general feeling of affin-
ity between sound and sense may operate powerfully in
determining the creation and selection of new words.
These and similar theories must all be regarded as
part of the general doctrine that natural signs psycho-
logically precede conventional signs. They are true and
useful inasmuch as they emphasise the part played by
phonetic elements in imitative expression. The imita-
tive use of vocal utterance paves the way for the de-
velopment of conventional speech. Why conventional
language has come to consist almost entirely of phonetic
elements we have attempted to explain in the last sec-
tion. The reason why natural signs have to so large
an extent been displaced by conventional signs lies in
their superior convenience and power.
9. Advantages of Conventional Language. The
primary and essential procedure of the language of nat-
ural signs is to represent things and processes by im-
itating the broad features of their sensible appearance
and especially of their appearance to the eye. But the
characters which are capable of being so imitated are of
a comparatively low grade of generality or abstractness.
They represent an analysis of perceptual experience
into universals and its reconstruction out of these uni-
versals. But the universals themselves are very far
from being simple and ultimate. They in their turn
are intrinsically susceptible of analysis, and constituents
thus revealed are again susceptible of further analysis,
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and so on. Now the more advanced is this process of
dissection, the more helpless is pictorial representation
to express the result either within the individual con-
sciousness or in the intercourse of different minds. But
the power of mentally representing a universal is sim-
ply the power of conceiving it. Where the mental re-
presentation does not exist, the conception does not exist.
Hence a mind whose discursive thinking could only
find expression in self-interpreting signs, would be in-
capable of the higher reaches of abstraction. Broadly
speaking, natural signs are capable of fixing attention
on universals which are constitutive characters of par-
ticular objects as presented in perceptual experience ;
but they can only to a very limited extent fix attention
on universals which are constitutive characters of other
universals. The thinking which depends on the imita-
tive gesture generates concepts ; but it can hardly gen-
erate a conceptual system, in which there is an ascend-
ing scale of generalisation, passing from species to genus,
and from genus to higher genus, and so on through a
series of gradations till the highest genus is reached.
It seems beyond the unaided powers of the thought
which works through natural signs to frame a system of
classification.
This impotence of the imitative gesture to express
higher universals is easily illustrated. "To make,"
says Tylor,
" is too abstract an idea for the deaf-mute
;
to show that the tailor makes the coat, or that the car-
penter makes the table, he would represent the tailor
sewing the coat, and the carpenter sawing and planing
the table."* According to Schmalz, "The more general
* Early History of Mankind.
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determinations of magnitude such as broad, narrow ;
long, short ; thick, thin ; high, low ; cannot be accu-
rately expressed ; the most that can be done is to teach
the deaf-mute signs which are suitable to the largest
proportion of cases."* Often a general concept is ca-
pable of pictorial expression ; but only in a way which is
cumbrous and circuitous when compared to the conven-
tional. A series of imitative gestures may be needed,
where a single word would effect the same purpose
with greater precision and certainty. Thus an Indian
who wished to convey to a deaf-mute that he had
travelled in the train, could only convey the idea of
train by three successive bits of pantomime, one repre-
senting the conception of something covered in, another
that of wheels, and the third that of smoke. Now this
mode of expression ma}r at first sight appear more
analytic than the use of the single word train. It
resolves into three universals and reconstructs out of
them what the conventional language expresses in its
totality by one sign. But we must remember that we
could use many signs if there were need for them.
If there were occasion to give an analytic description
of a railway train, that description could be given with
far more fineness, precision, and adequacy in words
than in imitative gestures. The conventional language
uses one word because one word is enough. The lan-
guage of imitative gesture uses three separate bits of
pantomime because it cannot do with less. It is forced
to describe because it cannot directly designate. Now
why is it unable to express by a single appropriate sign
the general conception of a railway train f The reason
* Ueber die Taubstummen, p. 275.
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is that the concept of a railway train possesses too high
a degree of universality. It gathers up into unity a
great multiplicity of special features, functions, and
relations. Among these are included some which it
would be difficult to express concisely, or even to ex-
press at all, in the gesture language, as for instance the
principle or mechanism of its locomotion, its function
as a means of communication and traffic, and so on.
Now the comprehensive unity which embraces within it-
self all these particular determinations is not capable of
being directly expressed in natural signs, without the
aid of convention. Hence in a communication by
imitative gestures, where there has been no previous
convention, the only course possible is to select certain
particular characteristics of the object, which are at
once important and easily presented to the eye, and to
exhibit as many of them as appear sufficient to enable
the intended meaning to be divined. The same de-
ficiency also makes it difficult to refer to an individual
person by a self-expressive sign. The imitative gesture
as such and apart from convention is incapable of di-
rectly expressing the universality which belongs to the
individual and is associated with the Proper Name.
The depiction of some special characteristic or peculiar-
ity may or may not be successful in directing attention
to the person intended. All depends on context and
circumstances. If representation of this or that char-
acteristic proves insufficient, others may be added until
understanding is reached, as in the case of the railway
train.
CHAPTER VI.
THE EXTERNAL WORLD AS IDEAL CONSTRUCTION.*
1. Unification of Perceptual Data. It is the
function of ideational consciousness to connect in a
continuous whole the detached data of sense-perception
occurring in the course of individual experience. The
isolated facts of sense-perception are made continuous
with each other by interposing between them ideally
represented links. The physical object reveals itself in
actual perception as existing, persisting, and changing
independently of the motor activity of the percipient.
Its characteristic nature as physical object essentially
involves this independence of the percipient subject
and his changing position in relation to it. But the per-
cipient may not only alter his relative position in regard
to it, while he is actually perceiving it ; he may also
turn aside from it altogether, or remove himself to such
a distance that it can no longer affect his senses. As
change of position on his part makes no difference to
the thing as physical object, so his presence or absence
can make no difference to its nature and existence.
When therefore he ideally represents it, he will repre-
sent it as existing, persisting, and changing, although it
* In connexion with this chapter, the student should recall and if
necessary re-read ch. ii. of bk. ii., div. ii.
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is no longer perceived. He will represent it as exist-
ing, persisting, and changing in the same manner as if
he were in its presence and actually observing it. Here-
in lies the possibility of extending knowledge of ma-
terial things and processes far beyond the limits of
actual perception so as to construct an ideally repre-
sented world of which only detached fragments are
actually perceived.
We have now to assign the motives which prompt
and guide the process of ideal construction. The first
of these is that which constitutes the impulse to all
theoretical as distinguished from practical thinking.
It is the endeavour to clear experience from incoher-
ence, contradiction, and ambiguity. Incoherence, con-
tradiction, and ambiguity obstruct the onward flow of
ideas. Where they rise, therefore, the course of mental
activity will direct itself to their removal. Now it is
obvious that conflict must continually arise between an
object as actually perceived and the same object as
ideally represented on the basis of previous perception.
A man leaves an object at rest in one place : he returns
and finds it in another place : the discrepancy can only
be removed by ideally connecting the two experiences
by intermediate links representing some mode in which
the transference from one place to another may or must
have taken place. A fire is left burning brightly ; after
an interval nothing is found but grey embers. Percept
and remembrance must be connected by ideal represen-
tation of a fire gradually decaying. Again, the fire
which is left burning brightly may after a long interval
of time be found still burning as brightly as ever.
Here the representation of the fire as gradually decay-
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ing collides with the actual percept. It has not gone
out. The incoherence may be removed by represent-
ing some one as having interfered in the meantime to
keep it alive. Apart from actual conflict between idea
and perception, the mere strangeness of an object acts
as a theoretical motive for ideal construction. The
mere inability to fit it into the general scheme of things
impels the subject to trains of thought directed to over-
come the difficulty.
Merely theoretical interest however is on the whole
a factor of secondary importance ; and the more primi-
tive the stage of mental development attained, the less
important it is. The pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake is a comparatively late outcome of mental evolu-
tion. In early stages of human development thinking
is mainly subservient to practical ends, and its impel-
ling motive lies in the pressure of practical needs.
Thus the process of ideal interpretation was carried on
only so far as it supplies a guide to action. Merely
theoretical speculation might exist as a sort of amuse-
ment : but it was not followed out in a serious and
strenuous manner.
2. Verification and He-interpretation. The pri-
mary function of ideal construction is the framing of
means for the attainment of practical ends. The ideal
combinations which thus arise are of use only in so far
as they are translated into action. The plan which is
formed in the head must be put into execution. Now
the course of events which takes place in the execution
of the plan may or may not conform to the ideal pre-
arrangement. When it does so conform, the ideal pre-
arrangement is verified by the result. When events fall
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out otherwise than was anticipated, the ideal pre-arrange-
ment is contradicted by the result. In case of failure,
there is a new impulse to thought. The ideal combina-
tions must be modified until an effective plan is reached.
In this way, the process of ideal construction is perpet-
ually finding and utilising new data. In the original
ideal train, there may be a sequence , #, c, d, but the
actual sequence of events when the plan is carried into
execution, may be a, #, c, q. This provokes a new
process of ideal construction, in which the represented
order is a, #, c, m, d. On trial, this ideally represented
sequence is verified. On subsequent occasions, whether
the practical end is the same or different, the sequence
c, m, d will be substituted for the sequence c, <?, where
other relevant conditions are similar. Thus ideal con-
struction subserves practical activity, and in its turn
practical activity yields fresh material for ideal con-
struction. It may happen of course that a plan of
action sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, owing
to conditions beyond the agent's control and possibly
beyond his power to foresee. When this is the case,
effective re-construction of his ideal scheme is not pos-
sible, and he must take his chance of success or failure
in each particular instance. Again, it may happen that
the result depends upon conditions entirely outside the
range of his experience, so that his action is quite in-
efficient. Under such circumstances there will be no
cessation of the activity of ideal combination or practi-
cal execution, if the interests involved are sufficiently
strong. We have an instance of this in modern times
in the widespread use of quack medicines. The patient
is really helpless, but he tries every means that suggests
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itself. In more primitive stages of mental develop-
ment, whole systems of ideas arise in this way, which
we from our superior point of view stigmatise as myth-
ology or superstition.
Real insight into physical nature, and effective con-
trol over its processes, are acquired mainly by mechan-
ical contrivance and mechanical execution. Weaving,
basket-work, pottery, building, the construction of tools
and weapons, yield in early stages of development a
real knowledge of the nature of physical things and a
real control over them. In such mechanical operations,
ideal analysis and synthesis are accurately translated in-
to real analysis and synthesis, a real separation and re-
combination of the parts of matter. Thus the constitu-
tion of the physical world is learnt by actually taking
it to pieces and putting it together again. In general,
insight into natural process is in proportion to the
degree of development of the mechanical arts.
The knowledge of nature which is embodied in
modern science is essentially of the same type. There
is however one important difference. We now artifi-
cially separate and re-combine physical conditions for
the sake of obtaining knowledge, and not merely for
practical purposes. Experiments are now made with
a purely theoretical interest, because the love of
knowledge for its own sake has become strongly de-
veloped.
3. Space as Ideal Construction. There are no
perfectly straight lines in nature, but none the less we
can conceive a line to be perfectly straight. This is
possible, because in ideal construction we can by men-
tal abstraction regard as irrelevant the physical condi-
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tions which actually prevent perfect straightness. A
drunken man tries to walk straight along a road ; but
in spite of his efforts his course is more or less con-
spicuously zigzag. In his own mind, the course he in-
tends to pursue is contrasted with the course he is
compelled to pursue against his will. The course he
intends to pursue is that which he would pursue apart
from certain interfering conditions. It is thus an ideal
construction due to conceptual analysis. Now it is pos-
sible in this way to disregard and treat as irrelevant all
properly physical conditions as contrasted with those
conditions which are contained in the very nature of
space, as such. A line, as straight as the nature of space
will admit of apart from other interfering conditions,
appears to ideal construction as a perfectly straight
line. In a similar way the conception of a perfect
circle and other perfect figures arises. It is possible to
notice different degrees of roundness before attaining
the concept of a perfect sphere or circle, just as we
notice different degrees of bigness, although there
neither is nor can be an ideal of perfect bigness. Hav-
ing had experience of &, which is rounder than a, we
may try to make c, which will differ from b in degree
of roundness as b differs from a. The obstacles which
hinder us in such an attempt are our own deficient skill
or the nature of the material we have to deal with. If
we abstract from such conditions and consider only the
nature of space, we have a concept of perfect round-
ness. The starting-point of this development is prob-
ably to be found in the attempt to make things as
round, as straight, or as square as possible in the pro-
cess of mechanical construction. In this way there
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will come to be an ideal of roundness, or straightness,
or squareness, and these ideals, at first rude, will ulti-
mately pass into the abstract mathematical conceptions
with which Euclid has made us familiar.
The conception of the infinity of space has a like
origin. Progress from place to place may be arrested
by all kinds of physical conditions ; but if these be dis-
regarded, and the nature of space alone considered, no
reason is discernible why movement from one position
to another should have any limit. A spatial limit is
the boundary line between one part of space and an
adjoining part ; it is a limit in space, and cannot there-
fore be a limit of space. It is by mental process of the
kind described that the transition is made from space
as perceived or imaged to space as conceived.
4. Time as Ideal Construction. The process of
ideal construction makes a greater difference in the
case of time than even in that of space. We have seen
how in an ideally represented time-series the distinc-
tion between now and then, or between one now and
another, becomes relative, so that according to the
point of view we may regard any part of the series as a
now, and what precedes or follows as relatively future
or past. But besides this relative antecedence and sub-
sequence, there is also what we may call an absolute
now, the moment of present sensation. Present time
in this sense is not merely defined by its relations, but
has a special stamp or mark upon it, constituted by its
sensuous vividness and definiteness. It thus forms a
fixed starting-point for ideal construction of time-order.
What is prior to it is regarded not merely as relatively
but as absolutely past; what is subsequent to it is re-
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garded not merely as relatively but as absolutely future.
Past and future are still defined only by their relations ;
but the starting-point from which we define them is
not arbitrary but fixed, and fixed not by ideal construc-
tion but by actual sensation. As Dr. Ward says : " To
a being whose presentations never passed through the
transitions which ours undergo first divested of the
strength and vividness of impressions, again re-invested
with them and brought back from the faint world of
ideas the sharp contrasts of 'now' and 'then,' and
all the manifold emotions they occasion, would be quite
unknown. ... In the obligation to wait and work in
hope or dread of what is ' still to come
' there is much
more than time-order."* The apprehension of past
and future in this absolute sense pre-supposes a start-
ing-point in the immediate sense experience of the
moment
;
and an ideal construction in two directions,
on the one hand, of what has preceded, on the other, of
what is to follow, the actual now. On the whole, an-
ticipation of the future must be regarded as prior in
the order of development to reminiscence of the past.
For the primary stimulus to ideational activity comes
from practical needs ; and these are in the first instance
concerned with the future. Given a present urgency
in the way of hunger or thirst, the primary demand
made upon ideational activity is for the devising of
means to procure food or drink. It is thus called on to
follow out a train of ideas representing the successive
links connecting the present state of need with a fu-
ture state of satisfaction. Trains of ideas representing
* Article "Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edition,
xx., p. 64.
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previous sequences of events will at first be called into
play mainly by the need for data derived from the past
to use in providing for the future. But the grand
stimulus to reminiscence is not to be found in dealings
with the physical world, but in the personal and social
interests which we shall have to discuss under the head of
Self-Consciousness. There are two characteristics which
distinguish the future from the past apart from abstract
priority and subsequence. The future is uncertain, or
in other words, its anticipation may take the form, not
of one definitely fixed series of ideal representations,
but of a number of alternative lines, which compete
with each other for predominance in consciousness.
But the past has already taken determinate form ; in it
one definite alternative has already been selected to the
exclusion of others. Besides this, past and future have
an altogether different relation to practical activity.
The future is something which may be in a greater or
less degree determined by the agency of the subject
himself
;
and he must be continually adjusting his
actions so as to modify it, if he is to survive and live a
tolerable life in the world. But the past is beyond his
control. Retrospection can only be of use in supply-
ing data for pre-arranging the future.
So far we have considered only the lapse of time as
it appears to the individual subject, or in other words
what is sometimes called subjective time. But it is
plain that this does not coincide with time as measured
by the clock. Shakespeare tells us that time travels
"in divers paces with divers persons"; Newton tells
us that time moves at a constant rate. Shakespeare's
time is evidently subjective time, and Newton's object-
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ive time. In a position of great difficulty and danger
minutes may appear like hours. Two lovers in the en-
joyment of a lovers' conversation may find hours pass
like minutes. The subjective estimate of time is differ-
ent from time as measured by the clock. Objective
time as distinguished from subjective is a product
of ideal construction. The beginning of the process
by which it comes to be conceived is found in the
conditions of practical activity. Lapse of time is
often an important factor in the attainment of prac-
tical ends. It takes a certain time, for instance, to
travel from one given place to another, or to cook
a piece of meat, or for water to boil, or for clay to
harden in the sun. Now in practical calculations it
will not do to leave the estimate of the lapse of time in
such cases to the varying impressions of the individual.
The only effective mode of procedure is to find some
other process which coincides in its beginning and
termination with the process of which the duration is
to be measured. Thus, if the question be, how long it
takes to get from one place to another, a sufficient
answer may be found by reference to the course of the
sun. It will take perhaps from sunrise to sunset of a
summer's day; or from sunrise till noon. The effi-
ciency of this mode of procedure depends upon the
discovery of uniform standards of measurement. These
are best supplied by rhythmic processes which repeat
themselves at intervals. If it is found that the dura-
tion of events in general can for practical purposes be
defined by saying that they take the same time as one
or more repetitions of a certain rhythmic process, this
process has proved its efficiency as a standard of meas-
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urement. The process which we now most commonly
use is the movement of the hands of a clock. The
movement of the minute-hand, starting from one posi-
tion and returning to it again, constitutes a fixed pe-
riod which we call an hour. So the movement over a
smaller interval on the dial constitutes another fixed pe-
riod which we call a minute. Objective time is thus an
ideal construction, and the principle on which it rests
is that processes otherwise similar, and taking place
under similar conditions, will occupy the same time.
Thus if they start simultaneously, they will terminate
simultaneously, and so on. Similarly, if two dissimilar
processes are found to occupy the same time on one
occasion, they will occupy the same time on another
occasion, under like conditions.
5. Causality as Ideal Construction. On
* the
purely perceptual level, there is a tendency to repeat
modes of procedure which have proved successful in the
past, and to discontinue modes of procedure which have
proved unsuccessful. To this extent, the category of
causality operates in perceptual consciousness. But for
the merely perceptual consciousness the question why
a given course produces a given effect has no exist-
ence. Ideal construction is continually asking this ques-
tion. It is the very essence of the process by which
means are -devised for the attainment of practical ends
to interpose between the starting-point and its termin-
ation a series of ideally represented links, each con-
stituting an indispensable term in a train of causes
leading up to the ultimate effect. These practical ex-
periences yield material for interpreting events which
take place apart from the agency of the subject. Thus
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it becomes possible to ask why A produces Z>, and to
answer by saying that A produces B, and that It pro-
duces (7, and that C produces D. So far as this ideal
construction is determined by more or less practical
experiences such as those connected with mechanical
contrivance, it yields a true insight into the nature of
physical process. But strong interests of a practical or
theoretical kind often create a need for explanation
where data for explanation are either altogether insuffi-
cient or absent. In such cases the ideal construction will
take a form which appears from a higher point of view
fanciful and absurd. Why has the robin a red breast ?
Because cock-sparrow shot it with his bow and arrow.
A good example of a simple causal series of this kind is
the story of the old woman whose pig would not go
over the stile. " As soon as the cat had lapped up the
milk, the cat began to kill the rat, the rat began to
gnaw the rope, the rope began to hang the butcher,
the butcher began to kill the ox, the ox began to drink
the water, the water began to quench the fire, the fire
began to burn the stick, the stick began to beat the
dog, the dog began to bite the pig, the pig in a fright
jumped over the stile, and so the old woman got home
that night." In savage thought, there are abundant ex-
amples of causal explanation which remind us of these
nursery fables.
The word why may have another application. In
asking why a given effect is produced, the interest
may lie in discovering which of a given group of con-
ditions are essential to the result, and which irrelevant.
This inquiry naturally arises when the same result fol-
lows under circumstances apparently dissimilar on the
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whole, or fails to appear under circumstances appar-
ently similar on the whole. To find a cause is here to
find points of identity in apparently dissimilar condi-
tions, and of difference in apparently similar conditions.
There is a West African story according to which a
hunter took the first hint for weaving nets from con-
templating the spider's web. His wife suggested that
he might make mats and similar articles in like manner.
He tried, but failed to give them shape. Accordingly,
he went back to observe the procedure of the spider, so
as to note the points of difference between the animal's
method and his own. He discovered that the spider
started always with a fixed framework and wove its
web on that. Going back to his own task, he made for
himself a framework by means of sticks and poles, and
so succeeded in giving proper shape to the articles he
made. He had compared the two modes of procedure,
so as to distinguish the points of agreement from the
points of difference, and in this way was able to explain
why a certain result should follow in the one case, and
a different result in the other. It is by such processes
of analytic comparison that universal laws of nature are
ultimately discovered, which laws may form the basis of
such exact and complicated mechanical contrivances as
the steam-engine or the electric telegraph. In early
stages of development, the distinction of the essential
part of a cause from the accidental is very crude and
irrelevant, and is in the main proportioned to the
degree of advancement in the mechanical arts. Arsenic
and incantations, according to Voltaire, will kill a flock
of sheep. The savage never thinks of using the ar-
senic without the incantations. The medicine man ac-
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companies even surgical operations with all kinds of
ceremonials having nothing to do with the result.
In Charles Lamb's dissertation on roast pig, we have a
fanciful exaggeration of this feature of savage thought.
Bo-bo discovers the flavour of roast pig by accidentally
setting fire to a house. The custom of firing houses in
order to roast pigs continued "till in process of time
... a sage arose, like our Locke, who made a discovery
that the flesh of swine, or indeed of any other animal,
might be cooked (burnt, as they called it) without the
necessity of consuming a whole house to dress it."*
The exaggeration in Lamb's story arises from his hav-
ing chosen a case in which all essential conditions fall
within the practical experience and control of the
agents interested in the result, so that it would be easy
for them to disengage the essential from the accidental.
He would scarcely have exaggerated if he had chosen
such natural phenomena as disease and death, in which
the operative conditions are in the main beyond the
control and even beyond the ken of the uncultured
mind. Here ideal construction cannot fix upon what
is essential
;
and since the strength of the practical
interests concerned demands the discovery of some
operative conditions to form a basis of practical pro-
cedure, causal efficacy is ascribed to all kinds of cir-
cumstances which are in reality totally irrelevant, such
as the evil eye, the malignancy of departed spirits,
the magical practices of witches, and the like. On
these assumptions, elaborate methods of procedure are
based. Such methods are often more or less intermin-
gled with truly curative measures, which prevent the
* Essays of Ella (Ainger's edition), p. 168.
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result being wholly a matter of accident. But on the
whole, much more stress is laid on what is irrelevant
and inefficient, than on what is relevant and efficient.
In treating a disease, it is obvious that the cure does
not depend merely on drugs, or the like ; for the pa-
tient may either die or recover when the same drugs
are used. Other conditions are therefore imagined
which by their very nature cannot come except in a
partial and uncertain way within the control of the
medicine man.
6. Thinghood an Ideal Construction. We have
seen that for perceptual consciousness whatever has
unity and distinctness of interest is a separate thing.
Since interest is primarily practical, whatever acts as a
whole, and is capable of being acted on as a whole, is
one thing. We have seen that conceptual analysis re-
solves the unity of the thing into its constituent parts,
qualities and relations, and that conceptual synthesis
re-constructs it by ideal combination of these constitu-
ent parts, qualities and relations.
Very important developments of the process of ideal
construction arise out of the connexion of the category
of Thinghood with that of causality. These assume two
forms. The first line of thought endeavours to give a
causal explanation of the nature and unity of the indi-
vidual thing from the connexion and interaction of its
parts. The other pre-supposes the unity and intrinsic
nature of the thing as ultimate and, instead of explain-
ing them, uses them as a basis of causal explanation.
The first of these lines of thought takes its point
of departure in mechanical contrivance and execution.
Inasmuch as a man has himself actually put a piece of
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mechanism together, so that it may fulfil a certain
function, he is able to explain why it fulfils this func-
tion, by showing how the parts are combined, and act
on each other so as to work together in producing a
certain result. The same kind of explanation may
afterwards be applied to things which he cannot him-
self construct. He may ideally analyse and combine
in a mechanical way what he cannot actually take to
pieces and put together again. He may even assume
constituent elements which are beyond the reach of
actual perception, and by ascribing to these fixed modes
of behaviour in relation to each other, he may explain
the phenomena which he can observe as the products of
their interaction. Modern theories of atoms and mole-
cules and of the motions of the particles of ether are
examples of the highest development attained in this
direction. Atomic theories explain the nature and
mode of behaviour of perceptible things, by assuming
as elementary constituents of the physical world "count-
less atoms, invisible from their minuteness, persistent
in their duration, and unchangeable in their properties.
These atoms, now coalescing in most manifold fashion,
now withdrawing unaltered from these fluctuating com-
binations, produce by the variety of their positions and
motions the different kinds of natural products and
their changeful development."
* The essential pre-
supposition of such theories is that the elements which
they assume as ultimate shall always behave in identi-
cally the same way in the same circumstances. Their
whole nature is supposed to be constituted by their
mode of behaviour in relation to each other, and this is
* Lotze, Microcosmus, third edition, vol. i., pp. 31-32.
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invariable. Explanation is more complete and satis-
factory the less variety there is in the constitution of
the ultimate atoms. It would be most perfect from a
mechanical point of view if all natural processes could
be explained by the combination and interaction of
atoms in themselves homogeneous, so that the resulting
variety of material products would be purely due to
variety in the way in which identical elements are put
together. This mechanical point of view has been ap-
plied, to a large extent with success, even to living
organisms. The construction of self-acting machinery
has had an important influence in suggesting this line
of thought.
" Our eyes," says Lotze, " cannot rest re-
peatedly and continuously on this remarkable border-
land of self-acting instruments, which derive their
material from Nature, but the form of their operation
from human volition, without our whole mode of con-
ceiving Nature being affected by these observations.
. . . We know in fact that not from within, by a spon-
taneous effort at development, but under extraneous
compulsion have the combined bodies acquired this
admirable play of mutually adjusted states. Far simp-
ler properties and effects belonged in themselves to the
particular substances which we combined, varying ac-
cording to universal laws with the alteration of definite
conditions. These invisible forces our mechanical skill
has compelled (by the cunning combinations into which
it has beguiled that which holds them) to work, under
such conditions that their conformity to universal laws
must, without any purpose of their own, realise the
ends that are our purposes." * Such human contri-
* Op. cit., p. 18.
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vances could not but suggest the question whether
even animated organisms were not composed partly or
wholly in a similar manner, having their origin in "the
world's course, which combines the elements sometimes
in one way, sometimes in another, and in each of these
groups inexorably initiates the system of movements
and operations that, according to general laws, corre-
sponds to the actual mode of their connexion." * As a
matter of fact, physiological explanation, so far as it
goes, is based on this principle.
The mechanical point of view, which has received so
vast a development in modern science, sprang from ex-
tremely meagre and rudimentary beginnings in primi-
tive thought. The power of mechanical construction
and analysis implied in the making of the simple in-
struments of savages seems almost infinitesimal, if we
compare it with our elaborate machinery. It is utterly
insufficient to suggest even the remotest possibility of a
mechanical explanation of the complex processes and
products of nature, and especially of living organisms
and their behaviour. Yet the mind of the savage can-
not remain at rest simply ignoring the play of the
natural forces which surround him and continually
influence his life and activity for good and evil, but
above all for evil. In particular, disease and death are
phenomena which he cannot neglect. The pressure of
practical interests compels him to act and to contrive
means of acting. Thus some kind of ideal construction
is for him a necessity in order that he may not sit down
helpless in face of a vast variety of phenomena which
he cannot even think of explaining on mechanical prin-
* Ibid.
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ciples. To him it is simply a familiar fact which re-
quires no explanation, that individual things exist, hav-
ing distinctive properties and modes of behaviour. It
is a familiar fact that such things are composed of
parts which act and are acted on together, so that
change in one part is accompanied by changes in other
parts. All this he does not think of explaining, but
pre-supposes it without question as a basis of explana-
tion. Hence he follows a line of thought which we
may call the anti-mechanical. Instead of explaining
the unity of the whole by the combination and inter-
action of the parts, he explains the combination and
interaction of the parts by the unity of the whole. He
knows that the sole of his foot is part of the same indi-
vidual unity as the crown of his head ; he knows that
if a nail runs into the sole of his foot, his mouth utters
a cry of pain. But the connexion of the two facts by a
series of intermediate links of a mechanical kind lies
entirely outside the circle of his ideas. He knows
nothing of afferent and efferent nerves, or of molecular
processes in brain and muscle. When the nail runs
into his foot, his organs of speech emit a cry simply
because he is one individual being of which both foot
and organs of speech are part. The important point is
that as this mode of explanation takes no account of
mechanical conditions, it is not subject to mechanical
limitations. The sympathetic communion between the
parts of a whole is not supposed to be conditioned by
those relations in space and time on which mechanical
interaction depends. It is thus possible to represent
the sympathetic communion as existing even when the
supposed parts of the same individual whole are widely
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separated in space, so that the conditions of mechanical
interaction are absent. The ideas and the practices of
primitive magic and witchcraft depend in a great degree
on this enlargement of the conception of individual
unity. Disease or death may be produced by operating
on the cuttings of a person's hair, or the parings of his
nails, or the remains of his food, when the person him-
self is far away. Hence it is a common custom with
savages to bury their nail-parings, hair-cuttings, and so
on, so that what happens to these may not by sym-
pathetic communion cause misfortune to them. In like
manner, the nature of a whole is often regarded as in
some manner present and operative in the part, even
when it has been dissevered from the whole, and ac-
quires connexion with some other individual. In this
way the nature of one thing may be in some measure
transferred to another. By wearing a tiger's teeth, a
man may make himself brave and fierce ; by appropriat-
ing the belongings of a deceased person, he may share
in that person's skill and good-fortune. Instances of
this kind are innumerable, and we shall have to refer to
them again in the next chapter.*
7. Ideal Construction as a Co-operative Process.
-Through language, ideal combination becomes a
function not of the individual merely, but of society.
It may be confidently asserted that the capacity for
ideation al thought would be of little use to a solitary
* It should be remarked that the savage view contains a great truth.
Its error and crudity lie in substituting explanation of the parts by the
whole instead of explanation of the whole by the parts. But it is equally
one-sided to suppose that merely mechanical explanation can yield the
whole truth. If this were so, there would be no place for philosophy as
distinguished from science.
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animal. Such thinking is essentially a social function.
Other animals co-operate in work and play, but only men
co-operate in thinking. Where many men are united in
striving to realise a common end, each single mind is,
so to speak, part of one great collective mind. The
ideas occurring to each are communicated to all. What
occurs to A, to .Z?, or to C respectively may be value-





may form a real advance : even in combination they
may be futile, yet when they reach the mind of D,
they may fall on fertile soil and suggest some feasible
plan of action or plausible line of thought.
The debt which the individual owes to social inter-
course by means of language is two-fold. He is placed
by it in possession of data which he could never have
acquired by his own personal experience. His think-
ing is based not only on what he himself has seen,
heard, and done, but also on what others have seen,
heard, and done. In the second place, he receives
from others not merely the results of their observa-
tions, but the results of their trains of thought. In
both ways his debt to his social environment is im-
mense. His debt is not merely confined to interchange
of ideas by means of language. Imitation also plays a
large part. In doing or attempting to do what others
have done before him, he re-thinks the thoughts which
have passed through their minds ; and he also in the
same process acquires novel ideas, inasmuch as imita-
tion is rarely, if ever, exact reproduction of that which
is imitated. The actions imitated are usually more or
less modified and lead to new results in the case of each
imitator. What has been said holds true for the rela-
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tions of the men of the same generation to each other ;
but its application to successive generations is even
more important. Every child in learning the language
of its ancestors assimilates in outline the whole sys-
tem of ideas, the whole system of conceptual anal-
ysis and synthesis, which has been acquired by the
mental and bodily activity of past generations. It
acquires knowledge by question and answer, and by
a gradual divination of the meaning of words, as
used in ordinary conversation, far more than by
direct personal experience.
" The words and sen-
tences that fall upon
" the " ear " of a child " and
are soon upon his lips, express not so much his sub-
jective experience, as the common experience of his
kind which becomes, as it were, an objective rule or
measure, to which his shall conform. Why, for ex-
ample, does a child have no difficulty about the relation
of substance and qualities that has given philosophers
so much trouble ? and why do all children understand
or seem to understand it alike, whatever their experi-
ence may have been ? Why ? but because the language
put into their mouths, and which they must e'en use,
settles the point for them, one and all ; involving, as it
does, a metaphysical theory which, whether in itself
unexceptionable or not, has been found serviceable
through all the generations of men."* We use our
own private experiences "mainly to decipher and
verify the ready-made scheme of knowledge that is
given to us en bloc with the words of our mother-
tongue. This scheme is the result of the thinking, less
or more conscious, and mainly practical, of all the gen-
* Croom Robertson, Philosophical Remains, p. 68.
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erations of articulately speaking men, passed on with
gradual increase from each to each."*
The educational influence of one human generation
on another is by no means wholly dependent upon the
use of language. The importance of the part played
by imitation cannot be exaggerated. What men have
learned to do in the past, the child has to learn to do
over again in its own individual case. This is only
possible in so far as it attends to the behaviour of its
elders, and strives to imitate them. As a matter of fact,
the period of childhood is mainly occupied in attempting
to reproduce the modes of action current in the society
to which the child belongs. Even the play of children
is penetrated through and through by this imitative
character. Children can take the place of their elders
in the next generation only by learning from them
those ways of acting which are necessary for the gen-
eral scheme of social organisation. But in this process
they acquire not only bodily dexterities, but also sys-
tematic combinations of ideas which they never could
have attained by their own unassisted efforts. Besides
this, the material environment of human beings is in a
large measure a creation of human thought transmitted
from one generation to another. Tools, weapons, uten-
sils, buildings, gardens and cultivated fields, are all
products of human intelligence. They are material
arrangements embodying in outward and visible form
trains of ideas which have passed through human minds.
Flowing from human intelligence these objects appeal
to human intelligence. The child, in learning their
nature and use, re-thinks the thoughts which gave them
* Op. Cit., p. 69.
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being. In this way, as much as by the help of lan-
guage and direct imitation, the ideas of one generation
are transmitted to the next to be by it further devel-
oped, so that from comparatively small beginnings
human civilisation may grow like an avalanche ever
accumulating and retaining new material as it advances.
Now the lower animals do not in this manner create an
environment for themselves by their own intelligence.
Bees, ants, nest-building birds, beavers and other ani-
mals with definite constructive tendencies may be said
in part to make their own environment. But they do
not do so in execution of designs framed by themselves.
Their constructions do not embody trains of ideas di-
rected to the attainment of foreseen ends. As their
work does not arise from trains of ideas in the first
instance, so it does not awaken trains of ideas in the
successive generations which repeat the same activities.
Each new generation is born with the instinctive apti-
tudes and propensities of its progenitors and repeats
their doings in the same undesigning way. On the
other hand, the works of man, as they arise from idea-
tional thought, so they arouse ideational thought. The
same understanding which was needed for their produc-
tion is needed for their reproduction. Hence the edu-
cational influence of an environment moulded by human
hands to embody human designs does not affect the ani-
mals which dwell with man. The human intelligence
incorporated in the products of human industry is
intelligible only to a mind essentially akin to the
human mind. The external world as an ideal con-
struction is a social product. It must therefore be
independent of the individual subject in the same
Psych.
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manner and degree as social organisation in general
is independent of its individual members. There is
thus introduced a new factor in the constitution of
external reality, the social factor. The ideal com-
binations which arise in the individual mind can only
become permanent parts of the ideal structure repre-
senting the real world if they are entertained by other
minds also, and so become current in the society to
which the individual belongs. Besides the verification
of ideal combinations by actual experience by means of
corresponding perceptual experiences, another kind of
verification is required. Social endorsement is neces-
sary. On the other hand, ideal combinations which are
generally current in society tend to maintain themselves
in the mind of the individual, even though he has never
himself verified them, and even though his own per-
sonal experience is unfavourable to them rather than
otherwise. Now and then a person is met with who
dares to deny that the earth is round ; there is nothing
in his direct personal experience to show the round-
ness; on the contrary, so far as he can observe it, it
seems to be flat. Now such a person is generally re-
garded as a " crank
"
;
he is generally spoken of as a
harmless kind of lunatic
;
and what is more important,
he is so spoken of by multitudes of persons who know
much less about the matter than himself. The reason
is that he is maintaining his own individual ideas
against the vast work of ideal construction which has
been built up by the co-operative thinking of many
generations. It is true that this ideal structure is in
process of constant development ; and that as it grows
it rectifies itself, excluding ideal combinations which
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had previously formed integral parts of it, and receiv-
ing into itself others which it has previously rejected.
But the earth-flattener does not appear as a represent-
ative of this advance : he puts himself forward, or is
supposed to do so, merely as an individual setting up
his own private thoughts in antagonism to the social
product. The experts who are the accredited repre-
sentatives of the development of the general system of
ideas in this direction, scout his pretensions : he there-
fore figures as an isolated individual appearing in the
strength of his own private judgment in opposition to
the established social order, and he is therefore re-
garded by society much in the same way as a lunatic
or criminal, the only difference being that he is con-
sidered to be harmless and amusing.
This is a case taken from our own complex society,
in which ideal construction is so vast in its extent and
so diversified that there is no single person who can hold
more than a fragment of it, and its various branches are
assigned to the keeping of special guardians. These com-
plex conditions give a certain freedom of play to the in-
dividual, which is absent in more simple organisations.
In more primitive communities, such as we find among
savages, the general stock of ideas is assimilated by each
individual, and all are equally its guardians. Thus the
pressure of society upon the individual is incomparably
more coercive. Any private rebellion against inherited
and accepted tradition would be resented and sup-
pressed with great speed and certainty. Thus prim-
itive societies are intensely conservative and remark-
ably unanimous in their modes of thought. Each thinks
as the rest think, and dares not persevere in any in-
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novation which does not find general acceptance. Ideal
activity is on the whole more occupied in finding rea-
sons to justify tradition, or to explain its apparent in-
consistency with actual experience, than in further
developing and improving the ideal scheme which has
been handed down from generation to generation.
CHAPTER VII.
SELF AS IDEAL CONSTRUCTION.
1. The Personal Series. On the perceptual level,
there is a bi-partition of conscious experience into two
parts, one belonging to the Self and the other to the Not-
Self. To the Self belong all sensations like the pain of a
wound, which exist or at least persist independently of
external impressions ; all organic sensations and appe-
tites
;
all active impulses and experiences of free move-
ment. To the Not-Self belong all those experiences to
which the organism must adjust its movements in order
to make them efficient in the attainment of practical ends.
Now adjustment is possible only in so far as the experi-
ences to which adjustment is made arise from conditions
independent of the organism itself and its movements.
Thus changes and differences in sense-experience, if
and so far as they depend purely on free motor activi-
ties, belong to the Self. Only in so far as they are
determined for and not by the percipient subject do
they possess the independence which makes it possible
to speak of motor activities being adjusted to them.
Thus the physical object reveals itself in actual percep-
tion as existing, persisting, and changing in relative in-
dependence of the motor activity of the percipient.
The case of ideal construction is analogous. This also
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is an activity primarily directed to practical ends ; and
in order to be effective, it must adjust itself to condi-
tions which it does not create. These conditions are
physical objects and relations as ideally represented.
On the other hand, the process of ideal construction is
an activity of the Self, just as the motor activity in-
volved in perception is. The ends pursued are dic-
tated by the nature of the Self. So too the order and
manner of devising means for the attainment of these
ends is largely within subjective control. The order in
which ideas occur is very far from corresponding with
the order of objective facts. In ideal construction the
mind starts with the idea of the end
;
in the order of
nature the end comes last. In a train of thought ob-
jects and processes may be represented together and
compared which in the order of nature are widely
separated in space and time. The same holds true of
perceptual process; the order in which the parts and
qualities of an object are perceived in no way corre-
sponds with their actual relations. The percipient may
see a thing and touch it afterwards, or he may touch it
first and see it afterwards. But this subjective order
has nothing to do with the physical relation of tactile
and visible qualities in the thing itself. We may look
at the parts of a building successively, but they do not
actually occur successively.
Now when ideal representation is concerned not with
the physical world but with the Self, it follows and ad-
justs itself to what we have called the subjective order.
It follows and adjusts itself to the order in which the
experiences of an individual have actually occurred in
the life-history of that individual. This may be illus-
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trated by the distinction between order of exposition
and order of discovery. If a man, after testing the
qualities of a cigar, is asked what sort of cigar it is, he
may say that it has an excellent flavour and is in good
condition. His thoughts are concentrated merely on
the nature of the cigar, without reference to himself.
If he is asked how he has found out that it has these
qualities, he may say that he began by looking at it,
that he then felt it, that he put it to his nose and smelt
it, that he put it to his ear and heard it crackle, and so
on. His thoughts follow the subjective order, the
order in which his experiences had actually occurred.
The material for the ideal construction of the Self
consists therefore in organic sensations and appetites, in
motor impulses and activities, and in ideational impul-
ses and activities. The order of construction is the
order in which these experiences actually occur, as dis-
tinguished from the order of the objects with which they
are concerned. Reference to these objects is involved,
but only because we cannot think of a perception or
idea without thinking of it as the perception or idea of
something.
It is evident that the bodily organism must be a very
prominent constituent of the Self as thus apprehended.
The order in which sensations come to us depends on
movements of the body and of the organs of sense
which are under our control. Organic sensations, and
those which persist after external impressions such as
wounds and blows, are localised in the organism itself;
and since these are subjective, the organism, being in-
separably connected with them, must be regarded as
belonging to the Self rather than the Not-Self. Even
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when the mind is absorbed in its own train of ideas, the
presence of its own body constitutes an important part
of its experience. Whatever objects may be absent,
the body itself is always present. We cannot move
away from it and leave it behind. It constantly enters
into actual experience ; it is not an external condition
to which motor activity must conform itself; it is the
indispensable condition of there being any motor activ-
ity at all. At the same time, it does not belong purely
to the Self. In some ways it is just like external ob-
jects. One part of the organism can perceive another,
just as it can perceive anything else. This analogy be-
tween the body and other material things becomes more
and more completely realised with the general develop-
ment of knowledge ; till in the end it becomes possible
to conceive of the Self in abstraction from the material
organism as such. But this is a very late result of in-
tellectual development. It constitutes a point of view
foreign to the ordinary thinking even of educated and
civilised men. The word " I " in ordinary language as
often as not refers directly to the body ; as when we
say
" I took a walk," " I fell down a pit," " I swallowed
a glass of wine."
2. The Social Factor in the Development of Self-
Consciousness. We have so far only given an ab-
stract account of what is meant by Self as ideal con-
struction. We have said nothing of the motives which
prompt it. These, as in the case of the external world,
are primarily practical, and arise from the relation of
different individuals to each other in the same com-
munity. In such a community each individual is even
more dependent on his fellows and their conduct than
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he is on his physical environment. We have seen
that even for the power of thinking effectively, and
so adjusting his actions to physical conditions, he is
dependent on intercourse with others by means of lan-
guage and otherwise. He must be continually adapt-
ing himself to his social environment ; and to that end
he must study the conditions which determine the con-
duct of his fellows towards himself and towards each
other. He must strive to ideally represent their expe-
riences, the impulses which determine their actions,
their emotions, their trains of ideas, and so on. In this
way he is led to the ideal construction of their subjec-
tive history. Now it is true that other Selves are not
his own very Self, but they are none the less Selves,
though they are other Selves.
Interpretation of the behaviour of others can only be
founded on data derived from his own experience of the
motives and ideas which prompt and guide his own
actions. Thus in the very process of constructing a
representation of the subjective experience of others,
he must construct a representation of his own subjec-
tive experience. He is continually comparing others
with himself, noting the points of agreement and differ-
ence. Every advance in his knowledge of them is also
an advance in his knowledge of himself ; and, converse-
ly, every advance in his knowledge of himself is an
advance in his knowledge of others. The same result
may be reached in a somewhat different way. The in-
dividual has not only to consider the attitude of others
towards himself, but his own attitude towards them.
He must shape his own ways of thinking and acting so
as to please them and secure their friendly behaviour
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towards himself. Thus he is constantly urged to a
comparison between what he is and does and what his
fellows require of him. In this way he is forced to
think about his own thoughts, actions, capabilities, and
the like.
In this way the environment of social relationships
supplies the prompting motives of an ideal construc-
tion, in which the present Self appears as a link in a
series embracing the remembered past and the expected
future. But this is only one part of the function of
the social factor. It not only supplies motives for the
ideal construction, it also supplies essential material
entering into all developed human self-consciousness.
The thought of Self always involves the thought of
manifold and complex relations to other selves. A
man's own ideal representation of himself includes the
view which he thinks other take of him, the view which
he wishes them to take of him, the view which he anti-
cipates that they will take of him, or that they would
take of him if he acted in certain ways, and so forth.
" The characters, attributes, functions, or other organic
constituents of the self commonly extend, from our own
point of view, decidedly beyond anything that can be
directly presented in any series of our isolated inner
experiences, however extended. When one is vain,
one's self-consciousness involves the notion that one's
self really exists, in some way or other, for the thoughts
and estimates of others, and is at least worthy, if not
the possessor, of their praise or of their envy. When
one feels guilty, one does not and cannot abstract from
the conceived presence of one's self in and for the ex-
perience of a real or ideal judge of one's guilt. In all
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such cases the self of self-consciousness thus appears as
something that it would not and could not be were
there not others in the world to behold, or to estimate
it, to be led or otherwise influenced by it, or to appeal
to it. It is now from such points of view that the self
of self-consciousness comes, in the end, to get form as a
being who takes himself to have a social position, an
office, a profession, in brief, a vast group of functions
without which the self would appear to itself to be, rel-
atively speaking, a mere cipher, while these functions
are at once regarded as organically joined to the self,
and centred in it, and, nevertheless, are unintelligible
unless one goes beyond one's private consciousness, and
takes account of the ideas and estimates of other
people."*
As the idea of Self essentially involves the idea of va-
rying relations to other selves, it will vary according as
its relations vary. In relation to enemies it is a com-
bative Self
;
in relation to superiors it is a submissive,
receptive Self ; in relation to inferiors it is a dominant,
controlling Self. To again quote Royce : " If I strut
about in fancied dignity, my non-Ego is the world of
people who, as I fondly hope, are admiring me. Ac-
cordingly I then exist, for myself, as the beheld of all
beholders, the model. If I sink in despair and self-
abasement, my non-Ego is the world of the conceived
real or ideal people whose imagined contempt interests,
but overwhelms me, and I exist for myself as the de-
spised Ego, worthy of their ill-will. When I speak, my
non-Ego is the person or persons addressed, and my
* Prof. Royce, " Observations on Anomalies of Self-Consciousness,"
Psychological Review, vol. ii.. No. 5, pp. 437-438.
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Ego is the speaker. If I suddenly note that, though I
talk, nobody marks me, both the non-Ego and my Ego
dramatically change together in my consciousness."*
The influence of the social factor in determining self-
consciousness is largely bound up with the process of
imitation. It is a conspicuous merit of Professor Bald-
win that he has brought this point into full prominence.
He distinguishes two phases of imitation the project-
ile and the ejective. In the protective stage, imitation
is as yet relatively unsuccessful ; the mode of activity
imitated and the experiences connected with its exer-
cise are as yet more or less beyond the reach of the
imitator; they have not yet become part of his exist-
ence. The conception of himself involves a contrast
between what he actually is or does, and what he is try-
ing to be or do ; and this coincides with the contrast be-
tween himself and the person imitated. In so far as
this is the case, his conception of the other person is
projected / it contains elements which do not enter into
the conception of his own present self, elements which
he is only trying to assimilate and incorporate in the
conception of himself. On the other hand, when and
so far as his imitative efforts have succeeded, this con-
trast ceases. His conception of himself coincides with
his conception of the other person. In thinking of
the other person, he simply ascribes his own experi-
ences to the other person, he ejects, or throws them
out into the other person, instead of projecting, or
regarding them as something beyond what he has
himself actually attained. "For example, last year I
thought of my friend W. as a man who had great skill
* Op. cit., p. 443.
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on the bicycle and who wrote readily on the type-
writer
; my sense of his personality included these ac-
complishments, in what I have called a 'projective'
way. My sense of myself did not have these elements,
except as my thought of my normal capacity to acquire
delicate movements was comprehensive. But now,
this year, I have learned to do both these things. I
have taken the elements formerly recognised in W.'s
personality, and by imitative learning brought them
over to myself. I now think of myseli as one who
rides a 'wheel' and writes on a 'machine.' But I am
able to think of myself thus only as my thought in-
cludes the personal accomplishments of W. ... So
the truth we now learn is this : that very many of the
particular marks which I now call mine, when I think
of myself, have had just this origin. I have first found
them in my social environment, and by reason of my
social and imitative disposition, have transferred them
to myself by trying to act as if they were true of me,
and so coming to find out that they are true of me.
And further, all the things I hope to learn, to acquire,
to become, all if I think of them in a way to have
any clear thought of my possible future are now,
before I acquire them, possible elements of my thought
of others, of the social
'
alter,' or of what, considered
generally, we may call the ' socius.'
" *
To see the full importance of imitation in the develop-
ment of the idea of Self, we must especially consider
the case of children. Children have to learn from their
social environment all that is necessary to make them
* Prof. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental De-
velopment, pp. 10-11.
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members of the society into which they are born. Un-
less they are born with the connate aptitudes and im-
pulses for acquiring the ideas and the ways of acting
current in the community to which they belong, their
existence is resented by the community. They have
little chance of survival in savage communities, and
even in the more civilised their position is a very un-
comfortable one. They are for the most part locked up
in prisons or lunatic asylums. The normal child is
perpetually engaged in acquiring the habits of thought
and action of its elders, and in doing so is constantly
developing the idea of Self by a process of imitation.
Baldwin notes that the child has two characteristic
mental attitudes, corresponding respectively to the
"
protective" and "ejective" phases of imitation. In
the first, he is receptive, submissive, and respectful. In
the second, he is aggressive, self-complacent, and dis-
dainful or patronising. The two attitudes correspond
to different social relations. " The child's sense of him-
self is ... one pole of a relation ; and which pole it is
to be, depends on the particular relation which the
other pole, over which the child has no control, calls
on it to be. If the other person involved presents un-
certain, ominous, dominating, instructive features, or
novel imitative features, then the self is 'subject' over
against what is protective.' He recognises new ele-
ments of personal suggestion not yet accommodated to.
His consciousness is in the learning attitude ; he imi-
tates, he serves, he trembles, he is a slave. But on the
other hand, there are persons to whom his attitude has
a right to be different. In the case of these the dialec-
tic has gone further. He has mastered all their fea-
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tures, he can do himself what they do, he anticipates no
new developments in his intercourse with them ; so he
4
ejects' them, as the psychological expression is; for
an
'eject' is a person whose consciousness has only
those elements in it which the individual who thinks of
that consciousness is able, out of his own store of ex-
perience, to read into it. It is ejective to him, for he
makes it what he will, in a sense. Now that is what
the brothers and sisters, notably the younger ones, are
to our youthful hero. They are his ' ejects '; he knows
them by heart, they have no thoughts, they do no deeds,
which he could not have read into them by anticipation.
So he despises them, practises his superior activities on
them, and tramples them under foot." *
3. The One Self and the Many Selves. All self-
consciousness implies a division of the total Self. When
I think about myself, the I and the myself are never
quite identical. The Self of which I have an idea is
always distinguished from the Self which has the idea.
As Professor Royce observes, "I can question myself,
and wait for an answer; can reflect upon my own
meaning; can admire myself, love myself, hate myself,
laugh at myself; in short, do or suffer in presence of
my own states and processes whatever social life has
taught me to do or suffer in presence of the states and
processes of others." | My total Self includes the whole
succession of my personal experiences ; and it therefore
includes that special phase of conscious life in which I
think of myself. But this special phase at the moment
of its existence cannot itself be part of the object of
* Op. cit., pp. 18-19.
t Psychological Review, vol. ii., No. 5, pp. 454-455.
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which it is aware. Of course, even the present moment
of self-consciousness is usually identified as part of the
total series of personal experiences ; but the identifica-
tion involves a distinct phase of conscious process,
and includes as part of its object both the I and the
myself involved in the primary self-consciousness.
There is yet another way in which the total Self is
necessarily broken up into a number of partial selves.
The life-history of the individual consciousness em-
braces a multitude of very diverse and often incongru-
ous states and tendencies. At any moment of self-con-
scious reflexion, attention is usually fixed on one or
other of these special modes of experience. In so far
as they differ from each other, and from the present
Self which is thinking about them, there is a tendency
to regard them as if they were relatively distinct selves.
Thus a man, when sober, reflecting on his conduct and
on his mental attitude when drunk, can hardly recog-
nise himself as the same person. In fact, he is apt to
say,
" I was not myself," or,
" I was not quite myself at
the time." The Self of our dreams is usually sharply
distinguished from the Self of waking life. The wak-
ing Self generally refuses responsibility for the thoughts
and actions of the dreaming Self. In such instances,
the person feels that there is more difference between
himself and these special phases of his life-history, than
there is between himself and other persons. These are
extreme cases, but the principle has a wide application.
There is always a tendency to refuse to recognise the
Self which is overcome by some sudden or exceptional
impulse, or transformed by peculiar -conditions, as one
and the same with the normal Self,
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The same antithesis is found not only in reflecting on
past states, but also in the moment of present con-
sciousness. When the mind is divided by conflicting
impulses, it often appears as if there were two quasi-
persons in the same individual consciousness, and as if
the one were criticising the other, contending or expos-
tulating with it. The analogy of the relations between
ourselves and other persons is transferred to the rela-
tion between conflicting groups of tendencies within
our own consciousness. The best example, perhaps, is
the conflict between moral principle and temptation.
In such cases one of the two conflicting tendencies is
often identified with our true Self, i.e. with the normal
flow of thought and action ; and the other tendency is
regarded as something relatively foreign and intrusive.
"If the tendency to the estimated act is a passionate
tendency, a vigorous temptation, and if the conscien-
tious judgment is a coldly intellectual affair, then the
situation dimly reminds me of cases where other people,
authoritative and dignified rather than pleasing, have
reproved my wishes. . . . But if, on the other hand,
the conceived act is less keenly desired, and if my con-
scientious plans are just now either fervently enthusias-
tic or sternly resolute in my mind, then ... I myself
am now, in presence of the conceived act, as if judging
another." * We must add to the actual past and pres-
ent selves those which may exist or might exist in the
future, or might have existed in the past. There is
always an antithesis between ourselves as we are or
have been, and ourselves as we wish to be or wish that
we had been. It is always possible in reviewing the
* Royce, op. cit., p. 454.
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past to transform the picture of it so as to represent
ourselves as thinking, feeling, and acting, not as we
have actually thought, felt, and acted, but as, from our
present point of view, we should wish to have thought,
felt, and acted. We can disregard actual conditions
and limitations, and mentally endow ourselves with
powers and qualities which we neither possess nor
have possessed, and we can imagine situations especial-
ly fitted to call them into play, and evoke the admira-
tion of our social environment. Without going to such
extremes as this, a man may simply say to himself,
" Oh ! what a fool I have been ! Why did I not work
instead of play?" and the like; and he may allow his
mind to follow out, by a train of ideal construction,
representations of what he would have been in the past,
present, and future, if he had acted otherwise. Such
ideal constructions are most common in reference to
the future, especially in the young. There is a ten-
dency to represent what the Self of the future is to be
and do, and what is to happen to it, in its social and
other relationships, in accordance with present desires.
This is sometimes mere day-dreaming ; but it may also
be of the greatest practical importance ; for a man's
future, unlike his past, is to a large extent under his
own control. By dwelling on the representation of
himself as he would wish to be, instead of as he is,
a direction is given to his activity, which actually
tends to realise his ideal. When the ethical end is
said to be self-realisation, what is meant must be the
realisation of a future Self constructed by abstracting
from the imperfections and limitations of the present
Self.
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4. Pathology of Self- Consciousness. Under nor-
mal conditions, the tendency to regard various actual or
possible phases of the Self as if they were more or less
distinct persons is not carried so far as to mistake
metaphor for literal fact. The man still knows or can
always remind himself that he is not in reality split
up into a plurality of personalities, distinguished from
each other in the same way as one person in society is
distinguished from another person. But in many cases
of insanity, the analogy is no longer mere analogy for
the patient. So great a transformation is brought about
in the train of his experiences, that the present phase
of his life-history is altogether discontinuous and dis-
cordant with his past. At the same time, the present
phase is so persistent and engrossing, and the idea of
the past relatively so feeble, that his whole actual by-
gone history is either partially ignored and partially
re-constructed or is ascribed to some other person.
Cases are extremely common in which insane patients
believe themselves to be such great personages as Na-
poleon, the Messiah, or even God the Father, and act
accordingly as far as lies in their power. "A soldier
whose skin had become insensible, believed himself to
have been dead since the battle of Austerlitz, where he
received a wound. When he was asked as to his health,
he said : c You want to know how Father Lambert is ?
But there is no Father Lambert, a cannon ball killed
him at Austerlitz
;
what you see here is not him ; it is a
wretched machine made to look like him
; you ought to
ask them to make a better one.' In speaking of him-
self he never said me, but always it"*
* Taine, On Intelligence, p. 377.
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Such delusions as this depend on a profound change
in the nature of personal experience, which makes the
present discontinuous with the past. Nervous disorders
tend to bring about such breaches of continuity. In
general, a change in the experiences connected with the
body, and especially with organic sensation, seems to
be an essential factor in the process. Sometimes the
resulting illusion relates specially to the bodily Self,
and does not profoundly affect the continuity of per-
sonal existence in other respects. Thus a patient whose
bodily sensations have become abnormal will feel as if
he were made of glass or butter, and come to suppose
that he actually is composed of such materials. But
when the illusion is not limited to the bodily Self, but
involves a transformation of the individual's whole idea
of his life-history, the reason probably lies in profound
alteration of emotional tone. Organic sensation is a
highly important factor in emotional states ; alteration
in it may either produce or be attended by a general
change of emotional attitude. But emotions are not
merely specific modes of feeling : they also involve
characteristic conative tendencies, either in the way of
expansive and aggressive activity, or of shrinking and
aversion. Now we have seen that these conative ten-
dencies may be initially vague and undirected to spe-
cific objects, and that, so far as this is the case, they
fasten on any object they can find. When they have
not an object, they make one for themselves. Thus a
herd of cattle, enraged by the sufferings of one of their
number, will vent their fury on the innocent victim, if
no enemy or other object of resentment obtrudes itself
on their attention. Thus emotions, in so far as they are
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initially vague, tend to define themselves. On the idea-
tional plane, the process of definition takes the form
of ideal construction. If the emotional moods due
to pathological conditions are sufficiently profound, in-
tense, and persistent, whole systems of ideas will arise
in this way which may be quite discontinuous and dis-
cordant with the actual past experience of the subject.
Now emotional moods in human life commonly arise in
connexion with certain social situations. These same
moods when they arise pathologically may define and
explain themselves by the ideal representation of cor-
responding relations between the patient and his social
environment. " Suppose that one's depressed emotional
condition, as in melancholia, or at the outset of a delir-
ium of suspicion or of persecution, contains emotions
resembling the normal emotions of conscientious guilt,
or the feeling of social dread. Then these feelings
tend to assimilate in one's actual surroundings, or
in one's memories, data which suggest, to one patient
an actually believed social condemnation of his deeds,
or an actual judgment of his inner conscience passed
upon his sinfulness, while to another patient his own
sorts of emotion suggest an especially hostile scrutiny
of his appearance by the passers-by, or an inner sense
that he must hide from possible scrutiny. On the
other hand, feelings quite the reverse of these sug-
gest to the exalted general paralytic whatever remem-
bered or fancied social relations, expressing his vast
powers, the fragments of left-over social habits which
still survive in his chaos permit him, in passing, to
express."*
* Prof. Royce, Psychological Review, vol. ii., No. 5, pp. 456-457.
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Now the idea of Self is so bound up with the idea of
social relations, that an ideal re-construction of these
involves an ideal re-construction of the Self also, and
in extreme cases this amounts to a breach of continuity
between the past and present Self, so that they appear
to be separate persons.
In other cases, the two Selves appear to be simulta-
neously present and at strife with one another. Some-
times the subject identifies himself with one of them,
and sometimes he is perplexed as to which of the two
he really is. It very often happens that this division
of the Self into two, one of which appears as a foreign
person, is determined by hallucinations. Thus in some
cases a man's thoughts appear to be stolen from
him because, independently of his own volition, the
words which he uses within his own mind to express
his ideas utter themselves either in the form of audi-
tory hallucinations or at least hallucinations of the mus-
cular sense. " The thoughts are his own. The sound-
ing of them forth, in this way, is not his. His thoughts
run off his tongue, get spoken in his stomach, creak out
in his shoes as he walks, are mockingly echoed or in the
end commented upon by another power."* He explains
the mocking repetition by ascribing it to another per-
son who is hostile and contemptuous, and he fills out
the idea of this other person in various ways, attribut-
ing motives to him and supplying him with words ap-
propriate to his character.
5. The External and the Internal Self. The
idea of the Self includes in all but its latest and most
abstract developments the idea of the body as the ve-
* Ibid., pp. 456-456.
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hide of perception and motor activity. There is also
another powerful reason why the body should be re-
garded as part and parcel of the Self. The idea of the
Self essentially includes the idea of its relation to other
selves. But it can only exist for other selves in so far
as it appears to them in bodily form.
But however important the body may be, it can never
be regarded as the whole Self or even as the most es-
sential part of the Self. Its attitudes and movements,
so far as they differ from those of other material things,
appear to be initiated by something inside the organism.
They follow on volitions, emotions, painful and pleas-
ant sensations, and the like. These experiences consti-
tute the inner Self, and the body as it presents itself to
the external observer is their instrument used in a way
more or less analogous to that in which other material
instruments are used. The contrast between inner and
outer Self is emphasised by the process of ideational
thinking, in which the body may be apparently quies-
cent, while the mind is active. The same is true of
dreams. Thus even in the most primitive stages of
human development, we find an antithesis recognised
between the body as outer husk and the soul as
inner kernel. But we find that the more primitive
modes of representing the existence of the inner Self
differ essentially from our own. Modern theories
regard the soul as simply an immaterial substance,
or identify it with the brain, or say that it is just
the continuous series of conscious states themselves.
All these views are very remote from those which are
naturally and inevitably taken in earlier stages of
mental development. The savage cannot find out what
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the inner Self is by exploring the inside of the body,
for this is possible only after death ; and after death
the inner Self no longer manifests its local presence.
Thus post mortem examination can only show that the
inner Self is not an internal organ of the body ; that it
is not the brain or heart or lungs. On the other hand,
the conception of a simple immaterial substance, or of
a mere series of conscious states, pre-supposes a de-
velopment of the power of conceptual abstraction en-
tirely beyond the reach of the savage. In all his prac-
tical dealings with the world, he has to do with things
extended in space and appreciable by his senses. Even
in his social relations, other persons only exist for him
in their bodily presentment. Now we have seen how
very slow and gradual a process it is by which the
primitive mind disengages what is essential in a con-
ception from the irrelevant material in which it is im-
bedded. This makes it impossible for the savage to
disengage in its abstract unity the conception of a
purely immaterial existence. Hence, in ideally repre-
senting the internal Self, he follows the analogy of his
general experience of personal beings. The internal
Self is for him more or less a repetition of the external
Self. " If a man lives and moves, it can only be be-
cause he has a little man inside who moves him."*
This mode of thinking is perhaps partly originated and
in any case it is strongly confirmed by certain special
experiences. Among these dreams play a prominent
part. A man who is absent or dead appears to another
in his dreams. The impression of the actual presence
of the person dreamt of is often extremely strong, and
*
Fraser, The Golden Bough, vol. i., p. 121.
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easily suggests the theory that though the ordinary
external body is lying in the grave or at a distance, the
inner counterpart of this body, the soul, has actually
appeared to the dreamer. But such apparitions are not
confined to dreams. All pathological conditions of
body and mind, due to disease, drugs, hunger, exhaus-
tion, and so on, tend to produce hallucinations of this
kind
;
and these conditions are very common among
savages, much more so than among ourselves. Add to
this the extreme difficulty which the human mind finds
in realising the termination of personal existence after
death. The difficulty is not merely that of realising
annihilation in the abstract, but of realising that the
dead person has ceased to play his habitual part in the
ordinary life of the living. The habits of thinking and
acting of his surviving friends and relatives have grown
up and become fixed on the assumption of his presence
among them. There is always a conflict between these
pre-formed habits and the new conditions introduced
by his decease, and the conflict is often intense and dis-
tressing. The survivor feels a shock of surprise, often
painful, when he misses his intimate friend from his
usual place. His rooted habits of thought lead him to
ideally represent the dead as still having an existence
analogous to his existence when alive. He is thus pre-
pared to meet illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, in
which the dead appear once more with the personal
appearance and garments of the living, with no incre-
dulity. On the contrary, the natural and necessary
explanation for his mind is that what he sees is actually
present. We must remember that physiological and
psychological theories of the origin of dreams and hal-
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lucinations are utterly beyond the range of savage con-
ception.
The relation between the ordinary body and the in-
ternal impersonation is not conceived in a mechanical
way. The unity of the whole individual is not ac-
counted for by the interaction between the internal
Self and the external Self. On the contrary, the reason
why body and soul are in sympathetic communion lies
ultimately in the bare fact that they form part of the
same individual. In ordinary waking life, the soul is
supposed to be locally present in the body. But it may
depart from the body without severing the connexion
between them. At least a modified form of sympathetic
communion may still continue between them. The
final departure of the soul means the death of the body ;
but a temporary departure is often supposed to involve
only illness, or trance, or dreams. The sympathetic
communion which is independent of local presence is
well brought out in the case of dreams. The savage
will ascribe the soreness and fatigue of his body to the
painful struggles which his soul has undergone in
dream wrestlings with other souls during its temporary
migrations. So presents and sacrifices to the departed
are usually offered at the tomb as if to the body; the
benefit goes to the soul. It is very commonly believed
that the burying of the body with appropriate rites is
an indispensable condition of the soul's welfare. Thus
the Greeks supposed that the shades of the dead must
haunt the banks of Styx or wander about the earth,
until their bodies received the rites of sepulture. After
these, they could pass to the under world and mix with
their own kind. It is instructive that the regions to
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which departed spirits are supposed to go are in primi-
tive thought generally represented as faint reproduc-
tions of the actual world, and the society of ghosts as
analogous to the society of the living, retaining such
relations as that of master and slave, rich and poor, and
the like.
Since the spirit is only occasionally visible and still
more rarely tangible, and since in general the relations
of the living to it are somewhat vague and dim, there is
a tendency to regard it as being itself shadowy and un-
substantial. But on this point primitive thought vacil-
lates a great deal. We often find the spiritual body
represented as existing and behaving in much the same
manner as an ordinary body. It is sometimes repre-
sented as eating and drinking, wrestling and fighting,
and sometimes intermarrying with the living. Marriage
between a living person and a disembodied spirit is not
uncommon in Chinese folk-lore. But these are excep-
tional cases. Familiar dealings with spirits are most
often supposed to be the privilege of magicians and
medicine-men, who often make it a regular part of
their profession to catch departed souls in snares, and
either detain them in custody, or bring them back to
the body to which they belong.
If there are two material impersonations of one in-
dividual, there is no reason in the nature of the case
why there should not be more. As a matter of fact we
find that primitive thought often recognises the exist-
ence of several. The explanation of shadows and re-
flexions by optical laws is beyond the range of the
savage mind ; they are accordingly interpreted in ac-
cordance with the system of ideas familiar to primitive
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thought. They are impersonations of the whole indi-
vidual, much as the soul is ; sometimes they seem to
be identified with the soul, but they are often regarded
as distinct. There is a Polynesian story of a girl who
stole a young man's shadow and imprisoned it in a
bottle
;
she then set it free and projected it upon a pool
of water. " As the man moved about in his own land,
so the shadow moved on the water."
Sometimes different impersonations are supposed to
have different functions. Thus the Tshi-speaking
people of the Gold Coast ascribe to each individual two
impersonations besides his body, the Brahman, or
soul, and the kra. The kra is especially connected
with the phenomena of dreaming, and of birth and
heredity. In dreams and visions it passes out of the
body ; after death it acquires connexion with some
other body, so that each man's kra has passed through
a long series of distinct embodiments. The srahman,
or soul, cannot leave the body without suspension of
obvious vital functions. After death, it passes to dead-
land, which in its social and other arrangements is a
counterpart of the world in which it has previously
lived. If the man has died before completing the pro-
per term of life, the srahman lingers about its former
habitation. During life, body, srahman, and kra are
regarded as different impersonations of the same indi-
vidual, so that what happens to any of them may affect
the whole. The incidents in a dream are believed to be
adventures of the kra. "If a native, having taken a
chill overnight, awakes in the morning with stiff and
aching muscles, and the usual symptoms of muscular
rheumatism, he at once concludes that during the night
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his kra has been engaged in some toilsome pursuit, or
in a conflict with another Jcra, and he attributes the
pain he feels to the exertions made or the blows in-
flicted." * Here the locally separate experience of the
Jcra is the experience of the whole man, including the soul
and body.
The primitive view of the internal Self as a counter-
part of the external body has only been very gradu-
ally displaced by the growth of civilisation. Even
among ourselves at the present day it is very far from
being extinct. People still believe in ghosts which ap-
pear under the form and even in the clothes of the liv-
ing person. It is true that these ghosts are for the
most part regarded as very attenuated forms of matter,
and there is a popular impression that they are impal-
pable, although visible. But they are sometimes re-
presented as being very palpable indeed. There is
one described in a popular monthly magazine which
" twisted up gunbarrels like so much soft paper." |
The first clear conception of a purely immaterial
principle is probably to be ascribed to Plato. But
long after Plato the old notion of spirit as an attenu-
ated form of matter survived even in scientific thinking.
As the progress of thought and knowledge brought into
clearer light the unity and continuity of nature, the con-
ception of the material soul became modified. There
was a tendency to explain its origin as part of the gen-
eral course of physical nature, and its resemblance to
the external body was no longer insisted on. The view
taken was that life and thought were properties of a
*
Ellis, The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of Africa,p.l51.
t Pearson's Magazine, March, 1898, p. 255.
542 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., CH. vn.
certain form of matter diffused throughout the physical
universe. The cue to this theory was given by the
phenomena of breathing and of vital heat. The gen-
eral soul-substance from which individual souls were
supposed to be derived was air rarefied by heat. The
best examples of doctrines of this kind are to be found
among the pre-Socratic philosophers. Anaximenes re-
gards the soul as being essentially air, and air as being es-
sentially of the nature of soul. Air in general is to the uni-
verse what our own soul is to us. Heracleitus regards
breathing as a connexion between the internal soul and
the surrounding air from which it is originally derived.
In later times, when the doctrine of an immaterial
soul became generally accepted, the old material soul
was still very commonly assumed to exist together with
it, and to constitute a link between it and the body.
We often find a division of psychical functions be-
tween the material, and immaterial souls. Ethical and
religious functions were often ascribed to the immaterial
principle, while all lower functions, such as sensation,
perception, appetite, and the like, were ascribed to the
material principle. Even in comparatively recent times,
we sometimes find the immaterial soul recognised only
by way of submission to theological dogma, all ordinary
conscious functions being ascribed to material soul.
Thus Bacon says : " The sensible soul the soul of
brutes must clearly be regarded as a corporeal sub-
stance, attenuated and made invisible by heat ; a breath
(I say) compounded of the natures of flame and air,
having the softness of air to receive impressions, and
the vigour of fire to propagate its action."* To this
* Works (Fpedding and Ellis), vol. iv., p. 398.
5.] SELF AS IDEAL CONSTRUCTION. 543
sensible soul he appears to ascribe such faculties as
"
understanding, reason, imagination, memory, appetite,
will." He demands that " the origin of these faculties
"
should be "handled physically as they are innate and
inherent in the [sensible] soul."* The uncreated and
immortal immaterial principle cannot be investigated in
this way ; it is a topic for theologians, and it is very
difficult to see what Bacon has left for it to do.
The last important survival of the doctrine of the
material soul in scientific thought is contained in the
doctrine of "animal spirits," as held, for example, by
Descartes. The animal spirits consist of a fine form of
matter constituting a connecting link between the body
and the soul, but they are no longer regarded as them-
selves capable of any kind of conscious experience.
They are merely part of the mechanism by which the
immaterial principle acts on the body and is acted on
by it. Thus the material soul for Descartes is a soul
no longer ; it is merely a mode of matter, and like all
other matter sharply and rigidly distinguished from all
conscious existence. With the advance of modern
physiology, it became displaced even from this position,




1. Distinction between Belief and Imagination.
A man sitting in his arm-chair can easily imagine
himself killing a lion by a blow of his fist. But sup-
pose that he meets an actual lion, and has to look to his
own safety. This ideal combination is no longer possi-
ble for him
;
the idea of the lion pouncing on him and
tearing him to pieces takes possession of his mind, and
excludes the fanciful picture of his own powers. The
same may happen without his actually encountering the
lion. If in his arm-chair he is planning a hunting
expedition to take place the next day, such ideas as
that of killing lions with a blow of the fist will be ex-
cluded, and they will be the more completely excluded
the more strenuous he is in the pursuit of the practical
end in view.
This example brings out the essential distinction be-
tween Belief and Imagination. All belief involves ob-
jective control of subjective activity. The nature of
the object thought about enforces certain ideal combi-
nations to the exclusion of others. But this objective
control is not absolute; it is conditional. It depends
upon the end towards which mental activity is directed.
So long as the subject is strenuously aiming at the
544
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achievement of practical ends, only certain combina-
tions of ideas are possible for him, but if his mind is
not bent on the achievement of practical results or on
the attainment of new knowledge, almost any ideal
combination may be possible for him which does not
involve an explicit contradiction. He cannot imagine
a thing as being at once round and square, black and
white
;
he cannot mentally make two straight lines in-
clude a space, without destroying their straightness ;
but apart from such limitations, he can ideally con-
struct all manner of relations
;
he can combine horse
and man so as to form an image of a centaur ; he can
picture a giant with a hundred heads, and so on. There
is always some restriction on the play of ideal construc-
tion, besides that due to overt contradiction ; but the
restriction in each case depends on the general direc-
tion of mental activity at the time. So far as the re-
striction exists at all, his mental attitude is one of
belief
;
the flow of ideas being restricted by the nature
of the object. Thus if he is thinking of normal men
and women, he may mentally frame a narrative about
them which has no reference to any actual man or
woman whom he has seen or heard of. So far, the play
of his ideas will be relatively free ; it will not be bound
down by conditions of date and place ; none the less, it
will be tied, inasmuch as he is not at liberty to intro-
duce into his mental construction features at variance
with the normal nature of human beings. He must not
make them breathe fire, or have their heads beneath
their shoulders. So far he is bound by the distinction
between the credible and the incredible. There is no
belief in the narrative as historical fact; but belief
Psych.
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about human nature in general is involved in it through
and through. On the other hand, suppose that the
play of his imagination does not refer to actual human
beings, but to certain creatures of its own ; it will then
have much wider range, but it will still be more or less
guided by initial assumptions. The subsequent flow of
ideas will be restricted by the anterior flow of ideas ; if a
man has started by imagining fairies inhabiting flowers,
he cannot think of them as giants inhabiting castles ; so
that even in this case there is a certain amount of ob-
jective restriction and consequently of belief.
Now objective restriction is at its maximum in the
pursuit of practical ends, and in the pursuit of knowl-
edge. It is therefore only in these cases that we find
full belief, belief which is not blended with imagina-
tion, but contrasted with it. For a moment we may
confine our attention to practical activity. The primary
motives of ideal construction lie in practical needs.
Ideal combinations are first framed with a view to
efficient action. Only those therefore are sought for
which will make action efficient. By ideal representa-
tion a man builds a bridge across a stream before he
comes to it
;
but the one thing important to him is that
the bridge shall not give way when he comes to use it.
Hence the flow of ideal construction is strictly limited.
Only such ideal combinations are of use as can be
translated into corresponding perceptual experience;
others, therefore, are as far as possible excluded. In
so far as ideal constructions break down on being trans-
lated into terms of perceptual activity, the attitude of
disbelief arises. What has happened is the actual fact ;
what was anticipated is contrasted with it as a false,
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opinion. In this .way the antithesis between the true
and the false, between the credible and the incredible,
becomes widened and deepened.
It appears from, this that the attitude of belief and
disbelief is prior to the free play of imagination. But
even the savage is by no means always in a strenuously
practical mood. He has his time for play as well as
for work
;
and among other forms of play, he indulges
in the play of ideas. When he is comfortable and idle,
it gives him pleasure to represent things not as they
are, have been, or will be, but as he would like them to
be, or in any way which may happen to interest him.
He may communicate his imaginings to his comrades,
and they may be handed down from generation to gen-
eration. Such works as the plays of Shakespeare, or
the novels of Thackeray, are examples of the most ad-
vanced development of this mode of mental activity.
2. General Conditions of Belief. There are two
main points of view from which the problem of belief
must be approached. It is at once a condition of activ-
ity, and conditioned by activity.
" The relation of belief to activity," says Bain, " is ex-
pressed by saying that ' what we believe we act on.'
" *
This may seem to be a statement rather of a conse-
quence than of a condition of belief. But a closer
scrutiny will show that the criticism is superficial.
Just because belief is a condition of activity, activity
must be a condition of belief. To strive after an end
is to strive after the means necessary for its attainment.
Hence in striving after an end, we strive after the be-
lief which alone makes action with a view to that
* Mental and Moral Science (1872), p. 37.
548 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., en. vm.
end a psychological possibility. Thus practical and
theoretical needs play an essential part in determining
what we shall and shall not believe. This holds good
in the pursuit of theoretical as well as of practical
ends. The man of science, eager to advance knowl-
edge, for the sake of advancing knowledge, clings to
working hypotheses ; he clings to them because they
are useful to him. He is apt to meet criticism by urg-
ing that no one ought to pull down a man's house
until he has himself constructed a better. Whether
the end aimed at be a practical result or an increase of
knowledge, in both cases the mind presses forward
towards its mark as best it may, shaping those beliefs,
and clinging to those beliefs, which are most helpful to
it, and passing by those alternatives which would ham-
per and paralyse its activity.
The activity which is concerned with the increase of
knowledge is in order of development subsequent to
the activity which directly pursues practical ends. The
ideal construction which is directly subservient to ac-
tion brings into being a connected system of ideas con-
cerning the world and the Self. Theoretical activity
consists in further development of this same system of
ideas without direct reference to practical results. It
is no free play of the imagination, but consists in the
formation of beliefs, just because it is the further de-
velopment of a pre-formed system of beliefs. The con-
ditions and limitations of this system as a whole apply
to all enlargements of it. It excludes or refuses to
include all merely imaginary combinations.
Let us now turn to the other side of the question.
Belief is not only conditioned by mental activity, but
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also involves restriction of mental activity. Objective
coercion is of the very essence of belief. Whatever in-
fluence subjective needs as such may have in determin-
ing belief, they can never be the sole factor. In framing
a belief, we endeavour to represent real existence as it is
in its own nature, independently of our own individual
consciousness. Where we feel that it is purely a mat-
ter of our own arbitrary choice whether we shall think
of A as JB or as not-JB^ there is no belief or disbelief.
There is a state of doubt when this freedom of choice is
accompanied by an effort to find something not our-
selves which shall determine us one way or the other,
so that we shall be able to arrive at a belief. There is
a mere play of imagination when this endeavour to
arrive at a belief is absent. For actual belief or dis-
belief, some restriction of subjective freedom is neces-
sary. Thus belief is at once dependent on activity and
on limitation of activity. There is no contradiction ; on
the contrary, the two points of view ultimately coincide.
Belief depends on subjective tendencies, just because
these tendencies cannot work themselves out without
it. Ends can only be realised by the use of means;
but in order to use means, we must have some belief in
their efficacy ; hence the impulse to pursue an end is
also an impulse to form beliefs which will make action
for the attainment of the end possible. But it is not
within the range of our arbitrary selection to determine
what means will lead up to a given end, and what will
not. This depends on the nature of the real world in
which we live. There must therefore in the framing of
a belief be always some endeavour to conform to con-
ditions other than, and independent of, our own sub-
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jective tendencies. Our inability to attain ends other-
wise than through certain means constitutes a restriction
of mental activity within more or less definite channels.
If wishing were identical with having, our freedom
would be absolute, and there would be no such thing as
belief. The nature of the steps which will issue in a
certain result are fixed independently of us. In devis-
ing means to an end, we are not free to make what
mental combinations we will. Our thinking, to be
effective, cannot be free; we can no more attain our
ends without submitting to control independent of our
wish or will, than we can walk independently of the
resistance of the ground on which we tread.
3. Variation in the Relative Importance ofthe Sub-
jective and Objective Factors of Belief. There are,
then, two factors which co-operate in the formation of
belief, one subjective, and the other objective. Neither
of these factors is sufficient by itself ; both must be opera-
tive. But their relative importance may vary greatly.
The keen urgency of practical needs may make it neces-
sary to come to a decision where objective data are
scanty. He who climbs a cliff to escape death by
drowning must use whatever foothold presents itself,
though he would never have trusted to it without press-
ing motives. So where there is a practical need to
form a belief, because indecision would paralyse activ-
ity, the mind must rest on whatever objective indica-
tions or suggestions it can find, however slight these
may be. On the other hand, where there is no interest
to be satisfied, there will be no tendency to form a belief.
The mind will occupy itself only with those questions
which lie in the line of direction of its own activity.
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The influence of the subjective factor is the more
prominent and dominant, the more primitive is psychi-
cal development in general. Primitive beliefs are near-
ly all relevant to the narrow circle of immediate prac-
tical interests within which the activities of the savage
are confined. Wherever these interests are involved,
they take shape in a body of belief often resting on
what appear to us extremely frail objective foundations.
The primitive mind does not concern itself, or only
slightly concerns itself, with questions which fall out-
side the range of its narrow circle of practical interests.
But increasing knowledge finds relevancy where ignor-
ance fails to find it. Thus in neglecting whatever does
not obviously relate to immediately engrossing needs,
the primitive mind must neglect much which is really
relevant to them. Hence, in the formation of belief,
data of the utmost importance will be ignored because
their relevancy is hidden and cannot be made apparent
without patient mental effort. Thus the narrower is
the circle of interests, the greater is the predominance
of the subjective factor, because the mind is blind to
objective data which do not obviously connect them-
selves with its immediate aims and tendencies.
Besides constituting the impelling motives for the
formation of belief, the subjective factor also con-
tributes to determine the nature of the beliefs which
are formed. When a negative judgment would para-
lyse activity, the active tendency is a force arrayed on
the side of the positive judgment, and vice versa. If a
certain ideally represented combination presents itself
as the only condition, or the most favourable condition,
of attaining a certain end, the active tendency towards
552 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., CH. vm.
this end is of itself a tendency to believe in the ideally
represented combination. If denial of this is tanta-
mount to sacrificing a cherished aim, the whole strength
of desire helps to enforce the affirmative side. Thus
persons of vigorous and courageous temperament are
apt to believe what they wish to believe. Indeed this
is sometimes stated as a maxim holding good of human
beings in general. Tarde creduntur, quae credita
laedunt, says Ovid ; but we must not push this view
too far. Where the general mental attitude is one of
fear, or timidity, or gloomy suspicion, it does not hold
good. Fear or timidity or gloomy suspicion favours
belief in disagreeable alternatives. Where the tendency
is not to face and fight difficulties and dangers, but to
evade and escape them, action will be most effectively
guided by taking the most unfavourable view of the
circumstances* Even if an alarm is false, it is better to
be on the safe side. There is much in the religious
superstitions of savages which shows manifest traces of
this influence of fear upon belief.
It should be clearly understood that the distinction
between the subjective and the objective co-efficients of
belief is not a logical but a purely psychological dis-
tinction. Whatever condition controls and limits sub-
jective activity, so as to enforce one way of thinking,
and to make other ways difficult or impossible, is from
the psychological point of view an objective coercion.
It may be that the control thus exercised does not
really proceed from the nature of the object as known
to more highly developed minds. Logical analysis from
the point of view of higher knowledge may show that
what is operative is some association of ideas, which,
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though it may be vivid and insistent, is none the less
casual and irrelevant. But for a mind which is unable
to recognise it as casual and irrelevant, the coercive
power of the association must appear as if it proceeded
from the nature of the object represented. The words
"casual" and "irrelevant" imply that a systematic
view of objective relations has already been formed,
and that this system excludes the connexion of things
or events suggested by the association which is called
irrelevant and casual. But a mind which has not at-
tained to this systematic view cannot distinguish be-
tween control really proceeding from the nature of the
object, and control proceeding from what is recognised
at a higher standpoint as^a merely subjective connexion
of ideas. Hence- savages appear to us to confuse ob-
jective with saaj&jfrctive necessity. Any association be-
tween A and B through which the idea of A vividly
and insistently calls up the idea of J3 may lead to a
belief in a real connexion between them. If in a fit of
anger we trample on a man's portrait, it is difficult for
the moment to avoid believing that we are by the act
doing the man himself a direct injury. The savage has
a real and permanent belief that men can be injured in
such ways. He thinks, for instance, that by destroying
a man's footprints he can spoil his journey or make him
lame. So the Chinese believes that by hanging up in
his house ancient coins he secures for himself the pro-
tective influence of the spirits of the emperors under
whom the coins were issued. Such instances are in-
numerable. There is nothing in the beliefs thus formed
which is at variance with the preformed system of be-
liefs. On the contrary they are in full harmony with
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this. Hence subjective interests together with vivid
and insistent associations of ideas exercise unresisted
control.
One main reason why the subjective factor is more
dominant in primitive thought is that the preformed
body of belief is comparatively small in extent and im-
perfectly organised. A body of belief is more fully
organised in proportion as the denial of this or that
combination of ideas which enters into its composition
involves a greater and more destructive alteration in
the whole system. Savage beliefs are not woven into a
unified whole to nearly the same extent as civilised
beliefs; hence the influence of the objective factor is
smaller. For the influence of pre-established convic-
tions in determining the credibility or incredibility of
new suggestions is in its nature objective. However
the old beliefs have been formed, and whether they are
true or false, they are affirmations or denials of real
existence. Whatever is rejected because of its incon-
sistency with them, and whatever is accepted because
its denial would be inconsistent with them, is accepted
or rejected because it is felt to be implied in or ex-
cluded by the constitution of the real world. Thus the
influence of the objective factor develops as the general
body of belief grows in extent and becomes more highly
systematised.
In this process, when it is carried far enough, truth
must be the gainer; for error cannot ultimately be
made self-consistent. But in relatively early stages of
the process the result is to a large extent of an opposite
kind. Beliefs shaped in ignorance under the pressing
urgency of practical needs help to produce new beliefs,
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and give rise to an organised system of error, so that
the united force of the whole resists interference with
any part of it.
4. Influence of the Social Factor. Ideal con-
struction is, as we have seen, a social product. Hence
the beliefs of the individual are to an immense extent
shaped and determined by the beliefs current in the
community in which he lives. This is an objective
factor of paramount importance. But its logical value
of course depends on the process by which current
beliefs at first came into being. When these have no
adequate basis in fact, their social endorsement simply
serves to safeguard them against doubts to which the
experience of individuals might otherwise give rise. If
a belief in witchcraft, for instance, is already estab-
lished in a community, those persons who think they
have in their own experience evidence for its reality
will have an immense advantage over any individuals
who may venture to oppose them. The most acute
reasoning and exhaustive research will have little
chance against the most flimsy and prejudiced tale of
old women causing sickness in children or preventing
the cows from yielding milk. It must seem futile and
perverse to put forward other explanations of these phe-
nomena when there already exists an established explan-
ation which, so to speak, forms part of the social order.
The adverse critic is an eccentric person who sets his
individual fancy in opposition to the whole community.
He is promptly suppressed. It is however a very rare
thing that such a critic should arise within the com-
munity itself apart from the intrusion of foreign in-
fluences.
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The people of a community often maintain their
beliefs by trusting each other, as the inhabitants of the
Scilly Islands are said to have eked out a precarious
livelihood by taking in each other's washing.
5. Some Features ofPrimitive Belief. We have
seen that the formation of new beliefs depends at every
step on the nature of the beliefs which are established.
Thus, in reviewing the history of human thought, we
have to take account of two points. On the negative
side we have to remember that complex systems of
ideas which are familiar to us have not yet come into
being in earlier stages of development. In particular,
the power of mechanical construction, and the mechan-
ical understanding of natural process was in the begin-
ning extremely rudimentary and limited in the range of
its application. Hence there are certain general condi-
tions of interaction between material things constantly
recognised by modern culture which are not present to
the mind of the savage, or even to the ignorant mem-
bers of civilised society. For early thought, it is ab-
stractly conceivable that anything should act on any-
thing else. The unity of the individual thing deter-
mines the connexion of its parts ; it is not the connexion
of the parts which produces the unity of the thing.
Hence there is no reason why the component parts of
the individual whole should not interact even when
they are separated from each other in space. Besides
this, the primitive view of what is and is not part of an
individual whole differs from ours. The savage is in
this respect powerfully influenced by associations
which we should call casual and irrelevant. Whatever
he has habitually connected in thought with a person
5.] BELIEF AND IMAGINATION. 557
or thing, he is disposed to regard as part of that per-
son or thing, and as having sympathetic communion
with it. He continues to associate vividly the dead
body with the ghost, the amputated limb with the man
who has lost it, and he cannot help feeling that what is
done to the body makes a difference to the ghost, or
that what is done to the amputated limb makes a differ-
ence to the man who has lost it. Similarly, he habitual-
ly associates a man's clothes, or his tools and weapons,
or his other belongings, with the man himself ; in think-
ing of the personal belongings, he is impelled to think
of the person, and he is led to regard them as part and
parcel of the total personality. Hence these external
appendages are for him no mere external appendages ;
the unity of the individual is present and operative in
them. By appropriating a dead man's spear, he may
appropriate his skill and good-fortune, and the like.
The unity of the world in general is vaguely conceived
after the analogy of the unity of the individual thing.
The unity of the world is not explained according to a
system of uniform and abstract laws regulating the con-
nexion of its parts. On the contrary, things and events
are supposed to be capable of sympathetic communion
just because they form part of the same world. Any-
thing from this point of view may be really connected
in determinate ways with anything else.- Specific char-
acteristics, powers, and modes of behaviour, will appear
as ultimate and inexplicable. They will appear as what
we should call occult qualities intrinsic to the things
themselves, and not as admitting or requiring further
analysis or explanation. Any interaction or real con-
nexion may be accepted as a fact, if it be vividly im-
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pressed on the mind in relation to some strong practical
interest. For example, there is no keener or more
widespread practical interest than that which is felt in
the course of future events. Hence we find all over
the world a belief in signs and omens, and methods of
divination. Often appeal is made in various ways to a
superhuman being supposed to possess prescience. But
in the most simple cases, anything which is found sug-
gestive to the persons interested may be regarded as
a sign. Among the Tshi-speaking tribes of the Gold
Coast, divination is practised by the priests in a variety
of ways as they are guided by the caprice of the mo-
ment. In time of war, a method of ascertaining which
party will get the better, is to haul on a rope fastened
to a tree till it breaks. While it is being pulled, the
names of the combating parties are called out alter-
nately, and the name which is called out at the moment
when the rope breaks is that of the party which will
gain the advantage. We may compare the belief in
fortune-telling by cards, which is sometimes found
among ourselves.
This then is the first point to be emphasised in con-
trasting cultured with savage thought. The limitations
imposed on our ideal construction by our pre-existing
knowledge, and especially by our mechanical view of
nature, are non-existent for the savage mind. But
besides considering the ideas which are absent from the
savage mind, we must also consider the positive nature
of the ideas which are most predominant in his think-
ing. We have seen that the conception of individual
unity is familiar to him and constantly utilised by him ;
but among all individuals those which are most famil-
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iar, interesting, and best known, are human beings,
himself and the members of the society in which he
lives. Hence the constant and prevailing tendency
which we find in primitive thought to interpret all
things in terms of personal life and personal relations.
Whatever arrests his attention and fixes his interest as
a source of good and evil to himself, is regarded by him
as having some sort of conscious existence more or less
analogous to his own. This is possible because of his
failure to understand the mechanical explanation of
natural events and processes. When the structure and
operation of a piece of mechanism is fully understood,
it can no longer be regarded as a separate and indepen-
dent agency prompted by internal impulses, analogous
to the will of personal beings. But where the prin-
ciple of action is regarded as something ultimate and
independent, intrinsic to the nature of the individual
thing, there is nothing to prevent the mind from treat-
ing the agency as personal or quasi-personal. The
cataract or the whirlpool appears a living thing to the
poet in his poetic moods ; for in these moods he ignores
the fact that the water is simply behaving in accord-
ance with certain abstract laws under certain given
conditions. This fact is not ignored by the savage ; it
has never been realised by him. Hence what may be a
transient play of imagination in the civilised mind, is
the permanent and serious attitude of the savage mind.
It is permanent and serious because it is prompted and
upheld by practical needs. In presence of personal
agencies, he can never feel himself utterly helpless.
He can always attempt to influence them as he in-
fluences his own fellows in society. He can propitiate
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them by offerings, by prayers, by self-humiliation, by
flattery, and even by threats and punishments. Of
course, these means often fail ; but they fail frequently
in the case of human beings. Personal caprice and
perverseness introduce incalculable elements into the
problem. But this only serves to make possible the
survival of the anthropomorphic point of view. Failure
can always be explained, and apparent success can
always be regarded as convincing evidence. Continued
malignancy on the part of the supposed personal agency
can always be ascribed to deep resentment of neglect
shown to it, or of injury done to it, consciously or un-
consciously. Besides it is always possible to say that
things would have been still worse if proper methods
had not been taken.
It has been shown that the primitive conception of
personal existence differs in many points from our own ;
and this difference appears in the mode of personifying
natural objects and agencies. Just as the human per-
son has an internal and external self, personified things
have also an internal and external self
;
and as the in-
ternal self in the case of human beings is a sort of
duplicate of the body, so all things which are regarded
as separate agencies are supposed to have spirits of a
similar kind. Hence the widespread savage doctrine
that everything has its " double." The ghost of a spear
may exist and kill people after the spear itself has been
destroyed. When sacrifices of food, clothes, and uten-
sils are made to the dead body, their spiritual counter-
parts are appropriated by the soul. We saw that the
same individual may have not only two but many im-
personations of this kind, all in sympathetic communion
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with each other, so that the unity of the whole is
present and operative in all of them. This is even
more true of natural agencies personified, when they
are powerful and important. Savage deities often
originate and are conceived in this way. To select an
instance at random, there is a god called Behnya wor-
shipped by the Tshi-speaking tribes of the Gold Coast.
Behnya is primarily a river ; he has also a human
shape, with whip and sword. He has an image and
stool, which used to be washed with the blood of human
victims offered to him. The body of the human victim
was cut into small pieces, and distributed round the
outskirts of the town, rendering it impossible for a
hostile force to make an entrance. There was also a
certain rock in which his influence was present and
operative. Thus the river itself, the human shape, the
image and stool, the pieces of the body of the human
victims, and the rock, were all separate vehicles of the
influence of Behnya. He was impersonated in all of
them.*
*




1. Introductory. The pleasures and pains of idea-
tional process have two sources. They are either due
to a remnant of the feeling-tone of an actual sensation
or perception persisting in ideal revival, or they arise in-
dependently in and through the ideational process itself
as an activity directed toward an end. It must also be
borne in rnind that trains of ideational thought always
have an accompaniment of organic sensation faint or
intense. They occasion changes in the common sen-
sibility, which have often a conspicuous feeling-tone.
2. Revived Conditions of Feeling -Tone. Feel-
ing-tone cannot be directly revived. Its recurrence
depends on the re-instatement of the original condi-
tions of production. Now the reproduction of the
percept in the ideal image is at the best only partial,
and we should therefore expect the revival of feeling-
tone to be partial also. Much allowance must of course
be made for differences between individuals
;
but it
may be said generally that the pleasures and pains of
actual sensation are very faintly echoed in the corre-
sponding ideal images. Some apparent cases of intense
revival are illusory, being really due to concomitant
organic sensations. Thus the idea of undergoing a sur-
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gical operation may produce a widespread and intensely
disagreeable disturbance of common sensibility ; but the
feeling-tone does not belong to the mere idea of being
cut, etc. Excluding such cases, it would seem that
strictly sensational pleasures and pains occur only to a
very limited extent in ideal revival. We must how-
ever guard against making too absolute a statement.
Probably persons who can visualise colours with great
vividness can also enjoy them in their ideal re-instate-
ment, in a way approaching more nearly the actual
sense experience than persons who visualise poorly can
readily comprehend.
The pleasures and pains due to perceptual combina-
tion in space and time are in general more perfectly
recoverable by those who have a sufficient power of
ideal imagery. The man who can visualise distinctly
and vividly, may, in recalling before his mental eye a
picture or a landscape, renew to a large extent his
original enjoyment of it. There are some few persons
gifted with an exceptional power of auditory revival
who can enjoy music almost as well in reminiscence as
in actual hearing. The main drawback they find is the
effort which it costs them. Actual hearing is very
much easier.
In actual perception an object may be pleasing or
displeasing, not through the immediate feeling-tone of
the sensations which it produces or their grouping in
space and time, but through the previous experiences
with which it has been connected. The sight of a
bunch of grapes may give pleasure in part because we
have had the experience of eating grapes. The feeling-
tone is due to the re-excitement of the cumulative dis-
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position left behind by previous experiences of the
object. Now this cumulative disposition is also re-
excited in ideal revival, and with it the feeling-tone.
In general, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the
ideal revival is not so intense
;
but apart from interfer-
ing conditions, it is generally present in some degre'e.
Poets often produce their best effects by accumulating
references to objects round which pleasing associations
cling. Tennyson's Brook is a good example.
I wind about, and in and out,
With here a blossom sailing,
And here and there a lusty trout,
And here and there a grayling,
And here and there a foamy flake
Upon me, as I travel
With many a silvery waterbreak
Above the golden gravel.
In this and similar poems, a number of objects pleas-
antly toned by the cumulative effect of past experiences
are referred to in succession, and the total result is ex-
tremely agreeable.
A very important source of ideal pleasures and pains
lies in the reminiscent revival of past activities in which
we have been triumphant or defeated. The greater the
difficulties overcome, the greater in general is the pleas-
ure of reminiscence. Where we have been successful
after a struggle, the pleasure of ideal revival is often
much more unmixed than the pleasure of the original
experience. In recalling past obstacles and difficulties,
we have always the consciousness that they have been
overcome, and this reduces to a minimum the disagree-
ableness of the original struggle. We are not bound to
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dwell on the unpleasant parts of the experience at more
length or in more detail than is required to enhance the
pleasures of success. Even where we have been de-
feated, reminiscence is often more pleasing than dis-
pleasing. The reason is that the mere lapse of time has
raised us to a point of view from which we can regard
past success or failure as a matter of indifference. This
in itself is a kind of victory. If the reminiscence of
our past struggles continues on any ground to be inter-
esting, it gives us pleasure rather than pain.* Besides
this we can always skip more or less lightly over occur-
rences which would be disagreeable even in their ideal
revival.
All that we have said about revival of feeling-tone
must be understood with one important qualification.
It is necessary to distinguish between the attitude of
imagination and the attitude of belief. The mere ideal
representation of an object may in itself give pleasure
or pain ; but this must not be confused with the pleas-
ure or pain arising from our belief in the existence
or non-existence of the object under given conditions.
Doubtless the pleasure of ideal revival is at its maxi-
mum when it takes the form of the pleasure of antici-
pation. A person living in a crowded city may take
pleasure in ideally recalling trees and woods and moun-
tains as a mere play of imagination. But a new source
of intenser pleasure arises when he finds that he can
take a holiday and actually visit the scenery of Scot-
land or Switzerland. The reverse occurs when his
mind is disagreeably disturbed by the thought that
* Of course this is not the case when the consequences of past defeat
continue to affect unfavourably our present position.
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these things are beyond Ms reach. " A busy man reads
a novel at the close of the day, and finds himself led off
by a reference to angling or tropical scenery to picture
himself with his rods packed en route for Scotland, or
booked by the next steamer for the fairyland of the
West Indies. Presently, while the ideas of Jamaica or
fishing are at least as vividly imagined as before, the fan-
cied preparations receive a rude shock as the thought of
his work recurs, 9'* The "rude shock" is due to the
direction of attention to the actual existence or non-
existence of what has been previously merely imagined.
This brings with it a desire for the actual experiences
themselves. The belief that they are out of reach
thwarts this desire and produces pain which displaces,
often though not always completely, the pleasures of
imagination. In general, the thought of a pleasing
object which is recognised as beyond our reach gives
pain rather than pleasure when there is a desire for its
actual possession. To enjoy the pleasure of ideal revival
in the case of unattainable objects, we must be able to
adopt the attitude of imagination or make-believe, and
this is very often impossible.
3. Feeling -Tone of Ideational Activity itself.
Belief. Ideational activity may assume two forms.
On the one hand, it may be directed to the production
of some new result in the real world, or to the increase
of our knowledge of the real world; on the other hand,
it may be a mere play of the imagination. The condi-
tions of pleasure and pain in the two cases are not
quite the same, and it will be well to treat them sepa-
* Ward's article " Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edi-
tion, xx., p. 74.
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rately. In both cases whatever furthers activity so as
to make it more efficient, conduces to pleasure ; and
whatever obstructs it and makes it inefficient, conduces
to pain.
We shall consider first those trains of ideas which
are directed towards the production of real results or
the increase of knowledge. Two modes of furtherance
and obstruction may be distinguished, the material
and the formal.
Material obstacles consist in ideally foreseen circum-
stances which would actually bar the way to the execu-
tion of a plan or to the occurrence of a desired event.
As Spinoza says, whatever hinders the body's power of
acting hinders the mind's power of thinking ; whatever
would, in fact, obstruct the execution of a plan, ob-
structs the formation of the plan, when it is ideally fore-
seen. If I am planning an excursion and discover that
the railway arrangements at a certain place are fatal to
its execution, this circumstance arrests the flow of my
ideas just as it would arrest their realisation. The
belief that a certain event will occur interferes with
the ideal train of thought, just as the event itself would
interfere with the actual train of occurrences. What
has been said of obstacles is equally true of further-
ances. The prevision of circumstances which would
facilitate the execution of an ideal scheme facilitates its
formation.
_ Formal obstacles and furtherances are those which
*
depend on the form of the flow of ideas and not on the
ideas themselves. They are due rather to error, ig-
norance, misapprehension or confusion on our part,
than to the actual circumstances of the case. Doubt
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and contradiction arising at a critical point arrest the
flow of ideas, just as the positive prevision of an ex-
ternal obstacle does. If in laying our plans for an
excursion we discover, not that the train arrangements
at a certain place are unfavourable, but that we have
no means of finding out what they are, the flow of
mental activity is held in suspense. The belief that
there will, and the belief that there will not, be a train
fit for our purpose are equally justified and unjustified,
so that their conflict blocks the onward progress of
thought. Suppose now that one authority, A, says
that there will be a train, and another, _Z?, that there
will be no train, the state of suspense is intensified.
The doubt arising from ignorance passes into the doubt
arising from positive contradiction. The statement of
the one person furthers and stimulates activity, while
the statement of the other suppresses it. If in the long
run we come upon evidence which proves that a train
runs just at the time we want it, there is a release from
tension and an onward bound in the flow of thought
which constitutes a highly pleasurable furtherance of
activity. Similarly, apart from any previous doubt or
contradiction, the mere fact that we find ourselves able
to arrange the details of a complex plan so that they
fit into each other without hitch or hindrance, is a
source of pleasure. Another formal condition of pain
is the struggle to find connexion between data which in
spite of our efforts continue to appear detached and
isolated. This is perhaps best illustrated when we are
attempting to follow the train of thought in another
person's mind? either by reading or listening. We are
looking for a logical connexion between the statements
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which follow each other
;
but if the exposition be bad,
or the subject-matter too hard for us, we find incoher-
ence instead of coherence, and the greater our mental
effort the more painful it is. A corresponding pleasure
is felt when facts which have been previously disjointed
and detached in our minds are brought under one
point of view, and shown to be exemplifications of the
same principle working under different conditions.
Here the efficiency of mental activity is increased.
" When we discern a common principle among diverse
and apparently disconnected particulars, instead of all
the attention we can command being taxed in the sepa-
rate apprehension of these 'disjecta membra,' they be-
come as one, and we seem at once to have at our dis-
posal resources for the command of an enlarged field
and the detection of new resemblances." *
We have laid down the general principle that ob-
struction of mental activity is painful, and its further-
ance pleasant. This is true, if properly understood;
but there are complications which are apt to cause con-
fusion if they are not carefully explained. Above all,
it must be noted that an obstacle to the attainment of
an end does not necessarily bring mental activity to a
standstill. What is really painful is dead strain com-
parable to pushing against an unyielding wall. But an
obstacle, whether formal or material, to the attainment
of an end, may heighten instead of arresting, the flow
of ideas, just as the dangers of mountaineering call into
play the resources of the climber, thereby increasing
his bodily and mental activity, and contributing to his
* Ward's article
"Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edi-
tion, xx., p. 70.
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pleasure. A difficulty in face of which a man feels
himself helpless, is painful in proportion to the strength
of the conative tendency which it thwarts. On the
other hand, a difficulty which calls his powers into
fuller and more varied play, may be a source of pleas-
ure. Whether it will be actually so or not, depends
upon the special conditions of the case. It is necessary
to distinguish between two kinds of end : in the one,
it is part and parcel of the end that it should be at-
tained in a certain way by our own activity ; in the
other, it is a matter of indifference whether it occurs
with or without our co-operation. If we are trying to
hit a mark with a stone, it will give us no satisfaction
for somebody else to hit the mark ; it will give us no
satisfaction to walk up to the mark and place the stone
on it. So in guessing a riddle it gives us comparatively
little satisfaction to be told the solution; the pleasure
lies in finding it out for ourselves. On the other hand,
if we are hungry and desire food, we are perfectly con-
tent to have it placed on the table for us. Our satisfac-
tion is not at all diminished by the fact that we did not
prepare it ourselves ; on the contrary, the necessity of
preparing it ourselves would in most cases be an actual
drawback. We have stated the contrast between these
two kinds of ends, so as to bring out the antithesis
between them as sharply as possible. But as a matter
of fact, they are for the most part blended with each
other, satisfaction lying partly in the attainment of the
final result, which we may call the material end, and
partly in the process of attaining it, which we may call
the formal end. We may suppose that CEdipus was a
man who delighted in guessing riddles ; and ordinarily
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his satisfaction would lie in finding out the answer for
himself. But when he had to deal with the Sphinx,
his satisfaction would mainly consist in the deliverance
of Thebes and in his own escape from being eaten.
Now in the case of an ordinary riddle, difficulty would
be mainly a source of pleasure, because it would give
scope for the fuller exercise of his mental powers. But
in guessing the riddle of the Sphinx, the conditions are
essentially altered ; for here the welfare of Thebes and
his own life were at stake, and these interests had a
much greater relative importance than the exercise of
his ingenuity in guessing riddles. Thus inasmuch as
the difficulty threw doubt on the attainment of the
material end, it would bring unmixed pain, which
would probably overwhelm and overbear the ordinary
pleasure of (Edipus in overcoming intellectual obstacles,
We may sum up as follows. The continuance of a
conation in face of an obstacle gives rise to mere dead
strain, and is therefore painful, in so far as the subject
feels himself powerless to deal with the obstacle. On
the other hand, so far as the obstacle calls into play the
resources of the subject to overcome it, it heightens
free mental activity, and to that extent gives rise to
pleasure. But even in this case a condition of pain is
introduced if and so far as the presence of the obstacle
makes doubtful the attainment of that final result of
activity which we have called the material end. The
pain is the greater, the stronger the doubt is, and the
greater the importance of the material end.
We must carefully distinguish between obstructed
activity and diminished activity. An obstacle blocking
the onward progress of a train of thought has for its
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first effect an intensification of the conative tendency
which it -renders ineffective. It is only in a gradual
way that the conation diminishes in intensity, until it is
displaced by some other activity. This takes a longer
time the stronger the interest involved.
The removal of an obstacle, either by our own activ-
ity or by external circumstances, is a source of pleasure.
The resulting pleasure is by no means a mere equiva-
lent of the pain of previous obstruction. Sometimes it
is less, and very often it is greater. When the preced-
ing tension is not too prolonged and intense, the pleas-
ure of relief for the most part exceeds the pain which
is its pre-condition. Thus such an activity as solving a
chess-problem is predominantly pleasing, in spite of
periods of dead strain, in which there appears no hope
of solution. So a novel with a good plot creates
pleasure by a series of alternating checks and releases
of mental activity. The extreme case is found in
certain forms of the ludicrous. A pun impels the
mind to identify objects utterly disconnected with each
other. This of course involves a conflict, and an ob-
struction of the flow of thought. But the obstruction
is so transient that it scarcely gives rise to anything
that can be called pain at all. On the other hand the
relief which comes with insight into the true state of
the case may be a source of keen pleasure. Mental
activity suddenly obstructed and so heightened is im-
mediately set free, and is so much greater than the situ-
ation demands that it has nothing to do but enjoy itself.
It should be noted that the same conditions which
increase or further mental activity may also be the con-
ditions which initially excite it. Let us take the case
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of a man who finds, either that he has come into a for-
tune, or that he has lost one. Consider first the sudden
transition from poverty to riches. One effect may be
the opening of the field for the satisfaction of conative
tendencies which actually played a large part in his
conscious life in the period of poverty. But besides
this there will be many tendencies which were compar-
atively latent while he remained poor, partly because
they were displaced by more pressing needs and partly
because of the hopelessness of attempting to satisfy
them. The sudden accession of wealth will open a
free field for the satisfaction of these previously latent
tendencies, and it will at the same time transform them
into conscious conations. In the opposite case of the
rich man becoming poor, many conscious ambitions
and projects will be crushed ; but besides this there is
much in his mode of life as a rich man to which he has
paid no attention because it has been a mere matter of
course and of routine. But his routine habits, so soon
as they are obstructed by poverty, become changed into
conscious conations
;
the same condition which denies
these conations satisfaction, calls them into being.
4. Feeling -Tone of Ideational Activity itself.
Imagination. One grand characteristic of the play
of imagination is the absence of what we have called
the material end. The end is simply the working-out of
the ideational process itself, apart from any special re-
sult to be produced in the real world or in the advance-
ment of our knowledge of it. This gives imagination a
great advantage as a pleasure-yielding activity. In
pursuing material ends, we are subject to the real con-
ditions on which their attainment depends. We are
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thus compelled to face all the obstructions and diffi-
culties which the constitution of the real world imposes.
In imagination, on the other hand, limiting conditions
are imposed by ourselves. If we begin by fancying
that we are as strong as Samson, and proceed to fancy
that we meet a lion, this is only a favourable opportu-
nity for rending the lion like a kid. If on the other
hand we actually anticipate meeting a lion, the problem
is how to avoid being rent ourselves. We need intro-
duce no obstacles into the flow of imaginative activity,
except such as can easily be overcome by imaginary
conditions and so serve to enhance our pleasure on the
whole. Take for example such an imaginary narrative
as Dumas' Monte Christo or The Three Musketeers.
Of course there must be a certain internal coherence
in the play of imagination. Explicit contradictions
give rise to the pains of obstruction as they do in the
pursuit of practical ends or of knowledge.
Besides the logical incoherence arising from explicit
doubt or contradiction, there is also a kind of incoher-
ence affecting the formation of the idea of an object,
apart from reference to its existence or non-existence.
Under this head comes incongruity between the structure
of an object and its function. The function of a pave-
ment is to be trodden on, and for this purpose the more
level it is the better
;
if it is worked in mosaic, so that
its parts appear in relief, the effect on the eye is un-
pleasing. We may know quite well that it is even ;
but its apparent unevenness interferes with our idea of
a pavement. The same kind of unpleasantness is pro-
duced by the sight of a key so elaborately decorated
that it appears unfit for its proper function. Similarly
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the lover of books feels discomforted if he sees a
favourite volume upside down on the shelves. Un-
pleasantness may be due to mere violation of habit.
Most people who have been accustomed to the ordinary
English mode of spelling, are annoyed when they see
words like honour and colour spelt honor and color.
This effect is intensified in so-called " phonetic spelling."
If in a picture shadows do not fall as the direction of the
light requires, the result is unpleasing even before the
incongruity is explicitly detected and formulated. Sim-
ilarly, incongruities in the development of character in
a novel obstruct the flow of ideas and create the im-
pression of unnaturalness, even though no contradiction
is explicitly recognised. This kind of incoherence may
attach to all forms of ideational activity. It is here
brought under the head of imagination, because it af-
fects the flow of ideas as such in distinction from beliefs
concerning existence and non-existence.
5. Sentiment and Emotion. After the full treat-
ment of emotion in bk. iii., div. i., ch. iv., it is not ne-
cessary to say much more about it at this point. What
is true of perceptual process, holds, mutatis mutandis,
of ideational. On the perceptual plane, the actual pres-
ence of a dangerous situation excites fear ; on the
ideational, the ideal prevision of a similar situation has
a similar effect. All the general characteristics of emo-
tion which we enumerated in bk. iii., div. i., ch. iv.,
1, apply equally to perceptual and ideational process.
There is only one point which appears to require
more extended treatment at this stage. We noted that
emotions, so far as they had not their primary origin in
organic change, usually exhibit a parasitical character.
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They arc in the main secondary phenomena, and pre-
suppose the existence of more specific tendencies. The
anger, for instance, produced in a dog by taking away
its bone pre-supposes the specific appetite for food.
Now on the ideational plane the specific tendencies
which condition the occurrence of emotion are incom-
parably more varied and complex than the primary
perceptual tendencies. All the various systems of ideas
which grow up in the process of ideal construction of
the world and of the Self, have their conative aspect.
Each system of ideas is a general tendency to feel and
act in certain ways under certain circumstances. It is
convenient to have a general name for ideal systems,
considered from this point of view. It does not appear
that any better word can be selected for the purpose
than sentiment, though in so employing it we extend
its application beyond the range of ordinary usage. If
we give this extended application to the word, we may
regard emotions which pre-suppose mental dispositions
organised through previous trains of ideational activity,
as episodes in the life-history of sentiment.
The credit of first drawing attention to this distinc-
tion between emotion and sentiment belongs to Mr.
Shand, and we cannot do better than quote his words.
Emotions " are in a sense adjectival and qualify a more
stable feeling. Whereas the specific organisation of
our sentiments, affection for our friends, the home-
sentiment, and every sentiment that we can use the
term ' love ' to express, as love of knowledge, art, good-
ness, love of comfort, and all our interests, as interest
in our health, fortune and profession, interest in books,
collections, self-interest, these, so far from being
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mere adjectives and qualifying other feelings, are the
relatively stable centres to which the first attach them-
selves, the substantives of these adjectives, the complex
wholes which contain in their possible life-history the
entire gamut of the emotions.
In the love of an object . . . , there is pleasure in
presence and desire in absence, hope or despondency in
anticipation, fear in the expectation of its loss, injury,
or destruction, surprise or astonishment in its unex-
pected changes, anger when the course of our interest
is opposed or frustrated, elation when we triumph over
obstacles, satisfaction or disappointment in attaining
our desire, regret in the loss, injury, or destruction of
the object, joy in its restoration or improvement, and
admiration for its superior quality or excellence. And
this series of emotions occurs, now in one order, now in
another, in every sentiment of love or interest, when
the appropriate conditions are present.
Now consider how these same emotions repeat them-
selves, often with opposite objects, in the life-history
of every sentiment which we name dislike or hatred.
There is pain instead of pleasure in the presence of the
object, desire to be rid of it, to escape from its pres-
ence, except we can injure it or lower its quality, hope
or despondency according to the chances of accom-
plishing this desire, elation or disappointment with
success or failure, anger or fear when it is thrust upon
us and persists, surprise when the unexpected occurs,
regret or grief, not in its loss or injury, but in its
presence and prosperous state."*
* " Character and the Emotions," Mind, N.S., No. 18 (April, 189C), p;i.
217-218.
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The distinction between emotion and sentiment is to
a large extent a distinction between dispositions and
actual states of consciousness. Such a sentiment as
friendship cannot be experienced in its totality at any
one moment. It is felt only in the special phase which
is determined by the circumstances of the moment. If
we are parting from our friend, we feel sorrow ; if we
are about to meet him after long absence, we feel joy.
The joy and the sorrow are actual experiences ; but the
sentiment which includes the susceptibility to either ac-
cording to circumstances, cannot in its totality be an act-
ual experience. It is a complex emotional disposition *
which manifests itself variously under varying condi-
tions. These varying manifestations are the actual ex-
periences which we call emotions. Thus we may say
that so far as actual experience is concerned the senti-
ment is constituted by the manifold emotions in which it
manifests itself. But this must be understood with an
important qualification. We must not suppose that all
sentiments are capable of manifesting themselves in the
same emotions. On the contrary, the character of the
emotion is specifically different according to the nature
of the sentiment on which it depends ; and the differ-
ence may be important enough to justify a different
name for the emotion. This is specially exemplified in
the distinction between the emotions which have refer-
ence to personal and to impersonal objects respectively.
The "emotions common to our love of whatever object
become complicated with new differentiations in the
love or hatred of a human being. Pleasure in the
presence of the object, desire for it in absence, for the
* See bk. ii., cb. iv., 5.
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preservation of its existence, for its superior quality,
anger or fear when it is threatened, hope, admiration,
disappointment, regret, recur, and constitute the love of
the object, of its well-being; but the specific emotion
of sympathy is differentiated. The nearest approach to
this in our love of inanimate things, or those great con-
structions of our thought, business, knowledge, art,
morality, is the interest we take in the continuance of
the object, in its improvement, or heightened quality,
and, conversely, in the pain which any loss of quality,
injury, or destruction occasions. Now if we supposed
the object were self-conscious and took pleasure in its
own continuance and improvement, and felt pain in its
injury or lowered quality, there would then occur a
sympathy or identical feeling excited in two conscious
beings in reference to the same object. Thus where
human beings are concerned, there necessarily arise co-
incidences of this sort which, multiplying in those com-
mon situations where danger or injury is present,
develop the emotion of sympathy as a new component
of the love of the object. And in the process of de-
velopment, pity acquires a qualitative flavour distin-
guishing it from the pain felt in the injury or destruc-
tion of inanimate objects.
In the next place, the pleasure felt for the excellence
or superiority of an object that we love, develops into
the new emotions of respect and reverence : respect
where there is a superior power or quality which fails
to win admiration, reverence where this superior qual-
ity is recognised as moral. And both admiration and
something of fear blend in this emotion and give to it a
flavour and specific quality of its own.
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Lastly, consider how the regret or sorrow that we
feel when we have injured any object that we are in-
terested in or love, where human beings are concerned,
and our action is not accidental but the outcome of
anger, or the change from love to hatred, differentiates
the new emotions of remorse and repentance. Repent-
ance is no mere revival of this same universal sorrow
or regret; it has acquired a character of its own with
the blame that we pass on ourselves, the futile effort to
recall and undo the past, the hope and desire and reso-
lution to make the future different. And remorse too
has a character of its own, with the fear and even
horror that blend with it, the regret for what has been
done, without the hope and resolution of repentance,
but rather with a deep despondency or despair which
sees no possible escape."
*
* Op. cit., pp. 218-219.
CHAPTER X.
VOLUNTARY DECISION.
1. Ascending Levels of Conative Development.
Conative development is inseparably connected with
cognitive development. If we consider conation in the
abstract, we can distinguish its positive from its nega-
tive phase, appetition from aversion. We can also
distinguish its varying degrees of intensity and persist-
ence and its feeling-tone. But beyond this all differ-
entiation of conative consciousness is differentiation
of cognitive consciousness. This does not imply that
conation is secondary to and dependent upon cognition.
The whole course of exposition in this work refutes
such an assumption. What is meant is rather that
conation and cognition are different aspects of one and
the same process. Cognition gives the process its de-
terminate character : without conation there would be
no process at all to have a character.
From this point of view, we may distinguish differ-
ent levels of conative process as connected with differ-
ent levels of general mental development. On the plane
of perception we have the perceptual impulse ; this in-
cludes instinctive impulses. Its general characteristic
is that the activity involved in it finds immediate ex-
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pression in bodily movement guided by external im-
pressions.
The perceptual impulse without losing its essential
character may involve a certain amount of ideal antici-
pation. But we reach a distinctly higher plane when
ideas become " sufficiently self-sustaining to form trains
that are not wholly shaped by the circumstances of the
present."
" We can desire to live again through ex-
periences of which there is nothing actually present to
remind us."* The mere ideal representation of an end
may be the primary starting-point of an activity di-
rected to its realisation
;
and this activity may itself
partly or wholly take the form of trains of ideas. It is
at this stage that the word desire has its most appro-
priate application. Perceptual conations are better
described as impulses.
With the development of ideational thought, higher
forms of desire arise. The process of generalisation
brings with-it generalised conative tendencies. We
aim at the fulfilment of rules of conduct instead of the
production of this or that special result in this or that
particular case. Ideal construction sets before us ends
which have never been previously realised. These ends
may be so complex that they can only be realised grad-
ually by activities persistently renewed as opportunity
allows. The writing of a book and sometimes the read-
ing of it, may serve as an example. Sometimes the
ideally constructed ends are such as the individual re-
cognises to be unattainable in his own lifetime. He can
only contribute his share towards bringing them to pass.
Sometimes there is a doubt whether they can be com-
* Ward, op. cit., p. 74.
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pletely attained, or even a certainty that they cannot
be completely attained. Ends of this last kind are the
highest, and are generally called " ideals."
2. Conative Aspect of the Conception of the Self.
Under the concept of the Self as expressed in the
word " I " is included in systematic unity the life-
history of the individual, past, present, and future, as
it appears to himself and to others ; together with all
its possible or imaginary developments. We have al-
ready described the way in which this complex ideal
construction grows up. We have now to point out
that its evolution accounts for the origin of Will in the
strict sense of the word, as implying deliberation and
choice.
Voluntary action is to be sharply discriminated from
impulsive action, and deliberation from conflict of im-
pulsive tendencies. The difference is, that in impulse
action follows the isolated conative tendency ; whereas
in voluntary decision special conations and their ends
are first considered in their relation to the total system
of tendencies included in the conception of the Self.
When two disconnected impulses simultaneously prompt
to incompatible courses of action, if the conception of
Self does not come into play, one interferes with the
other in a quasi-mechanical way. There is merely a
trial of brute strength between them. Instances are
sometimes found in young children and animals. The
characteristic expression of their mental state is a sort of
oscillation between two modes of action, each of which
is begun in turn and then gives place to the other.
" When a young child suddenly comes' face to face with
a strange dog, the impulse towards . . . and the im-
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pulse away from . . . are realised in quick succession.
The child goes up to the dog, runs back to its father,
approaches the dog again, and so on.'
M Professor
Titchener tells us that " in face of the two impulses,
(1) to shut a door on the right hand, and (2) to seat
himself at his typewriter-table on the left," he actually
began " a right-hand movement towards the door and
then all at once " slued round " to the typewriter, with-
out having closed it." | All of us can no doubt recall
similar experiences.
Deliberation in no way resembles this alternate jerk-
ing in opposite directions, as if pulled by a string, and
the decision which follows it is not a mere triumph in
strength of one isolated impulse over another. Volun-
tary action does not follow either of the conflicting
tendencies, as such ; it follows our preference of the
one to the other. It is the conception of the Self as
agent which makes the difference. The alternative is
not "this" or
"that," but "shall I do this" or "shall 1
do that?" Each line of action with its results is con-
sidered not in isolation but as part of the ideally con-
structed whole for which the word "I" stands. The
impulse of the present moment belongs to the Self of
the present moment ; but this is only a transient phase
of the total Self. If the impulse is realised the com-
pleted action will take its place as a component part of
the life-history of the individual. He may live to re-
gret it. In his present mood, with bottle and glass
before him, he may desire to get drunk ; but sobriety
may have been the habit and principle of a lifetime.
* Titchener, Primer of Psychology, p. 246.
\ Ibid., p. 247.
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If he yields to temptation, the remembrance of the act
will stand out in painful conflict with his normal ten-
dencies. He will be unable to think of it without a
pang. This incompatibility between the normal Self
and the present impulse, if vividly enough realised at
the moment of temptation, will restrain him from drink-
ing. If it is not sufficient, further developments of the
conception of Self may be more efficacious. He may
think of himself as churchwarden or elder; he may
think of the ideal aspirations of his better moments ; he
may call to mind the thought of himself as reflected in
other minds, the dead friend who expected so much
from him, and who would be so shocked at his lapse,
the talk of the general public conceived as pitying,
contemptuous, or malicious. He may even consider
how he would like to look back to such an episode on
his death-bed. Obviously, this detailed development of
what is included in the man's conception of himself as
a whole, might go on interminably. As a matter of
fact, it is possible that it would not be needed at all.
He might simply say, "What! I do such a thing?
How could the thought ever have occurred to me?"
In this case the mere concept of the Self in its vague
totality without detailed development would be suffi-
cient to produce a decision. The thought of getting
drunk attracts the man
;
but the thought of his getting
drunk repels, so as to give rise to instant rejection of
the suggested course of action.
3. Deliberation. Very often, however, the thought
of the Self does not at once give rise to a decision, posi-
tive or negative, but only to arrest of action, so as to
give time for deliberation. It may be that the way in
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which this or that line of conduct, if realised, would
affect the Self as a whole, past, present, future, and
ideal, can only be brought before consciousness with
sufficient fulness to determine action by a more or less
prolonged train of thought. When this is so, the con-
cept of the Self as a whole will not directly tend to
reinforce or suppress a desire ; it will rather tend to
postponement of action, until the concept of Self and
of the action and its consequences are developed in
such detail in relation to each other that a decision
becomes possible. In this way arises Deliberation.
The alternatives before the mind in deliberating may
be simply doing a thing or leaving it undone ; or they
may include two or more definite and incompatible
lines of action. In principle, there is no essential dif-
ference between the two cases. When two or more
definite lines of action are considered, each of them has
to be brought into relation with the general concept of
Self, and from this point of view they have to be com-
pared with each other.
The general point of view in deliberation may be
described as follows. A certain line of action being
suggested as possible, I contemplate myself as I shall
be if I put it in execution, so as to make it part of my
actual life-history, and on the other hand I contemplate
myself as I shall be if I leave it undone. I follow out
this representation of a hypothetical Self in more or
less detail until that turning-point in the process which
is called Voluntary Decision emerges.
In the more developed forms of deliberation there is a
kind of mental see-saw. Now one alternative, and now
another, comes predominantly before consciousness, and
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the mind is variously attracted and repelled by each in
turn. The desires and aversions which arise in this
way are called Motives. Hence the process of deliber-
ation is often called a Conflict of Motives. Motives are
not mere impulses. They come before consciousness as
reasons why I should act in this or that way. They
are not independent forces fighting out a battle among
themselves, while the Ego remains a mere spectator.
On the contrary, the motives are motives only in so
far as they arise from the nature of the Self, and pre-
suppose the conception of the Self as a determining
factor. From this it follows that the recognised rea-
sons for a decision can never constitute the entire
cause of decision. Behind them there always lies the
Self as a whole, and what this involves can never be
completely analysed or stated in the form of definite
reasons or special motives.
While the process of deliberation is going on, the
motives are motives for deciding : when the decision
is made, the triumphant motives become motives for
action. Or, to put the case in another way, while the
process of deliberation is going on, the competing de-
sires are regarded as possible motives for action : when
the decision is formed, they become actual motives for
action.
4. Voluntary Decision. The phrase voluntary
decision is ambiguous. It may mean the transition
from the state of suspense to the state of resolution ; or
it may mean the state of resolution when it has once
been attained. It will be simplest to treat first the
decision as already formed, the state of being resolved.
The most obvious difference between the state of inde-
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cision and that of decision is that in the first we do not
know what we are going to do, and that in the second
we do know what we are going to do. While deliber-
ating, we are making up our mind, and we do not know
what our mind is going to be. When we have formed
a decision, we have come to know our own minds. The
conception of the Self has become fixed where it was
previously indeterminate. The realisation of one line
of conative tendency is now definitely anticipated as
part of our future life-history, so far at least as external
conditions will allow of its execution. Opposing cona-
tive tendencies either cease to operate, or they appear
only as difficulties or obstacles in the way of carrying
out our decision. They are no longer regarded as pos-
sible motives of action. We have come to the settled
belief that, so far as we are concerned in our present
state of mind, the lines of action to which they prompt
will not be carried out. They are thus placed outside
the sphere of deliberation, and in consequence cease to
be motives. If they persist at all, they merely serve
to make the execution of our voluntary decision more
painful and difficult. But they do not on that account
impair the strength of this decision ; on the contrary,
they may only give an opportunity for exhibiting the
strength of the decision. With the full emergence of
the decision, the conflict of motives, as such, ceases.
"This termination of the struggle does not merely
mean that one impulse or group of impulses has turned
out to be stronger than its opponents. It might con-
ceivably manifest its superior strength without a ces-
sation of conflict. When two unequal and opposite
forces are applied to a particle, the particle will move
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in the direction of the stronger force ; but the action
of the weaker force still continues to manifest itself in
a diminution of velocity. The triumph of the volun-
tary impulse is not of this kind. In a perfect volition,
opposing impulses are not merely held in check ; they
are driven out of the field. If they continue to exist,
they do so as external obstacles to a volition already
formed. They are no longer motives ; they are on the
same footing with any other difficulty in the way of
attainment."*
On the other hand, the motives which in the process
of deliberation arrayed themselves on the side of the
course of action that actually comes to be adopted,
persist after deliberation is over, as the recognised
motives of the voluntary decision. We will the act,
because we desire it, or at least have an aversion to
omitting it, or to its alternatives. Thus, the state of
voluntary decision may be analysed as follows : (1) there
is the belief that so far as in us lies we are going to
carry out a certain course of action ; (2) this belief is
founded on that kind of reason which we call a motive.
It is recognised as having ground in our present cona-
tive tendencies. Thus we may define a Volition as a
desire qualified and defined by the judgment that so far
as in us lies we shall bring about the attainment of the
desired end because we desire it.
5. The Forming of a Decision. We have yet
to examine how the state of decision supervenes on that
of deliberation. At this point the vexed question of
free-will, as it is called, arises. According to the liber-
* Article by author on "Voluntary Action," Mind 7 N.S., vol. v., No. 19,
p. 357.
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tarians, the decision, at least in some cases, involves the
intervention of a new factor, not present in the pre-
vious process of deliberation, and not traceable to the
constitution of the individual as determined by heredity
and past experience. The opponents of the libertarians
say that the decision is the natural outcome of condi-
tions operating in the process of deliberation itself.
There is according to them no new factor which ab-
ruptly emerges like a Jack-in-the-box in the moment of
deciding.
Now it must be admitted that the transition from the
state of indecision to that of decision is often obscure,
and that it frequently appears to be unaccountably
abrupt. This makes it difficult or impossible to give a
definite disproof of the libertarian hypothesis on psy-
chological grounds. But certainly the onus probandi
rests with those who maintain the intervention of a
new factor which is not a development or outcome of
previous conditions. If we cannot definitely disprove
the presence of such a factor, we can at least say that
the facts are far from compelling us to assume its exist-
ence.
Deliberation may be regarded as a state of unstable
equilibrium. The mind oscillates between alternatives.
First one conative tendency becomes relatively domi-
nant, and then another. The play of motives passes
through all kinds of vicissitudes, as the alternative
courses of action and their consequences are more fully
apprehended in relation to the Self. As the process
advances, equilibrium tends to be restored. New de-
velopments of conative tendency cease to take place;
deliberation comes to a standstill because it has done
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its work. In this relatively stationary condition, it
may be that one of the alternatives, with the motives for
it, has a decided and persistent predominance in con-
sciousness, so that the mind no longer tends to revert
to the others. At this point the mind is made up, and
the result is formulated in the judgment, "I will do
this rather than that."
But there are other cases which present more diffi-
culty. It may happen that deliberation comes to a stand-
still without any one alternative acquiring a definite
predominance. The mind tends first to one and then
to the other without result. No new developments
occur which tend to give a superiority to either, and
the result is hopeless suspense. It would seem that
under these conditions no voluntary decision ought to
supervene, or if it does supervene, it must be due to
the intervention of a new factor and is not merely the
outcome of the deliberative process. Now as a matter
of fact we find that under such conditions voluntary
decisions frequently do come into existence. They
may even be of wide-reaching importance like Caesar's
determination to cross the Rubicon. But probably in
all such instances one or both of two traceable and
recognisable conditions of a psychological kind are
operative. These are (1) aversion to the continuance
of painful suspense, and (2) the necessity for action of
some kind. " It may be that though we are at a loss to
decide between two courses of action, we are none the
less fully determined not to remain inactive. Inaction
may be obviously worse than either of the alternative
lines of conduct. We may then choose one of them
much in the same way as we take a cigar out of a box,
592 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., CH. x.
when it is no matter which we select."* In view of
the necessity for action, a comparatively slight pre-
dominance of the motives for one alternative may be
sufficient to determine decision, though it would have
been ineffective under other conditions. Or again,
being pressed to decide, either by aversion to the state
of irresolution, or by the necessity for doing something,
we may simply adopt the course which seems to be
uppermost in our minds at the moment, although we
have no confidence that it would remain uppermost if
we continued to deliberate. Or we may mentally con-
sent to allow the decision to be determined by some
irrelevant circumstance such as the fall of a penny. We
determine that if heads turn up we shall do A, and that
if tails turn up we shall do J5. Curiously enough, the
reverse frequently happens. If heads turn up we do
_Z?, and if tails turn up we do A. This is due in part to
an aversion to having one's conduct determined in such
an arbitrary and irrelevant way. But it often happens
that immediately after the appeal to chance has been
made, and has issued in favour of one alternative, the
motives for the other alternative are mentally set in
contrast, not with the opposing motives present in pre-
ceding deliberation, but with the trivial result of the
appeal to chance. They thus acquire a momentary
predominance which determines voluntary decision.
Sometimes volition takes place before the process of
deliberation has fully worked itself out. In this way,
acts come to be decided on which would have been sup-
pressed if they had been more fully considered. Here
again, the necessity for acting in some way, and im-
* Op. cit., p. 364.
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patience of the state of indecision, are operative factors.
But the reason often lies in the intensity of some im-
pulse of the present Self which derives its strength, not
from its relation to the total system of conduct, but
from the circumstances of the moment.
In the vicissitudes through which the process of de-
liberation passes, it will often happen that this isolated
impulse through its momentary intensity will acquire
such a predominance as to arrest the full development
of other motives, which, if they had come into play,
would have given rise to a different decision. The de-
cision which thus takes place after imperfect deliberation
is generally called impulsive. It is not supposed to be
voluntary in the same degree as that which takes place
after fuller deliberation. The agent often commits the
act knowing that he will live to repent it. Most cases
of yielding to temptation are cases of deliberation ar-
rested and cut short by the transient strength of a
present impulse. It is in such instances that the agent
is most keenly aware in retrospect that he might have
acted otherwise than he actually did. He feels that the
act does not fully represent his true self. If he had
fully developed all the motives which were inoperative
owing to imperfect deliberation, the momentary impulse
might have been suppressed instead of realised.
6. Fixity of Voluntary Decision. The persist-
ence with which a voluntary decision, when once formed,
maintains itself against obstacles, is often much greater
than can be accounted for by the strength of the desire
which was its motive at the outset. There are many
reasons for this. One is that the line of conduct deter-
mined on is identified with the conception of Self.
Psych. 38
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"When I judge that in so far as in me lies I shall
realise a certain end, the endeavour to realise that end
becomes ipso facto an integral part of the conception
of myself. Failure to realise it is regarded as my fail-
ure, my defeat. Thus volition becomes strengthened
in the face of obstacles by all the combative emotions.
These are of varying kinds and of varying degrees of
strength in different individuals ; but all tendencies to
hold out or struggle against opposition, merely because
it is opposition, are enlisted in the service of the will,
inasmuch as the idea of the line of conduct willed is an
integral part of the idea of Self."*
"The fixity of will is also strengthened, often in a
very high degree, by aversion to the state of irresolu-
tion. Suspense is in itself disagreeable ; and when we
have emerged from it by a voluntary decision, we
shrink from lapsing into it once more. Besides this,
prolonged and repeated indecision is highly detrimental
in the general conduct of life. The man who knows
his own mind is far more efficient than the man who is
always wavering. Hence in most persons there is a
strong tendency to abide by a resolution, just because
it is a resolution. This tendency is greatly strength-
ened by social relations. If we are weak and vacillat-
ing, no one will depend upon us ; we shall be viewed
with a kind of contempt. Mere vanity may go far to
give fixity to the will." f
Volition also becomes fixed by the action which fol-
lows on it. So soon as we have attained the settled
belief that we are going to follow out a certain line of
conduct, we immediately begin to adapt our thoughts
* Op. cit., p. 358, t Ibid., p. 359,
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and deeds to this belief. We thus come to be more
and more committed to the course determined on. To
withdraw from it would be to disturb our arrange-
ments; to baulk expectations raised in others; and to
arrest the general flow of our own mental activity.
The more the mind has become set on one thing, the
more it would be upset by being diverted to another.
If I have once decided on going to New Guinea to
investigate the manners and customs of savages, instead
of staying at home to lecture on psychology, the whole
direction of my mental activity flows into channels cor-
responding with my preformed resolution. I begin to
read up books about savage tribes and about New
Guinea in particular. The arrangements for my outfit
and voyage, the kind of work I am going to do, the
kind of adventures I shall meet with, the men I am to
co-operate with, and other topics such as these, engross
my mind. The more advanced this process is the
greater fixity does my volition acquire. "To disturb
it is to disturb the whole system of tendencies with
which it has become interwoven. In this way I com-
mit myself to such an extent that it becomes impossible
to draw back."*
Perhaps the fixity of volition is not adequately ac-
counted for by reasons such as these. There appear
to be individual differences in this respect which de-
pend upon inherited constitution, so that they cannot
be explained by psychological generalities. In some
men infirmity of purpose appears to be innate. They
change like a weathercock, and can never be relied on.
Others follow up their voluntary resolutions with a
* Op. cit., p. 358.
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dogged persistence which is often utterly unreasonable.
Some men are born obstinate, and others vacillating.
7. " Action in the Line of Greatest Resistance"
Some volitions take place and are maintained only
by an effort. This is especially the case when volun-
tary decision follows some general principle of conduct
or some ideal aim, in opposition to an intense impulse
of the present Self which is excited and maintained by
the actual conditions existing at the time. Professor
James has laid great emphasis on this experience.
" We
feel, in all hard cases of volition, as if the line taken,
when the rarer and more ideal motives prevail, were
the line of greater resistance, and as if the line of
coarser motivation were the more pervious and easy
one, even at the very moment when we refuse to fol-
low it. He who under the surgeon's knife represses
cries of pain, or he who exposes himself to social ob-
loquy for duty's sake, feels as if he were following the
line of greatest temporary resistance. He speaks of
conquering and overcoming his impulses and tempta-
tions. But the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward,
never talk of their conduct in that way or say they
resist their energy, overcome their sobriety, conquer
their courage, and so forth."*
There can be no doubt that Professor James here
describes the facts accurately. But he proceeds to
interpret them as evidence in favour of the libertarian
view. If volition is merely the outcome of preceding
psychological conditions, it must follow the line of least
resistance, but in the cases described it follows the line
of the greatest resistance. This would seem to imply
* Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 548.
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the intervention of a new factor. Before admitting
this conclusion, we must analyse more carefully the
experience on which it is based.
We said in 4 that when a voluntary decision was
once formed, " opposing conative tendencies either
cease to operate, or they appear only as difficulties or
obstacles in the way of carrying out our decision."*
The disappearance of opposing tendencies, on the one
hand, or their persistence as obstacles, on the other, are
the two alternatives which correspond to action in the
line of least resistance and in the line of greatest re-
sistance. Now whether they persist or disappear, de-
pends upon the presence or absence of circumstances
over which we have no control. The simplest case is
that in which we voluntarily decide in opposition to
some present organic craving, such as the craving for
drink. The craving itself is maintained by organic
conditions which continue to operate both in the very
moment of decision and after the decision is made.
Thus, to use the phraseology of Professor James, the
volition is " hard " because it is both formed and car-
ried out against a persistent obstacle. On the other
hand, if the decision is in favour of indulging the
animal appetite, counter motives tend to disappear al-
together, instead of persisting as obstacles. They are
not maintained by organic conditions, nor are they ob-
truded on the mind by any other circumstances. As
soon as the man has given way to temptation and begins
to drink, he loses sight of the considerations which had
previously tended to restrain him. Besides this, the
drink itself, if he takes enough of it, soon obliterates
* See above, p. 588.
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any lingering traces of reluctance. Thus in resolving
to drink the man certainly decides in the direction of
least resistance
; indeed, there may be virtually no re-
sistance at all. On the other hand, in deciding to re-
strain his appetite, he decides in the direction of great-
est resistance, because the appetite itself still persists
after his decision.
The case is not essentially dissimilar when the per-
sistence of motives as obstacles is due to other cir-
cumstances. The interests opposed to the course of
action adopted may be so complex, they may play such
a large part in our life, that they continue to obtrude
themselves upon us even when we are deciding or have
decided that their realisation is not to be identified
with our conception of the future Self. They thus per-
sist as obstacles in the moment of resolution, and after
resolution. Regulus, in determining to return to Car-
thage, could hardly dismiss from his thoughts all that
he was giving up and the violent death which awaited
him. Perhaps if he had decided to remain at Rome,
his mental conflict would have been much less acute.
Surrounded by family and friends, and with all kinds
of congenial channels open for his activity, he would
probably have been able to a large extent to avoid
dwelling on the thought of his violated promise.
If this analysis be correct, cases of "hard" volition
do not show that in the process which leads up to a de-
cision, the weaker motives triumph. We must carefully
separate two questions. The first is, How does the vol-
untary decision issue out of the previous process of de-
liberation ? The other is, How far do opposing tenden-
cies become inoperative when the voluntary decision is
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made ? In proportion as they remain operative, they
constitute obstacles and render volition "hard." But
this has nothing to do with the psychological conditions
which determine the volition. It in no way proves
that these conditions are not adequate, and that a new
factor such as the libertarians assume is required to
account for the result.
8. Volition and Bodily Activity. A voluntary
decision is normally followed by action which carries
or tends to carry it into effect. Setting aside for the
present the case of voluntary attention, where the will
merely determines the direction of thought, we have
here to consider the relation between volition and
bodily movement.
Motor efficacy is not essential to the state of volun-
tary decision as a psychical fact.
" The question as to
the nature of a certain mode of consciousness, is quite
independent of the question whether or not this mode
of consciousness will be followed by a certain train of
occurrences in the organism and in the environment.
If I will to produce an explosion by applying a lighted
match to gunpowder, my volition is none the less a
volition because in the course of its execution the
match goes out or the powder proves to be damp.
Similarly the volition is none the less a volition if it
turns out that my muscular apparatus refuses to act, or
acts in a way contrary to my intention. The connexion
between certain modes of consciousness and correspond-
ing movements of the limbs is necessary to the main-
tenance of our existence
;
but it does not enter into the
constitution of the conscious state which precedes the
executive series of occurrences. When the conscious
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state is one of volition, it is necessary that the subject
should look forward to the bodily movements, either as
practically certain or at least as possible. A belief of
this kind is an essential ingredient of the voluntary at-
titude. But the existence of the belief is in itself suf-
ficient. Its truth or falsehood is a matter of indiffer-
ence. In a precisely analogous way we must, in deter-
mining to produce a gunpowder explosion, assume that
the powder is or may be dry enough to take fire. But
it is by no means necessary that the gunpowder in
point of fact should be dry."
*
Normally, however, volition is followed by corre-
sponding movements. How does this take place ? Pro-
fessor James has supplied what appears to be a satis-
factory answer to this question. The passage of volition
into movement is according to him a special case of the
general tendency of ideas to act themselves out. The
mere representation of an action tends to give rise to
the action itself, and will do so in the absence of inter-
fering conditions.
"
Try to feel as if you were crook-
ing your finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute
it will fairly tingle with the imaginary change of posi-
tion
; yet it will not sensibly move, because its not
really moving is also a part of what you have in mind.
Drop this idea, think of the movement purely and sim-
ply, with all brakes off, and, presto ! it takes place with
no effort at all." f
It very frequently happens that ideas pass into action
without preceding volition. "Whilst talking I become
* Article by author on " Voluntary Action," Mind, N.S., vol. v., No. 19,
p. 355.
f Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 527.
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conscious of a pin on the floor or of some dust on my
sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush
away the dust or pick up the pin. I make no express
resolve, but the mere perception of the object and the
fleeting notion of the act seem of themselves to bring
the latter about." * Experiences of this kind are very
common. We have already had occasion to dwell on
the tendency of ideas to express themselves in imitative
gestures ; and in that connexion we adduced other evi-
dence to show that ideas tend to act themselves out in
proportion to their vividness and dominance in con-
sciousness.
We now turn to the special case of volition. Voli-
tion is normally followed by movement, because the
voluntary decision gives to the representation of the
act decided on a settled predominance in consciousness
as against the representations of alternative courses.
This is Professor James's account of the matter, but it
seems possible to push analysis somewhat further, so as
to show how the predominance arises. During the
process of deliberation, the subject is as yet uncertain
what he is going to do. Incompatible courses of action
are ideally represented as possible alternatives. With
the voluntary decision comes the belief that one of
them is to be carried out to the exclusion of the others.
It is this belief which gives to the idea of the action the
predominance leading to its execution. This is perhaps
best illustrated by what takes place in the hypnotic
state. It is well known that the hypnotised subject
responds passively to all kinds of suggestions from the
hypnotiser. Within certain limits it is only necessary
* Ibid., p. 522.
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to suggest the idea of an action or group of actions to
bring about performance. "Tell the patient that he
cannot open his eyes or his mouth, cannot unclasp his
hands . . . and he will immediately be smitten with
absolute impotence in these regards."
* Tell him that
he is a pig or a lion or a baby or Julius Caesar, and he
will proceed to enact the part.
"
Subjects in this con-
dition will receive and execute suggestions of crime,
and act out a theft, forgery, arson, or murder." | Now
though the suggestion of the mere idea tends to have
this effect more or less, yet the result can be produced
with far more certainty and conspicuousness, when the
operator imposes on his patient a belief that he is such
and such a person, or that he is going to do such and
such a thing. Hence suggestions mainly take the form
of assertions, such as, You will do this, You will not do
that. When the patient has once adopted the belief
that he is going to act in a certain manner, the ideas of
alternative courses are suppressed, and the action fol-
lows.
It seems probable that the predominance which vol-
untary decision gives to the idea of a line of action is
essentially connected with the belief that this is the
line which we are going to follow out, to the exclusion
of other alternatives.
9. Involuntary Action. Fixed Ideas. In the
strictest sense an involuntary action is one which takes
place in opposition to a voluntary resolution. Thus if
determined to make a certain stroke at billiards, and if
in the moment of action the muscular apparatus fails
me, so as to give rise to an unintended jerky movement,
* Op. cit., vol. ii., p. 603. t Ibid., p. 605.
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my action is strictly involuntary. But cases like this
do not interest us here. What we are concerned with
is the defeat of the will, not by an accidental circum-
stance interfering with its execution, but by an antag-
onistic conation. We have an example of this in the
unsuccessful effort to restrain a reflex movement over
which we have normally sufficient control. Suppose a
party of soldiers to be climbing a crag in the dark so as
to surprise a castle. Noiselessness is a condition of
success. A sneeze or a cough probably means defeat
and loss of life. Now it is possible to a large extent to
restrain the actions of sneezing and coughing; but if
the irritation of the mucous membrane is sufficiently
intense and persistent temporary repression only makes
the ultimate outburst more violent. One of the soldiers
may be determined not to sneeze, although the impulse
is so strong as to give him great uneasiness. The ten-
dency to sneeze is a conation ; to restrain it is painful,
and to indulge it would be a relief. None the less, if
the impulse prove irresistible, the sneeze is involuntary.
In this instance the involuntary act follows on or-
ganic sensation and not on an idea. It does not take
place because the ideal representation of the act of
sneezing has become predominant, but merely because
of the intense irritation of the mucous membrane.
There is however a wide class of instances in which
the will is defeated by the obtrusive intensity of an
ideal representation. In spite of the mental assertion
that we are not going to perform a certain action, the
idea of that action, owing to other conditions, acquires
and maintains a dominance in consciousness which
ultimately leads to its realisation.
604 PSYCHOLOGY. [BK. iv., en. x.
This may happen even when the ideally represented
object is not desired, and even when the only feeling
towards it is that of intense aversion. A man standing
on an eminence, such as the top of a cathedral tower,
and looking down into the vast depth beneath him,
thinks of what it would be like to throw himself down.
Owing to the fascinating interest of the thought the
idea of the action and its consequences obtrudes itself
upon him with intense vividness, and he feels himself
impelled to carry it into execution. He may have a
very distinct and clear volition to the contrary ; he may
utterly refuse to identify the idea of the action with the
idea of Self. He mentally asserts, I shall not, or, I
will not
;
and as a rule this voluntary decision triumphs
over the "fixed idea," as it is called. But it still re-
mains true that the fixed idea derives its vivacity from
conditions independent of the will ; and it is always
possible that the impulse to realise it may acquire suffi-
cient strength to overcome a contrary volition. Some
people actually do throw themselves down precipices in
this way.
This result however is not common under normal
conditions. It is in pathological cases that the fixed
idea becomes really formidable. This is partly due to
imperfect powers of deliberation. The conative ten-
dencies which would have restrained the act lie in
abeyance ; the concept of the Ego in its unity and
totality can only be very inadequately developed in
relation to the act contemplated. But there are in-
stances in which this explanation does not apply. In
such instances it is not the absence of inhibiting ten-
dencies, but the positive strength of the impulsive idea
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which leads to action. Ribot gives a case of a man
who was possessed by the idea of killing his mother.
"<To you,' said he,
C I owe everything; I love you
with all my soul ; yet for some time past an incessant
idea drives me to kill you.'
" Tormented by this temp-
tation, he leaves his home, and becomes a soldier.
" Still a secret impulse stimulated him without cessa-
tion to desert in order to come home and kill his
mother." In time, the thought of killing his mother
gives place to that of killing his sister-in-law. Some
one tells him that his sister-in-law is dead, and he ac-
cordingly returns home.
" But as he arrives he sees
his sister-in-law living. He gives a cry, and the ter-
rible impulse seizes him again as a prey. That very
evening he makes his brother tie him fast. 'Take a
solid rope, bind me like a wolf in the barn, and go and
tell Dr. Calmeil . . .' From him he got admission to
an insane asylum. The evening before his entrance he
wrote to the director of the establishment : ' Sir, I am
to become an inmate of your house. I shall behave
there as if I were in the regiment. You will think
me cured. At moments perhaps I shall pretend to be
so. Never believe me. Never let me out on any pre-
text; the only use I shall make of my liberty will be
to commit a crime which I abhor.' " *
This is a case in which the fixed idea was not ex-
ecuted
;
but it easily might have taken effect, and many
similar cases could be adduced in which it actually did
so. What it is important to note is the conflict be-
tween the Self as a whole arranged on the side of the
* Ribot, Maladies de la Volontt, p. 77, quoted by James, Principles of
Psychology, vol. ii., p. 542.
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volition, and the isolated impulse to action which de-
rives its strength merely from the fixation of an idea by
pathological conditions. In these cases the conation
which resists the will arises primarily from the fixation
of the idea in consciousness. The fixation of the idea
itself does not arise from any desire for its object. But
under normal as opposed to pathological conditions, the
commonest cases of involuntary action are those in
which an idea becomes fixed through intense appetite
or craving arising from organic conditions. To take an
example given by Mr. Shand, a man may have a morbid
craving for drink or opium, and the ideas which move to
its satisfaction may at last become irresistible. Now here
there are four possible alternatives. In the first place,
indulgence in the drink or opium may be contrary to the
man's express volition at the moment when he drinks.
This is probably a very rare occurrence. As a rule,
when the impulse is strong enough to produce action, it
is also strong enough to prevent or displace an oppos-
ing volition. In the second place, there may have been
a preformed resolution to refrain from the action ; but
at the moment at which it takes place, the contrary im-
pulse acquires such intensity as to pre-occupy the field
of consciousness, so that the volition is temporarily in
abeyance. Here action at the moment is non-voluntary
rather than involuntary ; but taking a broader view we
may call it involuntary, because it runs counter to a
volition which has only lapsed for the time being, and
recurs in consciousness immediately after the act is over,
in the form of remorse. In the third place, the action
may take effect before a voluntary decision has been
arrived at. In the midst of the conflict of motives, the
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idea corresponding to the animal appetite may become
so vivified as to pass into action while the process of
deliberation is still working itself out. We may act
before we know our own minds. A man while still
mentally hesitating whether he is to drink a glass of
spirits or not, will find that the organic craving has so
vivified the idea of drinking that he is swallowing the
spirits before he has determined whether to do so or
not. The action is then involuntary, because it inter-
rupts the process of forming a volition. It may also be
involuntary in a deeper sense ; it may be that from the
constitution of the man's whole nature, he would cer-
tainly have willed otherwise if full deliberation had
been possible before acting. In the fourth place, the
organic craving may be the motive of a genuine voli-
tion, and the action may therefore be voluntary at the
time at which it takes place. None the less, there is a
sense in which the action may be regarded as involun-
tary. A comparison may be made between the totality
of interests defeated by indulging in the drink or
opium, and the animal craving itself considered as a
relatively isolated impulse. If the craving were taken
away the Self would still be left. If on the other hand
all the interests which are opposed to the indulgence
were taken away, there would be little left but the
morbid appetite itself. Thus the denial that the act is
voluntary may have a good meaning. It may mean
that the volition of the moment is discordant with the
general volition of a lifetime, so that the intervals be-
tween the periods of indulgence are embittered by re-
morse. It is supposed that the morbid craving by its
isolated intensity prevents full deliberation. There is,
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it is assumed, in the man's nature a vast system of
conative tendencies which, if they had found fair play,
and developed themselves in consciousness, would have
determined volition even if they did not determine
action. Of course, when we regard the question in this
way, the voluntariness or involuntariness of an action
is a matter of degree. We tend to think of the opium-
eating of a man like Coleridge as a kind of external
misfortune, because it is alien from the ideal aspirations
which we regard as constituting his true Self. To this
extent, we do not hold Coleridge responsible so much
as the unfortunate craving which possessed and mas-
tered him. In the case of a man of meaner nature, our
judgment would be very different.
10. Self- Control. All the cases of involuntary
action which we have discussed in the last section, are
cases of deficiency of self-control. Self-control is con-
trol proceeding from the Self as a whole and determin-
ing the Self as a whole. The degree in which it exists
depends upon the degree in which this or that special
tendency can be brought into relation with the concept
of the Self and the system of conative tendencies which
it includes. Failure in self-control may arise from one
or both of two conditions. On the one hand, the over-
powering intensity of a relatively isolated impulse may
prevent the due evolution of the concept of Self even
when this is fully formed and organised. On the other
hand, the defect may lie in the degree of development
which self-consciousness has attained, or in organic con-
ditions, mostly of a pathological kind, which disorganise
the Self, and prevent the full development of its normal
contents. To quote Dr. Clouston : " The driver may
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be so weak that he cannot control well-broken horses,
or the horses may be so hard-mouthed that no driver
can pull them up. Both conditions may arise from
purely cerebral disorder. . . . An imbecile or dement,
seeing something glittering, appropriates it to him-
self. . . . The motives that would lead other persons
not to do such acts do not operate in such persons. I
have known a man steal who said he had no intense
longing for the article he appropriated at all, at least
consciously, but his will was in abeyance, and he could
not resist the ordinary desire of possession common to
all human nature."* On this Professor James re-
marks : " It is not only those technically classed im-
beciles and dements who exhibit this promptitude of
impulse and tardiness of inhibition. Ask half the com-
mon drunkards you know why it is that they fall so
often a prey to temptation, and they will say that most
of the time they cannot tell. It is a sort of vertigo
with them. Their nervous centres have become a
sluice-way pathologically unlocked by every passing
conception of a bottle and a glass. They do not thirst
for the beverage ; the taste of it may even appear re-
pugnant; and they perfectly foresee the morrow's re-
morse. But when they think of the liquor or see it,
they find themselves preparing to drink, and do not
stop themselves; and more than this they cannot say."|
We have a good example of the inverse case in which
the concept of Self is fully organised and easily devel-
oped, but finds itself impotent in the face of an abnor-
* Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases, quoted by James, Principles
of Psychology, vol. ii., pp. 540-541.
t Ibid., p. 541.
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mally intense impulse, in the case of the man who was
possessed by the fixed idea of murdering his mother.
The process of ideal construction through which the
concept of Self grows, is gradual, and reaches different
degrees of perfection in different persons. The more
highly systematised and organised it becomes, the more
effective it is. Self-control is greatest in the man
whose life is dominated by ideals and general prin-
ciples of conduct; but this involves a development of
conceptual consciousness which is absent in children
and savages. We accordingly find that children and
savages are to a great extent creatures of impulse ; they
have comparatively little power of deliberation, so that
action tends to follow the conative tendency which is
excited and supported by the circumstances of the mo-
ment. Remoter considerations are comparatively in-
operative. The Self which determines action is pre-
dominantly the present Self, not the total Self as ideally
represented. Thus the savage wastefully exhausts his
present store in riotous indulgence, and is improvident
of the future. He cannot be brought to work in a regu-
lar and persistent manner. He may be industrious
enough for a time in order to gain a little money, or
some other object which he happens to covet at the
moment
;
but so soon as his immediate end is attained,
he thinks no longer of working, but only of enjoying
his gains. He is scarcely capable of pursuing a distant
aim, which requires persistent and repeated activity
continued for a long time without obvious result. Ends
which are at least in part immediately attainable seem
to be the only ends which effectively determine his
action. For this reason he does not appreciate the
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value of time. The end he is pursuing at the moment
has for him an absolute rather than a relative impor-
tance. He does not regard it merely as part of the
great business of life which must be subordinated to the
whole. He does not feel the necessity of completing
the transaction in which he is interested in time to pro-
ceed to other matters. Hence he often sorely tries the
patience of the civilised European by spending alto-
gether disproportionate time and energy on relatively
trivial bargains, etc. Such mottoes as "time is money"
do not appeal to the savage mind. The same holds of
young children, as we all know. The bird in the hand
is to them worth a thousand in the bush.
11. Voluntary Attention. A voluntary determin-
ation may be either a determination to perform certain
bodily movements or a determination to attend to cer-
tain objects. Attention, so far as it follows upon an
express volition to attend, is called voluntary attention.
All attention which is not so initiated is non-voluntary
or spontaneous. When we attend not merely without
an express volition to attend, but in opposition to
such a volition, attention is in the strictest sense in-
voluntary^ and not merely non-voluntary. A good
illustration of voluntary attention is to be found in
" certain psychological experiments, in which the ex-
perimenter fixes his attention on an uninteresting ob-
ject, in order to observe phenomena attending the
process of fixation. He determines to attend to the
object for the sake of observing what takes place
when he attends to it. The spontaneous and the
voluntary direction of attention are not merely dis-
tinct: they are also antagonistic. Everyone desires
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to avoid futile worry and fret ; but no one has a mind
so well regulated as to be able to divert his thoughts
at will from irremediable misfortune, and unavoidable
sources of anxiety. When, owing to overwork, our
minds are besieged at night by a subject which has oc-
cupied us during the day, we vainly endeavour to com-
pose ourselves to rest. We will to expel the intrusive
thoughts; but we cannot keep up the effort persist-
ently ; and so soon as it is relaxed, the spontaneous
movement of attention recurs, and murders sleep."*
" All mental training and discipline depend on the vic-
tory" of voluntary attention. "This usually takes
time. The resolution to devote attention to an un-
attractive subject can only succeed after repeated effort
followed by repeated failure. The mind wanders at
first, and requires to be again and again recalled to its
task. We form a design to occupy ourselves with a
certain topic. So soon as this design is being carried
out, we cease to think of it and of the motives which
prompted it. We think instead of the subject-mat-
ter which we had resolved to study. But this sub-
ject-matter is, ex hypothesi^ uninteresting. It can-
not, therefore, command attention. Accordingly our
thoughts wander from the point, and have to be re-
called by a renewed effort of will. This fitful alterna-
tion of attentiveness and inattentiveness may continue
until fatigue and tedium cause the task to be aband-
oned. On the other hand, interest may grow up as the
subject of study becomes better known. When this
happens, the periods of concentration become gradu-
ally prolonged, until the necessity for deliberate effort
* Author's Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 241.
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ceases to exist. Thus the function of voluntary atten-
tion in such cases is to create spontaneous attention.
When it fails in this, it produces only exhaustion and
disgust. A person condemned to spend his whole life
in constantly reiterated efforts to fix his mind on a
hopelessly uninteresting topic, would go mad, commit
suicide, or sink into a state of coma. Voluntary atten-
tion belongs coincidently to the province of intellect
and to that of practical volition. It is the l conduct of
the understanding,' and, like external conduct, is sub-
ject to moral law. In intellectual morality the funda-
mental virtue is patience."
*
The voluntary determination to attend plays a large
and important part in the more complex forms of de-
liberation. We may compare the value of conflicting
motives in relation to the total system of our lives;
and we may find that considered from this point of
view a certain motive or group of motives has not the
strength and prominence which it ought to have. We
may then attempt to give it this strength and promin-
ence by voluntarily turning our attention in a certain
direction. Thus a candidate preparing for an examin-
ation may find in himself a strong disposition to lazi-
ness, tempting him to spend a day in idleness. He
may at the outset very faintly realise the special con-
siderations which make such a course inadvisable : but
he may at the same time know that these considera-
tions are important, and that if he neglects them he
will bitterly regret doing so. This at the outset may
not constitute a motive sufficient to lead to a definite
decision to apply himself to work instead of play ; but
* Author's Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 242.
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it may be sufficient to give rise to the voluntary deci-
sion to fix attention on the reasons for working, and
so to give to these reasons the strength and liveliness
which they initially lack. In this indirect way he may
reach a distinct and effective decision to go to work
with steadiness and energy. It is in such cases as these
that the consciousness of freedom is most conspicuous.
For in such cases we not only will our act, but in a
manner we will our volition. The voluntary determin-
ation to act issues out of the voluntary determination
to attend ; and the voluntary determination to attend
directly and obviously depends on the controlling in-
fluence of the concept of the Self as a whole.
12. True Freedom. It must not be supposed
that anything we have said in this chapter implies a
denial of the freedom of the will in the sense in which
such freedom is claimed by the ordinary consciousness
of humanity. We have only thrown doubt on a cer-
tain theory of the nature of such freedom, the theory
which goes by the name of libertarianism, or of con-
tingent choice. By contingent choice is meant a choice
which does not issue out of the total process of mental
life in accordance with psychological laws, but springs
into being of itself as if it were fired out of a pistol.
This theory makes free decision arise by a kind of
spontaneous generation. Those who oppose libertarian-
ism sometimes call themselves Determinists. Some de-
terminists agree with the libertarians in identifying
freedom with contingent choice ; they only disagree in
denying the existence of such choice. As against both
these, we maintain that freedom consists in self-deter-
mination, and that self-determination means self-con-
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trol. Self-control, as we have defined it in 10, con-
sists in " control proceeding from the Self as a whole
and determining the Self as a whole. The degree in
which it exists depends upon the degree in which this
or that special tendency can be brought into relation
with the concept of the Self and the system of conative
tendencies which it includes."* Another way of put-
ting this is to say that acts are free in so far as they
flow from the character of the agent ; for character is
just the constitution of the Self as a whole. Character
exists only in so far as unity and continuity of conscious
life exists and manifests itself in systematic consistency
of conduct. Animals can scarcely be said to have a
character, because their actions flow from disconnected
impulse.
" If an animal could be supposed to think and
speak, it could not refer its actions to itself, but only to
its impulse at this or that moment." f Character is
little developed in savages as compared with civilised
men
;
for they have relatively little power of consider-
ing particular actions in relation to an organised sys-
tem of conduct. Now the development of character
and the development of freedom are two aspects of the
same process. A man's acts " are his own only when
he is himself in doing them," $ when they express
his total character rather than his momentary impulse.
It follows from this account that freedom is an ideal
which can never be completely realised, and this ideal
coincides with that of self-realisation, as expounded in
Professor J. S. Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics. But
* P. 608.
t J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, third edition, p. 95.
J Ibid,, p. 96.
See especially bk. ii., ch. v., 12, "The True Self."
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the last word about freedom lies neither with Psy-
chology nor with Ethics. Its full discussion involves
an examination of the relation between the thought and
will of the individual mind, and the reality of the uni-
verse. This relation from the point of view of any
finite science such as Psychology is utterly inexplic-
able. The more closely and conscientiously we en-
deavour to explain it by the ordinary categories of any
special science, the more plain it becomes that so re-
garded it is a miracle, indeed the miracle of miracles.
Psychology cannot explain how it is possible that an
individual can consciously mean or intend something.
To say that he has a present modification of conscious-
ness which resembles an object is very far from being
the same thing as saying that he has a thought of this
object, that he means or intends it. I may now have a
toothache, and you may have a toothache exactly like it,
but my toothache is not the thought of your toothache.
Will and thought are not explicable by such categories
as causality, substance, resemblance, or correspondence.
Hence, truth and freedom are ultimately topics for the
metaphysician. As psychologists, we deal not with the
ultimate possibility of will and thought, but only with
their mode of occurrence as time-processes taking place
in the individual mind.
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- on discrimination of move-
ments after anaesthesia of
skin, 191.
on hunger and thirst, 198.
on threshold of discernment,
201-202.
referred to, 181 (note).
Fovea centralis, 145, 363, 30 j.
Franklin, C. L. : on Helmholz'
theory of light- sensation,
165.
'
on Bering's theory of light-
sensation, 168.
referred to, 170 (note).
Fraser : on savage view of in-
ternal self, 536.
Free-will : question of, in form-
ing a decision, 589 seq.





Frog : description of experiments
on a, 37.
Function : misuse of the word, in
doctrine of materialism ,49.
Fundamental tones, 178.
Future: perception of , 389.
anticipation of : prior to
reminiscence of past, 497.
characteristics distinguish-
ing, from past, 498,
GENETIC theory of spatial
perception, 361.
Geology : analogy between, and
psychology, 10 11.
Psych.
Geometric configuration ; per-
ception of, yielded by fre-
movements, 359.
Geometrical illusion, 32.
Gestures : imitative, as primitive
form of language, 470.
[See Natural Signs.]
impotence of, to express
higher universal, 486-188.
Goldscheider : experiments of, on
sensibility of joints, 191.
experiments of, on nerve-
endings, 215.
Grief: always painful, 298 (note).
Gurney, E., 181 (note).
Guy Mannering : quoted, 437.
1TABIT : and automatism, 99
seq.
conditions of formation of,
101.
as example of facilitation,
101.
- formation of : analogous to
formation of memory, 436.
Habits of thought and will, 100.
Habitual actions, 99.
Hall, Stanley : on Laura Bridg-
man, 13 (note;.
Hallucination : as determining-
division of the self into
two, 534.
Hallucinations : conditions of,
413.
relation of, to illusions, 414.
relation of, to dreams, 414.
perceptual character of, 415




Hartmann : quoted, 306.
Hearing: organ of, 171.
Heat : sensations of. [See Tem-
perature -sensations . ]
Heinicke: quoted by Tylor,
485.
Heller, T. : 011 spatial perception
of the blind, 342 (note;,
40
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Helmholtz : theory of light-sen-
sation of, 162-166.
theory of : accounting for
analytic power of the ear,
180-181.
referred to, 161. [See Light-
sensation, Sound-sensa-
tion.]
Heracleitus : his doctrine of the
soul, 542.
Herbert : type of associationism,
107."
tiering : theory of light-sensation
of, 162, 166-170.
on optical process in eye-
movements, 375.
Hobbes: referred to, 67, 131.
Hudson: quoted, 287, 301, 305.
Hume : on difference in liveliness
between percepts and
images, 397, 398, 399.
Hunger : as an organic sensation,
198.
Huxley : his Elementary Physio-
logyrecommended, 3 6 (note)
Hypnotic state ; action following
volition illustrated from
the, 601-602.
IDEA : reproduction as taking
form of an, 94, 249 (note).
Ideal representation : schematic
character of, 403.






as determined by pre-
dominant interest, 431.







space as, 494, seq.
Ideal construction: time as, 496
seq.
objective time as pro-
duct of, 499.
causality as, 500 seq.
in early stages of
development, 502.
- thinghood as, 504
seq.
as a cooperative process,
509 seq.









of self : material and
order of, 519.
of subjective experi-




Ideas : accompanying perceptual
process, 264 seq.
in animals, 265.
in human beings, 266.
and images, Bk IV., ch. i.
and images : distinction and
relation of, 394 seq.
sequence of : compared with
perceptual change, 409.
and percepts : relation of
nervous seats of, 412-413.
[See Images and Percepts.]
trains of, Bk. IV., ch. ii.
association of, 419 seq.
law of association of : by
contiguity, 420 seq.





side, obstructing flow of,
433.
INDEX. 627
Ideas: conditions on constructive
side, obstructing flow of
433-434.
tendency of, to act them-
selves out, 468.
tendency of, to act them-
selves out, issuing in
imitative gesture, 470.
feeling-tone of, 5C2 seq.
[See Feeling-tone, Idea-
tional activity.]
passage of, into movement,
withoutpreceding volition,
600.





determinateness of, due to
conceptual synthesis, 451.
relation of, to language,
462.
Ideational process : two-fold as-
pect of, 418.









Illusion : measurement of geome-
trical, 32.
Illusions : conditions of, 413.
relation of, to hallucinations,
414.
relation of, to dreams, 413.
nature of pure, 417.
Image : verbal, compared with
mental picture, 395.
and percept : likeness of,
396.
and percept : difference of,
in intensity, 397 seq.
and percept : difference of,
in distinctness, 402 seq.
Image : sensory element of, com-
pared with sensations,
401.
and percept : relation of, to
subjective activity, 408.
and percept : relation of, to
motor activity, 410.
and percept : relative inde-
pendence of, 411.
origin of language in motor
elements of, 467.
Imagery : visual, 404.
visual : indistinctness of,
405-406.
and ideas, Bk. I., ch. i.






and belief, 544 seq.
among savages, 547.
attitude of, in revival of
feeling-tone, 563.
advantage of, as pleasurable
activity, 573.
pain arising from incoher-
ence in play of, 574.
Imitation, Bk. III., ch. ii.
as form of tradition, 269.
instinctive, 272.
learning by, 273 seq.
and ideal construction, 510.
educational influence of. 512.
importance of, in develop-
ment of idea of self, 524 seq.
Imitative impulse, 270 seq.




Impulse : in perceptual process,
266-268.
isolated : as determining
decision, 593.
Impulsive action : distinguished
from voluntary action, 583.
Innervation-sense, 192.
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Innervation-sense : existence of,
discussed, 192 seq.
relation of, to volition, 193.
facts supporting assumption
of, 194.
Insane : persistency of present
phase of self in the, 531.
Intensity : of a colour, 143.
differences in, 150.
not independent of colour,
151.
of percept as compared with
image, 397 seq.
sensational, 402.
Intensive quantity: and psychical
energy, 48.
Interaction hypothesis, 46.
objections to, 46 seq.
and law of conservation
of energy, 47.




of power to recall, 438.









alleged difficulties of, 16.
improved by training, 17.
drawbacks of, 18.
importance of habit of alert-
ness for, 19.
necessity of cooperation for,
19.
method of experiment in, 19.
Introspective psychologist: de-
pendent on work of his
predecessors, 18.
Involuntary action, 602 seq.
example of, from in-
ability to restrain reflex
movement, 603.
Involuntary action : following
intense ideal representa-
tion, 603-604.
following an idea fixed
through intense craving,
606.
arising from failure of
self-control, 608.
JAMES, Prof. W. : on organic
sensation determining feel-
ing-tone, 227.
his generaltheory of emotion,
289-290.
on strangeness as causing
fear in animals, 307.




on after-images, 379, 381.
on organic registration, 389.
on visualising, 405.
on improvement of memory
by practice, 443, 444.
on action in line of greatest
resistance, 596.
on passage of volition into
movement, 600.
on passing of ideas into action
without preceding volition,
600-601.
on action following hypnotic
suggestion, 602.
on failure of self-control,
609.
referred to, 18, 191 (note).
Joints : experiments on sensibility
of, 191.
KANT : referred to, 277, 351.
Keller, Helen: case of, 13 (note),
26.
Kiesow : referred to, 182 (note).
Kingsley, M. H. : quoted, 470
(note), 475.
INDEX.
Knowing. [See Cognition, Cog-
nitive Process.]
Konig : referred to, 170 (note).
Rries, Von: referred to, 170
(note) .
Kruse : on natural signs, 473.
-LJADD, G. T. : on conscious-
ness, 8.
on principle of relativity,
70, 72.
on feeling of distraction,
222.
on diverse modalities of
feeling-tone, 223-224.
on surplus excitation and
feeling-tone, 226.
on surplus excitation, 297.
on part played by retina's
own light in dreams, 416.
Lamb, Charles: referred to, 22.
quoted, 503.
Language : and conception, Bk.
IV., ch. v.
as intrument of conceptual
analysis and synthesis,
459 seq.
relation of, to ideational
activity, 462.
origin of, 464.
imitative gesture the primi-
tive form of, 470.
natural signs as, 471. [See
Natural signs.]
origin of conventional. 480.
theories of origin of, 433.
advantages of conventional,
486.
and ideal combination, 509.









Learning by experience : gradual





and learning by imi-
tation, 274.
Lehmann, A. : referred to, 218
(note).
Libertarians : hypothesis of, 590,
599.
James on hypothesis of , 596.
relation of, to determinists,
614.
Light-sensation, Bk. II., ch. iv.
nature of stimulus in, 141.









theory of, from colour-
blindness, 164-165.
failure of Helmholtz's theory
of, to account for contrast
effects, 165.
Helmholtz's theory of, as
regards negative images,
166.
statement of Bering's theory
of, 166-167.
criticism of Hering's theory
of, 167.
contrastand negative images
in Hering's theory of, 169.
present conditions of theory
of, 170.
experiments on : as illustrat-
ing extensity, 336.
Light-waves : nature of, 141.
amplitude and length of,
142-143.
illustrated from waves tra-
versing rope, 142.
C30 INDEX.
Light-waves, length of: and
colour-tone, 143.
complexity of, 143.
Lights of different wave-lengths :
effects of mixture of, 156
seq.
- best method of
mixing, 158.
Lipps, Dr. T. : referred to, 279
(note).





combination of, with pro-
jection, 357.
non-existent in case of sight,
357-358.
Localisation of functions, 43.
corresponds to bodily
organs of sense, 44.
indefiniteness of, 45.




on comparison in animals,
453.
Logic : point of view of, distin-
guished from that of
psychology, 4.




Lubbock : on sight in lowly
organisms, 137.
Ludicrous : feeling-tone of the,
572.
MACKENZIE, prof . j. s. : on
impulse in animals, 615.
ideal of self-realisation ex-
pounded by, 615.
Mallery, Col. : on natural signs
in children and savages,
474-475, 478, 479.
Manipulation of objects : as test
of what is physically real,
327.
Marshall, H. R. : on pleasant
phase of disagreeable ex-
perience, 218.
his physiological theory of
feeling- tone, 236 seq.
Materialism : objections to. 49.
destroys possibility of agency
on part of conscious beings,
50.
Matter: ultimate nature of, 52.
as phenomenon, 53.
as system of immaterial
agency, 54.
Meaning, acquirement of : as
mode of reproduction, 84.
example from tune, 85.
example from newly
hatched chick, 85-86.
as minimum in the




and learning by ex-
perience, 256.
as form of reproduction
in perceptual process, 263.





occasional: of a word, 461.




thought, 507, 556, 558.
Medulla oblongata, 36.
Meinong : followed in treatment
of Weber's law, 209 (note;.
Memories ; variety of, 442.
Memory : Bk. IV., ch. iii.
definition of, 435.
i personal and impersonal,
435-436.
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Memory: and habit, 436.
marks of a good, 437 scq.
serviceableiiCts, as mark of
a good, 437.
rapidity, as mark of a good,
438.
duration of power of recall,
as mark of a good, 439.
conditions of serviceableness
of, 439.
decay of, with lapse of time,
441.
improvement of, "by practice,
442.
increased attention as factor
in improvement of, 443 seq.
and past time, 446,
images : primary, distin-
guished from after-images,
304.
Mental process : physiological
antecedents and conse-
quents of, 34 seq.
primary laws of, Bk. I.,
ch. ii.
chemistry : Mill's doctrine
of, 110.
- fallacies of Mill's
doctrine of, 113 seq.
image . [See Image . ]
Mill, James : type of association-
ism, 107.
Mill, J. S. : on law of causation,
102.
his doctrine of "mental
chemistry," 110 seq.
Mills, "Wesley : experiments of,
on animals, 257-259.
Mind and body : Introd. ch. iii.
relation between, one of
interaction, 34. \_See Con-
sciousness, Nervous Pro-
cess, Organism, etc.]
Monkeys : their aptitude for
imitation, 275.
Morgan, Lloyd : on eye of snail,
138.
example from, of persistency
with varied effort, 251 -252.
Morgan, Lloyd : example from, of
adaptation, 253.
examples from, of learning
by experience, 256 scq.
on James's theory of emotion,
294-295.
experiment from, on com-
parison in animals, 454.
Mosso : on harmfulness of fear,
302-303.
Motives : process of deliberation
as conflict of, 586.
arise from nature of the self,
587.
for deciding and for acting,
587.
cessation of conflict of, 588.
persistence of, as obstacles,
597.
prominence given to, by
voluntarily attending, 613.
Motor activity : relation of per-
cepts to, 410.
relation of images to,
411.






Movement : active, 337.
free : in perception of third
dimension, 358.
revival of, in ideal repre-
sentation, 465.
tendency of ideal, to pass
into actual, 467.
theory of tendency of ideas
to pass into, 4C8.
relation between volition and
bodily, 599.
passage of volition into, 600.
Movements : spatial significance
of free, 350.
restriction in amount and
direction of free, 352.
Mozart : memory of, for music,
438, 442.
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Miiller, G. E. : referred to, 155
(note), 162, 170 (note).
Muller, Max : on theories of the
origin of language, 483-
484.







Natural signs : as language, 471-






use of, among savages,
475.
mutual understanding
of, in spite of diversity,
476.
as instruments of con-
ceptual thinking, 477-
tendency of, to become
conventional, 478.




Nervous process : and conscious
process, 35.
mechanism : function of
sub
-cortical, 36 seq.
system : description of, 36.
system : sub-cortical, as
organ of reflex action, 37.
process : correlation of, and
conscious process, 43 seq.
process : and the interaction
hypothesis, 46 seq.
process and conscious pro-
cess : no common factor be-
tween, 47.
Nervous excitement: revival of
states of, in perceptual
process, 264.
Newton: referred to, 498.
Noises: and musical sounds, 17 1
Not-self. [See Self.]
OBJECT : how far psychology
is concerned with an, 2-3.
psychological, 3.
meaning of the word, in
relation to cognition, 56.
cognitive consciousness and
its, 58-59.




Objects : presented, as data of
psychology, 10 seq., 16.
presented : need not have
actual existence, 13.
presented : measurement of,
32.
Obliviscence, 406.





Onchidium : eye-spots of, 138.
One-sided action : hypothesis of,
48 seq. [See Materialism.]
Ontology : point of view of, dis-
tinguished from that of
psychology, 5.
^
Organic craving : idea fixed
through, as cause of in-
voluntary action, 606.











Organic sensations : hunger and
thirst as, 198.
feeling-tone of, 210 xeq.










belong exclusively to, 227-
228.
and emotion, 288 seq.
experiments on, as
illustrating intensity, 337.
welfare: and feeling-tone of
sensation, 229 seq.
how far pleasant ex-
perience contributes to, 229 .
effect of alcohol on, 230.
Organism: spatial perception of
353.





as belonging to the self , 519.








Pain- sensations : varieties of, 21 3.
differences between, incap-
able of analysis, 213.
origin of, 214-217.
Parallelism : formula of, 50.




based on idealistic view of
material phenomena, 53.




Past: perception of , 389.




Paul : on variations in meaning
of words, 461.
Pendular waves, 179.




aggressiveness of, 402. [See
Image.]
Perception, Bk. III.





and attention, 246 seq.
and persistency with varied
effort, 251 seq.
and adaptation to varying
conditions, 253 seq.
and learning by experience,
255.
feeling-tone of : determined
by success and defeat,
280.
feeling-tone of : due to pre-
formed associations, 282.
of external reality, Bk. II.,
div. ii., ch. ii.
of external reality : in con-
nexion with motor activi-
ty, 323.
of external reality : con-
ditions of, 326.
of external world : and
manipulation, 327.
of the not-self, 329.
of the self, 329.
spatial, Bk. III., div. ii.,
ch. iii. [See Spatial per-
ception.]
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Perception : spatial, by touch,
Bk. III., div. ii., ch. iv.
. [See Tactual perception.]
spatial, by sight, Bk. III.,
div. ii., ch. v. [See Visual
perception.]
of organism as extended,
352 scq.
tactual : of third dimension,
358 scq.
visual : of third dimension,
365 seq.
of time, 384 seq.
of lapse of time, 385 seq.
of present, past, and future,
389 seq. [See Temporal
perception.]
unification of data of, 490.
Perceptions : as series, 243.
Perceptual process: unity and
continuity of. '242 scq.
process : in animals, 243.
consciousness : characteris-
tics of, Bk. III., div. i.,
ch. i.
process : internal continuity
of, 244.
activity : relation of, to idea-
tional, 248-251.
process : reproduction in,
2G3 scq.
* process : ideas accompanying,
264 scq.
process; and ideational, 266.
process: impulsive character
of, 266 seq.
process : pleasure-pain in,
276 seq.
- consciousness : categories of,
Bk. III., div. ii., ch. i.
consciousness: time in,
384.
pre-adjustment : and ideal
pre-arrangement, 447 seq.
process ; subjective order in,
518.
Persistency with varied effort:
as characteristic of per-
ception, 251 seq.
Persistency with varied effort :
connection of, with cona-
tion, 252.





Personal series, 537 seq.
Perspective : aerial, as factor in
perception of depth, 382.
Philological analysis : and con-
ventional language, 483.
Phrenology : as localisation of
cerebral functions, 43.
criticised, 44.
refuted by knowledge of
actual localisation of func-
tions, 44.
Physical sciences : distinguished
from psychology, 4.
nature : insight into, how
acquired, 494.





Plato : first conception of im-
material soul due to, 541.
Pleasure-pain, Bk. III., div. i.,
ch. iii.
in attention, 276 seq.
in perception of external
movements, 278.
in perception of geometric
forms, 279.
success and defeat as deter-
mining, 280 seq.
physiological theory of, 281.
relation of, to emotions, 298.
revival of sensational, 5G2.





Present : perception of, 389.









. differences in, 187.
. produced at different points
from those of temperature,
189.
Primitive magic : dependent on
enlarged conception of
individual unity, 509.
Primitive belief. [See Savages,
Belief.]
Process : mental, in others, 20




intimate connexion of, with
localisation, 357.
in case of sight, 358.
Projective stage of imitation,
524.
Psychical fact : distinguished
from psychological fact, 7,
9.
states: measurement of dura-
tion of, 28-30.
states : measurement of in-
tensity of, 30 scq.
states : measurement of ex-
ternal conditions of, 31.
states : measurement of ob-
jects presented by means
of, 31.
Psychological point of view : dis-
tinguished from that of
physical sciences, 4.
distinguishedfrom
that of logic, 4.
distinguishedfrom
that of theory of know-
ledge, 5.
distinguishedfrom
that of ontology, 5.
distinguishedfrom
that of ethics, 6.
Psychological point of view : dis-
tinguished from that of
aesthetics, 6.
Psychologist : attends to sen-
sations, as such, 123.
Psychology ; scope of, Introd.
ch. i.
point of view of, that of the
spectator, 2.
takes into account object as
well as subject, 2-3.
definition of, 4.
distinction of, from other
sciences, 4 seq.
data and methods of, Introd.
ch. ii.
presented objects as data of,
10 seq.
analogy between, and geo-
logy, 10-11.
as science of development,
10.
works of imagination as
data of, 12.
importance of philology and
anthropology to, 13.
introspective method in, 14
seq.
mental processes in others
as data of, 20 seq.
experiment and observation
as methods of, 24 seq.
quantitative methods in, 28
seq.
freedom of will not ultim-




variations : comparison of,
199.
Quantity : difference between




REACTION : forms of simple,
23.





perceptual and ideational :
distinguished from sen-
sation-reflex, 128.
sensory : and perception,
129.
instances of sensory, 130.
Reaction -time experiments : Tit-
chener on, 28.
Reality : perception of external,
Bk. III., div. ii , ch. ii.
Reduplication, 406.
Reflex : physiological, distin-
guished from sensation-
reflex, 125 seq, [See Sen-
sation-reflex.]
act: defined, 125.
act : conscious or unconscious,
125-126.
actions : description of, 37.
experiments on a frog
illustrating, 37-38.
sub-cortical centres,
organs of, 37 seq.
lack of spontaneity in,
39
how far they involve
consciousness, 41.
when inadequate, 42.
Rcgulus : mental conflict of, 598.
Relativity: principle of, 71 seq.
Reproduction : takesplace through
association, 83. [See
Meaning, acquirement of.]
specific : complication as
mode of, 90-91.
as dependent on association,
90.
nature of ideal, 94.
of sensations, 94-95.
free : as mode of specific,
94-96.
Reproduction of similars, 423 seq.
[See Ideas.]





Retentiveness : condition of pro-
gress, 76.
psychological law of, 76.
effect of repetition of the
same stimulus on, 78.
primary, 81.
and reproduction, 83.
primary : relation of acquire-
ment of meaning to, 89.
a condition of the formation
of habit, 101.
Retina ; description of, 145.
own light of, 151.
Retrospection : and introspection,
19.
Ribot, T. : case of fixed idea from,
605.
Robertson, Groom. : on spatial
perception of our own body,
353.
on double contact, 353.
on learning of language by
children, 511.
on scheme of knowledge
given with mother-tongue,
511.
Rote : learning by, 436.
Royce, Prof. J : on idea of self
asinvolving idea ofrelations
to other selves, 522-523.
on variations in idea of self,
523-524.
on division of total self, 527.
on tendency conflicting with
true self, 529.
on emotions due to pathologi-
cal conditions, 533.
on division of self into two,
534.




SATURATION : degree of, in
a colour, 143.
difference in, 150.
Savages : difficulty in interpreting
mental states of, 21.
anti-mechanical point of
view of, 508.
ideal construction in, 515.




views of, on sympathetic
communion, 538.
views of, on impersonations,
539.
imagination in, 547.
subjective factor of belief
among, 551, 554.
confuse objective with sub-
jective necessity, 553.
views of, on unity of in-
dividual thing, 556.
views of, on unity of the
world, 557.
tendency of, to interpret in
terms of personal life, 559.
their modes of personifying
natural objects, 560.
their deficiency in self-con-
trol, 610.
. character in, 615.
Schmalz : on natural signs in
deaf-mutes, 473, 487.
Schneider : referred to, 257.





and not-self : perception of,
328-329. .
as ideal contruction, Bk.
IV., chap. vii.
experiences belonging to, an
not-self, 517.
ideal construction an activity
of, 518.
material for, and order of
construction of, 519.
Self: organism as belonging to,
519.
thought of : as involving
thought of relations to
other selves, 522.
variation of idea of, 523,
importance of imitation in
development of idea of,
524 seq.
the one : and the many
selves, 527 seq.
the true : and conflicting
tendency, 529.
the future : representation
of, 530.
illusions relating to, 531.
external and internal, 534
seq.
theories of internal, 535.
savage representation of
internal, 536.
primitive views of relation
of body and internal, 538.
survivals of primitive view
of internal, 541. [See
Soul, Savages.]
conative aspect of conception
of, 583 seq.
relation of impulse to, 584.
Self-consciousness : social factor
in development of, 520 aeq.
pathology of, 531 seq,
Self-control : definition of, 608.
causes of failure in, 608
seq.
chi drenand savages deficient
in, 610.
freedom of will and, 614-
615.
Self-realisation : ideal of, coin-
cidentwith that of freedom,
615.
Selves : past and present, 529.
conflict of past and present,
534.
Sensation : distinguished from
sensible quality, 58.
definition of, Bk. II., ch. i.
and stimulus, 117, 208.
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Sensation : cause of, distinguished
from object of sense-per-
ception, 118.
antecedents of, 118-119.
mere : arguments for exist-
ence of, 120 seq.
- as cognitive state and as
cognised object, 122 seq.




















relative purity of, 133.
Sensational intensity, 402.
Sensations : reproduction of, 94-
95.
as such : meaning of, 95.
distinguished from sensory
elements, 119.
as such : attended to in psy-
chology, 123.
as such : not objects but
psychical states, 124.
feeling-tone of special, 217
seq.





variation in nature of, 134.
Sense-organs : division of func-
tion in cortex corresponds
to, 44 srq.
Sense-organs : differentiation of,
135 seq.
growing complexity of, 136.
evolution of special, 136
seq.
Sensibility: common, 210 seq.
Sensory elements, 119 ftcq.
impulses : in conflict with
perceptual, 129.
impulses : antithesis of
movements arising from,
131.
impulses : blending of, with
perceptual, 133.
Sentience, 68 seq.
Sentiment : use of the word, as




as constituted by emotions,
578.
Sentiments : as complex emo-
tional dispositions, 300.
Serviceable associated habits, 311.
Serviceableness : as mark of good
memory, 437, 439.
Shakespeare : on time, 498.
Sharid, A. F. : on distinction
between emotion and senti-
ment, 576-577.
on emotions referring to
personal and to imper-
sonal objects, 578-580.
example of fixed idea from,
606.
Shelley : quoted, 80.
Sidgwick, H. : referred to, 17.






Signs : interpretation of external,
20.
external : and communica-
tion by means of language,
20.
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Signs : interpretation of, 382. [c
Natural sigiiS.]
Similarity : association by, 4'23.
\_Sce Ideas.]





Smell-sensations : modified by
mixture with other sen-
sations, 184.
Snail: eye of, 138.
Social intercourse : debt of indi-
vidual to, 510.
factor : in constitution of
external reality, 514.
in development of self -
consciousness, 520 seq.
connected with imita-
tion in determining self-
consciousness, 524.
influence of : in forma-
tion of belief, 555.
Socrates : referred to, 464.
Sound-sensation, Bk. II., ch. v.
stimulus in, 171.
general theory of, 179 seq.
[See Pitch, Musical sounds,
etc.]





Soul : modern theories of, 535.
primitive views about the,
536 seq.
modification of conception
of the, as material, 541.
material and immaterial :
division of functions be-
tween, 542.
material : last survival of
doctrine of, 543.
Space : as ideal construction,
494 seq.
origin of conception of in-
finity of, 496.
Spatial perception : in general,
Bk. III., div. ii., ch. iii.
-by touch, Bk. III.,
div. ii., ch. iv.
of the blind, 342 seq.
and free movements,
350.
of organism as extended,
352 seq.
direct : of the organism,
origin of, 360 seq.
genetic and nativistic
theories of, 361.
-by sight, Bk. III.,
div. ii., ch. v. [SeeTactual
perception, Visual per-
ception.]




Spencer, II. : his 'theory of fear,
303.
on anger in animals, 308.
Spinoza : referred to, 567.
Steinthal : and the " ding-dong
"
theory, 484.






Stimulus: definition of, 117.
Stimulus-threshold, 202.
Striving. \_Sce Conation, Cona-
tive attitude.]
Stumpf : on mere sensation, 120.
his Tonpsycholo.gie recom-
mended, 181 (note).
Subjective and objective time,
498.
and objective factors of
belief, 550 seq.
Sub-consciousness, 68 seq.
Sub-cortical centres, 36 seq.
organs of reflex action,
37.
G40 INDEX.
Sub-cortical centres : function of,
almost vholly reflex, 39.
can work independently
of cortical process, 40.
consciousness in, 40.
as apparatus used by
cortex, 42.
Sully, J. : on feeling-tone due to
association, 282.
on extensity in sense of
touch, 334-335 (note).
on cast-shadows, 382.
on the "no more" con-
sciousness, 390.
on children's treatment of
dolls, 430 (note).
Surplus excitation, 222 seq.
energy : and feeling-tone,
236 seq.
energy : Marshall's theory
of, 237 seq.
Synthesis : conceptual, 449, 451.
TACTILE sensibility : experi-
ments on, as illustrating
extensity, 334-336.
Tactual perception, Bk. III.,
div. ii., ch. iv.
in the blind, 342 seq.
in high stages of de-
velopment, 345 seq.
as yielded by freemove-
ments, 350 seq.
of the organism as ex-
tended, 352 seq.
of the third dimension,
358 seq.
of the third dimension :
free movement in, 359.
of the third dimension :
presentation of our own
body in, 360.









produced at different points
of the skin from those of
pressure, 189.
Temporal perception, Bk. III.,
div. ii., ch. vi.
and processof attention,
391. [See Time, Percep-
tion.]
Tendons : part played by, in
perception of resistence,
191.
Tennyson : quoted, 564.
Theory of knowledge : distin-
guished from psychology,
5.
Thinghood : category of, 315 seq.
variability of our application
of, 317.
purely practical, 318.
in ideational thinking, 457.
as ideal construction, 504
seq.
connexion of, with causality,
504.
Thirst : as an organic sensation,
198.
Thorndike : experiments on
animals conducted by,
259-262, 274 (note), 314,
454 (note).
on association in animals,
263.
Timbre, 177 ft.
Time : perception of, 385 seq.
perception of lapse of, 335.
empty : meaning of, 38G.
lapse of : measured by
cumulative effect of ex-
periences, 386.
lapse of : immediate esti-
mate of, 387.
lapse of : attention as de-
termining estimate of, 388.
past, present, and future :
at perceptual level, 3C9.
INDEX. 641
Time: as ideal construction, 406
seq.
subjective and objective, 498.
objective : an ideal con-
struction, 499.
Time-transience : immediate ex-
perience of, 384 seq.




on muscular reactions, 28.
on sensory reactions, 29.
on compound reactions, 30,
on tendons, 191.
on conflict of impulses, 584.
Touch : spatial perception by.
[See Tactual perception.]
synthetic, 342-343.
synthetic : union of, with
analytic, 343 seq., 346.
analytic, 343 seq.
analytic : as applied to
larger objects, 346.
Touch-sensatiomc : connected with
taste-sensations, 182.
Touch horizon, 347.
Traces : in law of retentiveness,
76.
decay of, 76-77. [See Dis-
positions, EetentiVeness.]
Tucker, Abraham : quoted, 69.
Tylor, E. B. : on natural signs,
479.
on deaf-mutes, 485, 487.
UPTHOFF: referred to, 372
(note).
Unconsciousness, 8.












and synthesis in, 363.
of surface, 363 seq.




of third dimension :




of third dimension : as




of third dimension :




of third dimension : as
monocular, 375 seq.
secondary conditions
in monocular and binocu-
lar, 377.
of third dimension :
andstraight or curved lines,
379 seq.
of third dimension :
play of light and shade as
factor in, 381.
of third dimension :
aerial perspective as factor
in, 382.
Visualisation : differences in
power of, 404.
Voit : case of, illustrating possi-
bility of attention without
images, 249-250.
Volition: definition of a, 589.
as following line of greatest
resistance, 596.
motives persisting as
obstacles in "hard," 593.
41
642 INDEX.
Volition : and bodily activity,
599 *eq.
passage of ideas into action
without preceding, 600.
why normally followed by
movement, 601.
opposed to fixed idea, 604.
Voltaire : referred to, 502.
Voluntary action : distinguished
from impulsive, 583.
influenced by concep-
tion of self, 584.
an article by author
on : quoted, 589, 592, 594,
595,599-600.
as result of determina-







decision, Bk. IV. ch. x.
relation of, to concep-
tion of self, 583 scq.
as result of delibera-
tion, 586.
as state of resolution,
587.
analysis of state of,
589.
formation of, 589 seq.
free-will in, 590 seq.
when not outcome of
deliberation, 591.
as determined by ne-
cessity for action, 592.
impulsive : after im-
perfect deliberation, 593.
fixity of, 593 seq.
fixity of : and idea of
self, 593.
fixity of : by aversion
to state of irresolution.
594.
fixity of : through ac-
tion that follows, 594n
595.
Voluntary decision : fixity of :
individual differences in,
595.
motor efficacy not es-
sential to state of, 599.
belief accompanying :
as cause of action, 601.
"Waller, Dr. : on the brain,
35-36.
his Human Physiology re-
commended, 37 (note).
on localisation of cerebral
functions, 45-46.
on reflex act, 125.
Ward, Dr. J. : on psychological
data, 12.
on immediate continuity, 72.




on difference between com-
plication and free repro-
duction, 94.
on copresentation of sensa-
tions, 134-135.
on pleasure-pain in attention,
276-278.
on extensity, 333.
on obliviscence and redupli-
cation, 406-407.
on unsteadiness of images,
409.
on comparison, 452.
on apprehension of time-
order, 497-
on imagination and belief,
566.
on feeling-tone of ideational
activity, 569.
on desire in ideational
thought, 582.
referred to, 411, 412 (note),
427 (note).
Wasmann, E. : referred to, 255
(note) .
Weber-Fechner Law, Bk. II.,
ch. vii. [See Weber's
law.]
INDEX. G43



















"Welton, J. : on visualising, 351,
405.
Whyte-Melville : quoted, 302.
Wilbrand : case described by, 412.
"Will : origin of, 583.
freedom of, 590.
true freedom of, 614.
freedom of : dependent on
character, 615.
freedom of : not ultimately
explicable by psychology,
616. [See Volition, Volun-
tary Decision, Free-will.]
Wolff, G.: referred to, 248 (note).
Words : variations' in meaning of,
460.
occasional meaning of, 461.
asexpressinguniversals,463.
mental control over articu-
lation of, 466.
Wundt : on innervation-sense,
194.
his theory of innervation-
sensecomparedwith Bain' s,
195.
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